Global Security in Crisis

The urgent need for strategies that work

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Editor
WITH APPRECIATION

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Patron of the 24th International Workshop on Global Security
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Table of Contents

Sponsors iv

Workshop photographs vi

Contributors xxxv

Welcoming Remarks xxxix
Ing. Général Robert Ranquet

Preface xli
Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon, Workshop Chairman

Overview xlix
Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon, Workshop Chairman

Dinner Debate lix
General George Joulwan, Moderator

Part One

Chapter 1. Discours d'Ouverture: Vers la Complexification de la Gestion des Crises 3
Général Henri Bentégeat

DE PLUS EN PLUS D’ACTEURS DANS LE JEU INTERNATIONAL ................................................................. 4
L’ACTION MILITAIRE TROUVE SES LIMITES .............................................................................................................. 5
LA CONDUITE DES OPERATIONS MILITAIRES EST DE PLUS EN PLUS DIFFICILE ........................................ 6
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................................................................ 7

Chapter 2. Opening Address: Towards the Complexification of Crisis Management 9
Général Henri Bentégeat

AN INCREASING NUMBER OF INTERNATIONAL ACTORS ..................................................................................... 10
MILITARY ACTION HAS REACHED ITS LIMITS ........................................................................................................ 11
PROGRESSIVELY MORE DIFFICULT MILITARY OPERATIONS ............................................................................ 12
CONCLUDING REMARKS ............................................................................................................................................. 12
Chapter 3. Key Address
General Jean-Louis Georgelin
(Address presented by Lieutenant General Christian-Charles Falzone)

THE THREATS WE FACE.............................................................................................................................................................13
HOW WE DEAL WITH THREATS..............................................................................................................................................14
THE CONSEQUENCES OF OUR ACTION...............................................................................................................................15
CONCLUDING REMARKS............................................................................................................................................................16

Chapter 4. Forecasting and Influencing the Future—It Is Not Always What We Seek 17
Mr. Jean de Ponton d’Amécourt

OPENING REMARKS .....................................................................................................................................................................17
FORECASTED FUTURE TRENDS .............................................................................................................................................18
THE DANGERS OF BREAKING WITH THE PAST....................................................................................................................18
CONCLUDING REMARKS............................................................................................................................................................20

Chapter 5. Expanding Security Challenges—An Operational View 21
General Rainer Schuwirth

OPERATIONS ...................................................................................................................................................................................21
BALKANS ...........................................................................................................................................................................................22
TRANSFORMATION AND CAPABILITIES.............................................................................................................................23
CONCLUDING REMARKS............................................................................................................................................................23

Chapter 6. NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan 25
General Egon Ramms

THE NATO COMMAND STRUCTURE AND THE ISAF MISSION....................................................................................25
THE NEED FOR ACTION .............................................................................................................................................................26
BURDEN SHARING AND BURDEN SHIFTING....................................................................................................................27
SUCCESSES IN AFGHANISTAN .............................................................................................................................................27
EMPLOYING THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH ....................................................................................................................28
U.N. RESPONSIBILITY ................................................................................................................................................................29
THE AFGHAN MODEL.................................................................................................................................................................29
THE WAY FORWARD ..................................................................................................................................................................30

Part Two

Chapter 7. Energy as a Security Imperative 33
General James L. Jones

OPENING REMARKS .....................................................................................................................................................................33
THE CHARACTERISTICS AND CHALLENGES OF A MULTIPOLAR WORLD ........................................................................33
Chapter 17. Major Challenges in the Black Sea Area
Ambassador Borys Tarasyuk

ISSUES IN TRANSNISTRIA ..................................................................................................................................................79
CONFLICT-RESOLUTION EFFORTS ...............................................................................................................................80
THE CONSEQUENCES OF PROTRACTED CONFLICTS ..................................................................................................80

Chapter 18. Major Challenges for the Balkan Region and Albania’s Contribution
His Excellency Fatmir Mediu

MAJOR CHALLENGES FOR THE REGION ........................................................................................................................81
ALBANIA’S CONTRIBUTION TO BALKANS REGIONAL STABILITY ...............................................................................82
WORK THAT IS YET TO BE DONE ..................................................................................................................................82

Chapter 19. Towards a Stable and Secure Black Sea Region
His Excellency Dr. Vesselin Bliznakov

Chapter 20. Towards a Stable and Secure Black Sea Region
His Excellency Gela Bezhuashvili

THE BLACK SEA REGION’S TIES TO EUROPEAN AND EURO-ATLANTIC STRUCTURES ........................................85
CHALLENGES IN THE BLACK SEA REGION ..............................................................................................................86
GEORGIA’S CONTRIBUTIONS TO SECURITY AND STABILITY ......................................................................................86
THE BLACK SEA REGION AND ENERGY SECURITY ..................................................................................................86
DEFINING THE BLACK SEA’S REGIONAL IDENTITY .................................................................................................87
CONCLUDING REMARKS ..............................................................................................................................................87

Ambassador Tacan Ildem

CHALLENGES IN SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE ................................................................................................................89
CHALLENGES IN THE BLACK SEA REGION ...............................................................................................................90
CONCLUDING REMARKS ..............................................................................................................................................90

Chapter 22. The Black Sea Region and the Balkans: A Russian View
Lieutenant General Evgeniy Buzhinsky

CHALLENGES IN THE BLACK SEA REGION ..............................................................................................................91
SOLVING THE CONFLICTS ...........................................................................................................................................92
FINDING A MORE PURPOSEFUL APPROACH ..............................................................................................................93
CHALLENGES IN THE BALKANS ..................................................................................................................................93
Part Five

Chapter 23. New and Expanding Security Challenges in The Middle East and South Asia 97
Ambassador Munir Akram

THE NEW SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA.........................................................97
THE CENTRAL CONUNDRUM OF THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST .........................98
CONCLUDING REMARKS............................................................................................................................................................99

Chapter 24. The Security and Future of the Middle East 101
Major General Zhan Maohai

THE NEW SECURITY SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST............................................................................................101
THE IRAQ ISSUE.........................................................................................................................................................................102
THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR ISSUE.................................................................................................................................................103
THE PROSPECTS FOR SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST..............................................................................................103
CONCLUDING REMARKS..........................................................................................................................................................104

Chapter 25. Algeria and the Issue of Security in the Mediterranean Region 105
Ambassador Youcef Yousfi

ADDRESSING MEDITERRANEAN ISSUES WITHIN A GLOBAL FRAMEWORK ...................................................105
MISPERCEPTIONS REGARDING THE SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN ...........................................................................107
THE MEDITERRANEAN AS AN EQUAL, UNITED SPACE...........................................................................................107
REKINDLING SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN HOPES ................................................................................................107

Chapter 26. The Definition of Security: Rehashing an Old Debate 109
Ambassador Mahmoud Karem

OPENING REMARKS...................................................................................................................................................................109
THE NATURE OF TODAY'S MIDDLE EASTERN CHALLENGES ..............................................................................110
CONFLICTING DEFINITIONS OF SECURITY: A DOCTRINAL DIVIDE IN THE MIDDLE EAST ....................111
CONFLICTING DOCTRINES OF DEFENSE SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST..........................................113
OUTCOMES OF THE RIYADH ARAB SUMMIT ..............................................................................................................116
CONCLUDING REMARKS..........................................................................................................................................................117

Chapter 27. The Moroccan View of Global Security 119
Ambassador Menouar Alem

OPENING REMARKS...................................................................................................................................................................119
A NEW APPROACH FOR THE NEW SECURITY THREATS.......................................................................................119
FOUR CHALLENGES OF THE NEW SECURITY CONFIGURATION .................................................................................120
THE NEED FOR COOPERATION AND PARTICIPATION ..............................................................................................120
Part Six

Chapter 28. NATO After the Riga Summit 123
Ambassador Stewart Eldon

SIGNS OF PROGRESS .................................................................................................................. 123
STEPS THAT REMAIN .............................................................................................................. 124
CONCLUDING REMARKS ...................................................................................................... 124

Chapter 29. A View from the South 125
Ambassador Pablo Benavides Orgaz

THE NEED FOR POSITIVE LEADERSHIP ........................................................................... 125
THE IMPORTANCE OF SYNERGY AND OPENNESS ........................................................... 125
ASYMMETRIC THREATS ...................................................................................................... 125
MAINTAINING ARMS CONTROL .......................................................................................... 126
BEING CLEAR WITH RUSSIA .............................................................................................. 126
MAINTAINING A REGIONAL APPROACH TO THE BALKANS ........................................... 126
TALKING FRANKLY WITH THE SOUTH .............................................................................. 126
CONCLUDING REMARKS ...................................................................................................... 126

Chapter 30. Iraq and Afghanistan: Lessons to Learn for NATO 127
Ambassador Stefano Stefanini

OPENING REMARKS ............................................................................................................ 127
NATO INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN ..................................................................... 128
NATO INVOLVEMENT IN IRAQ ....................................................................................... 128
NATO INVOLVEMENT IN GAZA ....................................................................................... 128
LESSONS TO LEARN ........................................................................................................ 128

Chapter 31. Why the Alliance Needs a New Strategic Concept and a New Shared Vision 131
Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola

THE NEED FOR A NEW SHARED VISION ............................................................................ 131
CONCLUDING REMARKS .................................................................................................... 132

Chapter 32. NATO After the Riga Summit: A Polish Perspective 133
General Franciszek Gagor

THE POLISH VIEW ON ISSUES THAT AFFECT NATO’S FUTURE .................................... 133
CONCLUDING REMARKS .................................................................................................... 135
Part Seven

Chapter 33. Three Key Questions—How the U.N., OSCE, NATO, EU Can Work Together 139
Ambassador Marc Perrin de Brichambaut

Chapter 34. The EU Cannot Save the World, but the U.N. Can Try 141
Ambassador Kirsti Lintonen

THE STRENGTHS OF THE U.N. .............................................................................................................................................. 141
PEACEKEEPING AND OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES ................................................................................................. 142
EFFECTING COOPERATION BETWEEN THE U.N. AND THE EU ............................................................................. 142

Chapter 35. How the U.N. Can Work with Other International Organizations 143
Ambassador Gabor Brodi

PARTNERSHIPS WITH THE OSCE AND THE EU ............................................................................................................. 144
POSSIBLE AREAS OF FUTURE COOPERATION ......................................................................................................... 144

State Secretary Edgars Rinkevics

Ambassador Linas Linkevicius

Chapter 38. Emerging Multipolarity and the Prospects for Cooperation 149
Ambassador Vladimir Chizhov

DEFINING THE ELEMENTS OF SECURITY ORGANIZATION INTERACTION ............................................................. 149
EMERGING MULTIPOLARITY ......................................................................................................................................... 150
BUILDING ON PREVIOUS SUCCESSES ...................................................................................................................... 150
THE NEED FOR REFORM .................................................................................................................................................. 150
EFFECTING A COMMON FOREIGN POLICY .................................................................................................................. 151

Vice Admiral Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte

NATO AND EU ISSUES ..................................................................................................................................................... 153
THE NEED FOR THE U.N. .................................................................................................................................................. 154
Part Eight

Chapter 40. Global Security—How Defense Industries Can Cooperate Better
Mr. Marwan Lahoud

THE NATURE OF SECURITY TODAY .......................................................................................................................... 157
FOSTERING COOPERATION ................................................................................................................................. 158
ISSUES WITH THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK ...................................................................................................... 158
CONCLUDING REMARKS ......................................................................................................................................... 159

Chapter 41. Resolving the Paradox of a Good Spectator Experience in a Safe Environment
Mr. Kent Schneider

THE CHALLENGES OF THE LONDON OLYMPICS ............................................................................................ 161
APPLYING TECHNOLOGY ..................................................................................................................................... 162
GOVERNING THE PROCESS .................................................................................................................................... 162
CONDUCTING SURVEILLANCE .............................................................................................................................. 163
THE USE OF SMART CARDS ............................................................................................................................... 163
ACCEPTING THE LEVEL OF SCRUTINY .................................................................................................................. 164

Chapter 42. Responding to New Threats: A Long-Term Vision
Mr. Patrick Auroy

THE NATURE OF THREATS ..................................................................................................................................... 167
WORKING WITH NATO AND THE EUROPEAN DEFENSE AGENCY ............................................................... 169
ONGOING SUPPORT AND PROGRAMS .................................................................................................................. 170

Chapter 43. Remarks on International Armaments Cooperation
Mr. Alfred Volkman

THE GOOD ................................................................................................................................................................. 173
THE BAD ................................................................................................................................................................. 174
THE UGLY ................................................................................................................................................................. 174
CONCLUDING REMARKS ......................................................................................................................................... 174

Chapter 44. Europeanization, Industrial Cooperation, and the 3Cs
Dr. Hilmar Linnenkamp

THE NEED FOR EUROPEANIZATION .................................................................................................................. 175
EFFECTING INDUSTRIAL CONSOLIDATION ........................................................................................................ 176
WORKING TOWARD THE THREE Cs .................................................................................................................... 176
Chapter 45. Governments and Defense Industries in a Global Industrial Base
Mr. Jan-Olof Lind

A STRONG FOCUS ON DEFENSE AND INDUSTRIAL ISSUES ................................................................. 177
ATTRACTING THE RIGHT COMPETENCIES TO THE DEFENSE SECTOR .................................................. 178

Chapter 46. Governments and Defense Industries in a Global Industrial Base
Dr. Edgar Buckley

WHY GOVERNMENTS NEED INDUSTRY ........................................................................................................ 179
HOW TO IMPROVE THE EUROPEAN DEFENCE TECHNOLOGICAL AND INDUSTRIAL BASE (DTIB) .... 180
THE EFFECTS OF REGULATION ON INDUSTRY ....................................................................................... 180

Chapter 47. Two Basic Trends in Industry-Government Relations
Dr. Robert H. Trice

THE RESULTS OF THE TRENDS .................................................................................................................... 183
THE NEED FOR GREATER GOVERNMENT SPONSORSHIP ....................................................................... 184
DEVELOPING NEEDED TALENT .................................................................................................................. 184

Chapter 48. The Relationship between Governments and Defense Industries
Ing. Giovanni Bertolone

THE NEED FOR COLLABORATION ............................................................................................................... 185
RECONSIDERING OFFSET .......................................................................................................................... 186

Part Nine

Chapter 49. The Way Ahead
Ambassador Zoltan Martinusz

THE APPROACH TO AND THE MEANING OF SECURITY ........................................................................... 189
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT ...................................................................... 190
IDENTIFYING CHALLENGES ...................................................................................................................... 190

Chapter 50. Some Practical Issues for the 2008 Summit in Romania
Ambassador Sorin Ducaru

Chapter 51. Global Security: The Way Ahead
General Harald Kujat

CREATING A MORE STABLE WORLD ........................................................................................................... 193
THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH, A NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, AND ENLARGEMENT .................. 194
FOCUSED ON WHAT IS RELEVANT ............................................................................................................. 194
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*Vice Chairman of the China Institute of International Strategic Studies, Former Director General of Foreign Affairs, Chinese Defense Ministry*
Bienvenue à tous! Je suis heureux de vous accueillir ici.

Welcome to everyone! I am very happy and honored to welcome you here on the “Toits de Paris,” the “Roofs of Paris,” on behalf of Minister Hervé Morin, the new minister of defense. He is not able to join our seminar this year as scheduled, and I apologize on his behalf. Some of you may know that here in France we are experiencing some rather bumpy, chaotic days. The new French president was just elected, the government is only partly formed, and we will soon have elections at the Chambre des Députés, the House of our national parliament, all of which make the political landscape in France rather busy and a bit shaky.

Following the last elections Minister Morin emerged as a key person because he comes from the center, but he joined what is mostly seen as a rightist government. However, no one in France these days knows exactly where the right, the left, and the center are—everything seems to be a bit puzzling. Which ever way you think of it, though, Minister Morin is clearly at the center of things, and because he is of high political importance he needs to be on the front line of the political battlefield, which is where he is right now and will be through the rest of the workshop.

The Paris Hilton, our lovely venue, is a very nice place, so when you go back home you will be able to tell your friends and relatives—to their amazement—that you have been visiting the Paris Hilton and not some jail in Los Angeles! This is truly a spectacular place, and I understand from reading the program that we will be visiting other spectacular places during the seminar. Tomorrow night we will be at the Hotel des Invalides, which is a terrific palace from the 17th century, with all the French grandeur. The day after we will be visiting the Musée Jacquemart-André, which is a gorgeous mansion that was owned by very wealthy people of the 19th century and houses an amazing art collection.

At the reception now, we have a tremendously high level of experts gathered from government, industry, and academia, and I am pleased to see so many well-known and friendly faces. Roger Weissinger-Baylon and his excellent team have as usual done a terrific job of organizing the seminar. As we head off now for two and a half days of discussing security issues at the highest and most expert level, I look forward to hearing all of your exciting ideas and I wish you all the best for the next three days.
Welcoming Remarks
Preface

Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon
Workshop Chairman and Founder

Patronage of French Defense Minister Hervé Morin. With the support of French Defense Minister Hervé Morin in his role as Workshop Patron, we were delighted to present this year’s 24th International Workshop on Global Security in Paris on 14-17 June 2007, in association with the Salon du Bourget/Paris Air Show. We are grateful for the French Defense Minister’s invitation, and that of his predecessor, Mme Michèle Alliot-Marie. She was the Patron and Keynote Speaker of the 22nd International Workshop in 2005, and she encouraged and formally invited us to hold this year’s Workshop once again in France’s beautiful capital.

Contributions of the Ministry of Defense. We would also like to acknowledge the assistance of a great many political and military leaders within the French Defense Ministry. We are particularly grateful for the contributions of General Jean-Louis Georgelin, Chief of Staff of the French Armed Forces; Lieutenant General Christian-Charles Falzone; Mr. Jean de Ponton d’Amécourt, Director of the Délégation aux Affaires Stratégiques; Mr. Francois Lureau, Director of the Délégation Générale de l’Armement; his deputy, Patrick Auroy; and Mr. Henri Serres, the Ministry’s Managing Director of Information and Communication.

Paris organizing committee. In all phases of the workshop, the Délégation aux Affaires Stratégiques played a leading role and none contributed more than its Deputy Director, Ing. Général Robert Ranquet. The Workshop would have been truly impossible without his invaluable advice and the immense time that he generously contributed. In order to achieve smooth coordination between the French Defense Ministry and the defense industry, Admiral Jean Betermier, advisor to the CEOs of EADS, played an equally important role. Together, General Ranquet and Admiral Betermier were the heart of the host country organizing committee, and they were most effective in guiding the planning and organization of the Paris Workshop.

Other important contributions. In addition to the immense contribution of the French government and its defense industry, we appreciate the contributions of Defense and Foreign Ministers, Chiefs of Defense, ambassadors, diplomats, industry leaders, and academics from more than 30 countries. While their contributions are briefly summarized in the “Overview” which appears in the next section of this report, we would like to especially acknowledge our appreciation for the participation of Georgian Vice Prime Minister Giorgi Baramidze, Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili, OSCE Secretary General Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, OPCW Director General Rogelio Pfirter, former Ukrainian Foreign Minister Borys Tarasuk, Albanian Defense Minister Fatmir Mediu, former Austrian Defense Minister Werner Fasslabend, Bulgarian Defense Minister Vesselin Bliznakov, Estonian Defense Minister Jaak Aaviksoo, and former Lithuanian Defense Minister Linas Linkevičius. We also appreciate the contributions of many senior military leaders including Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola, Chief of Defense of Italy and designated Chairman of the NATO Military Committee; General Franciszek Gabor, Chief of Defense of
Poland; General Ants Laaneots, Chief of Defense of Estonia; General Rainer Schuwrith; SHAPE Chief of Staff; General Egon Ramms, Allied Joint Force Commander; General Harald Kujat, former Chairman of the NATO Military Committee; and former Supreme Allied Commanders, Europe (SACEUR) General George Joulwan and General James Jones. Other truly vital contributors were General Henri Bentégeat, Chairman of the EU Military Committee and France’s former Chief of General Staff; Lieutenant General Jean-Paul Perruche, who just recently retired after serving as the Director of the EU Military Staff; and General Richard Wolszynski, former Chief of Staff of the French Air Force. Within the office of the Minister, we would also like to thank Madame Hélène de Rochefort.

**Principal Sponsors of the 24th International Workshop on Global Security**

We gratefully acknowledge the principal sponsorship of the 24th International Workshop, which comprised:

- French Ministry of Defense, with the patronage of Minister Hervé Morin
- EADS (European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company)
- Northrop Grumman Corporation
- Microsoft Corporation
- U.S. Department of Defense (Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration; Office of the Director of Net Assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense; Defense Threat Reduction Agency)
- Center for Strategic Decision Research, which instituted the workshop series and has presented the workshops annually for 24 years.

**EADS.** We greatly appreciate the interest and assistance of a number of senior executives at EADS, especially Mr. Louis Gallois, EADS CEO; Dr. Thomas Enders, Airbus CEO; Mr. Marwan Lahoud, COO of EADS (who welcomed us with an address at the Musée Jaquemart-André); Dr. Stefan Zoller, President and CEO of EADS Defence and Communications Systems; Professor Dr. Holger Mey, head of Customer Relations in Defense and Security Systems; Mr. Thomas Homberg, EADS Sr. Vice President for Corporate Strategy & Planning; Mr. Hervé Guillou, President, EADS Defense and Security Systems SAS: Mr. David Oliver, President and CEO, EADS North America Defense; and Admiral Jean Betermier, Senior Advisor to the EADS CEOs, who has been mentioned above for his key role on the host country organizational committee for this year’s Workshop in Paris.

**Northrop Grumman.** After many years as a leading supporter of the International Workshops, Northrop Grumman was a Principal Sponsor for the fourth year. Under the leadership of Northrop Grumman executives Mr. William Ennis as well as Mr. Kent Schneider, Mr. Joseph Penarzcyk, Mr. Tom Baker, and Vice Admiral Malcolm Fages, Northrop Grumman helped us broaden and strengthen the workshop’s senior military dimension and added greatly to the discussion of Alliance transformation and network-centric operations (including Allied Ground Surveillance).

**Microsoft.** Microsoft was a Principal Sponsor of the workshop for the second time, corresponding to the recent establishment of a Microsoft corporate element supporting military, national security, police, and fire department customers worldwide. Mr. Tim Bloechl, Executive Director, Microsoft Worldwide National Security and Defense, was the leading industry representative on information technology and we were delighted to welcome Mrs. Gerri Elliott, Corporate Vice President, Worldwide Public Sector; Mr. Sam Kamel; Mr. Daniel Maly, Microsoft, Central and Eastern Europe; Mr. Bernard Marty, Business
Director–Defense, Microsoft France; and Lieutenant General Mike McDuffie (Ret.), Vice President, U.S. Public Sector Services.

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. In the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, we are grateful for the advice and support of Mr. Alfred Volkman, who developed and chaired the panels on international cooperation over the last several years, as well as Mr. Robert Bruce, Mr. Roger Golden, and Ms. Karen Kay. We also appreciate the efficient assistance of Ms. Rita Bidlack.

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Networks and Information Integration). Thanks to Assistant Secretary of Defense John Grimes, Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert Lentz, and Mr. Tim Bloechl (now at Microsoft), network-centric operations have become an increasingly important component of the International Workshops. We also appreciate the helpful administrative support of Lieutenant Colonel Richard Palermo, Major Paul Ettenger, and Ms. Paula Cross.

Office of the Director of Net Assessment. Since the beginning of this Workshop series almost 25 years ago, the Director of Net Assessment in the U.S. Department of Defense, Mr. Andrew Marshall, has sponsored the activities of our organization. Ms. Rebecca Bash, also in the Office of the Director of Net Assessment, reviewed this report prior to publication. We appreciate Net Assessment’s support over the years and the very helpful advice and assistance that has been provided.

Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). At DTRA, we are grateful for the many contributions of Colonel Robert Dickey and especially the Agency’s Director, Dr. James Tegnelia, who participated actively in the Workshop sessions again this year. Lieutenant General Colby Broadwater represented the DTRA Field Office in Belgium. We would also like to thank Dr. Arthur T. Hopkins, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs (Acting), for his very effective workshop address on the risks of WMD proliferation.

Major Workshop Sponsors

Alenia Aeronautica. At Alenia Aeronautica S.p.A., we appreciate the participation of CEO Ing. Giovanni Bertolone and his important Workshop address on international defense industry cooperation. We are also grateful for the long-term interest and encouragement of Ing. Dr. Giorgio Zappa, now COO of Alenia’s parent company, Finmeccanica. Since Alenia Aeronautica has agreed to sponsor the 25th International Workshop in Rome, we would also like to acknowledge the assistance of Mrs. Palmira Rotolo in the planning for the coming year.

Lockheed Martin Corporation. Dr. Scott Harris, Lockheed Martin’s President for Continental Europe, has contributed to the workshop for many years, both as a participant and as a speaker. This year, we were truly delighted to welcome back Dr. Robert Trice, Corporate Senior Vice President, as a Workshop speaker.

Thales. At Thales, we appreciate the workshop participation and address of Senior Vice President Edgar Buckley. He brought to the workshop discussions his experience not only at Thales but as a former NATO Assistant Secretary General.

MBDA Missile Systems. At MBDA Missile Systems, CEO Marwan Lahoud was an important supporter of the workshops until he assumed his current position at EADS. We greatly appreciate MBDA’s continued sponsorship.

MITRE Corporation. We would like to thank MITRE for its sponsorship of the Workshop for the last two decades, as well as this year’s workshop participation by Mr. Raymond Haller, Mr. David Lehman, and Ms. Marnie Salisbury.
At IAP Worldwide Services, we are grateful for the support and participation of Mr. David Swindle, board member General George Joulwan, and investor representative Mr. George Kollitides, Senior Vice President of Cerberus Capital Management.

Sponsoring Governments

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Advisory Board. For helping shape the workshop agenda through their guidance and ideas, we would like to warmly thank the Board of Advisors:

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Workshop Participants. This year, representatives from the Mediterranean Dialogue participated in the workshop for the first time, joining their colleagues from the U.N., OSCE, NATO, EU, and OPCW international organizations. Together, participants represented over 30 countries. We appreciate their active involvement in the workshop agenda, themes, and speakers and their interest in participating in workshop discussions.
General Franciszek Gagor, Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces
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Major General Zhan Maohai, Vice Chair of the China Institute of International Strategic Studies
Dr. Stefan Zoller, President, EADS Defence & Communications Systems

Acknowledgements: Hotel National des Invalides, Musée Jacquemart-André, Hilton Paris Hotel, and the Workshop International Staff

Hotel National des Invalides. At the invitation of Defense Minister Hervé Morin, the Workshop was welcomed for a reception and dinner in the Grand Salon of the magnificent Hotel National des Invalides with an address by Mr. Jean de Ponton d’Amécourt, Director of Strategic Affairs in the French Ministry of Defense, and an 18th century musical performance by a string quartet of the French Republican Guard. Designed by Libéral Bruant and Jules Hardouin-Mansart, the Invalides were created under the
reign of Louis XIV to provide accommodation for up to 4,000 disabled war veterans. We are grateful to General Robert Bresse, director of the Army Museum, for arranging for a private visit of the armory rooms. Workshop participants also visited church Saint-Louis and the Dome, where famous military leaders, including Emperor Napoléon, are buried.

The Hilton Paris Hotel. Wonderfully located near the Seine River and the Eiffel Tower, the Hilton Paris hotel was a perfect site for this year’s workshop. The conference facilities were excellent and we received outstanding support from Lauren Ball and Hubert Ducoulombier who ran everything smoothly on the hotel side. The workshop opened with a dinner debate moderated by General George Joulwan on the Toits de Paris, the aptly-named 10th floor restaurant of the Hilton hotel which offers amazing views over Paris and the Eiffel Tower.

Workshop International Staff. Again this year, Eugene Whitlock, J.D., Jean Lee, Whitney Hopkins and Caroline Baylon returned to share their workshop experience with us. Caroline was the overall director of the workshop staff; Eugene handled workshop logistics, some key contract negotiations, and other legal issues; and Jean, who was joined by Mika Shiozawa, a Paris-based photographer, was responsible for the workshop’s graphics and photography. Montse Morell was fortunately able to take time from her Ph.D. work at the Institut de Biotecnologia I Biomedicina in Barcelona to assist us. We appreciate the help of Nevenka Mattenet, a recent Stanford University graduate in International Relations and East Asian Studies, Marie Andrade, a marketing graduate from HEC in Paris, and Analia Duran, a recent Master of Science graduate of the Institut d’Études Politiques de Paris (“Science Po”). This year again, Anne D. Baylon arranged a cultural program for workshop spouses. Ghislaine Blanc guided the visit of Paris with enthusiasm and a wealth of interesting historical details. Without the tireless efforts and years of experience of everyone on this outstanding staff, the workshop would be hard to imagine.

Workshop Publications. As Co-Director of the Center for Strategic Decision Research, Anne D. Baylon, is head of publications, which includes responsibility for the editing of these Proceedings. She prepared the translations of the official presentations by General Henri Bentégeat and General Jean-Louis Georgelin, and transcribed and edited many of the Workshop presentations. She gratefully acknowledges the contributions of Carol Whiteley, for reading and assisting in the copy editing of all the chapters; Jean Lee, for her professional assistance with the photo layouts and other graphics; and Kevin Cotter, for arranging the final preparations for printing.
Overview: Setting the Ship
In the Right Direction

Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon¹

Since dangers to global security are spreading, the need is urgent for countries and international organizations to find more effective political and military strategies and better ways of working together. Former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe General George Joulwan calls for a new direction in order to achieve the better world we all seek:

“I am not very optimistic and that concerns me. I do not want to be negative, but I have to be realistic as a soldier who has spent most of his life trying to deter or prevent war…Where are we now? What can we do to set the ship in the right direction? And what can we do to create the conditions that we need to bring about a better world for our children and grandchildren?”

THE GROWING DANGERS IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD

Some of the great challenges underlying these concerns are outlined by Italy’s Chief of Defense Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola (who has since been elected as the next Chairman of the NATO Military Committee) and by the NATO Military Committee’s past Chairman, General Harald Kujat. According to Admiral Di Paola, the list of security challenges now also includes “…energy, terrorism, globalization, the revolution in information technology, scarcity of resources, the relationship between western heritage and culture and the emerging Muslim world, and relationships with emerging powers such as China, India, east Asia, Mexico, and Brazil.”

General Kujat offers a broad description of these grave dangers and of their complexities, including hot conflicts, frozen conflicts, traditional security risks that have already been present for a long time, and new, emerging risks that may not even be fully understood, such as cyber-attacks, energy, and climate change:

“The world is more complex than ever before: there are areas of hot conflicts, including Iraq and Afghanistan; there are frozen conflicts in Moldova, Transnistria, and the Caucasus; there are old security risks, including the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, unsuccessful arms control, drug trafficking, illegal immigration, poverty, hunger, ethnic and religious conflicts, and international terrorism; and there are new security risks, including cyber-attacks, the use of energy as a strategic asset, and the unknown consequences of climate change.”

¹ Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon is the Workshop Chairman and Founder as well as Co-Director of the Center for Strategic Decision Research. The views expressed in this overview are entirely his own and do not reflect policies of the U.S. Department of Defense or any other sponsoring or participating organization.
Not only are challenges to global security increasing, but the structure of international political, military, economic, and other influences is shifting as well. Remarkably, the world is no longer unipolar, but multipolar. In the unipolar world, the U.S. was the dominant player—and not only in the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts but even in NATO, the U.N., and other international organizations. Largely due to difficulties in Iraq, however, U.S. international influence is less dominant. At the same time, the influence of China, India, and Russia (which has benefited immensely from the surge in oil prices) is growing.

According to General Kujat's analysis, it seems that:

“...the multipolar world is becoming more diverse. New world powers are becoming more and more influential. China, India, and Russia's economic and military power is growing, which means more self-confidence and perhaps more nationalism. At the same time U.S. influence in world affairs is declining, a consequence of the prolonged Iraq conflict. In addition, and above all, globalization is producing advantages and risks and winners and losers, and creating new antagonisms.”

In his opening workshop address, General Henri Bentégeat, Chairman of the EU Military Committee and former Chief of the French General Staff, offers a similar observation concerning the extraordinary shifts in power and influence within just a few years:

“Five years ago, it was believed and acknowledged that the great strategic balances of the past had become permanently obsolete. There was only one very large political, economic, and military power—the United States of America...Since that time, however...Russia and China have reaffirmed in various ways their intent to be involved in the most sensitive issues. Militarily, Japan's rising importance and India's emergence have confirmed that these two countries have gradually evolved and now hold a leading international role.”

Until a year ago, General James Jones was NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. He too believes that it is vital to study and understand the implications of the multipolar era: “The evolution of the world from the bipolar 20th century to the very brief unipolar period to...a long-term multipolar world is a fact of life we have to deal with and whose implications we have to analyze very carefully.” In his view, “Multipolarity is having a profound impact on the very institutions, both national and international, that are charged with maintaining and preserving our concept of what we think of as security—that impact might make some of us wish for the good old days of the 20th century, when life seemed to be a little simpler, a little more ordered, a little bit more predictable, and a little clearer.” General Jones also remarks that “the new characteristics are also more asymmetric, and they include, in my view, a broader range of issues.”

According to Russia's Ambassador to the EU, Vladimir Chizov, it is a fact of the new multipolar world that countries and international organizations can succeed only by working together, since “no single existing organization, neither the United Nations nor NATO nor the European Union nor the OSCE, is now capable of dealing with the new security agenda alone.”

While the factors underlying this shift of influence are complex, General Bentégeat suggests that there are at least two important consequences:

- **Military action has reached its limits.** It now seems that “military action has reached its limits and new approaches are required.” From a political perspective, the limits on military action are clearly shown

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2 In an address at Kansas State University, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates advances a similar argument: Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan show that "military success is not sufficient to win." He says that U.S. expenditures on non-military foreign
by the reluctance of governments and parliaments to provide the budgets that military leaders are seeking. From a military viewpoint, the limits of military action are demonstrated, according to General Bentégeat, by the “dramatic shortage today in the number of deployable ground forces, in particular, with helicopters and strategic and tactical air transport.”

- Crisis stabilization is impossible without reconstruction. The limits of military efforts can also be seen in the difficulties encountered in mounting reconstruction efforts, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan. As General Bentégeat also remarked, “We have all become aware of the fact that it is impossible to stabilize a crisis area without a reconstruction effort. Attempting to eradicate violence without a global approach to the crisis as well as a clear understanding of its origins and roots would be illusory.”

General Jean-Louis Georgelin, the present Chief of the French General Staff, points out that, “The best thought-out strategies are sometimes unable to resolve local crises—crises which in turn may have a large impact on an entire region of the world.” For this reason, he suggests that “we must reflect on the profound significance of military action and, consequently, on the role of our armies. First, we must examine the threats we are facing, then the way we deal with them, and finally infer practical consequences for the tools at our disposal.”

WHY NEW STRATEGIES ARE NECESSARY

Consequently, the present global security challenge is a dual one—responding to a broad range of threats while dealing with a rapidly evolving structure of political, military, and economic influence in an increasingly multipolar world. In this context, it is not surprising if international organizations such as NATO have difficulty responding effectively to the challenges. While many are happy with the progress made at the Riga Summit, Admiral Di Paola is not encouraged by recent progress. He notes that:

“…nothing remarkable has come from the Riga Summit, just as nothing remarkable has come from the Prague and Istanbul summits. Somehow we are floating over the water but with no clear sense of direction.”

Admiral Di Paola believes that the U.S. and Europe need a “shared vision” in order to deal with such a broad scope of dangers. Consequently, he calls for “a new covenant, a new strategic concept between Europe and the United States,” and a new mission for NATO: “If we do not have a new mission and if we do not have a new covenant between Europe and the United States, we will not have a shared future.”

In his address to the 23rd International Workshop in Berlin in May 2006, SACEUR General James Jones identified strategic lift as a “critical shortfall in the Prague capability commitments.”

4 General Jean-Louis Georgelin’s keynote address to the 25th International Workshop was presented by Lieutenant General Christian-Charles Falzone.

5 Ambassador Stewart Eldon, the U.K.’s Permanent Representative to NATO, is one of Riga’s numerous supporters. While he admits that his position is “perhaps unfashionably positive,” he argues that “it is important to remember that Riga’s accomplishments were quite substantial in many ways. The summit focused on Afghanistan, and I believe that the agreement that if any ally got into serious difficulty in Afghanistan that the others would come to his assistance was very valuable.”
Spanish Ambassador to NATO Pablo Benavides Orgaz also emphasizes the importance of the transatlantic relationship. He considers that a political consensus is a necessary condition for continued support of military operations:

“I believe that positive leadership on both sides of the Atlantic is very important for the immediate future. This for me is key, because we have to base NATO discussions on healthy political consensus. NATO is basically political. Obviously, its roots are military in nature, but without political debate, operations cannot be sustained.”

THE CHALLENGES

The re-examination of threats and strategies, which Admiral Di Paola, General Georgelin, General Jones, and others are seeking, must deal with difficult challenges. The threats arise, for example, within areas such as the Middle East or Afghanistan that are geographically remote from the traditional areas of operation of many countries. Alternatively, such challenges as energy, global warming, and cyber-attacks are fundamentally different in nature from the dangers that NATO and other international security organizations are accustomed to dealing with.

WMD Proliferation

WMD proliferation probably remains the gravest challenge, since WMDs might be acquired by a rogue state or else fall into the hands of extremists. If so, these dangerous weapons could be used against military or civilian populations with horrible consequences. The recent instabilities in Pakistan are extremely dangerous: the country already possesses nuclear weapons. Moreover, some government officials or their allies are unfriendly to the U.S. and other western countries—or sympathetic to extremists.

As the Special Assistant to the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Dr. Arthur T. Hopkins is responsible for preventing such WMD proliferation. He believes that the most effective means of doing so is to act “upfront, early in the process, when nonproliferation measures such as treaties, agreements, and other cooperative measures can actually unite nations in dialogue about their common goals for global threat reduction.” Yet, as Dr. Hopkins points out, such “nonproliferation measures have limits” and their effectiveness is uncertain. Fortunately, there are success stories that fall exactly in line with the “upfront, early on” nonproliferation measures he advocates: One of them is Ambassador Rogelio Pfirter’s Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). As the OPCW Director-General, Ambassador Pfirter believes that “. . . a world that is completely free from chemical weapons appears today not as an improbability but as an achievable goal.” He notes that the OPCW, by seeking to eliminate weapons in possessor states, has succeeded over the last decade in destroying over “71,000 metric tons of chemical warfare agents and 9,000,000 munitions.”

Cyber-security

With broadened access to computer systems and huge increases in their capabilities, the risks arising from the information environment are growing rapidly. U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense John Grimes notes that the “threats we face can come from anyone, from harmless teenagers to criminal organizations, non-state actors, and nation-states that are intentionally infiltrating and corrupting our systems.” Perhaps the most dramatic illustration of the dangers is the cyber-attack against Estonian institutions early in 2007. Estonian Defense Minister Jaak Aaviksoo describes the situation:

“Estonia recently was hit by a politically motivated cyber-campaign that targeted government, industry, and private sites using a wide array of offensive techniques. Though it is difficult to identify the persons, groups, or organizations behind the attacks, we do know that most of the attacks were carried out not only by amateurs with primitive methods, but also
by highly skilled cyber-attack specialists with significant resources. The attacks were not only protests against the Estonian government, but also large-scale, well-coordinated, and targeted actions that took place at the same time as political, economic, and media events. In our minds, what took place was cyber-warfare and cyber-terrorism.”

NATO’s Lieutenant General Ulrich Wolf points out that the potential dangers are even greater: “The threat of cyber-war is real and it…could be waged against all of us.” In a possible robot attack “…thousands of computers are connected to overload a targeted storage device with messages and with the aim to shut down its services. The systems used are hijacked by the attacker. . . An estimated 50 million machines around the world have been compromised in this way. Microsoft’s Tim Bloechl observes that “. . .we do not have adequate laws, regulations, and policies in place to deal with cyber-attacks. Clearly, this

needs to be improved both nationally and internationally so that cyber-criminals cannot take free advantage of the vulnerabilities of the Internet.”

Energy and Security

Of the issues facing policy makers, energy security is among the most important. In a recent round table at Stanford University, the former Commander of the U.S. Central Command, General John Abizaid, described the Iraq War as being “about oil and we cannot really deny that,” and argued for the necessity of reducing instabilities in the region (including Israeli-Palestinian tensions) and cutting back our dependency on Middle East oil.

General James Jones describes energy security as “a global, national, and local issue” that he sees as “critical to the economic stability of our markets” with “impact on security but also on our environment.” According to General Jones:

“Energy and the energy infrastructure will be true challenges as the global appetite for energy dramatically increases and our infrastructures do not keep pace, which is predicted…The next 20 years will see a dramatic rise in demand for electricity, natural gas, and transportation fuels in a world that we can only begin to understand, and they will also see a corresponding impact on the environment and the global climate.”

General Jones also warns that nearly 80% of the world’s oil reserves are already nationally owned. In this context, he suggested that it would be unwise for “international organizations to stand idly by as the Gulf region slides towards chaos.” He asks, “Isn’t it time to take proactive action to mitigate the effects of a potential crisis in that region?”

Global Warming

Climate change, other environmental issues, and energy are closely linked. According to General Jones, in fact, “You cannot have a serious discussion on energy-related issues without having an environmentalist at the table.” The U.K. Foreign Office’s Special Representative for Climate Change, John Ashton, describes climate change as “a threat multiplier” that can “destabilize and amplify” other factors. Darfur is an example: Over recent decades, a 50% rainfall reduction (which is consistent with climate change models) seems to have made the crisis more severe. For such reasons, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni says that climate change is a form of aggression by developed countries against poor nations. Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s joining of the Kyoto accords offers some hope, however, since all the developed countries (except the United States) have now committed to join the treaty.

The Relationship with Russia

While serving as SACEUR, General Joulwan found that the relationship with Russia was genuinely promising, but he currently sees “a lessening of that relationship.” He now asks, “How can we revive
it?…Will it always be adversarial? I don’t think it needs to be.” France’s Deputy Director for Strategic Affairs, General Robert Ranquet, thinks that the key to understanding the Russians is to put oneself in their shoes. In the case of the proposed missile defense “third site” in Poland and the Czech Republic, he suggests, “Just think how the French people would react if Russia were going to have a missile base in, let’s say, Luxembourg. How would we feel?” In the purely personal view of Jaromir Novotny, the Czech Ambassador to Japan, Russia feels stronger because of its growing oil wealth. The country consequently feels able to reaffirm its “near abroad” by putting pressure on the Baltic States (with Estonia as the most dramatic recent example). At the same time, Russia is pressuring “Ukraine, where the Orange Revolution was lost” as well as Georgia and Kosovo, where it seeks to veto the area’s long-sought independence from Serbia. According to General Kujat, the Russians know that the small number of missiles in Poland will not threaten them, so he considers that the real issue is the following:

“The U.S. ignored the status of the other nuclear strategic superpower. Russia is no longer a world power. It does not have worldwide power projection capability but it is a nuclear strategic superpower. When you deploy missiles at the front door of the other nuclear strategic superpower, you ignore the status of that power.”

General Joulwan believes that, on the basis of shared interests in Afghanistan and Iraq, we should try to “reach out to the Russians and work together.”

Security in the Black Sea and the Balkans

According to Georgia’s Vice Prime Minister Gela Bezhuashvili, the unresolved territorial conflicts are among the gravest security problems in the Black Sea region: “They undermine economic cooperation. They breed suspicion and tensions. And they considerably undermine the statehood of most of the conflict-affected countries. [which] renders secessionist entities in these states virtual black holes, plagued by lawlessness and smuggling.” Ukraine’s recent Foreign Minister, Borys Tarasyuk, offers a broader view of the region’s challenges. In addition to the frozen conflicts mentioned by Minister Bezhuashvili (Transdnistra, Abkazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh), Minister Tarasyuk lists the following other dangers:

“The foreign military presence in the countries of the region; energy security, which is a challenge not only to the region but to the entire Euro-Atlantic community; regional borders that are being challenged or are in the process of settlement; and of course the various ethnic factors.”

While recognizing the need to resolve such conflicts, Bulgarian Defense Minister Dr. Vesselin Bliznakov cautions that, “The military alone cannot be successful. We must build confidence in the local populations. Without their help, our missions will not be fully accomplished. Moreover, we need to persuade neighboring countries to work for regional security. It is rather difficult to create an island of security in a single state, be it Iraq or Afghanistan.”

The Balkan region is a special challenge: Turkish Ambassador to NATO Tacan Ildem suggests that “the Balkans have never really been synonymous with projecting stability.” In fact, he cites the Interna-

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6 Some eastern European leaders are less eager to cooperate with Russia, since they do not want Russia to consider their countries as part of its “near abroad.” According to this logic, Russian opposition to a missile defense “third site” in Poland and the Czech Republic is one of the best reasons for building it, since such a decision—in the face of strong Russian opposition—affirms their sovereignty.
tional Crisis Group’s assessment of the area as one of “critical strategic interest to Western governments and a potential flash point for further conflicts.” Because of the complexity of issues that the region currently faces, moreover, progress is likely to be difficult “without sustained attention and involvement on the part of the international community.” For the case of Kosovo, Albanian Defense Minister Fatmir Medić calls particular attention to the striving by many Kosovars for independence from Serbia. He says that Albania supports “...an independent Kosovo that respects and guarantees the rights of all its citizens and its ethnic and cultural groups provide the most suitable and sustainable solution to this challenge.”

Lieutenant General Evgeniy Buzhinsky of the Russian Defense Ministry points out that security in the Black Sea and Middle East are linked, since vital energy supplies transit through the Black Sea:

“Should there be a worst-case scenario in the Middle East, the Black Sea region could make an essential contribution to European energy security. At the same time, its energy potential is a challenge...its infrastructure is highly attractive to terrorists of various kinds and cannot absolutely be protected against current threats.”

Afghanistan and Iraq

At the present time, Afghanistan is NATO’s most important mission; General Egon Ramms is NATO’s operational-level commander for the region. Despite much progress in recent months, he reports that insurgents there have employed increased violence, terrorism against civilians, suicide attacks, and IEDs. This has created a dilemma for ISAF:

“Every time we use kinetic military means, we run the risk of civilian casualties and collateral damage and we make the task of winning over the support of the local population more and more difficult. Deciding when and how to respond to asymmetric attacks is one of the most challenging elements of this campaign and one that we are learning about while we are conducting the mission.”

One of the serious challenges in Afghanistan is drug trafficking. As General Jones points out, illegal drugs tend to be one of “the economic underpinnings of extremist movements in the world.” For this reason, some current and past military leaders, including the recent defense minister of France, have sometimes suggested actually purchasing the poppy crop from Afghan farmers. Such proposals, however, tend to be rejected out of hand by political leaders in most countries, on the basis that illegal conduct should not be rewarded.

In order to prevail in Afghanistan, General Ramms emphasizes the importance of “sustaining the political consensus behind NATO’s ISAF mission,” because the mission is too large to be handled by just a few NATO member-countries. In any case, SHAPE Chief of Staff General Schuwirth argues that investments are necessary to develop Afghanistan’s own capabilities, including police forces. This “must be part of our success and exit strategy if we do not want to stay there forever and if we do not want to develop a culture of dependency or even perceived continuous occupation.” In any case, Italy’s NATO Ambassador Stefano Stefanini says that the conflict in Afghanistan should be considered “a work in progress.” While it will be difficult, success is possible provided that “the achievements we strive for are realistic.”

Italy’s Military Representative to NATO, Vice Admiral Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte, sees additional problems, however:

“NATO, a survivor of the Cold War success, is in fact bogged down in a war of attrition in Afghanistan. Reconstruction efforts are only now being coordinated, after too many years, while stabilization and counter-insurgency operations are being carried out in the same battle space. Thus, the two efforts are hindering each other.”
In any consideration of strategies for dealing with Afghanistan, it is important to consider that they are all intimately related. As Ambassador Munir Akram, Pakistan's Permanent Representative to the U.N., points out, “The final challenge is that all seven major flashpoints in the Middle East—Palestine, Israel, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Iran, and Afghanistan—are linked. They are linked first by the involvement in and the interest of the principal powers, the United States and the other major powers. Second, they are linked by the fact that each contains a very large element of asymmetric warfare and terrorism. Third, they are linked because the strategic fight, not only the balance of power, is over the oil resources in the region.”

As to Iraq, the immediate future is not promising. Of special concern is a proposed agreement with the Iraqi government that calls for the presence of U.S. troops in the country for decades to come. In return for this supposed security assistance, U.S. oil and other firms will be encouraged to invest in the country. While there will be efforts to put the agreement in a positive light, most Iraqis will see the agreement as nothing less than a plan for permanent occupation of the country in order to take out the country’s oil and other sources of wealth.

Israel and Palestine

The conflict between Israel and Palestine is a festering wound, and there cannot be stable peace in the region until it heals. For this reason, the Annapolis conference is vitally important, even though President Bush is unwilling to put necessary pressure on either Israel or Palestine to achieve an agreement. The president’s call for a two-state solution is certainly a most positive step, as is Israeli Prime Minister Olmert’s declaration of willingness to make sacrifices in order to obtain peace. Above all, the opposition of Hamas and Iranian President Ahmadinejad could be a signal that a true chance for peace does exist—otherwise, why would they protest so fiercely against the Annapolis conference?

The Annapolis meeting may be almost the last chance for peace over the next few years, because the Israel-Palestine conflict casts such a dark shadow over the entire region. According to Ambassador Youcef Yousfi, Algeria’s Ambassador to the U.N. and a former foreign minister, “The daily acts of violence in the Middle East and the inability of the international community to settle the Israel-Palestine conflict also adversely affects the security and stability of the Mediterranean and undermine our dream to make the Mediterranean an area of peace and prosperity.”

According to Ambassador Mahmoud Karem, “Prolonging the conflict, avoiding the capture of historic moments or windows of opportunities to grab peace is a matter of serious concern for students of history as well as for leaders assiduously working for the cause of nation building. The argument from Arab citizens occasionally...[is] that Israel is working to prolong the conflict in order to keep Israel undivided domestically, to weaken the Arab world, and to push for an unavoidable clash between peoples and leaders, leading possibly to the...decay of Arab unity and cohesion. Proponents of this view also argue that such delaying tactics may be used to usurp more land and create a new fait accompli.” Instead, Morocco’s Ambassador to the EU, Menouar Alem, says that “the international community as a whole must engage in a frank, honest, and sincere dialogue on security issues.” Speaking along the same lines, Major General Zhan Maohai, Vice Chair of China’s IISS, sees the need for Israel-Palestine talks based on the principle of “land for peace” as established by U.N. resolutions.

How Can Industry Contribute?

Since globalization is a key influence on the international defense industry, Alfred Volkman, the U.S. Director for International Cooperation, argues that, “We need to find ways to take maximum advantage of its good qualities and to minimize the bad and eliminate the ugly.” Unfortunately, governments often
react to the bad aspects of globalization by resorting to protectionism”—which means that “...offsets are unlikely to go away in the near future, but...nations need to find ways to limit the adverse effects of offsets.” France’s Deputy Director for Armaments, Patrick Auroy, who also views these issues from a government perspective, sees the need for more effective cooperation between government and industry:

“All stakeholders must develop federated approaches—security can no longer rely upon the aggregation of fragmented, dispersed, non-coherent local and specific solutions nor rely upon solutions devised in a reactive manner and inherited from yesterday’s practices.”

According to Marwan Lahoud, Chief Operating Officer of EADS, an appropriate response to such challenges is to recognize that “...a large part of our security is embedded in the security of our partners. This situation requires strong cooperation among the industries involved in the defense and security domains and will see significant improvements in costs as well as schedule through global leveraging of shared information, R&D, and investment.”

Alenia Aeronautica’s CEO, Ing. Giovanni Bertolone, suggests that such changes mean it is time to view government-industry cooperation in an entirely new way: the extremely complex rules that defense ministries have developed to deal with industry are now outdated by the rapid pace of technological progress and changes in the nature of the threats that must be addressed. He believes that “these procedures must be changed, because...it is no longer possible to separate the world between customers and industries. “Industry and government must begin working together from the earliest stages in the planning and conception of new systems. He also suggests that “...we need to speak more about flexibility and globalization than about consolidation in certain areas—for example, we have to look at what is happening in Russia, what is happening in Asia, and our collaboration with India.”

According to Dr. Edgar Buckley of Thales, “If Europe intends to play a strong security role, it needs a strong European defense industry supported by a strong defense technology base. And since the U.S. needs Europe to contribute strongly to defense and security operations in order to share the burden of maintaining global security and stability, I believe that the U.S. also needs and should support a strong European DTIB.” Lockheed Martin’s Senior VP Dr. Robert Trice says that one of the greatest of the changes in the defense industry is that “…we are more and more a software- and IT-driven industry” which is especially significant since “IT is inherently already globalized.”

Both Dr. Trice and Jan-Olof Lind, Sweden’s National Armaments Director, see a need to graduate more engineering and science students who can contribute to the development of the international defense industry. “We all know that growing economies in the east are graduating many more students from their universities than the U.S. and Europe together. Should we regard this as a problem and, if so, what can be done?”

Among the security threats on the horizon are large public events such as soccer World Cups or the Beijing Olympic Games. Northrop Grumman’s Kent Schneider describes the challenges:

“The information-sharing requirements across this very complex environment are...data mining, data fusion, and situational awareness, things that we do in the military environment all the time but that here involve different numbers of players and data that is subject to privacy laws...I think the solution is to leverage existing systems...technology is out there today that monitors the movement of people internationally, everything from travel manifests to associated criminal terrorist databases. There is also...surveillance capability that can be applied to the problem effectively and without infringing on people’s rights. It is going to be very important, however, to link this capability to existing financial and transportation systems, because that is where efficiency lies for the kinds of transaction rates we are talking about.”

The Role of International Organizations

At the United Nations, Finland’s Ambassador Kirsti Lintonen observes that the U.N.’s vast scope of responsibilities and the diversity of its members make it hard to achieve results as impressive as those of a
regionally focused organization such as the E.U., which helped bring peace and prosperity to Europe after centuries of conflict. She argues that, “The differences in development and capacity between the U.N.’s member states are huge and U.N. norms are bound to be less deep than EU norms.” Nonetheless, the norms established by the U.N. “are unrivalled in their legitimacy, and…for a significant number of the world’s nations - if not the majority - the U.N. is the only source of international norms.” Hungarian Ambassador to the U.N. Gabor Brodi sees room for improvement, however, especially in terms of U.N. relations with regional organizations. For example, he suggests that, “A more structured relationship between the U.N. and regional organizations would take advantage of their genuine complementarities, based on their comparative advantage.” Lithuania’s NATO Ambassador and former Defense Minister Linas Antanas Linkevičius also sees the need for such international organizations to work together, but he says that “worst practice examples are numerous.” He remarks that “although NATO has deployed in operations some 50,000 troops under the U.N. mandate, the visit of the newly appointed U.N. Secretary General to the North Atlantic Council lasted only 20 minutes.”

Ambassador Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, the OSCE’s Secretary General, points out that international organizations such as the U.N., OSCE, EU, or NATO tend to face many of their greatest challenges when a crisis actually emerges (often unexpectedly). At this point, a number of practical questions must be worked out among the various international organizations and state actors. He asks, “When there is a lasting crisis, a frozen conflict, a prolonged cease-fire, the need for peace building or a political solution, ...how can the [international] organizations work together?...Who does the political mediation? Who handles the peacekeeping on the ground? Who provides the special representatives...?” As a measure of the success of cooperation among international organizations, Latvia’s State Secretary Edgars Rinkevics suggests: “The test case for cooperation between the U.N., the EU, the OSCE, and NATO will be Kosovo. Settling this sensitive political issue will prove how effectively all four...organizations can cooperate...How will we react if violence breaks out in Kosovo?”

THE WAY AHEAD

According to U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense John Grimes, security is a matter of perception—which depends on where you sit. Consequently, global security “can mean different things to different people.” Drawing on Secretary Grimes’ observation, Hungary’s Ambassador to NATO Zoltan Martinusz asks in his wrap-up remarks, “Without a shared vision of security, how can we approach it?” Let us therefore heed Admiral Di Paola’s call for a broad re-examination of the nature of security, which will hopefully lead to a re-examination of the present challenges, a new strategic concept, and a new transatlantic vision.

As France’s Director for Strategic Affairs, Jean de Ponton d’Amécourt, reminds us, “History is not always a product of what we rationally seek, but also tends to exaggerate, to the nth degree, the effects of unexpected events and unsought developments.” This certainly suggests that the search for new security strategies—no matter how well directed or motivated it may be—is no guarantee of finding the right way forward. Yet, we can be reasonably certain that, without such an effort, we will remain mired in our current difficulties.
Opening Dinner Debate

Moderated by General George Joulwan

OPENING REMARKS

Tonight I am not going to give formal remarks—Roger has asked me to do something a little bit different this year. We are going to have a dinner debate to start the workshop off, something like we did last year after dinner with General Jones, a kind of question and answer period in which we talked very informally with him about the issues we are facing. That discussion turned out to be quite lively and very important and allowed us to discuss some of the issues that we had not had time to get into.

Before we begin, however, I want to recognize the wonderful setting we are in. Paris has always meant a great deal to me, just as Berlin has, and I could not help recalling today the experiences I had in Paris when I was the Supreme Allied Commander and came to Paris for two very important meetings.

One meeting had to do with Bosnia. The heads of state of NATO, all 16 presidents and prime ministers came to Paris in December of 1995 and authorized NATO forces to conduct operations to stop the killing and the atrocities in Bosnia. I was able to speak to those heads of state in a way that enabled us to clarify the mission and rules of engagement. I do not want to criticize the U.N. effort, which was valiant but clearly a bankrupt strategy. NATO, along with its partners, was able to stop the killing, and because of the political support of 16 democratic nations working together—with France a very key member of that team—we ended up engaging 37 nations in a strong, humanitarian, peace-enforcement effort that ended the violence between three vicious, warring factions in the Balkans. We have not suffered one hostile death there since that time. That is doing it right, and it all began here in Paris in 1995.

The second occasion that took place in Paris that I think is important to remember happened in May 1997. Heads of state once again came to Paris to sign the very important NATO Russia Founding Act, which established the relationship between Russia and NATO as well as a partnership with Ukraine. That occasion set the foundation for an engagement with both those countries that had been missing for hundreds of years and attempted to shape a future in which we would be able to prevent wars rather than have to fight them. And this workshop played an important role in providing a forum to discuss the need for cooperation and solidarity between Russia and NATO and the need to act in the Balkans.

FINDING THE WAY AHEAD

Hard as it was to imagine, in 1997 I had a three-star Russian deputy working with me at SHAPE Headquarters in Mons for 20 months. When I left Paris in the spring of 1997, and later on when I turned over

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1 General George Joulwan is a former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.
my command, very optimistic about the future, both Russia and NATO were working together as a team. But now, 10 years later, I am not very optimistic, and that concerns me. I do not want to be negative but I have to be realistic as a soldier who has spent most of his life trying to deter or prevent war. So I am very delighted to be here and to have such a diverse group to discuss not only the past but the future.

Where are we now? What can we do to set the ship in the right direction? And what can we do to bring about the conditions that we need to provide a better world for our children and our grandchildren? I do not care if you are Christian, Jewish, Muslim, or any other religion. In my view, we are all striving to create a better world, one in which we can live in peace and harmony and friendship. I think the conditions right now are causing great concern about what we are doing. But there is no better place in my view to talk about these things than at this workshop here in Paris. Let us ask ourselves, What can we do to find the right way ahead? What can we do to get a better understanding of people from different cultures and who practice different religions and live in different parts of the world?

THE DINNER DEBATE

General Joulwan: Let’s start with the issue of Russia. Ten years ago I talked about a very positive relationship with Russia but since then we have seen a lessening of that relationship. Since the Russians joined us in Bosnia, which I thought was very positive, our relationship has gone downhill. How can we revive it? How can we restore the relationship, or will it always be adversarial? I don’t think it needs to be. But let’s talk about issues—for example the missile defense shield that is being proposed for Europe, the Russian concern for NATO enlargement, and even the issue of cyber-attacks against NATO systems. How do we feel about the issues with Russia? Where do we think it is going and what do we think can be done?

Ambassador Jaromir Novotny: You mentioned the missile shield, which Czechs are deeply involved in because the radar has to be on Czech territory. The issue is difficult for me as ambassador, but I am speaking now as a private person, and my comments do not reflect the position of my government. I think that Russia is trying to be a power again. Oil prices are the highest they have been in history, Russia has paid all its debts, and the country is getting back its pride. Now it is trying to be the way it always was in history, whether during the time of the tsars or the time of the communists—it is trying to be a power. The Baltic States are feeling this greatly, with Estonia the latest to feel the pressure. Russia is trying to tell Estonia whether its government will or will not be. It is also trying to build a “near abroad,” for example, in Ukraine, where the Orange Revolution was lost. Russia is also trying to put pressure on Georgia again, as well as vetoing the decision about Kosovo, so we are right back to where we were with Russia previously.

General Joulwan: But how can we engage with Russia? Are we in an adversarial relationship again? What are our common interests? Do we have common interests with Russia and how we can work them?

Ambassador Novotny: I think that we are not back in the Cold War period but we are starting a Cold Peace. Because the Russians are strong enough, they are using energy as a weapon. Last winter they turned off the gas, and you can imagine what could happen to Western Europe, which is dependent on Russian gas and Russian oil. The Russians are trying to build a new pipeline from the Baltic Sea to avoid the Baltic countries, although I believe that will not be possible because the Estonian government will not allow the pipeline on the bottom of the Baltic Sea. I think we are in a game with Russia—you know the West is no danger to Russia. The danger may be somewhere in the south but the Russians are trying to keep their part of the pie.
General Joulwan: Let me hear some other voices here. Do we have to have a Cold Peace? I do not think Russia wants to see a failed state, for example, in Iraq or Afghanistan. I do not think Iran being a nuclear power is in their interest. Some comments?

Ingénieur Général Robert Ranquet: The reaction to the U.S. missile project is overstated, of course. It may be useful to try to, as we say in France, “prendre la place de l’autre,” or be in the shoes of your opponent for a bit. Just think what the French people would think if Russia were going to have a missile base in, let’s say, Luxemburg. How would we feel? It would be trouble for us, beside any objective analysis. How would the U.S. react if Russia were going to have a missile base closer to the U.S., in Cuba, for instance? A lot of psychology is involved in this issue, so how can we deal with Russian psychology today?

General Joulwan: I think we have heard two very interesting responses. General Kujat would like to make a few remarks now.

General Harald Kujat: Here is a third view. I was in Munich when I listened to President Putin and it was not just the missile issue that he mentioned. He mentioned a whole bunch of problems: the CFE Treaty, the missile issue, NATO enlargement. The net result from my perspective was frustration on the Russian side regarding cooperation with NATO, frustration with the relationship with the United States, frustration over the entire spectrum. The fact that the missile issue popped up as the primary focus is because of inner European acceptance. The concern was echoed in Europe, which made it very attractive for Russia to continue with it.

But the frustration is understandable, because the military has warned for some time: We are going too far with NATO, we are making too many compromises, we are not getting anything out of this. But that is the kind of difficulty that can arise when one nation has a strategic partnership with a 26-nation alliance.

As far as the missile issue is concerned, there was a little sensitivity on the U.S. side regarding the Russian position. No threat exists from the 10 missiles, which the Russian military and politicians know. They know, of course, that these missiles are not aiming at Russia, and they know the missiles’ exact purpose. The problem is that the U.S. ignored the status of the other nuclear strategic superpower. Russia is no longer a world power. It does not have worldwide power projection capability but it is a nuclear strategic superpower. And when you deploy missiles at the front door of the other nuclear strategic superpower, you ignore the status of that power.

So it is a matter of principle—it is not a question of informing or not informing the other side. Their status has been ignored. Russia is recovering in the conventional field, it has more self-confidence, and it has more money. The country is also improving its nuclear strategic capability and its conventional-force military capability. They always fear that they are encircled by enemies. So we need to find an answer to that problem, which is a Russian problem, not a bilateral problem. The first part of the answer will be given when NATO offers some concessions concerning the CFE Treaty, and we should continue negotiating along this line.

General Joulwan: Thank you, that was very interesting. Many of us predicted what would happen to Russia, that Russia would bottom out and then come back up. Now they are coming back up. Ten years ago I thought that the relationship would be based on what we call in the West mutual trust and confidence and that we could build on that. Now I think we have to go back to those principles. When Foreign Minister Primakov asked me in London about NATO enlargement, I told him very clearly that he had nothing to fear from it. In fact, I said that NATO enlargement would secure Russia’s Western flank, and that his problems were to his south and east. He smiled and said, “When did a NATO general get to be strategic in his thinking?”

So, we do have common interests. When Jim Jones had a 10-year reunion with the Russians I had worked with at SHAPE, they said the same thing that General Kujat just mentioned, that they felt they
were not being respected as a nation. But they also said, “We have common interests in Afghanistan and we have common interests in Iraq.” So I do believe we need to reach out to the Russians and work together.

Let me shift to another topic now—where we are in France. The French just had an election and there is a lot of speculation about where things are going. How do we see France’s engagement over the next four to six years both with the EU and with NATO? Do we see a change? Where do we see France going?

Admiral Jean Betermier: I would first like to follow up on General Kujat’s words on Russia. This is an important topic that we do not pay enough attention to. With the Russians admitting that a reunified Germany could be in NATO, though one of the conditions of reunification was that there would be no permanent stationing of NATO forces beyond the old borders, deployment in Central Europe without shared understanding with Russia could be provocative. On the Western side, we say the Four plus Two agreement only concerned the reunification of Germany. Nobody thought at the time that the Warsaw Pact would disappear, but the Russians believe that the spirit of the agreement was that there would be no permanent deployment in their garden. So I concur with General Kujat.

As a retired admiral, I have no personal connection with the president of France, and even though I am still a member of the defense scientific board, the minister has changed. So I am not an expert. However, I believe that, globally, France’s foreign policy commitment will remain the same. The president said several times that he would like to act in closer cooperation with the U.S.

When I was in the Middle East recently, that wish upset a lot of people there. Europeans and Americans must be very careful and sensitive when we play the transatlantic game, and not give the impression that a big bloc is arriving together. I believe that defense expenditures will remain at the same level but it is not clear how they will be shared among the people, those who provide the manpower, and investments. The president will probably try to impose his own mark on the next programming law—we are going to work on a new defense white paper and exchange views with close friends from the Pentagon and the National Defense University. Without influencing the French view, it may, at the end of the day, concur with that of our European friends and our U.S. partners.

General Joulwan: Perhaps you or someone else would like to comment on how the EU, NATO, and France can come closer together in the future under this administration.

Admiral Betermier: I was very impressed when I participated in several different meetings in Washington, Brussels, and Paris. There has been a sea change on the U.S. side. Correct me if I am wrong, but the European Security and Defense Policy was for too long seen as some kind of cheval de Troie, an engine that would destroy NATO from the inside. It is no longer seen that way; in fact, in Brussels recently the discussions we had with people from NATO concluded that a strong ESDP will be the best thing for strengthening the Atlantic partnership. I am rather sure that our German friends hold the same view, and it is also the view of the new French political team as I understand it.

General Joulwan: Many of us know that there has been tension between the EU and NATO and between the U.S. and France, and now there is a great opportunity to work together. Does anyone else have a comment on this very interesting issue?

General Richard Wolsztinsky: I have two or three things I would like to say. The first thing is that when you talk about NATO and the EU, you always hear about confrontation and comparison and it looks like there is a fight. To me, that is just nonsense. Why? I will give you a simple example. When you are in a given country—France for us and the U.S. for many of you here—there is only one way for our fellow citizens to put money in the budget. Although I do not belong to the leadership of my country, I do try to help them. If you have a certain amount of money to put into, let’s say, a defense budget, you do not have three ways to use or to suggest this money be used. For you or a member of NATO or a member of the EU, whatever body you belong to, there is only one way to do it. So every time I am asked this ques-
tion, I say we have to stop this ridiculous competition between NATO and the EU or whatever body is being talked about. We know that there are good contributors to some bodies and that also there are bad ones. Some hold nice talks but they do not put the money on the table and some do not say a damn word but they do give the money.

The second point I would like to make regards a possible change in France. During the election campaign our newly elected president said that we may have to look at things a little differently when we look at our relationship with the U.S. He said very frankly that the French people know what they went through in the past. The French people know what we owe to the U.S. and U.S. soldiers. I was born four kilometers from Saint Avold, the cemetery in which the biggest number of soldiers were buried in Europe. So that is one thing. But how the politicians talk to each other is another thing.

One or several new paths may be looked at by our president. That is what he said in his campaign and now everyone is waiting to see how he will implement it. One path may lead toward the EU, which is the direction he was taking when he went to see German Chancellor Angela Merkel and when he went to Poland. Another path may lead toward Africa, because we have to take a position to deal with African countries. Things are changing. The African continent is in a very tough position today. The whole world should be interested in that, and certainly Europe should, because it is just north of the African continent.

But the real thing I think we should be concerned about today is the real world. There is chaos in Iraq, there is chaos in the Gaza strip, I also see growing chaos in Lebanon. All of these places are located in the same part of the world, which I discovered 26 years ago at the very nice Air War College in Maxwell called Central Command. The question I asked 26 years ago of my American friends was, “What is the perimeter of what you call Central Command?” I got no answer. Today I ask again, “What is the perimeter of Central Command?” because that is another way of asking, “What is the perimeter of what we call the Middle East theater?”

Who is involved today in the Middle East theater? It no longer includes only Israel-Palestine or Israel-Arab tension or conflict. Does Turkey belong to this theater? What about Iran? Where does the theater stop? Where does it start? How far does it extend when you look north, east, west, and south? I think these are the real-world issues we must deal with today. When I go to buy bread every morning or buy my newspaper, I hear what people are talking about, and they are talking about chaos in Iraq, chaos in the Gaza strip, chaos in Lebanon. They are very much concerned.

General Joulwan: Thank you for bringing up a concern I think we all share. Another issue that ties into this concern is what we see in Iraq, Afghanistan, Gaza, and northern and southern Lebanon and that is the issue of Islam, several of whose representatives are joining us at the workshop. How do we react? How do we interact? What interests do we have in common? We sometimes paint a picture that we have no common interests, that it is strictly us against them, but I do not believe that. I truly think we need a better understanding of the extreme fundamentalist Islamic issue that is affecting many countries, not just Iraq and Afghanistan. How do we go about developing the kinds of common interests that we find in democracies? Is there common ground that we can explore together, or will it always be adversarial? If it is the latter, I think we are in for a rough ride, but what do you think? What are some of your views?

Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon: I am not on the Islamic side, but from talking to my neighbors in my small town in California, my perception is, and I say this very sincerely, that the U.S. as a country, and certainly our leaders, really wants the oil in Iraq. That perception may be right or wrong, but, as I understand it, it will take about 30 years to get that oil out. So we will need to have our troops there for 30 years, which means an occupying force. And that means growing chaos, as the general mentioned, increasing animosity toward the U.S., and a really horrible situation.
Regarding your concern about Islamic views, my concern is about Christian views. From talking to my Christian friends I’ve found that a growing part of the U.S. population—about 30% of the U.S. population, about 20% of the cadets at the U.S. Air Force Academy, and the majority of Republicans—wants Israel to gain its biblical territories. If this happens, these people deeply believe, Christ will come in 10, 20, or 30 years. So there seems to be a very strong desire for getting land for the Israelis and getting oil for the U.S. Of course, this is not the view of an expert, but the view I gained from reading the newspapers and talking to my friends.

**General Joulwan:** So, do we really feel that the motivation behind all of this is oil?

**Ambassador Mahmoud Kareem:** General, you pose a very important question, and I will be direct with my answer. First of all, let us not fall into sweeping generalizations. Let us not judge, nor be swayed by the acts of a misguided few and attribute them to the nature or core of Islam. Islam is a holy religion as is Christianity, Judaism, and many other faiths we all respect and believe in. In its literature the holy book or Quran, Islam has an entire chapter devoted to the Virgin Mary. No other religion has given this privilege to the mother of Christ. Yes, terror has been done in the name of Islam, but, believe me, these acts are not what Islam preaches for. These acts do not reflect the Islam we have been taught to follow, or the Islam we practice. If we go back to the history of Salah Eldin Al Ayyubi (1187) we discover that even during special moments Islam gave refuge to the resident Jews in Jerusalem by respecting their homes, their synagogues, never entering their places of worship, and never asking them to fight our wars. A noted scholar expressed: “Salah El Deen expressed in the most practical way the kindness and mercy of Islam when, at the peak of his victory and power he gave freedom for all inhabitants of Jerusalem to leave the City unharmed.” The origin of these instructions could be traced earlier to Umar Ibn Elkhattab in 636 in a famous letter addressed to the citizens of Jerusalem that same year and later in the conquest of Egypt when the same Caliph instructed his General Amr Ibn Elass to treat the Christian Copts of Egypt with dignity and respect.

The second point I want to make is that we should not hold any discussions based on the assumption that because we are all part and parcel of global united action against terrorism, we should face Muslims or Islam as the primary source of the threat. I want to draw a very clear distinction between our common endeavors against international terrorism and linking those endeavors to a particular region or faith. We should not forget Egypt’s campaign against terrorism and the losses we endured in our fight against terror, human losses incurred as well as losses inflicted on our economy, the attempts to destabilize Egypt as a result of its steadfast position against international terrorism. Egypt’s bill in this regard and its sacrifices are noteworthy.

My third and last point is that we have an unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict in the region that has been stagnant for a very long time. Prolonging the conflict as well as delaying a solution levies heavily even on unexpected sectors of Egyptian society. In a recent poll in Egypt targeting new graduates of Egyptian universities and performed by a reputable European/Egyptian institution, the poll question: “What is your major worry as a young graduate?” produced unexpected results. The expected answers were finding a job—Egypt is faced with 650,000 new graduates each year—finding an apartment, finding a wife, obtaining a good salary, and so on.

Astonishingly, most graduates answered, “The Arab-Israeli conflict.” This is what is alive and well in the minds of young Egyptians who have been torn by this conflict and who continue to see killings on live TV broadcasts and networks. Where then, I ask, is the culture of peace that we all need? So I argue tonight and I shall argue tomorrow that we must all work together, Europe, the United States, and especially Russia, to nurture a common culture of peace and common understanding in our region. Let us not forget that Russia co-chaired the Madrid International Peace Conference with the U.S. and that Russia is a
permanent member of the Security Council, and that much is expected from Russia as is expected from
Europe and the United States.

**General Joulwan:** Thank you very much. Those points tie in with the issue of common interests, with
Russia, Europe, the United States, and even most of the Arab countries. And I agree with you that we
cannot allow this to go on—whenever we get close to reconciliation something always happens to make
us separate again. It seems to me that now, particularly in southern Lebanon and northern Lebanon,
things are much more dangerous than they are in Iraq and Afghanistan. We are not seeing the world peace
that we all are looking for.

**Dr. Werner Fasslabend:** The Middle East is the region that links Europe, Asia, and Africa, and its
importance will increase because of its oil and gas. By 2010 more than 50% of China’s oil will come from
the Middle East and of course the same thing will happen in Europe, the U.S., and other regions such as
India. The Middle East is one of the big civilizations of the world and its population has a tremendous
dynamic for growth. The region now has a population of about 275 million people and by 2030 that
number should be 450 million. By 2020 about 100 million more jobs will be needed for young people
because the population will be so young.

When you look at all these facts, you realize that the question of the Middle East is not a question you
can solve unilaterally by force. I think it will be necessary to make an arrangement between the big forces
in the region—the United States and Iran. However, it will also be necessary for Americans and Europeans
to work together, because it would be a tremendous mistake for Europeans to think that Iraq is a
question only the U.S. should solve. This is not possible, and chaos could ensue, because only 60% of the
Iraqi armed forces have reached Level 1 of the training standard, with Level 5 the highest.

I believe that in the next few years we need to develop a new joint concept for Americans, Europeans,
and partners in the region. There must also be an arrangement between two big players in the Middle
East, Israel and Iran, who I think can find a way to at least live alongside each other. Then, I think, we can
be successful. But it is certainly not just a question of one power, one concept, and just a few steps.

**General Joulwan:** I think, at least within my country, that we have gotten off the track we used during
the Cold War and even in the post-Cold War period, the track on which the United States consulted with
our allies and partners and did not just inform them of the action we were going to take. I believe by con-
sulting you develop a common bond and give everyone a chance to agree or disagree, and eventually find
consensus, a word that has dropped out of our vocabulary. Sometimes you have to act unilaterally, but it is
better when you can act in a multinational way.

But how do you work with other nations? We did this very successfully during the 40 years of the Cold
War, and now we have another chance to meet a challenge to civilization. I completely agree that people
do want jobs, do want a better life, whether they are Muslim, Christian, or Jew. So how do we make that
possible? It cannot be done only with ships and tanks and planes. It requires a new conception of the
secure environment but the relationships between nations and peoples are going to decide that.

**General Rainer Schuwirth:** There is a big difference between the period of the Cold War and today.
During the Cold War, we could do it with—how many were we, 13, 14, 15, finally 16?—and now we also
have to consult with our so-called host nations, with the Afghan government, with the Iraqi government,
with the Israeli government. We cannot impose on their countries what we think is useful—we have to
talk with them to identify mutually acceptable solutions that are, first and foremost, to the benefit of the
nations concerned and not, in the tradition of Western countries, the solutions we think are useful. Without
pulling the boat too far backward, this is also one of the reasons that we have problems in
NATO-Russia relations.

**General Joulwan:** Rainer seemed to be getting energized there, which is the sort of dialogue that I
think this workshop has prided itself on for the 15 years I have been involved with it. It was at a workshop
that we really debated Partnership for Peace. It was at a workshop that we talked about enlargement. It was here that we talked about engagement and here that we talked a great deal about Russian involvement, in fact, with General Shetsov sitting with me arguing with the ambassador from Russia about where Russia ought to be going with regard to NATO. I think we have created a situation in which these workshops can really get into issues, and I ask those who will be presenting here to allow time for this sort of dialogue during your presentations. This kind of exchange will get to some of the clarity we need to find the way ahead.

It is a daunting task. The world we live in is a very dangerous one, and we all bring to it different ethnic, religious, and other backgrounds. In the end, though, we all want a better world for our children and grandchildren to grow up in, and I think that is something we can fight for and look forward to.

I hope this has been a good start to the 2007 international workshop in Paris. I look forward to seeing many of you and listening to many of the presentations over the next few days. I think this is an exciting time to be in Paris and I am looking forward to our time together. Thank you all for coming.
Part One

General Henri Bentégeat

General Jean-Louis Georgelin

Mr. Jean de Ponton d’Amécourt

General Rainer Schuwirth

General Egon Ramms
C'est un grand privilège de pouvoir s'exprimer dans ce Forum qui embrasse chaque année, avec une rare fécondité, les réflexions conduites sur les deux rives de l'Atlantique dans le domaine de la sécurité et de la défense.

Je sais que mon ami Jim Jones doit s'exprimer devant vous samedi prochain et je m'en réjouis. Grand patriote et chef militaire incontesté, homme de cœur et de conviction, il doit à sa jeunesse française d'être un des meilleurs vecteurs d'une relation transatlantique forte et apaisée. Nous avons traversé ensemble beaucoup de turbulences dans la confiance et la compréhension réciproques.

Je n'ai pas aujourd'hui la prétention de vous faire un exposé de politique générale et je ne vous infligerai pas non plus une présentation fastidieuse des institutions européennes.

Tout a été dit ici ou sera dit sur notre environnement de sécurité et sur les défis posés par le Proche et le Moyen Orient, l'Afghanistan, les Balkans peut-être qu'on aurait tort de négliger, l'Afrique qui s'impose à notre attention, avec en toile de fond le terrorisme et la prolifération.

Je me contenterai donc de puiser dans mon expérience des cinq années passées pour appeler votre attention sur la complexité croissante de la prévention et de la gestion des crises.

Comme le disait un de mes subordonnés à qui je demandais si nous avions progressé, “il y a un an, nous étions au bord du gouffre, et depuis nous avons fait un grand pas en avant.”

Au-delà de la plaisanterie, il est indiscutable que le jeu se complique:

- le nombre des grands acteurs internationaux s'accroît et cela nous crée de nouvelles obligations;
- ensuite, l'action militaire a trouvé ses limites et d'autres approches sont nécessaires;
- enfin, la conduite des opérations militaires est de plus en plus complexe et difficile à gérer.

Les responsables politiques et militaires doivent le prendre en compte.

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1 Le Général Henri Bentégeat est le Président du Comité Militaire de l'Union Européenne.
DE PLUS EN PLUS D'ACTEURS DANS LE JEU INTERNATIONAL

On a pu croire et dire légitimement, il y a cinq ans, que les grands équilibres stratégiques du passé étaient définitivement obsolètes et que seule s'imposait une très grande puissance politique, économique et militaire, les États-Unis d’Amérique. On pouvait s’en réjouir ou le regretter, mais chacun devait admettre que l’unique grand acteur avait pour lui de porter les valeurs de la démocratie et de la liberté.

Des institutions anciennes et reconnues, comme l’ONU et l’OTAN, étaient affectées dans leur crédibilité et leur fonctionnement par cette prédominance incontestable.

Force est de reconnaître que depuis, le paysage de l’action internationale s’est considérablement compliqué.

Sous des formes diverses, la Russie et la Chine ont réaffirmé leur présence sur les dossiers les plus sensibles. Dans le domaine militaire, l’affirmation du Japon et l’émergence de l’Inde confirment l’évolution, engagée depuis quelques années, de ces deux pays appelés à prendre une dimension internationale de premier plan.

Les organisations internationales elles-mêmes prennent un poids nouveau. L’ONU déploie plus de 100 000 hommes dans plus de 60 opérations de maintien de la paix et ses modes d’action évoluent, n’excluant plus les actions de combat ponctuelles, comme on l’a vu au Congo.

L’Union Africaine devient sur ce continent un acteur incontournable en dépit de l’insuffisance actuelle de ses capacités. Au Moyen-Orient, la Ligue Arabe devient un interlocuteur de poids.

Et pour en rester au monde occidental, l’OTAN et l’UE évoluent, s’adaptent. Je laisserai à d’autres la responsabilité d’évoquer l’évolution de l’Alliance, mais je vous dois quelques mots sur l’adaptation de l’UE.


Mais cette multiplication d’acteurs que j’évoquais complique naturellement la gestion des crises. Certes, l’ONU, l’OTAN et l’UE affichent les mêmes objectifs : la préservation de la paix, la défense de la liberté et des valeurs démocratiques. Mais la multiplication des crises et l’émergence d’acteurs nouveaux défendant d’autres visions du monde et d’autres intérêts impose plus que jamais un partenariat étroit entre l’UE et l’OTAN afin que les efforts se conjuguent sans compétition ni duplication inutile.

Pour que ce partenariat se développe efficacement, quelques principes doivent être respectés :

- autonomie de décision dans chaque enceinte, pas plus de caucus européen à l’OTAN que de préemption de la décision européenne par l’OTAN ;
- rejet des dogmatismes nourris par des peurs irrationnelles. Nous ne devons pas craindre que la puissance militaire de l’OTAN étouffe la capacité militaire limitée de l’UE. Mais nous ne devons pas avoir peur non plus du développement de la capacité d’action de l’UE. Elle ne se construit pas contre les États-Unis, allié majeur indispensable à la sécurité européenne et ne menace pas l’OTAN, alliance militaire unique et indispensable.
- Enfin, il nous faut résoudre la double et difficile question de la réunification de Chypre et de la place de la Turquie en Europe.
Sur ces bases, la complémentarité de l’UE et de l’OTAN doit s’organiser dans la confiance et la transparence. La multiplication, ces derniers temps, des contacts d’état-major et des échanges entre Secrétaires Généraux témoigne d’une volonté réciproque de développer pragmatiquement ce partenariat.

C’est d’autant plus important que le jeu se complique également du simple fait que l’action militaire trouve aujourd’hui ses limites.

**L’ACTION MILITAIRE TROUVE SES LIMITES**

Le constat le plus indiscutable est certainement l’épuisement des ressources disponibles. Pour être plus précis, on relève aujourd’hui l’insuffisance dramatique du volume des forces terrestres déployables, en particulier dans le domaine des hélicoptères, ou des moyens de transport aérien stratégique et tactique.

Toutes les organisations internationales en sont affectées. S’agissant de l’OTAN et de l’UE qui puissent largement dans le même vivier, force est de reconnaître que la “transformation” a été insuffisante ou que les nations européennes répugnent à trop dépenser dans des aventures lointaines peu soutenues par les opinions publiques.

On aurait tort néanmoins de forcer le trait et d’accabler les Européens. Aujourd’hui, la France et le Royaume-Uni déploient en opérations 12% de leurs forces terrestres, contre 15% pour les États-Unis. La différence existe mais elle n’est pas considérable.

On ne peut s’empêcher pourtant de se souvenir qu’en 1991, la coalition Desert Storm déployait au Koweït plus de 500 000 hommes.

Mais comment ignorer la forte réduction des dépenses de défense en Europe, depuis la fin de la Guerre Froide. Certains reprochent à l’UE de ne pas déployer suffisamment d’efforts pour accroître les capacités européennes. Ce procès est infondé. Un processus de développement capacitaire complet, moderne et rigoureux a été engagé et continue de se développer, notamment au sein de l’AED. Il a permis d’accroître l’interopérabilité des forces et de réduire les lacunes par davantage de coopération et d’intégration. Mais les budgets de défense restent nationaux et beaucoup de gouvernements s’abritent derrière la garantie de sécurité offerte par l’OTAN pour limiter leur effort.

Au-delà même des ressources, le deuxième constat qui s’impose, notamment en Irak et en Afghanistan, est celui des limites d’une action purement militaire. Il est devenu évident pour tous que sans un effort de reconstruction, la stabilisation d’une zone de crise est impossible.

Sans une approche globale de la crise et une parfaite compréhension de ses origines et de ses racines, l’éradication de la violence est illusoire.

A cet égard, permettez-moi d’insister sur la différence fondamentale, structurelle qui existe entre l’UE et l’OTAN.

L’OTAN est une alliance militaire, la plus puissante de l’histoire du monde et c’est aussi un vecteur incontournable du lien transatlantique.

L’UE n’est pas une alliance militaire, c’est une communauté de nations engagées dans un processus d’intégration européenne. Cette entité dispose de moyens d’action beaucoup plus diversifiés que ceux de l’OTAN : commerce, développement, finances, justice, police, environnement et, depuis 2003, une capacité d’action militaire limitée mais crédible.

Ceci confère potentiellement à l’Union une capacité unique au monde d’agir simultanément sur tous les leviers d’une crise pour la prévenir ou pour la gérer dans le temps.

C’est pourquoi il serait déraisonnable de limiter le rôle de l’UE dans la gestion des crises à celui d’un complément civil à l’action militaire de l’OTAN.

Certes, c’est possible et c’est ce que nous nous préparons à faire au Kosovo et en Afghanistan.
Mais l’expérience de ces dernières années montre bien l’intérêt qu’il y a à une gestion centralisée, intégrée de la gestion d’une crise.

Bien sûr, l’UE n’a ni la vocation, ni les moyens de gérer toutes les crises. Mais quand celles-ci ne nécessitent pas un engagement militaire de grande ampleur, l’UE est un acteur potentiel complet qu’il faut savoir utiliser.

Comme je l’ai déjà dit plusieurs fois, le jeu de l’action internationale est de plus en plus complexe. L’action militaire rencontre ses limites, mais le plus préoccupant pour nous, responsables militaires, est que la conduite des opérations devient de plus en plus difficile.

**LA CONDUITE DES OPÉRATIONS MILITAIRES EST DE PLUS EN PLUS DIFFICILE**

Guerre asymétrique, multinationalité, judiciarisation, médias, conquête des esprits et des coeurs, autant de facteurs qui influent directement sur l’efficacité de nos engagements.

On a tout dit sur l’asymétrie des conflits modernes : asymétrie des moyens quand une armée régulière et puissante affronte des groupes mal armés et sans uniformes, asymétrie des modes d’action quand notre puissance de feu est paralysée par des attentats suicides ou des foules désarmées de femmes et d’enfants, asymétrie de comportement quand nos opinions publiques exigent de nous une parfaite maîtrise de la force alors que nos adversaires n’hésitent pas à recourir à la violence la plus ignoble.

Les puissances militaires sont entravées par l’obligation qui leur est faite de mesurer les coups portés à l’adversaire, d’épargner les populations civiles et même l’environnement.

Les opérations multinationales sont devenues la règle pour une raison de légitimité politique. Mais la multinationalité affaiblit l’efficacité de la force. La cohésion et l’interopérabilité sont difficiles à réaliser. Les caveats et les règles d’engagement nationales compliquent singulièrement la tâche du commandant de la force.

Un grand commandeur de l’OTAN me confiait, il y a quelques temps qu’il avait découvert, après 40 ans de service, une nouvelle forme de commandement, le commandement par marchandage.

Une autre contrainte pour la conduite des opérations est la judiciarisation progressive de l’espace militaire. Les participants à une opération sont désormais comptables de tous leurs actes. La création de la Cour pénale internationale concrétise cette évolution. L’omniprésence du droit est une garantie fondamentale pour tous, mais elle peut provoquer chez beaucoup de chefs militaires une inhibition, une incapacité à prendre des décisions qui est dommageable pour tous. Le risque est particulièrement grand en ce qui concerne le traitement des prisonniers qui ne relèvent pas d’un statut légal clair.

Les médias, enfin, contribuent à l’inhibition des chefs militaires en portant instantanément devant le tribunal des opinions publiques la moindre action conduite par nos forces. Avec Internet et la multiplication des téléphones portables, le contrôle de l’information est devenu très difficile et, si la transparence y gagne, les conséquences opérationnelles des fuites peuvent être dramatiques.

D’autres défis, sur le terrain, sont difficiles à relever. L’équilibre, par exemple, entre la protection des forces et la présence auprès des populations. Comment gagner les coeurs et les esprits si on reste enfermés dans des bunkers ? Et, dans certains cas, comment conjuguer impartialité face aux parties en conflit et proximité nécessaire avec les responsables locaux ?

Loin de moi pourtant, l’idée de dire que nos soldats sont placés dans des situations insoutenables. Il suffit de relire les récits de la 2ème Guerre Mondiale pour savoir que nos anciens ont connu bien pire.

Mais il faut être conscient que ces nouvelles contraintes qui pèsent sur la conduite des opérations suscitent des attitudes nationales divergentes qui ne sont pas le fait des responsables militaires mais sont des choix politiques liés aux sentiments et aux réactions des parlements nationaux.
On peut le regretter, mais on doit l’accepter. C’est une contrainte de la vie démocratique.

CONCLUSION

Pour conclure, je souhaite vous dire que la complexité croissante de la gestion des crises internationales appelle de la part de tous les responsables civils et militaires un grand effort d’humilité, de conviction et de compétence.

Toute décision d’engagement de la force doit être réfléchie et concertée, avec une vision claire de l’état final recherché. Une stratégie globale doit être définie avec un coordonnateur identifié.

Nos dirigeants politiques doivent enfin avoir une idée précise des moyens militaires nécessaires et des contributions prévisibles des partenaires. Ce n’est pas à vous que j’apprendrai qu’il y a beaucoup de chemin à faire pour atteindre ce schéma idéal.

On a opposé, il y a quelques temps, l’approche américaine et l’approche européenne des conflits, en invoquant Mars et Vénus. Peut-être avons-nous surtout besoin aujourd’hui de Minerve ou Athéna, la déesse de la raison.
It is a great privilege to speak at this forum, which addresses every year, in a thought-provoking way, the main security and defense issues on both sides of the Atlantic. I am delighted that my friend, General James Jones, will also be speaking to you. The fact that he is a great patriot and military leader, a man of conviction who is also thoughtful, and a man who spent time in France during his formative years makes him one of the best assets for a strong transatlantic relationship. He and I have gone through turbulent times in a spirit of mutual confidence and comprehension.

Today I have no plans to present a general policy expose nor do I intend to give you an exacting presentation on European institutions. Everything has been said or will be said here on our security environment and the challenges raised by the Near and Middle East, Afghanistan, the Balkans, and Africa. Based on my experience of the past five years, I am going to call your attention to the increasingly complex prevention and management of crises.

As one of my staff members put it when I asked him if we had made progress, “We were on the edge of the abyss one year ago but we have taken a big step forward since that time.” All joking aside, the game is undoubtedly getting more complicated, for three reasons:

1. The number of major international players is increasing, which is creating new obligations.
2. Military action has reached its limits and new approaches are required.
3. Military operations are getting more and more complex to run and manage, a fact that our political and military leaders must take into account.
AN INCREASING NUMBER OF INTERNATIONAL ACTORS

Five years ago, it was believed and acknowledged that the great strategic balances of the past had become permanently obsolete. There was only one very large political, economic, and military power—the United States of America. Whether this fact was viewed with joy or regret, no one could deny that, as the sole major actor, the U.S. had the advantage of exhibiting the values of democracy and freedom. This undisputable predominance affected the credibility and functioning of old and well-established institutions, such as the U.N. and NATO.

Since that time, however, the international landscape has become considerably more complex. On the political scene, Russia and China have reaffirmed in various ways their intent to be involved in the most sensitive issues. Militarily, Japan's rising importance and India's emergence have confirmed that these two countries have gradually evolved and now hold a leading international role.

International organizations are also assuming new responsibilities. The U.N. is deploying over 100,000 men in more than 60 peace-enforcement operations and its modalities for action include quick combat interventions, as was the case in Congo. On the African continent, the African Union is becoming an indispensable actor in spite of its current lack of capabilities. In the Middle East, the Arab League is taking on a major role.

As to the Western world, NATO and the EU are evolving and adapting. While other speakers at the workshop will talk about the evolution of the Alliance, I am going to say a few words about the EU's adaptation.

ESDP, sometimes called “The Defense Dimension of the EU,” or “Europe de la Defense,” has become a reality. It was born in 2003 with the approval by the European Council of a document called the “European Security Strategy.” Since that time, the European Union has organized 16 missions or civilian, military, or civilian/military operations in Europe, Africa, and Asia, four of which were military peacekeeping operations or operations for imposing peace, with or without the involvement of NATO's collective capabilities. Today, the European Union is conducting its own reform in order to create better synergy between its capabilities for civilian and military action. A few years ago, Henry Kissinger was wondering which phone number he should call in case he needed to call Europe. Today, for this particular need, world leaders are well aware of Javier Solana's phone number.

The multiplication of actors has made crisis management more complex. Of course, the U.N., NATO, and the EU have similar objectives: maintaining peace and defending freedom and democratic values. But the multiplication of crises and the arrival on the political scene of new actors with different visions of the world as well as different interests makes a close EU/NATO partnership even more necessary if both organizations' efforts are to complement each other without competition or duplication.

In order for this partnership to develop efficiently, several principles must be respected:

- Autonomy of decisions within each organization—that is, no European caucus within NATO and no preemption of European decisions by NATO.
- Rejection of dogmatisms born out of irrational fears. We have no reason to fear that NATO's military power will overwhelm the EU's limited military capability. In the same way, we should not be afraid of developing the EU's capacity for action. This capacity is neither being built against the United States, a major and indispensable ally for European security, nor is it a threat to NATO, a unique military alliance that is indispensable as well.
- Finally, we must resolve the dual and difficult question of the reunification of Cyprus and the place of Turkey in Europe.
On these bases, EU/NATO complementarity must be organized in an atmosphere of trust and transparency. The recent multiplication of contacts between military staffs and the exchanges at the secretary-general level underscore the mutual willingness to develop this partnership in a pragmatic way. This is all the more important now that military action has reached its limits.

**MILITARY ACTION HAS REACHED ITS LIMITS**

Undoubtedly, the most obvious sign of military action having reached its limit is the exhaustion of available resources. To be more specific, there is a dramatic shortage today in the number of deployable ground forces, in particular, with helicopters and strategic and tactical air transport. All international organizations are affected. As far as NATO and the EU are concerned, whose resources come mainly from the same pool, we must recognize that either the “transformation” has been insufficient or European nations are unwilling to spend money in faraway adventures that receive little public support.

Nevertheless, we should not go too far in excoriating the Europeans. Today, France and the United Kingdom deploy 12% of their ground forces in operations, compared with 15% for the United States. Although there is a difference, it is not that large. Still, how can we not remember that, in 1991, 500,000 men were deployed in Kuwait during the Desert Storm coalition? And how can we ignore the sharp reduction in defense spending in Europe following the end of the Cold War?

The European Union has been accused of not making a great enough effort to increase European capabilities. This accusation is unfounded. The EU has initiated and continues to develop a capability development process that is thorough, modern, and rigorous, especially through the European Defense Agency. This has made it possible to increase force interoperability while decreasing weaknesses through better cooperation and integration. But defense budgets remain a national prerogative, and many governments take advantage of the NATO security umbrella to limit their effort.

Even setting aside the resource problem, we must acknowledge the limits of purely military action, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan. We have all become aware of the fact that it is impossible to stabilize a crisis area without a reconstruction effort. Attempting to eradicate violence without a global approach to the crisis as well as a clear understanding of its origins and roots would be illusory.

In this regard, I would like to underline the essential structural difference between the European Union and NATO. NATO is a military alliance, the most powerful one in world history, and it is also the indispensable instrument of the transatlantic link. The European Union is not a military alliance; it is a community of nations that has initiated a European integration process and whose means of action are considerably more diversified than NATO’s. These means include commerce, development, finances, justice, police, environment, and, since 2003, a limited but credible military action. This potentially provides the European Union with a unique capability to act simultaneously on all levels of a crisis to prevent or manage it.

Therefore, limiting the EU’s role in the management of crises to that of civilian complement to NATO military action is unreasonable. It can be done, though, and we are preparing to do so in Kosovo and in Afghanistan. However, recent experience shows the advantages of being able to manage a crisis in a centralized and integrated way.

Of course, the EU does not have the vocation or the means to manage all crises. But when crises do not require a large military engagement, we should keep in mind and utilize the EU’s potential to be a complete actor.

As I already mentioned, the international landscape is getting more complex and military action has reached its limit. For those of us who are military leaders, however, the increasingly difficult conducting of operations has become our biggest worry.
PROGRESSIVELY MORE DIFFICULT MILITARY OPERATIONS

Many factors—asymmetric war, multiple nations, growing recourse to legal intervention, the media, the desire to win the hearts and minds of the people—are directly affecting the success of our operations. The asymmetry of modern conflicts has been well documented in many forms: military asymmetry, when a regular and powerful army is assaulted by ill-equipped groups without uniforms; mode of action asymmetry, when our firepower is paralyzed by suicide bombings or civilian crowds of women and children; and behavioral asymmetry, when our publics demand that we use our force in a perfectly controlled way while our adversaries have no qualms about resorting to the most abject violence. Military powers are constrained by the obligations placed upon them to proportion their military response to the adversary, to spare civilians, and even to respect the environment.

For reasons of political legitimacy, multinational operations have become the norm. But incorporating multiple nations tends to decrease the efficiency of the force. Cohesion and interoperability are difficult to achieve. Multiple national caveats and rules of engagement seriously complicate the task of the force commander. I was even told recently by a major NATO commander that, after 40 years of service in the military, he had discovered a new form of command—the “bargaining” command.

The conducting of operations is also hampered by the growing recourse to legal intervention in the military arena. Those who participate in an operation are now responsible for all their actions, as evidenced by the creation of the International Criminal Court. While an omnipresent legal system is a fundamental protection for all, it can have an unwanted result among military leaders who may, as a result, feel inhibited and unable to take risks. Such risk is particularly severe concerning the treatment of prisoners without clear legal status.

Finally, when they instantly deliver to the “tribunal” of public opinion any action taken by our armed forces, the media also contribute to inhibiting military leaders. The Internet and the multiplication of cell phones make information control very difficult—though there is a gain in transparency, the operational consequences of leaks can be devastating.

Other challenges on the ground, for example, the balance between force protection and the presence of forces among a population, are also difficult to meet. How can we win a country’s hearts and minds if we stay in our bunkers? How, in some cases, can we show the conflicting parties that we are impartial while needing to stay close to local leaders?

I would not go so far as to say that our soldiers are being placed in unbearable situations. Our elders who fought in World War II tell us they saw much worse. But we do need to be aware that the new constraints that place a burden on the conducting of operations elicit diverging national attitudes that are not due to military leaders’ actions but reflect political choices that correspond to national parliaments’ ways of thinking and reacting. While this may be regrettable, we must accept it as a fact of life in a democracy.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The growing complexity in the management of international crises requires that all civilian and military leaders make a great effort of humility, conviction, and competence. Decisions to engage forces must also be well thought out and concerted, with a clear vision of the final goal. A global strategy must also be defined and a coordinator selected. Finally, our political leaders must have a precise idea of the military means that are necessary and of the contributions our partners will be asked to make.

All of you know well that a long road must be traveled before we can reach the ideal scenario. A while ago, American and European positions regarding conflicts were contrasted by invoking Mars and Venus. Perhaps we need Minerva or Athena, the goddess of reason, today.
The theme of the 24th International Workshop on Global Security is central to the challenges we face today. To add to the very important contributions that have been made here so far, I would like to address global security from the military point of view, which is my own.

The question as to which threats most urgently affect world security arises quite naturally in the context of my activities. In order to better answer the question, we are developing military capabilities able to deal with the multiple and diverse crises occurring throughout the globe, even when we cannot anticipate their nature in advance. We are also reflecting on the specific situations in Afghanistan, the Middle East, and Africa, since our forces are presently engaged in Afghanistan, the Indian Ocean, Lebanon, and several African countries. Indeed, we must never forget that even the most elaborate strategies must find their application in a specific location and in a specific context.

The conjunction of the general nature of our strategies and the specific aspect of each action is a constant source of difficulty: the best thought-out strategies are sometimes unable to resolve local crises, which in turn may have a large impact on an entire region of the world. In order to resolve the challenge, I believe that we must reflect on the profound significance of military action and, consequently, on the role of our armies. First, we must examine the threats we face, then the way we deal with them, and, finally, infer practical consequences for the tools at our disposal.

THE THREATS WE FACE

When we study the crises we are involved in and that we think of as causes for concern today—in Africa, in the Middle East, and in Afghanistan, in particular—we notice that they share two principal characteristics:

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1 General Jean-Louis Georgelin is the Chief of General Staff of the French Armed Forces. English translation by Anne D. Baylon.
First, the crises are almost always those of the state, crises of the local political organization that is either incapable of keeping its own population at peace or unable to enjoy harmonious relations at the regional and international level. Strategy analysts sometimes call this the “notion of a failed state.”

Second, these crises trigger phenomena that go way beyond existing borders.

When I think of such crises I have in mind massacres and sometimes genocides that engender almost inextinguishable hatred. I have in mind population movements that, when exploited by unscrupulous smugglers, in particular in Africa, end up generating resentment and frustrations in the destination countries. I have in mind the effect of crises on production and energetic procurement, including their well-known impact on financial markets, particularly as they involve the Middle East.

I also have in mind the problems crises create concerning the water supply, which, in turn, generate new crises throughout an entire region. I have in mind the ecological disasters to which we are undoubtedly more susceptible today than we were yesterday. I have in mind organized crime, specifically illicit drug trading, with corruption, money laundering, and the discrediting of state organizations as its corollaries, which is a real threat to a region's equilibrium and which affects us directly. I have in mind terrorism, particularly in Afghanistan, which finds fertile soil and financing in destabilized zones and then casts its shadow over our societies.

I also have in mind the dissemination of conventional weapons, including the most sophisticated ones, through various kinds of smuggling. Such dissemination makes it even more difficult to confront the military challenges that our armed forces face. I also have in mind the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which puts at risk an ever-larger number of regions through the spread of long-range missiles.

These examples, which are well known, show how interdependent our societies are and how much we need to be connected to each other.

**HOW WE DEAL WITH THREATS**

We should not derive erroneous conclusions from the analysis I have just made. Although we live in an interdependent world, the disquieting phenomena I mentioned, which are triggered by state failures, arise from situations that are different and specific. Here, state instability is caused by history and derived from ill-defined borders, ethnic rivalries, or ancestral hatred. There, secessions or uprisings against the legal authority result from identity phenomena or religious fanaticism. Here, fragilities and dismemberments are due to powers along borders that have regional appetites. There, issues derive from a national or ethnic community’s feelings toward solutions that have been imposed from the outside, feelings that can even be stronger when the community has the perception that the international community is applying a double standard to solving the crisis. Here, problems arise from a marginal state’s feeling of insecurity, prompting that state to arm itself beyond its legitimate needs and to cut its links with the international community.

Thus a variety of reasons cause states to fail and, consequently, to generate the global and trans-border phenomena that feed the threats. These various reasons deserve our careful analysis; they also deserve to be thoroughly understood. In fact, nothing would be more dangerous than to aggregate all the causes of crises into a unique threat that would be promoted to public enemy rank under the pretext that our societies are interdependent and that crises reach out very far, sometimes even into our own territories. Very quickly, we can run the risk of creating this unique threat by uniting against us adversaries that have no particular reason to do so.

We know that the actual situation is quite different. Among those men and women who contribute to the phenomenon of the desegregation of states, you can occasionally find terrorists intent on using inde-
fensible means; you can often find men who rebel out of despair or arm themselves to defend a cause they believe in. There are also men and women whose motivations and objectives follow their own logic.

We should always try to understand those who take the risk of resorting to arms. This is my deep conviction, which is born out of my daily experience conducting operations. It is also the conclusion I reached based on my personal observations in the theaters and from reading reports from my staff when they return from a mission.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF OUR ACTION

That conviction prompts me to say that, in order to confront the crises we face, we must rediscover the meaning of military action. An army only acts, and should only act, based on a specific situation and after careful review of the limits of engagement. Every military action should also be viewed in its political context; its goal is always to subvert the will of the adversary who has chosen to fight. In order to reach that goal and to influence the adversary’s will, it may be necessary to resort to armed confrontation or to seek the destruction of some of the adversary’s forces. Sometimes, the simple threat of destruction is enough. In any case, our forces must show great determination if they are to work effectively on the adversary. This means taking risks and acting with great cohesion within the multinational coalitions that are the most common framework for today’s interventions. Once an engagement decision is made, French forces will be full co-partners of their allies, as is the case in Afghanistan.

When employing our armed forces, however, we must guard against several pitfalls. First, an adversary’s destruction can never be a goal in itself—let’s not take the means for the end. The use of force always necessarily takes on a political meaning—what matters in current crises is “the day after.” All of us know that one day, even though there may still be ambiguities, a “peace of the brave” will have to be signed. Therefore, the political negotiation that we will conclude with the adversary’s forces is what gives meaning to our action, so we must keep a partner for negotiation and understand all the intricacies and particularities of the crisis. In all crises, political negotiation takes place at all levels, both centrally and close to the theater of operations.

This brings me to the problems that occur when “non-political” security actors are involved. Although we can justify employing subcontractors in the area of logistics, for example, which is a rationalization of our expenditures, subcontracting with private partners for functions that may involve the use of force raises delicate questions as to their legality as well as to our goals. Indeed, in this case, the necessary link between political solutions and military means is broken.

I must also draw attention to a second pitfall: military forces have only a limited role in these crises. They are powerless to resolve by themselves problems that are essentially political in nature—other national or international political forces must participate in their resolution. It is always important that local actors be able to make the distinction between what concerns combat’s military logic and what concerns other types of logic.

For this reason in particular, France, which advocates a global approach to the resolution of crises, believes that a purely military organization like NATO or an ad hoc coalition cannot singlehandedly assume the global responsibility of the interagency and pluridisciplinary approach that the international community’s action must assume. If we fail to take into account this aspect of the question, the military operations we are starting may actually add complexity to a given problem rather than help to resolve it.

The third pitfall we should stay away from is the thought that armed intervention is the only way to deal with threats. Prevention is a major requirement. In this respect, armed forces have a dynamic role to play. Beyond cultural and national differences, the military from different nations may understand each other more easily than other groups. They are often trained in the same schools and often share similar
problems in terms of doctrine, equipment, and leadership. This shows the usefulness of both military defense cooperation and of the different exercises we can share with armies from countries in fractured regions.

In certain parts of the world, the army remains an institution that is among the most solid and open to the outside world. It is a privileged tool of positive influence that can consolidate the democratic state and highlight the necessary role of regional cooperation. This is the idea behind the RECAMP initiative in Africa, whose goal it is to allow Africans to create their own security by installing an African force on standby. The European Union has agreed to be in charge of RECAMP.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

I believe that the military institutions in our various nations and the multinational organizations we belong to constitute first-order instruments at the disposal of our political leaders. They are the product of constant investment by our fellow citizens and of the determination of men and women who, before us, served their countries in these institutions. They deserve our reflecting on their future and on the way they must be used, because an organization that cannot adapt and is centered on itself is condemned to disappear. These institutions also deserve our attention because of the consequences of the actions they have been asked to carry out, which sometimes require the use of force. It is to the credit of this conference that it permits us to reflect on these issues together.
Chapter 4

Forecasting and Influencing the Future—It Is Not Always What We Seek

Mr. Jean de Ponton d'Amécourt

OPENING REMARKS

Those of you who have previously attended events of this kind that are organized by France—and I realize many of you have—will know that I am required, by our administrative law, to make a short speech to mark the occasion. As someone who has, in the course of a long career in the public and private sectors, had to listen to hundreds—for all I know, thousands—of such speeches, I can promise you that it will be relatively short. I hope it will be amusing in places as well, and I believe it will address some important issues.

As you entered the majestic Hotel des Invalides for the evening, you were welcomed by the figure of Louis XIV on horseback. Just next door is the gold-capped mausoleum in which the Emperor Napoléon is buried. No one would deny that those two men are two of the great figures not only of France but Europe, and I would like to think that their spirits are watching over us this evening.

These two great figures from our history had a number of things in common, besides, of course, a commitment to a Europe united under French leadership. First, they each had an established tendency toward the exercise of unrestricted personal power; second, they had immense ambition, both for themselves and their country; third, they had great faith in the modernizing power of a rationally organized state; and, finally, as we are reminded by the pictures that decorate the room in which we meet, they possessed a great (some would say excessive) confidence in the power of war to mold the future of a people.

The heritage these two figures have left us—in its high points and its low points—reminds us that history is not always a product of what we rationally seek, but also tends to exaggerate, to the nth degree, the effects of unexpected events and unlooked-for developments. At its simplest, history is made not only through trends and through developments determined by the past, but also by clean breaks with that past.

1 Mr. Jean de Ponton d'Amécourt is Director of Strategic Affairs in the French Ministry of Defense.
The feeling I have—perhaps you share it—of being in the presence of the ghosts of these two great historic figures leads me to reflect not only on the lessons we can draw from their lives, as I have briefly tried to do, but, more importantly, on the possibility of a break with the strategic order of the past, which we ourselves, perhaps, may have to confront tomorrow.

To this end, I would like to share with you some thoughts on the 30 years ahead. We in the Ministry of Defense have been collecting these thoughts over the last few months and we have organized it—as you must when looking into the future—both by analyzing the major trends of today—that is the historical determinism part—and by looking at possible departures from those trends.

**FORECASTED FUTURE TRENDS**

I hardly need to say much about the major trends over that period, because they mostly represent common ground among organizations whose job it is to peer into the future. For example, there is the “Strategic Trends” document produced by our British friends and the American report on “Mapping the Global Future,” both of which have appeared in recent times. What we get from these reports is that the world in 2035 may contain a sepia-tinted Europe, a vision described as “gloomy” in the European Union’s long-term vision, whether it relates to:

- The population of Europe reducing in both absolute and relative terms, in a world in which the balance between Europe, Africa, and Asia is changing
- The vitality and competitiveness of its economy, at risk of falling behind because of a chronic lack of investment in the future
- Its technological potential, increasingly marked, as it is, not just by interdependence but perhaps by dependence pure and simple
- The possibility of constant competition for access to natural resources and energy
- An incontestable reduction in its military capability
- Issues, still unresolved, relating to the identity and the boundaries of the European Union
- Continued conflict around the frontiers of Europe, not the least of which is on its immediate borders, in the Near and Middle East and in the Black Sea area and Central Asia

Taken together, these trends amount to a vision that could be thought of as pessimistic, of a Europe progressively falling behind in terms of population and competitiveness and therefore in economic and military power, with uncontrolled fires raging on its periphery, in a world system in which its influence is reduced.

**THE DANGERS OF BREAKING WITH THE PAST**

In reality, nothing about the future is fixed. The worst is never inevitable. Indeed, it is clear that the future belongs to those who take hold of it and bend it to their will. There is no such thing as fate: mankind, individual men and women, are masters of their destiny. It is a matter of will. There is no reason at all why our future, in 2035, has to be like the unhappy picture I have described. It will depend very much on the policies that are put in place between now and then. It depends more than anything else on us.

But I do not intend to put too much emphasis on continuing trends; I intend to talk more about the dangers from strategic surprises, of discontinuities, of breaks with the past, which we might be faced with over this period. It seems to me that these possible discontinuities can be understood under three main headings: the world order, the idea of power, and the relationship with modernity.
The World Order

For the first of these, the question is, clearly, are we headed toward a better-ordered or a worse-ordered world? Will there be more order or will there be less? In fact, it is quite possible to address this question in an objective and quantitative fashion; order is something you can measure.

It is quite a different thing to ask whether we are moving toward a morally better world or a worse one. And you will understand immediately that this is not the frame of reference I use now. The question of the order of the world can be sub-divided into a number of others. For example:

Even today, each state is much more vulnerable to economic events elsewhere on the planet, even when it has little to do with the region affected, because crises spread in a paradoxical fashion. Could this process of infection produce a major international economic crisis, a catastrophic actualization of a risk that is always present in the system? One thinks, for example, of risks linked to the wild, and perhaps uncontrollable and unsustainable, rate of growth of China and the speculative bubble that is accompanying it.

Could the development, even the super-abundance, of international law go too far, and lead one day to states simply deciding not to respect it? Is it possible, in some way, for too much order to produce disorder?

Are we heading toward the progressive decline of non-proliferation regimes and the outlawing of weapons of mass destruction? This break with the past, which nobody wants, would be an especially powerful aid to the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems.

Can we imagine what it would be like if an extremely sensitive country, such as Iraq, were to come apart? This would lead to major regional instability, as each state tried to counter the effects of such a collapse or alternatively tried to benefit from it.

Power

The second type of discontinuity, that surrounding power, is of the most interest to us. It is clearly at the center of the strategic game and here, too, there are many possibilities. For example:

If there were easy access to weapons of mass destruction, facilitated by new information technologies, could this weaken or even destroy the regulating effect of the West's conventional military superiority? Do we understand the consequences of this radical “asymmetry”?

What about the weaponization of space? Could it open a new dimension for military conflict between states?

What would be the consequences of the first use of nuclear weapons since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, marking the end of a major historical taboo, with enormous doctrinal consequences?

Could keener and keener rivalries between “traditional” powers for access to natural resources and energy lead to a new Cold War conflict or, for that matter, a hot one?

The Relationship with Modernity

One last area in which the future might be radically different from the past is that which concerns the very basis of our societies and those societies with which our relations are problematic. Fundamentally, it is a question of whether there can be a convergence—or at least an orderly dialogue—between Western societies that have largely lost their faith in modernity as a source of progress and other societies. I am thinking here of various parts of the Arab and Islamic world that struggle today to find a route toward this type of model (if indeed that is what they really want), and Asia, which might, who knows, invent a new and unique concept of modernity for the 21st century, a century that, we are told, will belong to that continent.
Some other concrete examples of this issue are:

Western soldiers are more and more tied down by legal and other limitations, but have to confront an environment in which frequently there are no rules. We are thus at the point of revolution as fundamental as that which saw the complex ballet of 18th and 19th century warfare replaced by the total war of the two great conflicts of the 20th. There is a real risk that the conventional employment of military force could become inappropriate for coping with the spread of indirect strategies and wars of populations. If so, we need to think about radically different ways to employ our forces and new technologies such as roboticization, non-lethal weapons, situational awareness, or even embedding elements of our forces in the local population.

We might suffer a major WMD attack or a coordinated series of cyberattacks, disrupting vital information networks such as those for telecommunications. This would represent a significant development in the way in which terrorists operate, and our societies are not well prepared to confront this.

Could the tendency toward fragmentation of our societies into identity-based groups oblige us one day to reconsider something so basic as the notion of defense itself? In other words, in societies that are divided or have retreated into communitarism, who exactly is defending whom?

CONCLUDING REMARKS

After this rapid canter through several possible discontinuities that could affect us in the future, I would like to come back, by way of conclusion, to the two great historical figures whose memories I evoked at the beginning of my speech. We can learn from their examples that deterministic factors and global trends amount, in the end, to nothing, because they affect all equally and do not differentiate.

In reality, there is no possibility that a vision based on trends alone will come to pass in the form expected. There will certainly be surprises and breaks with the past. As has always been the case, it is the ability to forecast what may happen and the determination to act that make the difference between being left scattered by history and “surfing the wave” of historical progress. Seeing so many distinguished decision-makers and eminent experts on defense and security questions gathered together, I have no doubt that this capacity to peer into the future and then to act in a decisive manner is widely shared among us. This would be my wish for us collectively.

I began by citing Louis XIV and Napoléon. But there is another figure whom I am legally required to mention in all speeches of this kind that last longer than five minutes. It is not the president—not the current one, anyway—but it is, of course, General de Gaulle. Let me conclude, then, not with my words but with his:

“Happy are they with the highest ambitions, the most skilful performers, the leavening in the bread of life, who, stranded on the beach by the flow of ordinary days, dream only of sailing off on history’s tide.”
Chapter 5

Expanding Security Challenges in Afghanistan, Iraq, And the Middle East—An Operational View

General Rainer Schuwirth

In the previous few workshops participants had to endure presentations and go through question and answer periods with two generals who happened to come from Germany but were actually working in an international capacity. One was the Commander Joint Forces Command Brunssum, and the other one was me, at SHAPE. It has always been a pleasure to try to entertain you and we will try to do so again. Recently, I was joined on this panel by General Gerhard Back, and now by his successor, Egon Ramms, in office since the beginning of 2007. He will talk about Afghanistan and therefore I will refrain from providing comments on this operation.

Those of you who attended this workshop in 2006 may remember that it was a workshop that occurred just before the Riga Summit. It created some expectations about the Riga Summit, which have been accomplished, but we all live in the real world and know that things do not develop easily.

So, what I would like to do today is to give you a bit of flavor concerning certain areas that complement what Henri Bentegeat talked about: where we stand, and the continuing challenges that remain. I will do this discussing what we call established NATO priorities, namely, operations, cooperation, and, transformation and capabilities.

OPERATIONS

You all know and hear almost every day that operations remain NATO’s number one priority. At the moment a few more than 50,000 soldiers are deployed on three continents, but when you take into account that these soldiers have to be rotated every four or six months depending on the national rotation rhythm, at any given time you need a force package of between 200,000 and 300,000 soldiers. This becomes more and more difficult for the nations and consequently becomes more and more difficult for us, the force generators, to obtain the required capabilities.

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1 At the time of this workshop, General Rainer Schuwirth was Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE).
At the same time, annual costs are increasing. Just to give you two figures, and I am talking about the costs from the NATO budgets, in 2001 we spent 52 million euros on operations, money of course provided by the nations. In 2007 it is about 700 million. Again, this is almost peanuts compared to the sum of national contributions, but it becomes an increasing burden for the common NATO budgets because there is no willingness at all to increase them. If operation costs go up, all other costs must go down.

A third point is that, in principle, regardless of whether we talk about Afghanistan, the Balkans, or Africa, it is clear that we have to do more in order to develop indigenous capabilities. Developing national security structures in Afghanistan for the police and the forces, and doing the same in Africa and the Balkans, must be part of our success and exit strategy if we do not want to stay there forever and if we do not want to develop a culture of dependency or even perceived continuous occupation.

THE BALKANS

In the Balkans the military situation is stable but the political situation is becoming more and more shaky, as understandably the Kosovars are waiting for political solutions. As you know, the recent G8 summit was unable to unlock the difference of opinions concerning an independent Kosovo or the Ahtisaari proposal. NATO remains ready to do so to maintain a safe and secure environment and to support the implementation of the Ahtisaari proposal if so agreed.

The European Union is also prepared to field a follow-on mission to UNMIK in the civilian-support area, including the police. But so far, even with all excellent staff to staff coordination and cooperation between the two organizations, the political side has been unable to decide that NATO could officially cooperate with the European Union and that the two would give each other mutual support. At the moment there is no chance for such a political approval.

In Bosnia, Albania, Serbia, Croatia, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, with advice from NATO headquarters or from advisory teams, we continue to assist in building indigenous capabilities and to help these nations on their way to integrating into Euro-Atlantic structures. Under the Berlin Plus framework, we continue to support the European Union and run the EU operation in Bosnia from SHAPE with the embedded EU operation headquarters. From my point of view this is also the cheapest way for the European Union to have its own command and control capability.

The Mediterranean and Operation Active Endeavor

Turning to the Mediterranean, Operation Active Endeavor has kept this area free from terrorist use. It also has an additional very positive dimension because it has facilitated the development and deepening of contacts within the framework of the Mediterranean Dialogue and with countries along the Black Sea coast. And it has assisted more and more the understanding that threats do not only know any borders but use ungoverned spaces. Operation Active Endeavor also has become a facilitator for what I would call innovative transformational approaches: drawing on modern information technology and sharing information regardless of whether it is with a partner-nation or a member-nation of an organization. This kind of cooperation based on technical systems—the technical expression is Maritime Situation Awareness—has now extended well beyond the Mediterranean basin and certainly contributes to maintaining our security against the risks and threats from terrorists and other criminal groups.

Iraq and the NATO Training Mission (NTM-I)

The very modest NATO mission that is training Iraqi forces is now being expanded to include gendarmerie training. This is an example, as is our modest support for the African Union, of how the develop-
ment of indigenous forces can be supported with a rather small investment. What we should learn from that is, from my point of view, that rather than wait until fire breaks out we must provide early crisis prevention in a better, more coherent way by assisting countries in maintaining or achieving stability before the situation deteriorates into fights and civil war.

The NATO Response Force

We have talked several times during the workshops about the NATO Response Force, and you heard that it was declared fully operational at the Riga Summit. This certainly was a political declaration. Although significant improvements in meeting the requirements had been made, particularly through the efforts of Jim Jones, they were not fully achieved. I expect that we will be tasked to look into new methods for maintaining, sustaining, or modifying the NATO Response Force. Undoubtedly, while it may put a big strain on our nations’ resources it must be fit for use as we know that the next crisis is on the horizon or even closer.

TRANSFORMATION AND CAPABILITIES

There is not much to report on progress in the area of capabilities. It all has to do with money, with industrial benefit sharing, and, in certain cases, with national egoism. We all know and have talked during the workshops about where the shortfalls are, so I do not have to repeat that. But much has remained the same in that area, including, until to date, the inability of the NATO nations to decide to adapt the current NATO Command Structure in order to make it more deployable, which everyone knows is a requirement.

On a positive note, between the 2006 and 2007 workshops a significant amount of work was done and we have made some progress. But we cannot be satisfied yet, as we are confronted more and more with complicated issues. Most of these issues have to do either with principal political points, some of which surfaced in earlier discussions, or with resources or national approaches instead of multinational ones, be it on the side of NATO or on the side of the European Union. No one can afford to develop capability for EU purposes only or for NATO purposes only. We are also faced with political home fronts, as I call it, that lead to restrictions on the usability of forces. In NATO we call this caveats. And as of yet we have not experienced a real breakthrough within the NATO system for resource processes, which was already used during the Cold War but which is not at all fit to support today’s crisis response operations.

Finally, people everywhere talk about the comprehensive approach—it is also part of a lot of political papers and declarations. So far, however, the NATO nations have been unable to agree on a definition. When you ask who is responsible for it, it is difficult to find an answer. But I think we all share the understanding that we need to properly coordinate and have proper cooperation between NATO, the EU, the U.N., the OSCE, the African Union, between nations, and so on. And I think we also need to improve our communication strategy.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Just a final wish: When all the participants of this workshop go back to their countries, after having listened to the variety of topics discussed here, I hope they will participate in important discussions and activities and contribute toward better public understanding and awareness, including the media.
Chapter 6

NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan—The Operational Commander’s View

General Egon Ramms

As the acting commander of the NRF and the NATO operational commander for Afghanistan, I have a very special vantage point from which to address the topic of this very important event. We practitioners in the realm of international security share a great responsibility to the citizens of our nations as well as the people of the nations in which our forces are deployed. How well we do our jobs will have a lasting impact on the lives of generations to come. For NATO, how skillfully my colleagues and I implement the decisions of the North Atlantic Council will also determine whether NATO itself—an institution created nearly 60 years ago—can adapt to the changing environment we now face.

THE NATO COMMAND STRUCTURE AND THE ISAF MISSION

The part of NATO that I command has responsibility for all of Afghanistan. For those of you not familiar with military terminology, my role as the operational-level commander places me between the in-theatre commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), General (U.S.) Dan McNeill, in Kabul, and the Supreme Allied Commander, General (U.S.) John Craddock, at SHAPE. A third U.S. four-star admiral overseeing the activities of the separate U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan is also involved. Keeping a European view of the situation within NATO is also my responsibility, which I take quite seriously and which I feel serves an important purpose.

So my first conclusion is that the NATO command structure has demonstrated the flexibility necessary to meet the challenges.

The second question raised by the Afghanistan mission is whether the internal organization of the ISAF mission is correct. At the strategic level, SHAPE responds to the decisions of the political level and provides strategic advice to that level. My headquarters, Joint Force Command Brunssum, comes next and is tasked with translating the broad strategic guidance from SHAPE into operational tasks.

1 General Egon Ramms is Commander, Allied Joint Force Command, Brunssum.
Brunssum also develops the operational plans and the overall campaign plan for the ISAF mission and provides any support needed between manning and transportation for ISAF in Afghanistan.

Next in the chain of command is ISAF headquarters in Kabul and the forces of ISAF throughout Afghanistan. Whereas Brunssum looks 12 to 18 months into the future, ISAF is focused on the here and now and on the next few months. The very important tasks of ISAF are managed by General McNeill, an extraordinary officer with extensive experience in Afghanistan. General McNeill is supported by a multinational staff. Below ISAF we have five regional commanders and 25 Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

The operation in Afghanistan is a very complicated one, requiring each level of the chain of command to perform its unique tasks. We each depend on each other, but we must not duplicate each other’s efforts. In such an operation, it is unfortunately inevitable that bad things happen—casualties—to friendly forces and civilians, and collateral damage and accidents must be minimized.

So my second conclusion—which you may also take as a recommendation—would be that the NATO structure is well suited for the kinds of operations we are performing in Afghanistan, so long as each level keeps its focus on its unique and important responsibilities and ambassadors do not deal with tactical issues.

**THE NEED FOR ACTION**

The Operation Plan for ISAF has held up pretty well, but a plan cannot be a static thing, no more than political guidance can be static. Because opposing forces are not static—they are dynamically adjusting their strategy and tactics all the time—we must not be static either. Our operations must anticipate the opponent’s next moves and preempt those that would give him an advantage. Indeed, we must stay several moves ahead of the creative and determined opponent or opponents whom we face.

In the case of Afghanistan, our opponents have chosen to escalate their violence and use terrorist tactics against the civilian population. Suicide attacks and use of IEDs have increased. This has forced ISAF to also use a broader spectrum of means to combat the attackers. However, we face a difficult choice in doing so. Each time we use kinetic military means, we run the risk of civilian casualties and collateral damage and we make the task of winning over the support of the local population more and more difficult. Deciding when and how to respond to asymmetric attacks is one of the most challenging elements of this campaign and one that we are learning about while we are conducting the mission.

The picture I have drawn of the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan underscores the importance of the dynamic process of sustaining the political consensus behind NATO’s ISAF mission. Why is this critical? Because, as the situation in ISAF today clearly illustrates, the demands for resources for any mission will require the full support of all the participants. ISAF is too large, too complex, and too demanding to be left to just a few members of the Alliance. The NAC’s political decisions must be backed by commitments of human, materiel, and financial resources from all the member-states. I find it a little embarrassing that some non-members of NATO, for example, Australia and New Zealand, are doing more in ISAF than many member-nations of the Alliance. In my mind, this is a sign of a political process in need of some attention.

The result of the reluctance of nations to fully support the ISAF mission has practical impact on the ground. The shortages of helicopters and other key enablers in ISAF are no secret. The persistence and severity of these shortfalls are increasing the risk to our soldiers. We are putting our soldiers in the position of being told to do a dangerous job but being denied the training, equipment, and resources to do it. This is the situation in which we find ourselves today. So my third conclusion is that while I recognize that the way forward at the political level is sometimes difficult, it must remain dynamic and forward-looking. Most important of all, political decisions must be backed up by all the participants with the means to
carry out those decisions. Again, I think NATO’s existing structures are capable of carrying out that task but there remains much to be done in this area.

**BURDEN SHARING AND BURDEN SHIFTING**

One final word on resources has to do with burden sharing and burden shifting. In Afghanistan we have seen that the demands of the geography and the nature of the operation are beyond the capabilities of many of the Allies who voted for the mission in the first place. Only a handful of nations have the training, equipment, and resources suitable for use in Afghanistan. These deficiencies reflect decades of stagnant defense budgets, some failures to plan properly, and some reluctance to modernize forces, thereby making them less useful—in general, a rather widespread failure to invest in the tools needed to address the current threats, not to mention emerging threats such as cyber-attacks like those recently experienced by Estonia.

All too frequently in Afghanistan today we encounter sophisticated IEDs, but only a handful of nations have any counter-IED expertise, training, or equipment. We encounter suicide bombers, but only a few nations can provide actionable intelligence to address that threat. We engage complex targets requiring precision and video surveillance, but, again, only a few nations can deliver those capabilities. The solutions to these shortcomings will take time, but they must not become an excuse for inaction and their absence must also not become a reason to do nothing. ISAF needs more helicopters, but nations whose helicopters are unsuited for use in Afghanistan could still provide other critically short assets, perhaps an infantry battalion without the helicopters. A nation that cannot supply UAVs could still provide trainers for the Afghan National Army. Many ISAF requirements have remained unfilled for months, and most are not high-technology requirements that only a few nations can meet. So this issue of force generation is one that I would have to say is not yet responding to the changed threat environment we face today.

**SUCCESSES IN AFGHANISTAN**

To this point I have described a NATO system that is fundamentally sound but which seems lately to be faltering in some key areas. That is not to say that the ISAF mission itself is endangered. Our operations in Afghanistan in the past year have succeeded in placing the opposing forces under great pressure. In places, Afghan citizens are responding with an increasing willingness to cooperate with ISAF—as we, with our Afghan partners, demonstrate the ability to sustain a security presence in a given location, the people have begun to show their support for ISAF and the Afghan government and against the radical opposing elements among them. This is critical to our success—we must gain and maintain the support of the people.

Toward that end, we have been successful in eliminating many top opposition commanders and other leaders and in inflicting significant losses on the opposing forces when they made the mistake of confronting our forces directly. We have made a great deal of progress in improving security in the most heavily contested areas in the south and east. Our casualties have been high, it is true, and I regret each one individually. But the price we have paid has not been in vain and we all should keep sight of that fact.

However, the ISAF campaign is now moving to a critical phase that requires a better understanding of the task before us and a renewed effort by the member-nations. As the NATO Secretary General has correctly stated, and as everyone at this workshop well understands, the stabilization of Afghanistan will not be achieved solely by military means. The threat to Afghanistan’s stability today derives from where we started. In December 2001, Afghanistan was a failed state that harbored a large terrorist infrastructure
that had been ruled by a radical fundamentalist dictatorship. Every measure of wealth, education, and human welfare placed Afghanistan at or near the bottom. Hunger was the norm. But the international community has done much to minister to this very sick patient and since 2003 NATO has expanded its role to reach the current level of support for restoring security.

**EMPLOYING THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH**

Today, Afghanistan is not a failed state. It has an elected president and parliament, a growing economy, and an improving infrastructure. But it also has an active insurgency. Why? I believe it is not so much because the radical Taliban and other opposing forces have become so strong, but because the government of Afghanistan remains so weak. This is something for which the international community bears some responsibility.

Reconstruction has taken too long. Too much development assistance has been wasted and too little attention has been paid to developing a competent, honest, and responsive government and to developing Afghan human capacity. Even today, there is no lead nation for training Afghan civil service workers.

But what do these failings have to do with NATO? Indeed, a few nations have raised this very question in the political discussions that occur in Brussels. The argument is made that NATO is, after all, only a military alliance. It is said that NATO lacks the expertise or the skills to address the shortcomings of governance and economic development. These are 100%-correct observations. I have no economic planning staff in my headquarters, no one capable of training lawyers and judges, no banking experts, no agronomists, no urban planners. There is no way around these limitations. With proper support from the nations, I can provide the 20 or 30% of the solution to Afghanistan's problems that relate to security and military matters. But who will provide the other 70 or 80%?

Let me offer the opinion of a simple soldier. As the operational commander, I have the task of bringing security to Afghanistan—a necessary but not sufficient condition for everything else that the international community is trying to achieve. The Riga Summit Declaration stated the situation much better than I could do. It said, and I quote, “Today’s challenges require a comprehensive approach by the international community involving a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments. . .”

From the operational perspective, what this statement means seems quite clear; however, how to bring it about is another matter. To me, the work being done by ISAF is an integral part of the comprehensive approach. The strengthening of Afghan security with NATO and Afghan forces is gradually bringing the security needed to permit the other requirements to be met. I can even go a step further and say that if I had the resources I have asked for, I could support some of those people and institutions that might provide the additional elements of the comprehensive approach that are beyond my capabilities.

For example, I might find that a good governor is unable to extend his reach in his province due to a key road that needs to be secured, or because he lacks communications or occasionally needs a helicopter to get to remote areas. Perhaps a team of engineers needs to survey the snow cover to determine whether a valley is threatened by flooding. Or maybe a medical training team needs security to train a group of midwives. These are things a well-resourced military force could provide in support of the comprehensive approach. We could help strengthen governance and demonstrate the ability of the government to deliver services to its people. These clearly non-military tasks would be supported by ISAF but not provided by ISAF.

Another example of how ISAF might support the comprehensive approach involves intelligence. Suppose an area is assessed by intelligence and through the personal involvement of the PRT is ready to shift allegiance to the government, but it needs better security to allow engineers to feel safe enough to begin reconstruction efforts. ISAF could target that location not with 500-pound bombs but with a secu-
rity advisory team to show the villagers how to improve their own security. Again, the reconstruction would be left to the experts, but ISAF could enable those experts to do their work by enabling the Afghans to create the necessary security conditions.

U.N. RESPONSIBILITY

At a higher level, the task of organizing a comprehensive approach in Afghanistan needs to find a sponsor and a home. Is this a task for ISAF? Is it a military task? I say, clearly not. Should it be done by the United Nations? I think it should. The mandate exists and recently UNAMA has shown greater interest in cooperating more closely with ISAF.

If the U.N. stays away from dangerous provinces because it fears for the safety of its staff, this is the wrong approach. ISAF must help the Afghan National Security Forces protect U.N. field offices in dangerous locations since this is precisely where the U.N.’s presence is most needed. Likewise, the U.N. must be willing to co-locate with a PRT or other ISAF field installation if that is the only viable option. Again, ISAF can play a supporting role, but must not step into a lead role in areas for which we lack the necessary skills.

THE AFGHAN MODEL

Is what I am describing simply a naive and idealistic dream? I am certain that it is not because I have seen it being done today in Afghanistan. Once again it is the Americans who are leading the way. The United States has put enormous effort, huge amounts of money, and its best people into Afghanistan. The U.S. has suffered the most combat casualties and losses of equipment, yet it has sustained its effort over many years. I am very appreciative of the U.S. commitment and would like to see other nations make a proportionate level of effort. Soldiers of the (U.S.) 10th Mountain Division recently completed their extended 16-month tours of duty in Afghanistan—which greatly exceeds the four-month tours of duty of many ISAF soldiers, who have a fortnight’s leave halfway through. The soldiers of the 10th Mountain Division did an excellent job, too, especially in regard to winning hearts and minds, reconstruction, and development. During a recent visit to ISAF’s Regional Command-East I had the opportunity to assess the work of MGEN Rodriguez in RC-S and his extremely able team, particularly a task force commander named Colonel Nicholson. It was there, a few weeks ago, that I saw the comprehensive approach in action.

While the debate continues in Brussels about whether the comprehensive approach should be pursued in NATO operations and how to do it, men and women in Afghanistan are simply doing it. Combat operations, Special Forces missions, psychological task forces, broadcasting, reconstruction and development, quick impact projects, Provincial Reconstruction Teams, U.S. and other nations’ aid projects—all are woven together like a handsome Afghan carpet in a very impressive way. Civilians and military members work together harmoniously and with great dedication in a well-conceived and coordinated counterinsurgency effort. Americans, and Allies, are working with Afghan leaders, elders, and the general population in a very effective way. It is something everyone here would do well to see for themselves. It will give you hope, as it did to me, that it is possible to bring all the complex pieces of this campaign together where it matters most, at the village, district, and province levels.

One thing the Americans are doing that should serve as a model is their placing emphasis on improving the quality and availability of good governance in their area of operation. Leveraging their access to vast resources, PRT and Task Force commanders spend most of their time working with Afghan counterparts and civilians to address local needs. Their approach is to use minimal force when force is needed, and to conduct most operations partnered with Afghan units. In doing so, they are gradually building
Afghan capacity with an eye to a decreasing and less visible ISAF role in the foreseeable future. To be sure, the area of operations is still dangerous and hotly contested, but it is not a barren battlefield. Rather, it is an area in which the people are becoming hopeful.

**THE WAY FORWARD**

My final note is this: The international community has much to be proud of in Afghanistan and we should feel satisfied with how far we have come. At the same time, Afghanistan was a terrible mess when we arrived and many of its deficiencies are not susceptible to quick solutions. By deciding to hand over responsibility for all of Afghanistan to NATO, the Alliance has taken a step into the unknown. In doing so we have revealed some of NATO's shortcomings but, in my view, no fatal flaws. By recognizing at this stage that the task before us demands skills and resources that NATO does not have—and should not have—we have identified the way forward. Now we need to shelve the esoteric debate about whether the comprehensive approach is a good thing and how it should be defined and simply move on to its implementation as best we can. We do not have time for philosophical contemplation. We have a model that seems to be working well and that I am sure we could enhance with ideas from other nations currently operating PRTs and forces elsewhere in Afghanistan.

What the Afghan people want—and what our publics want—is progress toward achievable goals. I believe with the proper support of the members of the Alliance, the many other non-NATO nations already engaged there, and those nations still considering joining this very honorable effort, we can be successful. But the road to success must be travelled together with the Afghan government and the Afghan national security forces (ANSF). We in ISAF and NATO have to enable the ANSF to do their work and the Afghan government to take responsibility. Those are the big tasks we need to fulfil before we can step back to the second line, which is the prerequisite for later withdrawal. We cannot leave 70% of the work to be done in Afghanistan undone. That is the reason I do not use the phrase “exit strategy.”

For my part I intend to ensure that my headquarters and ISAF and its soldiers meet every operational demand of this mission at the highest professional standard, with the urgency and dedication that this important task deserves.
Part Two

General James L. Jones
Ambassador Rogelio Pfrirter
Dr. Arthur T. Hopkins
Mr. John Ashton
Chapter 7

Energy as a Security Imperative

General James L. Jones

OPENING REMARKS

In the aftermath of my active duty career, I have had the opportunity to sit back and reflect a bit on a number of things. Before I get into my presentation, I would like to say that one of my conclusions is that this 21st century will be a century in which the very concept of security will have a much more expanded notion, perhaps greater than we can imagine. The evolution of the world from the bipolar 20th century to the very brief unipolar period to, more recently, what obviously will be a long-term multipolar world is a fact of life we have to deal with and whose implications we have to analyze very carefully. I believe it is essential to understand the characteristics of this multipolar world and their implications for what constitutes security, both national and international.

THE CHARACTERISTICS AND CHALLENGES OF A MULTIPOLAR WORLD

Looking at my own nation and at what I know of other nations, it seems to me that multipolarity is having a profound impact on the very institutions, both national and international, that are charged with maintaining and preserving our concept of what we think of as security—that impact might make some of us wish for the good old days of the 20th century, when life seemed to be a little simpler, a little more ordered, a little bit more predictable, and a little clearer. It was certainly easier to categorize then, especially when you look at the diversity and the difficulties and the greater number of issues that go into our concept of a secure globe or a secure nation today.

In addition to being broader, the new characteristics are also more asymmetric, and they include, in my view, a broader range of issues:

• Cyber security is certainly up there on the list.
• Energy is there as well: we touched on that briefly at Riga and the last summit and went to great lengths at NATO to discuss it and hold some related events; the Secretary General was very committed to the idea that energy is a security issue.

• The security of the energy infrastructures that support what we seek to achieve in energy security is obviously a very important topic.

• So is the increasing impact of drug trafficking on the economic underpinnings of extremist movements in the world, with Afghanistan a prime example.

• Illegal immigration of people, with its enormous potential for impacting demographics all over the globe.

• The proliferation of non-nation state actors and the request for weapons of mass destruction.

• The stability of world commerce, climate change and its impact on security issues such as world hunger, education and poverty—all aspects of potential terrorist and extremist breeding grounds.

All of these things together—and the list could probably go on—are factors that have to come into play in any discussion addressing security.

Broadly speaking, security is no longer simply the property of a nation, its Ministry of Defense and Foreign Affairs, and perhaps its national security advisor. It includes the whole gamut of international and national organizations that must work more cohesively together and must work at a much more rapid and agile pace than perhaps ever before in order to deal with the multiplicity of the challenges and the speed with which they arrive. Today the very viability of our national and international structures is being tested, and it is not just the property of one or two or three agencies or institutions.

THE NEED FOR PROACTIVE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Clearly in Afghanistan the potential solution is not simply a military one. The narcotics problem, police reform, and judicial reform must also be addressed, just three examples of the diverse issues that go into solving an international security problem. In the Sudan, we see international institutions held back by their own rules and regulations from doing anything positive to stop what some have referred to as genocide and that are clearly human problems of enormous proportions. Similarly in Iraq the solution set argues for a broader-based solution set and strategic consequences, not just for the region or for the United States or any one country but for all regions, especially concerning matters pertaining to energy and energy infrastructures.

Generally speaking, there seems to be a rise in the number of non-governmental organizations both at the national and international level that organize themselves to do what some 20th-century governmental institutions either won’t or cannot do. On matters pertaining to energy, this is particularly important. Therefore, it is imperative that we clearly understand the security environment we face.

I draw a lot of lessons from the business community, which has shown itself to be much more flexible and certainly much more rapid and agile in the diagnostic work that goes into assessing the environment for future markets, adapting the business to the environment, making the changes in order to be competitive, and then simply doing it. National and international institutions need to do more of that type of thing as they seek to understand the marketplace composed of the very sectors that are part of the new security environment we collectively face. Just as businesses whose existence and survival depend on clear analysis, rapid action, and a demonstrated ability to change, those of our institutions that are concerned with security—and I feel particularly strongly about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—need some agility and speed.
To my mind, nowhere is this more evident than in the area that we call energy security, where the outcome will be felt at the international, national, and even the family level. Energy is a global, national, and local issue. It is fundamentally critical to the economic stability of our markets and it will have a deep impact on security but also on our environment. Energy and the energy infrastructure will be true challenges as the global appetite for energy dramatically increases and our infrastructures do not keep pace, which is predicted and which will severely strain resources in the future. The next 20 years will see a dramatic rise in electricity, natural gas, and transportation fuels demand in a world that we can only begin to understand, and they will also see a corresponding impact on the environment and the global climate. I am convinced you cannot have a serious discussion on energy-related issues without having an environmentalist at the table.

The links between energy, security, and the security of our critical infrastructures deserve a little bit more attention. The rise in the demand for energy should cause us to look critically at both the security and capability of our critical infrastructures to deal with what I characterize as a coming energy tsunami in terms of demand. Despite the efforts of many people, Riga only peripherally touched on the energy security challenge but what it did was encouraging. I hope that the Alliance will continue to broaden the envelope regarding the critical energy security issues.

A good example of the way key international organizations such as the U.N., the European Union, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are not changing rapidly enough to deal with the rapidly changing strategic environment can be seen in the way they face security challenges—reactively rather than proactively. Being proactive is required in my view and failure to recognize the imperative to do so will cause some institutions to fundamentally rethink their raison d’être in order to move into new exciting fields; this means that we will wait, possibly until it is too late. The cost of addressing security challenges, of course, will increase exponentially the longer we wait.

ENERGY AS AN INTERNATIONAL, NATIONAL, AND FAMILY ISSUE

In places such as Sudan, where the collective will of many nations is being tested, energy is a huge part of the problem. It is also fair to say that one element of the world’s energy portfolio, oil, is being used as both an economic and a political weapon. This situation is likely to stay as it is for a considerable period of time, and the implication of the trend for Middle East scenarios is also significant for the world. The trend towards nationalization of oil assets is an international security issue—77% of the world’s oil reserves are now nationally owned. In my view, the question is, can international organizations stand idly by as the Gulf region slides towards chaos? The energy impacts of the global supply of oil on that region alone could be very significant in the future. Isn’t it time to take proactive action to mitigate the effects of a potential crisis in that region?

The way ahead is both clear and relatively compelling. When I was offered the opportunity to form the Institute for 21st Century Energy in association with the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, I eagerly accepted. I believe it to be a national security issue as well as an international and family security issue. We need to consider all three aspects as we undertake our mission and we need a comprehensive, global energy strategy that is well understood, rational, workable, and environmentally sensitive. It also must be affordable, diverse, secure, and fundamental to economic growth and to international and national security.

EDUCATING THE PUBLIC

Over the next year, this institute will develop a document that will articulate a pragmatic strategy for a national view as well as address U.S. responsibility in the international arena. The United States must be
part of the global solution and not part of the global energy problem. We will be asking those who sit at our table, both real and virtual, representing the demand sector, the supply sector, and the environmental sector, to put self-interest aside in favor of the common good. We will be educating at the grass-roots level to show our publics that the issue is much more complex than the price at the pump, although that seems to stimulate the most activity in the near term. We will also battle the myths surrounding energy—the idea of energy independence in a global economy seems somewhat absurd. In addition, we will study the impact of global warming on future energy solutions and the successes others have had creating a vision that has materially assisted their national drive. In particular we should tip our hats to France for its nuclear power vision, which has put France in a good position, at least in terms of one aspect of energy. In the United States, the market for alternative sources of energy was $30 billion in 2006. U.S. venture capitalists have invested seven times more in green technology than their European counterparts, which is one of the brighter pieces of news that I have been able to uncover thus far.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

I conclude that the only workable solutions are global—individual nations cannot solve the problems by themselves, although sovereign interests are certainly at stake. None of our existing institutions, either national or international, seem to be able to effectively address the diversity of the expanded security challenges, and change is definitely and urgently required. We will need to deal with these issues sooner or later, and, in my view, it makes good sense to start now, before it is too late.
Chapter 8

The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Chemical Threat

Ambassador Rogelio Pfirter

OPENING REMARKS

It is a very great honor and a pleasure for me to be here today at the 24th International Workshop on Global Security and to address this prestigious audience. I would like to thank most warmly His Excellency Hervé Morin, the Minister for Defense, and Dr. Weissinger-Baylon for their kind invitation to me to attend this important meeting, which represents a timely contribution to the debate over the contemporary challenges to international peace and security.

France has the proud legacy of hosting in 1993 the historic ceremony at which 130 nations of the world signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and committed themselves to achieving a world free from the scourge of chemical weapons. Today, as the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) commemorates the 10th anniversary of its establishment, it is my proud privilege to be in Paris and to share with you a brief account of our progress and our challenges.

THE HISTORY OF THE CWC AND THE OPCW

In 1992 the Security Council recognized that new threats to our security environment from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction were imminent. Twenty-five years later, this danger is felt more acutely, especially because of the possibility of terrorists acquiring and using these weapons. Against this background, the value of the CWC is magnified when we consider that the international community has almost universally joined a treaty regime aimed at the total, verifiable destruction and non-proliferation of a whole category of such weapons. The groundswell of support that the CWC, with its 182 States Party, enjoys from the community of states is an indication of these nations’ commitment to rid the world forever from the threat of chemical weapons and of the binding force that their total ban has acquired under international law.

The chemical weapons ban has successfully broken new ground in multilateral disarmament. The Convention is the most comprehensive disarmament and non-proliferation treaty ever to be imple-

1 Ambassador Rogelio Pfirter is Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).
mented and occupies a crucial position in the global security architecture, including being an effective tool to address the threat of international terrorism.

The achievements during the 10 years that the Convention has been in operation have been significant in our attempt to contribute to international peace and security through chemical disarmament. Notwithstanding the challenges that we face, the realization of a world that is completely free from chemical weapons appears today not as an improbability but as an achievable goal. Within a relatively short time span and despite the impasse in disarmament and non-proliferation generally, the Convention has been broadly accepted by the international community as a credible and unique instrument for the elimination of a whole category of weapons of mass destruction. The OPCW has emerged as a robust and efficient institution that is carrying out its mandate with dedication and determination.

CURRENT CHEMICAL THREATS AND DANGERS

At the same time, we recently witnessed how present and dangerous the threat of chemical weapons still is in our world today. The recent multiple cowardly attacks with chlorine gas carried out in Iraq to kill and injure innocent civilians came as a tragic reminder of the dangers that the misuse of toxic chemicals, even the most common ones, poses to our security, and of the importance of striving to strengthen the norms against chemical weapons and to achieve the goals enshrined in the Convention.

As the Director-General of the OPCW, I condemned these attacks in the strongest possible terms. The Executive Council of the Organization also unanimously condemned these actions and firmly rejected the use of toxic chemicals under any circumstance. Making the world free from chemical weapons is a challenging and multifaceted task. Under the Convention, this goal includes not only achieving chemical disarmament and ensuring non-proliferation, but also supporting effective domestic implementation and promoting international cooperation in the peaceful uses of chemistry. In the face of increasing threats of terrorism, the salience of OPCW programs in the field of assistance and protection has also increased.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION PROGRESS AND GOALS

During the first 10 years of our work, our attention has been understandably focused on possessor States meeting their destruction obligations. The Convention set for those states the ambitious task of destroying over 71,000 metric tons of chemical warfare agents and nearly nine million munitions within a period of 10 years. Eliminating this huge stockpile of extremely toxic and dangerous substances, while ensuring that neither people nor the environment is harmed, has always been a daunting challenge for possessor States.

Undoubtedly, some gratifying results have been reached. By the end of April 2007, over 22,000 metric tons, or almost 32%, of the declared chemical warfare agents were destroyed in six States Party. At the same time, all 65 former chemical weapons production facilities that were declared by 12 States Party were permanently inactivated, 42 of them destroyed and 19 converted. The contribution already made by this process to our global security environment cannot be underestimated.

But while these figures indicate steady progress, it is just as clear that disarmament efforts will continue to demand most of our attention, energies, and resources. As you are no doubt aware, all six possessor States have been granted deadline extensions for destroying their chemical weapons. India and another state party have made steady progress in their destruction efforts and seem to be on the right track to meet their final destruction deadlines. By May 29, 2007, Albania destroyed approximately 71% of its Category 1, and approximately 76% of its Category 2, chemical weapons stockpiles. Although it did
not meet its April 29, 2007 extended deadline, Albania is continuing its efforts and remains politically committed to complete destruction as quickly as possible.

In the United States, the destruction campaign has remained stable, and by June 1, 2007 this possessor State had destroyed over 12,000 metric tons, or approximately 44%, of its Category 1 chemical weapons. In the case of the Russian Federation, there is encouraging progress, especially with the recent momentum resulting from new destruction facilities coming online, as I personally witnessed during a visit to the destruction facility at Kambarka in April 2007. By May 2007, the Russian Federation had destroyed more than 8,500 metric tons, or approximately 21%, of its Category 1 stockpiles. I remain hopeful that both Russia and the United States will leave no stone unturned in order to uphold their obligation to completely eliminate their stockpiles by the 2012 deadline set forth in the Convention.

I continue to believe that the solemn commitments undertaken by all States Party to the Convention will be honored, and I support possessor States in their efforts to achieve this target. Let me take this opportunity to recognize once again the support that the destruction program in the Russian Federation is receiving from the G8 countries through the Global Partnership, and to further encourage donors to continue to engage and cooperate with Russia in this endeavor. In this regard, I welcome with satisfaction the G8’s declaration, at its last meeting in Heiligendamm, expressing its support for strengthening the WMD multilateral treaty system, including the CWC. That declaration also embodies the G8’s commitment to promoting effective implementation by all States Party and full compliance with their obligations under the Convention.

ENSURING THE NONPROLIFERATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

While we must persevere in upholding the provisions of the Convention that cover disarmament, there are other pressing priorities that need to be tackled. The Convention contains provisions and obligations that, if effectively implemented, will go a long way toward addressing the international community’s heightened concerns about proliferation and possible terrorist acts perpetrated through the use of chemical weapons. Lax controls over trading in, manufacturing, or selling toxic materials can not only lead to their proliferation but it can also increase the risk of chemical terrorism, especially since the knowledge and the skills needed to produce rudimentary types of chemical weapons are not difficult to acquire.

Since June 1997, when they first began, the OPCW has completed over 2,900 inspections to ensure the total destruction of stockpiled weapons and the non-proliferation of chemical weapons and their precursors. Elimination of chemical weapons being the primary objective of the Convention, the most frequent inspections take place at chemical weapons-related facilities. The largest amount of inspector time has been devoted to overseeing the destruction of chemical weapons and a major allocation of inspection resources will continue to be made in support of the disarmament aspects of the Convention. Over time, though, as inventories of existing stockpiles reduce significantly and the CWC regime matures further to adapt to contemporary needs, inspections at industrial sites will continue to increase.

We should not forget, however, that rapid advancement in technology and developments in the chemical industry represent a significant challenge to the Convention. New research, synthesis, and production technologies and new business and organizational models represent evolving conditions that did not exist at the time the CWC was negotiated. We need to adapt to the changing circumstances if we want to maintain the effectiveness of the chemical weapons ban. At the same time, strengthening the non-proliferation aspects of the Convention also requires an enhanced regime concerning industry verification, especially in the category of Other Chemical Production Facilities (OCPFs) of higher relevance to the objective and purpose of the Convention. In this context, an effort is required of the Organization and
its policy-making organs to try to improve the industry verification regime. The Technical Secretariat is ready to give its full support to Member States to conceive and implement improved inspection site selection criteria and verification methods.

STRENGTHENING LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY FOR HANDLING TOXIC CHEMICAL MISUSE

Eliminating existing inventories of chemical weapons is not the only means for rendering our world a safer place. While the Convention sets out a concrete legal framework for disarmament and non-proliferation, it is vital that states have in place the necessary legal and administrative capacity to apprehend and prosecute all individuals and entities that contemplate the misuse of toxic chemicals for criminal or terrorist purposes. When OPCW Member States fulfill their obligations under the Convention, such measures translate into security enhancement for themselves and for other state parties.

We have also had to recognize the hard fact that not every OPCW Member State is currently in a position to detect, pursue, and prosecute a breach of the Convention by nationals within its jurisdiction. We have therefore been intensifying our efforts since the adoption by the first CWC Review Conference in 2003 of an Action Plan to enhance national implementation, to identify areas for improvement, and to spend the time, money, and effort required to address perceived gaps as expeditiously as possible.

Effective national implementation implies leaving no loopholes in domestic legal systems that might compromise full compliance with the provisions of the Convention, including enacting penal legislation with respect to prohibited activities, improving border controls, and introducing appropriate industry regulations. The OPCW has spared no effort in providing States Party with technical assistance to implement all aspects of the Convention, and the results of our combined efforts are today quite tangible. As of May 2007, 74 States Party had legislation in place covering all key areas of the Convention while a further 43 had enacted implementing legislation that covered some, albeit not all, key areas. In addition, 95% of our Member States have designated or established their National Authorities, which are the key actors in the adoption of domestic implementing measures. Full and effective implementation of the Convention in domestic legal orders appears even more important today in the face of the threat of terrorists acquiring chemical weapons, especially within the meaning of UNSC resolution 1540 (2004).

THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE OPCW TO GLOBAL ANTI-TERROISM EFFORTS

While not an anti-terrorism treaty, the CWC has a contribution to make in this area. Resolution 1540 (2004) creates an obligation on all U.N. member-states to adopt a series of concrete legal and administrative measures to prevent non-state actors from gaining access to weapons of mass destruction, which, as regards chemical weapons, are equivalent to the obligations enshrined in the Convention. With its extensive legal definitions and provisions establishing a legal mechanism to prevent and repress access to chemical weapons and toxic chemicals by persons, groups, and other entities, the Convention represents a necessary and effective complement to the obligations set out in the council’s resolution. Full implementation of those legislative measures, including the universal application of the principle of extraterritorial jurisdiction inscribed in the CWC, helps to ensure that any violators of the Convention can be prosecuted and punished, that declarable activities are reported and transfers of toxic chemicals and precursors are properly monitored, and that transfer prohibitions required under the Convention are enforced.

The OPCW contributes to the efforts toward achieving implementation of resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1673 (2006) and cooperates with the Security Council and its subsidiary body to this end. At the same
time, the Organization operates in strict accordance with its mandate under the Convention. On February 23, 2007, I addressed the Security Council at its meeting on the issue of “Cooperation between the Security Council and International Organizations in the Implementation of Resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1673 (2006),” and briefed on the OPCW’s contribution. On that day, a Presidential Statement was issued whereby the Security Council acknowledged the contribution of the OPCW in the implementation of those resolutions.

**OPCW SUCCESSES AND ONGOING EFFORTS**

An outstanding achievement of the OPCW is represented by the wide adherence that the CWC has attracted in a relatively short time span. On March 7, 2007, Barbados became the 182nd state to ratify the Convention. In the Middle East, Iraq and Lebanon informed the Secretariat that they have taken concrete domestic legal steps toward accession. In Africa, Congo has made the decision to ratify and will soon join the OPCW. The Technical Secretariat is also currently engaged with Myanmar, a signatory to the Convention, in an effort to persuade the country to ratify. Myanmar’s interest in the Convention is evidenced by its increasingly frequent attendance of OPCW-related events.

However, despite being the fastest growing disarmament treaty ever, the Convention has still not been accepted by a few states. A number of these states have been hampered by a lack of administrative assets or human resource constraints and we are working with them to find ways of addressing their difficulties. Other countries are located in regions that face political difficulties. For example, Egypt, Syria, and Israel continue to cite a number of security compulsions as reasons for not joining the Convention.

For my part, I continue to stress that the Convention should not be linked to any other security or political considerations—there is no legal, political, or moral justification to retain the chemical weapons option. If anything, such an option adds to insecurity in the region and further complicates efforts for bringing peace and promoting harmony. Removing the specter of chemical weapons from the Middle East arena will add to regional stability. The countries of the Middle East can utilize the CWC as a vehicle for dialogue concerning their security situation, and mutual efforts in this area could lead to other initiatives and help with the peace process.

I am continuing my efforts with the countries in the region. I travelled to Egypt. Immediately after that, I met with a delegation from Israel at the OPCW headquarters in The Hague. I presented those countries with what I believe are compelling arguments for them to join the chemical weapons ban, including as a measure to defuse tension in the region and progress toward the elimination of WMD prospects and toward promoting peace in the Middle East. It is evident that the achievement of universality in this region will continue to pose challenges. At the same time, though, I do value the presence of Egypt, Israel and Syria as observers at our Conference of States Parties, as well as the disposition to holding a friendly and frank dialogue with the OPCW as shown by Egypt and Israel, both during my visits to those countries and in the exchanges held with their envoys at our headquarters in The Hague. In the case of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), the recent developments towards resolving the nuclear issue might also open up prospects towards that country’s consideration of joining the Convention. I will continue to urge participants in the six-party talks to include this issue in their agenda at the appropriate time. DPRK’s acceptance of the Convention must remain a key objective, because it is fully consistent with the goal of complete elimination of chemical weapons from the world.

In the Caribbean sub-region, despite relevant decisions by the Organisation of American States that call for the establishment of a biological and chemical weapons–free zone in Latin America, there are still two countries that are not yet states party. Their non-participation is not inspired by any fundamental disagreement with the objective and purpose of the Convention and it is my hope that the recent adherence
by Barbados will encourage the Bahamas and the Dominican Republic to take concrete steps toward joining the Convention. In Africa, we hope that Guinea-Bissau and Angola will soon join the rest of the continent in support of the Convention. For our part, the Technical Secretariat remains committed to engaging with these countries to encourage their early adherence to the Convention.

**PROMOTING A SENSE OF OWNERSHIP**

Along with our other key objectives, we also need to promote a sense of ownership in each and every state that joins the Convention. In particular, States Party must be reassured that the Convention's regime does in no way aim to hamper their economic development or their participation in legitimate international trade in chemicals. The Technical Secretariat has been carrying out an important number of activities in the field of international cooperation, ranging from the annual Associate Program to laboratory assistance programs to research projects. Through our international cooperation programs, the OPCW continues to develop key disciplines that strengthen national capacity to pursue peaceful chemistry and to effectively implement the chemical weapons ban. For instance, the OPCW trains chemists and engineers in industrial best practices to safely manage chemicals in a complex industrial environment. Over 1,400 participants have been sponsored to attend such training programs. The OPCW also supports specialized training programs that enhance analytical skills and supports research projects and encourages internships at world-class research institutions.

**CONCLUDING REMARKS**

This workshop offers a very interesting and ambitious program for discussion. My message to you is that while, indeed, we face a number of challenges, we remain totally committed to fulfilling our mission to implement the provisions of the Convention in order to achieve the vision upheld by the international community of a world free of chemical weapons.

The OPCW is a young Organization entrusted with fulfilling an unprecedented mission in the history of disarmament. The Organization is a worthy example of the way to address and resolve issues in a cooperative, multilateral framework on the basis of consensus. This in itself should serve as an inspiration to all state parties to continue to work together to ensure the Convention's successful future and to see the OPCW as a contributor to global efforts to face the contemporary challenges to our security environment and to maintain international peace.

In closing I would like to say that we could not have come this far in implementing the Convention's provisions and in contributing to advance the cause of international peace and security without the steadfast and sustained support of our Member States. I wish to conclude by expressing my warmest appreciation and gratitude to France for its dedicated commitment to the goals of the Convention and its outstanding record of support for and co-operation with the OPCW.
Chapter 9

How to Reduce WMD Proliferation: 
The New Risks and Responses

Dr. Arthur T. Hopkins1

OPENING REMARKS

Last year's Berlin discussions and the current participation of so many thoughtful people have created high expectations for this year's gathering. The diversity of opinion, just within this group, is a basis for understanding the most important elements of global security and serves as strong testimony to the fact that we do share so many interests and values. However, we all recognize that our common interests in global security are gravely threatened by the prospects of global terrorism, and by potential threats from the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.

AN UPDATE ON PROLIFERATION

My comments today will start with updating what I reported last year: the risks of, and the responses to, proliferation. Today I would like to offer some observations on new risks and responses.

In June 2006, the risks of nuclear, chemical, and biological proliferation were well recognized. We noted the increasing numbers of nations that wanted to acquire nuclear weapons. Public headlines about Dr. A. Q. Khan were fresh and discussions with North Korea and Iran were major news, best described as difficult. Medical pandemics were also in the news, and the growing biological threat potential was becoming common knowledge. Now, a year later, North Korea has conducted a nuclear test and Iran is further along with its enrichment programs. We still have not identified the anthrax attacker in the U.S. and Iraq has seen the use of toxic industrial chemicals as indiscriminate weapons of mass destruction.

In April of 2007, the New York Times reported in a front-page story, with the headline “Fears of an Arms Race,” that a dozen states in the Middle East are seeking International Atomic Energy Agency help in starting nuclear programs. The article went on to note that “the rush of activity is intended to counter the threat of a nuclear Iran.” Turkey and Egypt are specifically identified, and Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates are said to be considering, or planning for,

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1 Dr. Arthur T. Hopkins is Assistant to the U.S. Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs (Acting).
nuclear power. The Wall Street Journal summarized nuclear proliferation quite succinctly: “The problem with nuclear weapons today can be summed up as follows: They are going out of fashion where they are needed most, and coming into fashion where they are needed least.”

In addition to nuclear concerns, other threats have evolved over the past year. For example, biotechnology remains a major concern as dual-use technologies make counterproliferation more difficult and genetic engineering leads to prospects of threats that might actually diminish the value of existing vaccines and countermeasures. Nanotechnology that could be used to enhance biochemical agents or evade medical countermeasures is a growing concern. The emerging public health threats are gaining more attention, especially when coupled with the accelerating vectors provided by global connectivity and modern transportation. And with respect to chemicals, we’ve recently seen a toxic industrial chemical, chlorine, used as a terrorist weapon.

At the same time, there have been some positive developments. It has been a productive year in terms of securing nuclear weapons and materials in some former Soviet states. It also has been a remarkable and productive year in chemical weapons destruction. The holding of conferences such as this one during the past year indicate that international awareness and concern are growing.

A FRAMEWORK FOR REDUCING THE THREAT OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

When we talk about reducing threats from weapons of mass destruction, we have learned from history that there is no single action that will make the world safer. In practice, we have to take a number of steps to dissuade the acquisition of WMD, prevent its use, identify bad actors, assure that we have the ability to retaliate effectively, and recover from a WMD attack if necessary. A framework that includes the three elements of nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management helps to organize our thinking and underscores the fact that each is necessary, but not one is solely sufficient, to reduce global threats.

The most efficient and effective measures are taken upfront, early in the process, when nonproliferation measures such as treaties, agreements, and other cooperative measures can actually unite nations in dialogue about their common goals for global threat reduction. But nonproliferation measures have limits, some of which are reached when national interests override and universality is not achieved, most notably as a result of threats from non-state actors. Recognizing the strengths and weaknesses of nonproliferation’s cooperative nature, counterproliferation options are necessary to help with deterrence. But experience has taught that investments such as missile defense and offensive counterforce weapons are very expensive and also potentially limited in reducing WMD threats.

The third element of this framework, the ability to manage the consequences of WMD use, is absolutely necessary, but certainly not sufficient, to reduce threats. Like the other two categories, nonproliferation and counterproliferation, recovery from a WMD attack would be time consuming, imperfect at best, and expensive in both dollars and, most importantly, in terms of human lives.

Overall, global security does require all the elements of nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management, but the challenge is defining the balance among them. Realistically, the nature of WMD threat reduction is that no one nation has a monopoly on the science, technology, and intellectual capacity needed to dissuade or prevent or otherwise deny proliferation or use.

At the last workshop I noted three imperatives for controlling the risks of proliferation: #1—controlling nuclear proliferation; #2—controlling WMD materials; and #3—sustaining strong international partnerships. It is interesting to look at events a year later and assess where we stand with respect to nuclear, chemical, and biological threat reduction progress.
NUCLEAR THREAT REDUCTION PROGRESS

With respect to controlling WMD materials, at the 2006 workshop I talked about the limited success of the Nonproliferation Treaty, the need for full implementation of the IAEA Safeguards Additional Protocol, and the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, or GNEP, concept. GNEP is a way to support international nonproliferation goals. It is a concept for partnering to develop advanced safeguards and security technology and protect against the diversion of nuclear materials. It is interesting to note that, according to the BBC, the Russian offer to assist Iranian nuclear development apparently contained what they called a “confidential protocol” that included provisions similar to GNEP for returning spent fuel rods to Russia. GNEP, along with the Proliferation Security Initiative (a global effort to stop trafficking of WMD) and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, are potentially effective nonproliferation measures to reduce nuclear threats. Their common thread is global partnership.

One new idea that would support nuclear nonproliferation is based on attribution. Until now, much of the serious technical and political thinking about reining in nuclear proliferation has focused on denying proliferators the ability to successfully attack. Complementing the deterrence of proliferation by denial, an interesting dialogue has been taking place on the possible effectiveness of deterrence through attribution.

What is new here is the prospect of multinational partnerships in forensics, with technologies, techniques, and data shared among nations that have developed nuclear weapons or are producing fissile material for peaceful purposes. With collaboration and technology sharing, teams of nations could enable nuclear forensics experts to determine the origin of nuclear weapons, fission fragments, and fissile material. The experts would do so with enough authority and credibility to deter nuclear threats and proliferation by essentially insuring attribution and denying the sanctuary of anonymity. A potential benefit may be dissuading both suppliers and terrorists by essentially fingerprinting the nuclear materials to identify the aggressors and their outlaw collaborators. Articles in the October 2006 Nonproliferation Review and the spring 2007 issue of the Washington Quarterly both discuss the strategic and political issues as well as the technical hurdles in creating an international nuclear forensics capability. Perhaps this forum will help.

CHEMICAL THREAT REDUCTION PROGRESS

Earlier I mentioned the recent terrorist use in Iraq of the chemical chlorine as a weapon. In April 2007, a suicide bomber used a truck with explosives and chlorine to kill 27 people. Three other attacks with chlorine sickened—that is, burned the lungs of—350 civilians. In addition to the obvious humanitarian, legal, and treaty concerns, these actions highlight the need for all nations to examine and strengthen industrial security and transportation practices for toxic industrial chemicals.

During the year before the workshop, I had the privilege of delivering periodic progress reports on the U.S. chemical weapons destruction program to the 182-nation Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the OPCW, in The Hague. The worldwide commitments, and especially the U.S. and Russian efforts to destroy what is the overwhelming majority of the world’s stockpile of chemical weapons, are true success stories. These nations committed billions of dollars and rubles, respectively, to eliminate all chemical weapons by 2012. Both nations also learned to deal with the tyranny of timetables when safety, not just a timeline, is the metric that is most important to citizens. We have also all learned to deal with technical surprises and with munitions that are over 50 years old and not really designed to be demilitarized in a safe, controlled environment. We also have learned how to successfully address the concerns of local communities, environmental advocates, regulatory communities, and political stresses. Both
countries are now on track to meet near-term destruction goals and are setting the example for collaboration and cooperation for possessor states.

In fact, in addition to living up to our commitment to completely destroy our Cold War legacy stockpile of 30,000 tons of chemical weapons, the United States continues to be the world’s most generous partner in chemical threat reduction efforts. We are in the final stages of our $1.039 billion program to assist Russia in constructing a chemical weapons destruction facility at a place in Siberia called Shchuch’ye. That facility will greatly contribute to Russia’s ability to live up to its commitment to destroy its 40,000-ton chemical weapons stockpile.

Our active support of both Russia and Albania is just one element of another success story, the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program. Fifteen years after its inception, the program has not only contributed to chemical weapons destruction, but it has also strengthened the security of nuclear stockpiles, eliminated hundreds of strategic offensive systems, enhanced security at biological research facilities in former Soviet states, and generally created an atmosphere in which shared goals and mutual trust have enabled many nations, some former adversaries, to unite in the interest of reducing WMD threats. CTR is one of several U.S. programs that, in total, have provided more than nine billion dollars of nonproliferation-related assistance to former Soviet states.

**BIOLOGICAL THREAT REDUCTION PROGRESS**

Biological threats are certainly not new. History has seen the use of filth, cadavers, animal carcasses, and contagion in attacks on armies, civilian populations, and food and water supplies. Worldwide literature even includes stories of how fleas from plague-infested rats could be used by terrorists to start a plague epidemic. Fortunately, most state-sponsored offensive programs have been stopped, and replaced by defensive programs for detection, protection, vaccines, and therapeutics.

What is new, however, is DNA synthesis technology. The ability to synthesize novel life forms (or genomics) could lead to much that is good for society, such as novel treatments for diseases and new ways to prevent infections. It also has the potential to be misused, to create dangerous pathogens. This especially dangerous dual-use technology will require special attention, and strategies, to prevent its misuse.

The U.S. National Science Advisory Board on Biosecurity has been looking at the effectiveness of national policies and regulations to strengthen biosecurity, to develop recommendations for more efficient and effective oversight of dual-use life science research, and to help foster international dialogue. The board concluded that it is possible to construct infectious agents from synthetic or recombinant DNA fragments. It certainly is not easy, and the process requires some art, but the technology is internationally available. (Note the obvious parallels here with nuclear energy technology.) Currently there are laws against knowingly producing, synthesizing, or engineering select biological pathogens, but one of the board’s key findings is the need for more governance and harmonized international cooperation to provide oversight as well as guidance for the providers of nucleic acids and genomes as well as their consumers, the international research community.

**THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION**

All of the previous information just adds to the obvious fact that international cooperation and collaboration will continue to be crucial. Today, no one nation has a monopoly on technical innovation, military capabilities, or operational skill. All the nations that are represented at this workshop, and many that are not, are vitally interested in the same global security concerns. I would like to leave you with the observation that there are effective solutions, but they are complex and must include the full spectrum of nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management. All three areas rely on partner-
ships, and our experience has shown that some key steps have contributed to successful partnerships. These steps include participating in dialogue and collaborating in science and technology, exercises, training, and cooperative threat reduction measures. However, as a U.S. defense policy official stated in testimony to Congress in May 2007: “The first line of defense in combating weapons of mass destruction is international cooperation.”
Climate Change Is a Threat Multiplier That Must Be Addressed As an Issue of Collective Security

Mr. John Ashton¹

As you listen to what I have to say, you may at first think that I am talking about something rather different from what Ambassador Akram and Major General Zhan talked about. The challenge for me is to convince you that my topic is not a different problem, and that the challenge of climate security is fundamental to the way we need to think about security today.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF NOT ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE

We know enough about climate change to know that if we do not come to grips with it—and, frankly, we have not done so, despite the intense coverage of the issue and the way it has climbed the agenda over the last few years; we have not begun to shift our patterns of production and consumption to the low-carbon basis the problem requires—we will face more failed and failing states, greater competition for water, more intense competition for productive land and energy resources, and migration on a scale that has not been seen before in human history.

In the spring of 2007, a group of very distinguished retired United States generals and admirals published a report on climate change in which they described it as a threat multiplier, a factor that, combined with other factors, tends to destabilize and amplify those factors. I think this is a very powerful image, and provides the key to thinking about the relationship between climate change and security.

Currently France has 10,000 troops deployed in seven African countries. In all of those countries, problems are arising from the consequences of human-induced climate change that are making the security situation worse. For example, the international community has been struggling for several years with the tragedy that has been unfolding in Darfur in the Sudan. That part of the Sudan has suffered almost a 50% reduction of its rainfall over the last couple of decades in the exact way the climate models predicted would happen in that part of Africa during that particular time frame. Now there is solid consensus that the water problem caused by the climate problem has made the Darfur problem even more difficult to

¹ Mr. John Ashton is Special Representative for Climate Change at the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
deal with. Perhaps we would still have the Darfur tragedy without it, but inevitably it has made it more difficult. The evidence is even stronger in Somalia, where threats related to climate change are multiplying.

Recently the British economist Nicholas Stern published a report on the economics of climate change and concluded that if we do not deal with it as the decades unfold in this century, climate change will become a market failure on a scale greater than the combined consequences in Europe of World War I, World War II, and the Great Depression. One may question whether the term “market failure” is even sufficient to encompass the social, political, and economic consequences of disruption on that scale, but if we learned one lesson in Europe in the 20th century it is that economic disruption on a large scale has security consequences. If market failure occurs, it will result in part from a failure of political imagination to respond to climate change as a security threat.

**CLIMATE CHANGE AS A COLLECTIVE SECURITY ISSUE**

Climate change—and this is where what I say may sound a little bit different from what you have heard so far—is not a traditional security threat. It is not a threat that can be dealt with by investing in the traditional instruments of hard power and it is not a traditional threat in the sense that there is no country or region that can insulate itself from the security consequences of climate change. It is, therefore, a problem of collective security, not national security, and if we do not succeed collectively in dealing with it, in building very rapidly a global low-carbon economy, then we will all face security consequences that we would rather not face.

What we have to do is learn to use soft power more effectively in order to avoid having to invest a great deal more blood and treasure in hard power as the hard security consequences of climate change unfold. We need to invest in the diplomacy of energy, for example, as part of our security investment. Traveling to east Asia these days, spending time in China and in Japan, you get a sense that both countries increasingly recognize that making the major economies of east Asia less energy intensive and more energy efficient is seen as a security investment as well as an energy investment. Japan and China are working very closely together on energy efficiency, which is good for security as well as for the economy.

**RESPONDING TO CLIMATE CHANGE ON A WORST-CASE-SCENARIO BASIS**

We will succeed in responding to the climate challenge only if we respond to it as a security challenge, an economic challenge, and an environmental challenge. Over the last 10 years we have been dealing with it primarily as an environmental challenge, and we now know that this does not work alone. We cannot solve the climate problem as an environmental challenge because that does not capture the full dimension of the problem.

What does it mean to deal with climate change as a security challenge? It means that we must plan on the basis of a worst-case scenario while we hope for the best. When you face a security challenge, you do not just hope for the best, you do not just hope that things will pan out and be a bit less serious than they seem. You make decisions on the basis of the worst case possible and you try to mitigate the risks of the worst case possible. This means that we have to realize that the only effective response is one that deals with the problem in its totality and in a cost-effective way, rather than one that deals with some of it on a cost-benefit basis that understates the risks of not dealing with it effectively. Either we build a low-carbon economy quickly or we do not.
FUNDING AND DEFINING CLIMATE SECURITY

The powers who have invested in the unfolding events in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2003 have invested about three-quarters of a trillion dollars of their taxpayers’ money to do so. If we could mobilize even a fraction of those public resources to deal with the next stage of the climate problem we would basically break the back of the problem. I am not saying that we should stop spending money on traditional defense in order to spend it on the transition to a low-carbon economy, nor am I saying that public investment is the primary instrument for building a low-carbon economy. It is not—this is a very complex problem that requires a multiplicity of instruments. What I am saying is that we will only respond on the necessary scale if we understand the full dimension of the problem, including the security dimension.

That was very apparent in April 2007 when the United Nations Security Council for the first time debated climate change as a result of an initiative put forward by my government. The debate was the largest thematic Security Council debate in the history of the United Nations, and participants from the varying countries reached a very high degree of consensus that climate change is a security problem as well as other kinds of problems and that we need to see it in that light.

Let me just add here that doubts and questions were raised about the appropriateness of raising this subject in the Security Council, but our intention was not to usurp the authority of other U.N. groups or processes—the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Affairs Council, or the U.N. climate process. It was to make sure that the work of those organizations and processes was better informed by a discussion of the implications of climate change on international peace and security. Now, we will continue to make our case and to try to build a shared understanding so that we can use climate change as a political impulse that brings us together as we learn to live in a world of increasing interdependence. If we do not use it to bring us together, it is going to drive us apart.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

President Museveni of Uganda recently talked about climate change as an act of aggression by the rich countries against the poor countries. His words reflect the fact that the psychology of security has entered the debate, and certainly it is true that the problem we now face is largely a result of the choices that were made in growing the economies of the industrialized world. The industrialized world does need to hold itself accountable for that if we are going to succeed in building a genuine collective response to this collective security problem, but we cannot afford interpretations such as President Museveni’s to grow. That would be destabilizing, not only regarding our efforts to deal with climate change but regarding our efforts to build a multinational system based on the rule of law and on the idea that the biggest problems we face are shared problems to which there are only shared solutions.
Part Three

Estonian Defense Minister Jaak Aaviksoo

The Honorable John G. Grimes

Mr. Robert Lentz

Lieutenant General Ulrich Wolf

Mr. Tim Bloechl
Thank you for inviting me to speak here today on a topic that in my opinion deserves more attention than it has gotten, specifically, the topic of this panel, “Cyber-Defense: The Unnoticed Third World War.” I believe this topic reflects the reality of today. Whereas conventional threats have more or less stayed the same, a new and potentially more menacing type of activity has arisen that so far has not been given much consideration. One could even say that it has been deliberately isolated in cyber-space and dealt with only on the margins—until events in cyber-space made us pause and re-think the issue’s impact on our security.

CYBER-ATTACKS IN ESTONIA

As you may know, Estonia recently was hit by a politically motivated cyber-campaign that targeted government, industry, and private sites using a wide array of offensive techniques. Though it is difficult to identify the persons, groups, or organizations behind the attacks, we do know that most of the attacks were carried out not only by amateurs with primitive methods, but also by highly skilled cyber-attack specialists with significant resources. The attacks were not only protests against the Estonian government, but also large-scale, well-coordinated, and targeted actions that took place at the same time as political, economic, and media events. In our minds, what took place was cyber-warfare and cyber-terrorism.

Estonia is one of the most wired countries in the world. Roughly 60% of the population use the Internet every day and over 97% of all bank transactions are done online. Indeed, the Internet has become a common channel through which people pay their taxes and even vote in local as well as general elections. Hence, e-services and access to the Internet are integral parts of our society. The unprecedented cyber-attacks that occurred can thus be defined as attacks against the Estonian way of life. It is clear that if we had not applied timely countermeasures the situation could have turned much worse and posed a significant risk to our national security.

His Excellency Jaak Aaviksoo is Minister of Defense of Estonia.
In essence, the cyber-attacks against Estonia demonstrated that the Internet is a battlefield of the 21st century, and our increasing global dependence on the Internet, online services, and our critical information infrastructure is making us more vulnerable. As demonstrated by the events in Tallinn, effective political propaganda can motivate a significant number of people to launch a massive cyber-attack almost instantly, potentially damaging critical information infrastructure even when the attack is carried out by amateurs.

Cyber-domains thus present a paradox—the more wired you are, the more attractive you are as a target, because the potential damage is greater. Even those countries that are technologically well advanced are vulnerable to cyber-attacks—complete safety simply does not exist. Of course, one could say that human lives are not at stake in cyber-attacks, but when you imagine a situation in which basic everyday needs are denied, for example, traffic systems are hacked and emergency numbers are unusable, you can see that human lives can be very much at stake.

**ADDRESSING THE ISSUES OF THE 21ST-CENTURY BATTLEFIELD**

As we try to come to grips with this new 21st-century battlefield, certain aspects immediately stand out:

1. **Dealing with cyber-defense in general.** It is worth asking ourselves whether it would serve our common purpose better to start acknowledging the impact of cyber-defense on our civilian as well as our military affairs. I think we all agree that our military command and control, ISR, and precision strike capability rely on ensured access to the electronic spectrum. It is also clear that losing freedom of action in cyber-space is not an option. At the end of the day, all the data in our national or international neural networks is relatively useless unless it can be protected.

   In Brussels, NATO defense ministers agreed that urgent work is needed to enhance our ability to protect information systems of critical importance to the Alliance. I think this is definitely a step in the right direction.

2. **When tackling a problem that is international in nature, such as cyber-defense, more rather than less cooperation is the only way to deal with it.** Estonia is a small country, open, transparent, and cooperative, and it was our transparency and eagerness to cooperate that enabled us to mobilize quickly and minimize the cyber-attack damage.

3. **The need for a legal framework.** Closely tied to the aspect of cooperation is perhaps the toughest issue—that of a legal framework. All of us should ask ourselves, Do we as nations, but also as allies and partners, possess all the required judicial instruments? Do we have a proper legal code that defines a cyber-attack in detail? Do we know where cyber-crime stops and terrorism or war begins? Should NATO, for example, safeguard and defend not only its communications and information systems but also some critical national physical infrastructures? And what of collective defense when cyber-war is being carried out against one of the Allies?

**CONCLUDING REMARKS**

As you can see, I do not have many answers yet, but if we do not start answering these hard questions soon, we will not be able to deal with the future effectively. As we try to draw the right conclusions for the way ahead, it would serve us well to look to the past, because the nature of cyber-defense is not that different from another field of endeavor, specifically, sea faring.

The European Long-Term Vision that was agreed to in 2006 puts it well—it sees cyber-space as a new common environment that states and organizations aspire to access and control. The sea was actually regarded in the same way for centuries, because the sea had and still has an international character and is a
place where trade and international communication are conducted. In addition, two of the main problems of cyber-space are the enormous degree of anonymity among the players and its ever-expanding nature. We are asking now, How can we handle that? How can we make sure that the communication lines between suppliers and customers are protected? These are the same questions that were asked before the Information Age regarding the communication lines at sea.

Because this workshop is being held in Paris, I would like to take the opportunity to remind you of the Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law that dates from April 16, 1856. This short piece of paper called the signatories to abolish privateering, which basically was seen as state-sponsored piracy. The declaration represented the first multilateral attempt to codify in peacetime rules that were to be applicable in the event of war. Though it had holes in it, the declaration established maritime law among the major powers of Europe.

Now, once again in Paris, we need another universal convention, this one against cyber-crimes, be they state or non-state in origin. That is because cyber-defense will not work if there are national or international judicial gaps. The choice we must make is not to change our way of life or stop developing technology that makes our world a better place, but to effectively stop those who want to attack our way of life by abusing that technology.
Estonian Defense Minister Jaak Aaviksoo
Chapter 12

The Power and Challenges of the Internet

The Honorable John G. Grimes

It is a pleasure and an honor for me to talk to all of you today. Actually, though, I feel like a fish out of water, because usually I talk to my own kind of folks—techies—and we talk about networks and systems and that kind of thing. But I believe I can add a few things to the discussion, although this morning I sat in on the first session, which was very enlightening, and a number of my points were discussed. But global security can mean different things to different people. Security is a perception—what you see depends on where you stand.

THE POWER AND CHALLENGES OF THE INTERNET

Let me start by talking about connections. As we all know, we live in a global society whose pace has been accelerated by the advent of the telephone, data networks, jet airplanes, television, and now the Internet. Some historians think that globalization started with the 707 and the telephone back in the early ‘50s, and of course it is gaining speed every day. You cannot overestimate what the Internet is now doing. It is pervasive. You can get connected just about anywhere. And it has moved us beyond the Industrial Age into the Digital Age or the Knowledge Age, in what some call a borderless society. To understand it better, you may want to read The World Is Flat, which is about as good a reference as you can read if you want to understand the impact of information on our society.

In my own work the key thing I am charged with is information sharing, and the only way you can share information quickly is through the Internet. But The 9/11 Commission found that certain government elements—law enforcement, foreign intelligence—did not share information. Some of the difficulties associated with the lack of sharing came from activities conducted by DOD intelligence and counter-intelligence units during the 1960s and 1970s when the United States experienced significant civil demonstrations and protests. Over time, information on the legitimate political positions and expressions of U.S. persons was collected and shared with law enforcement authorities. These acts were determined to be abuses of Constitutional rights and laws were passed to prevent DOD, law enforce-

1 The Honorable John G. Grimes is U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Network and Information Integration, Chief Information Officer (CIO).
ment and intelligence agencies from collecting and sharing certain information. As national security concerns evolved—particularly in light of 9/11—the U.S. Patriot Act loosened restrictions in certain situations.

Of course, technology plays a bigger role than ever before. Now the Internet is heavily involved. A few months ago, when I had breakfast with representatives of the Federal Reserve Bank, we discussed their concerns about all the international finance transfers that are taking place at night—$12.4 trillion have been transferred. Their concerns are not only about the physical aspects of transfers but also the connectivity involved. It is the same with international air traffic control and with worldwide public health and with the military. We had some scares when misinformation was put on the Net. So we benefit from Internet technology capabilities but they also bring us problems.

The downside to Internet technology, of course, is that information can be stolen or damaged and service can be denied. Personal identities can be stolen, money, credit cards, intellectual property—we see it every day. In the military, the Department of Defense, the amount of information that is being exfiltrated from our unclassified networks is just unbelievable—and supposedly we have some of the best defense.

**FACING THE LOSS OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE**

In the public’s mind, the fastest-growing problem right now is the criminal element. The non-state actors—like terrorists—are all exploiting the capabilities and vulnerabilities of the Net. And the Net does have vulnerabilities—just ask Microsoft. Before they even get out a fix for a problem, another problem hits.

I do not want to sound like an alarmist, but I want to give you some empirical data about how devastating it can be if you lose a critical infrastructure. About a year and a half ago, off the coast of China, an earthquake took out an undersea cable. Although most of the traffic was rerouted, the capacity really went down, and if several such events happened simultaneously, you would have consequences you do not want to even think about. That cable going out was not catastrophic, but it definitely disrupted a lot of information sharing and of course the enormous amount of trade that takes place between China and us.

Another issue is satellite systems, which we do not often think about. But we have become more dependent on satellites, especially in remote areas without infrastructure or wireless capabilities, and satellites are now used to back up special undersea cable connections. One issue with satellites is that there has been intentional interference with GPS signals. Of course, GPS signals are critical—we all depend on them one way or another, whether for locations or for system timing. Not long ago there was an attack on Brazil’s power grid, the SCADA network, which caused major disruptions. We are working with industry to prevent more of these kinds of attacks from happening.

The threats we face in the information environment can come from anyone, from harmless teenagers to criminal organizations, non-state actors, and nation-states that are intentionally infiltrating and corrupting our systems. Recently, when I was in Brussels, a serious broadband cyber-attack was perpetrated on Estonia—the aggressor patched together a network of more than a million compromised computers using public domain machine-launched waves of denial of service attacks that lasted for nearly a month. Telephones switches were flooded, data packets and emergency numbers were temporarily unreachable, and e-mail was crippled for four days. This was no haphazard attack—it was orchestrated. General Wolf’s team provided some assistance—most people do not realize that NATO has a cyber-space center of excellence in Estonia. These are the kinds of things that can inflict severe damage and loss of life.
THE GLOBALIZATION OF THE SUPPLY CHAIN

The Internet is now quickly moving to wireless communication to enable mobility. I live and die by this PDA (holding up a Blackberry). As an aside here I want to mention an issue related to the Internet—at the International Telecommunication Union (ITU, a U.N. organization) meeting, a worldwide radio conference in Geneva this October, there is going to be some very serious discussion about the spectrum that supports the Internet, because any time you broadcast in free space someone is probably able to intercept what you send and break it down.

But back to information sharing and the globalization of supply chains. As you know, many of our contractors and many of our businesses build and assemble on a global basis. Boeing and Airbus are prime examples. Both have contractors in all parts of the world, both are connected and sharing parts, and we are very concerned about that because many supplies are coming on- and offshore. So we are working to ensure that production continues and we can depend on getting critical components in times of national emergency.

One of the most critical elements in this is software. Every major program I have that is in trouble, be it a weapons system or a business system, invariably involves software. A lot of software code is written overseas, a piece here and a piece there, and then all the code is integrated. We are always concerned about what may be in that code. You may wish to ask Tim Bloechl when he speaks about Microsoft about what the company is doing to protect software code for both its business and government customers.

PROTECTING KEY INFORMATION SYSTEMS

One of the elements of the Riga Declaration underscores how critical NATO believes command and control information is—the declaration speaks for the first time about protecting key information systems against cyber-attacks. But we are going to have to address this subject in all that we do, and here I will talk about another area of ITU. When General Jones was at EUCOM, he pushed very hard for what we call stabilization or reconstruction of nations. That means going into a nation before you have to put in weapons to train people, establish an infrastructure, and develop communications and technology. We are making this kind of critical effort now and I believe other countries are as well, especially to assist Third World countries that need that kind of help to stabilize their government. All too often destabilization occurs when nations do not have an infrastructure in which the government can operate and provide services to support the people. Our new command, AFRICOM, is going to have State Department inter-agency organizations as well as two deputies, so we are doing what General Jones urged—we are out there for peaceful purposes, stabilizing and reconstructing and restoring peace.

PROTECTING THE ECONOMY

Now I want to comment about something that happened recently. Last May the FBI took down a guy from Ghana who was going to take out JFK airport. Two comments he made that the FBI intercepted are 1) just by taking down JFK America will be demoralized, and 2) through military or business means we will take down the American economy. That is the focus of many terrorist groups now, whether they are religious groups or otherwise.

Immediately after 9/11, the president decreed that the National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee to the President, which I was chairing, ensure that Wall Street was back up on the following Monday morning. We broke all the rules, but we got Wall Street back up to signal to the world that America’s economic base was still functioning. Everyone was concerned that the devastation would
snowball, just as the Wall Street plunge snowballed during the Great Depression. The president realized that terrorists were focusing on our economy and worked to prevent them from taking it down.

THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

The ITU, with its global cyber-security agenda, plans to help increase technical and legislative cooperation among its 191 members. To do this they are going to establish teams to help nations in need but they are also going to encourage nations to do more on their own. The Department of Defense is also encouraging cooperation among agencies and partners. For example, the work to limit the damage of the cyber-attack on Estonia ended up involving NATO as well as EU Justice ministers. The way ahead, at least for the foreseeable future, will involve cooperation between international organizations involved in Internet or radio systems if we are going to have safe and assured use of the Internet, because it is under continual major attack by numerous and varied actors. Like our air traffic systems and our water systems, all of our information systems are fragile and subject to being brought down.
The issue of cyber-security was teed up at the global summit in Moscow. It was at that summit that we began to more seriously discuss the information technology and security issues that stemmed from our movement into the Information Age. We also started to discuss there how we, as institutions, NATO and the EU in particular, would address those issues.

Since that time, Roger Weissinger-Baylon has regarded that topic as a very important one, and today we have a very distinguished panel addressing the subject and taking it very seriously. I think we can all agree, based on the comments that have been made since the beginning of the workshop, that cyber-security is a strategic imperative and something we have to start dealing with.

In his luncheon address, John Grimes covered a lot of ground, so I will not go into the particulars of why this area is so important. I will say, however, that if there is one summary of why the topic is important, it is that institutions are not only making a strategic security and stability shift from guns to blankets, as we talked about earlier, but that they are going from guns to blankets to information, because there is no doubt that without the full use of our information and computers and information technology, our institutions will not be successful in bringing enhanced security and stability to all the regions we have been talking about at this workshop.

One example of just how much our network technology is already benefiting people everywhere and how our institutions can leverage that situation is the effort now underway to design inexpensive, small computers—the cost is being driven down below $50—to make them so human-friendly that people in the most illiterate and underprivileged countries can use them. The fact that personal digital assistants (PDAs) can now be used by farmers in Africa to map their fields to instantly download satellite coverage to determine irrigation patterns or to get quick, up-to-date weather information shows that we can use information technology to our advantage, especially in the areas of security and stability in very underprivileged regions.
This panel is going to be dealing with such issues. It is also going to deal with the issue that Mr. Grimes raised—that advanced information technology is a dual-edged sword, because while we can leverage it and it is a tremendous source of great strength, it is also a significant source of vulnerability, because it can make us very vulnerable to the kind of cyber-terrorism that is now on the rise.
Chapter 14

Cyber-war and NATO

Lieutenant General Ulrich Wolf

The threat of cyber-war is real and it is amongst and could be waged against all of us. Are you aware that you might be a cyber-terrorist? While of course you would not be one intentionally, there is a chance you might be one by accident.

THE POSSIBILITY OF ROBOT ATTACKS

Let me explain this statement. There are such things as “robot attacks” in which thousands of computers are connected to overload a targeted storage device with messages and with the aim to shut down its services. The systems used are high-jacked by the attacker and are distributed all over the world. An estimated 50 million machines around the world have been compromised in this way, and are ready to be used in these types of denial-of-service attacks. One of them could be your computer, in your home or your office, or it could be your children’s computer.

The attack on Estonia was the first of its kind against a NATO member. However, defending against attempted intrusion into NATO’s data networks is a daily reality. NCSA is responsible for secure end-to-end communication services and is therefore the first line of resistance in the cyber-defense of the Alliance. We receive about one million e-mails at SHAPE Headquarters each month. Nearly half of them are unwanted SPAM and about 76,000 viruses were stopped at our firewalls.

NATO’S CYBER-DEFENSE PROGRAM

NATO’s cyber-defense program, which was initiated three years ago, is at its initial operating capability. At my headquarters in Mons we have a state-of-the-art NATO Computer Incident Response Capability Technical Center, whose intrusion prevention system saw 14.5 million potential security incidents in 2006. But most of us consider cyber-security as a subject for computer specialists and nothing to really worry about. It is a bit like it was during the Cold War: We theoretically are aware of the threat, but in our day-to-day private lives and businesses we do not care. But cyber-war threatens our entire society—the

1 Lieutenant General Ulrich Wolf is Director, NATO CIS Service Agency.
military, government institutions, industry, finance, and health systems, as well as all of us individually. Therefore defense against this threat should be a matter of importance for all of us.

It is the responsibility of our governments to develop a comprehensive defense concept horizontally across all departments and vertically from the state down to the community level. We need to find new forms of coalitions that include industry and the financial world. ISPs and software companies also need to play a key role. But in which of our countries is this already the case?

There is a real need for a cyber-related policy at the Alliance and the EU level—the case of Estonia may have opened the question about the need for a cyber-version of Article 5. My agency, NCSA, has taken the first steps to reach out to the information-security domains of Alliance member-nations to coordinate our efforts, share best practices and threat assessments, and establish a system for incident reports and warnings. In addition to our contracted defense capabilities we have also developed an active partnership with many of our main software and hardware vendors because they are also targets of the same enemy.

**GOING FROM PASSIVE TO ACTIVE DEFENSE**

There is much work still to do. One of the most important areas that urgently needs further development is a common intelligence capability that will enable us to go from mere reaction to active prevention. NATO has no capability for active cyber-warfare. Why is this? Is it not time to reconsider the rationale for cyber-warfare?

What I recommend is an open, politically driven discussion, a thorough, in-depth threat assessment that should lead to a common, realistic understanding of the situation. It should also lead to the development of a comprehensive strategy and finally to an effective multi-organizational and multi-national defense capability that includes an element of active cyber-warfare. NATO should take the lead in this. There must also be the necessary investments of money and manpower, which will definitely not be small.

On a personal level, I would like to end by advising you to update your Internet security software on a regular basis in order to avoid being turned into a cyber-terrorist unintentionally.
To follow up on the insights raised by Defence Minister Aaviksoo, when the cyber attacks occurred against Estonia the NATO cyber-defense workshop was taking place at our headquarters in Redmond, Washington. Very quickly, the NATO nations and the NATO membership were talking about the incident, sharing ideas on how to counter it and, from there, a plan of response developed. It is a testament to NATO that the member states had the vision to create this kind of capability several years ago and to develop it to the point where they have a very active cyber-defense center in Mons today. It is a very effective center and is continuing to improve.

When I look at such operational examples from the standpoint of a former war planner and intelligence officer, I think in terms of things like offense, defense, deception, psyops, and intelligence gathering. I think there are enemies out there right now conducting reconnaissance and surveillance of our military networks, and this tells me we are technically in a state of cyber-war today. It is a peace time cyber-war, but it could very quickly turn into an active war once more traditional hostilities occur.

I think industry has a very important role to play in this state of cyber war. Industry is the provider of capabilities, many new technologies, and innovation we can take advantage of. At the same time, because we have these capabilities, we accrue new types of risk. Industry must take a role in helping to mitigate this risk and must work very closely with military, government, intelligence, and other types of organizations and the critical infrastructures they protect to help prevent some of the security challenges described at this workshop.

I believe industry’s role can be summed up in terms of five key components, which I call the five “P”s: policies, partnerships, programs, processes, and people. Let me explain each one of them.

POLICIES

One of the things we have identified in our discussions is we do not have adequate laws, regulations, and policies in place to deal with cyber-attacks. Clearly, this needs to be improved both nationally and internationally so cyber criminals cannot take free advantage of the vulnerabilities of the Internet, steal
our money, take our identity, and in general do bad things to us. Some activities are underway to improve
the situation but we are not there yet and work remains to be done.

We generally adhere to some policies or international standards in place today which attempt to iden-
tify software vulnerabilities and get them fixed to ensure the software on our military networks are ade-
quately secure. One such standard is Common Criteria. If you are not familiar with it, it is a standard
adhered to by many countries and used to ensure that software placed on our military and government
networks meet some degree of evaluation. In our view the Common Criteria methodology is out of date,
too cumbersome and expensive a process, does not keep pace with technologic change, and does not sig-
nificantly reduce today’s vulnerabilities. A replacement for Common Criteria is something I think we
need to take on as an issue internationally. We need to find a better standard so we can properly assess the
technology we place on our networks and do it more effectively, efficiently, and quickly.

Procurement Cycles

If you think about it, in the government and the military, when you buy something you typically hold
on to it for a long time. But the IT world does not move slowly. For example, think about the IT devices
you have in your hands today and then think back five years ago to what you had then. The amount of
change is amazing. Clearly we have to take a look at government procurement cycles and work together as
a team to figure out ways to speed up the system to allow for more flexibility in the world of rapid IT
change. If flexibility and adaptability are built into the procurement system, you will be able to take
advantage of new IT capabilities and not be stuck with legacy systems and their inherent vulnerabilities
down the road.

Piracy

There is a huge amount of pirated software in use today around the world. In fact, I would venture to
say some of you at this workshop have pirated software on your home or office systems and may not even
know it. Pirated software is dangerous as often additional code is added, as well as back doors and other
malicious capabilities, leaving you more vulnerable. Such vulnerabilities are inherently dangerous for mil-
itary operations. To defeat this problem, we need policies and trade laws to deter the use of pirated soft-
ware and we also need to build in capabilities in the software development life cycle to help us identify
pirated copies so we can reduce the use of such software.

PARTNERSHIPS

Industry needs to develop four levels of partnership: with military/government; with law enforce-
ment; with critical infrastructure owners; and with other industry partners and competitors. Such part-
tnerships should help improve the products we develop, ensure they are designed to better meet military
and government needs and standards, and reduce some of the challenges mentioned earlier.

Military and Government

First, as I just mentioned, is the partnership with military and government organizations. We have one
with NATO right now, as well as with many other customers, which allows us to jointly look at product
road maps to see how we can work together to identify where technology is headed in the future, and to
plan together how we can insert new technology once it is available for use. Also, we are sharing informa-
tion about computer vulnerabilities, techniques, processes, and procedures, as well as how to work
together when a cyber crisis occurs. Finally, we are discussing how to respond to such crisis situations and how we can effectively team to mitigate the threats we jointly face.

**Law Enforcement**

Another level of partnership should be with law enforcement. Clearly, there is an awful lot of illegal or potentially dangerous activity out there—for example, a lot of cyber-crime, exploitation of children on the Internet, and other disgusting activities, so it is critical for industry to work with law enforcement to help reduce the evil side of the Internet. Of course, this cooperation leads back to a point I made earlier—we need to put laws in place to make such acts illegal or industry and law enforcement will face a much harder battle.

**Critical Infrastructures**

The next level of partnership is with critical infrastructure owners. Industry needs to work to improve cyber security with all the different layers of critical infrastructure, including areas such as power generation, telecommunications, banking and finance, and transportation. In their own right, each of these infrastructures are very important to the way we work every day, and when you look at them from a military operational perspective they are extremely critical because most militaries cannot operate without them. So it is important to establish this type of relationship with critical infrastructure owners early, to keep the relationship current, and to keep it strong.

**Industry to Industry**

To some degree, there are representatives of companies at this workshop who are competitors to Microsoft. Where cyber-defense is concerned, industry has to come together regardless of competition and work to help defeat the threats we jointly face and affect us all. We welcome such industry cooperation and discussion.

**PROGRAMS**

I would like to mention a couple of programs which industry and government organizations should consider to share information or intelligence on the cyber threat. One is a government security program in which vendors open up their source code to government and military organizations to prove to them that there are no hidden back doors within the software; to show the software being put on their system is effective; to validate the software has gone through very careful screening; and to give government the option of providing feedback to help improve the software before it is delivered. Another program might be a security cooperation program, with established mechanisms between industry, military organizations, and governments for sharing information on software vulnerabilities. One could also share open source threat information under such a program. I would recommend we consider such programs to improve our cyber security readiness and operations across NATO.

**PROCESSES**

My good friend Bob Lentz used to say, “We need to bake in security, not brush it on after the fact.” I think it is very important we bake in security capabilities in the software development life cycle, and we are very focused now on doing just that in industry. In fact, we use a program called the Security Development Lifecycle, which we are continuing to refine and improve, including Red Team attacks against the
software to identify vulnerabilities and fix them; to conduct penetration tests; and to put the software through many other checks before the software ships and becomes a product on the market.

Regarding migrating from legacy systems to new IT, we know some of these older military systems have major problems but you are stuck operating with them as change does not happen overnight. Industry needs to work with you to conduct some degree of technical refresh of these systems, and to make sure they are interoperable with new IT, and integrate adequate security to keep up with present threats. “Defense in Depth” is the term applied to the type of security referred to here—a system to ensure security practices and procedures work from the hand-held device to the desktop or laptop all the way back to the network and the back-end systems. Effective Defense in Depth requires that various types of security capabilities are built into operational networks and all the hardware and software maintained on them. This is clearly a process for government, software vendors, hardware producers, and others involved to work on together to build a safer and more secure net.

**Research and Development**

R&D to improve products and processes, and to come up with new ways to do things, is extremely important in our mutual business. Technology has such a huge impact on society today. Change is rapid. Everyone wants the newest gadget or device and our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines expect to have these great IT capabilities. They also expect us to deliver even better capabilities so they can stay one step ahead of their adversaries. We have some challenges to overcome. For example, we must look at requirements like cross-domain sharing, or the ability to improve sharing information across top-secret or secret level networks in cases where everyone may have the same clearance level, but not an equal need-to-know. We have overcome some of the challenges to build and deploy an effective cross-domain environment but more work needs to be done. Also, there is no solution today for multi-level security—the ability to move information back and forth seamlessly between unclassified, secret, and top-secret levels. When we find that answer, I think we will save an awful lot of money and also have a much more secure system to support military operations.

**PEOPLE**

My last “P” – People! Leadership is key here—effective cyber defense is not just the world of the CIO and J6, but also the world of commanders and CEOs, J3s, J2s and security officers. Leaders must understand today’s cyber-operations are an inherent part of military operations and have an increasingly important impact on success or failure. Education and awareness are critical. We have got to build cyber warfare related information into our training programs, and industry should work with the military to conduct exercises which help our people plan for, mitigate against the risk of cyber attack, and respond to a problem when one occurs.

The last point I want to talk about here is the use of services personnel—highly trained software experts embedded within our military organizations. When I served with Joint Task Force-Computer Network Defense in the U.S. military, the organization was one-third military, one-third government/civilian, and one-third contractor. During these years I learned it is very important to embed IT service capabilities right in your units. You need to have as part of the organizational structure people who have a deep understanding of the technical capabilities of software, the way we use it to communicate, and the security methods we need to impose to protect our IT infrastructures. The result is a much more effective operational network and these experts often help us find new and exciting ways to improve operational techniques and procedures.
CONCLUDING REMARKS

I believe that if we focus on these five Ps in our cyber defense activities, our unitees will be pretty effective and this operational effectiveness should lead to a sixth P—Power. Information is extremely important to our command and control processes. If we can gather and share the right information using the IT systems and capabilities available today, and if we make those systems secure, we have the opportunity to turn this information into knowledge—and knowledge is power. This is what commanders at all levels need. They need to have the best possible situational awareness to improve their ability to command and control. The only way they will be able to do this on the modern battlefield is to have an IT system they can trust and that they are 100% sure will work all the time. Effective cyber-defense to lessen the effects of today’s cyber-war is an essential element for ensuring that our commanders achieve the power offered by today’s information technology.
Part Four

Georgian Vice Prime Minister Giorgi Baramidze
Ukrainian Former Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk
Albanian Defense Minister Fatmir Mediu
Bulgarian Defense Minister Veselin Bliznakov
Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezuashvili
Turkish Ambassador to NATO Tacan Ildem
Russian Lieutenant General Evgeniy Buzhinsky
Chapter 16

Georgia’s Role in Euro-Atlantic Security

His Excellency Giorgi Baramidze

OPENING REMARKS

It is a distinct honor and pleasure for me to share with you my vision of Georgia’s role in Euro-Atlantic security, the process of Georgia’s integration with NATO, and the impact of the Riga Summit. Obviously, at such a challenging time for NATO, the Riga Summit, at which Allies agreed on NATO’s future key priorities, main goals, and objectives as well as its future role in contributing to peace and stability, was very important.

THE IMPACT OF THE RIGA SUMMIT

The Riga Summit was rather significant in terms of observing the development of the organization that we aspire to join. As you are aware, Georgia has been trying to contribute to global security. Hence, the challenges and priorities identified at the Riga Summit have been incorporated into our objectives. For example, the summit emphasized the importance of the success of NATO’s Afghan operation. Georgia deployed soldiers in Afghanistan during the 2005 September presidential elections and is also ready to contribute during the current crisis approximately 50 Special Forces servicemen in cooperation with the U.S. A Georgian medical group will also operate under Lithuanian command and additionally we are examining the possibility of sending a contingent for French, German, or U.K. brigades. Furthermore, Georgia has already demonstrated its ability to be a reliable and credible partner of the Alliance. At the moment Georgia has 850 people deployed in Iraq and 184 people deployed in Kosovo. The decision has been made to increase our contingent in Iraq to 2,000.

The Riga Summit reiterated the importance of ratifying the CFE Treaty, which is a cornerstone of European security. It is of the utmost importance that this decision not be questioned by any country. Russia should certainly fulfill the commitments it made at the Istanbul Summit in 1999 regarding the

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1 His Excellency Giorgi Baramidze is the Vice Prime Minister of Georgia.
withdrawal of its military from Georgia and the Republic of Moldova, and we very much appreciate the fact that ratification of the adapted treaty depends on the fulfillment of these obligations.

The increasing threats of terrorism and instability due to failing states and regional conflicts, so familiar for my country, have been properly assessed as having global implications. Unresolved conflicts in the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali/South Ossetia, however, have been wrongly perceived as maintaining the status quo by a number of politicians. The situation continues to destabilize because of events that continue to take place in these regions, though we constantly demonstrate our peaceful intentions by undertaking unilateral actions. However, securing sustainable peace and stability in our region will require the collective efforts of international organizations and countries that have the political will and the capability to partner for security.

At the Riga Summit, promoting energy infrastructure security was declared one of NATO’s new priorities; it has been widely acknowledged that global security is impossible without tackling the energy security issue. Naturally, it is important that NATO, as a security organization, be involved in these matters. Georgia has already experienced the impact of using energy supplies for political reasons and is advocating for raised awareness of the dangers of such policies. The issue of energy security deserves to be addressed at international fora, including at NATO, in order to forge sustainable solutions. Georgia, with its potential to link the oil-rich Caspian region to the outside world, can be not only a contributor to European security in general but a contributor to the field of energy security as well.

**GEORGIA’S INTEGRATION WITH NATO**

Although the Riga Summit did not focus on enlargement, it did include very clear and important signals regarding enlargement that were encouraging to aspiring countries including Georgia. Membership in NATO is clearly a driving force of democratic transformation. Georgia has been working toward this goal since the Revolution of Roses in 2003, when it set itself the objective of becoming a self-sustaining, democratic state capable of handling its own affairs and contributing to global stability.

Naturally, integration with NATO is a top foreign policy and security priority for my country, and I am glad to say it is based on a national consensus not only of the major political parties but the public as well. In March 2007 all parties represented in parliament signed the memorandum in support of Georgia’s NATO membership and, consequently, voted on the relevant declaration. Public opinion polls conducted in December 2006 by the Gallup organization once again demonstrated overwhelming public support of NATO membership, with 83% of the population in favor.

We also have been successfully utilizing the instruments provided by NATO for undertaking democratic reforms. In October 2004 Georgia was the first country to be granted an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), which has proved to be an effective mechanism. Through the successful implementation of IPAP and the political support of Allies, in September 2006 Georgia was granted Intensified Dialogue (ID) on membership issues. We consider this an important step toward NATO membership and are very successfully utilizing all formats for cooperation provided in the ID framework.

In May 2007, the NAC-Georgia meeting was held in Brussels, where we once again demonstrated—and the Allies recognized—our strong progress in all fields and our serious commitment to democracy. With the ID framework and the IPAP instrument, Georgia has all the mechanisms needed for successful cooperation with NATO, and which, in due course, should lead us to the next stage: a Membership Action Plan (MAP). However, we are well aware that MAP does not necessarily guarantee membership in the Alliance, although this is crucial for reinforcing the process of democratic reforms and making them even more sustainable and irreversible.
GEORGIAN ADVANCES

Cooperation with the EU within the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) framework is another factor reinforcing Georgia’s reformation process and that is in full compliance with NATO integration processes. Here I would like to briefly elaborate on a number of important and necessary political, legal, and economic reforms that have been carried out:

1. Tackling corruption was one of our highest priorities and needed to be addressed urgently if other democratic reforms were to be implemented. The government of Georgia launched a vigorous campaign to eradicate corruption, which has led to an enormous decrease in bribery, nepotism, and other ills. This is one of our most successful areas, a fact that has been recognized by key international organizations. For example, according to the 2006 World Bank report “Anticorruption in Transition 3,” Georgia saw the largest reduction in corruption among all transition countries between 2002 and 2005. In addition to this, 95% of Georgian citizens surveyed by the International Republican Institute in February 2007 reported that they had not paid or heard about anybody paying a bribe to receive a public service in the previous 12 months.

The extremely corrupt fields of law enforcement, energy, public administration, and education underwent thorough reforms with exemplary results: public trust in the Georgian police rose from less than 2% to more than 70% and remains high. As part of the reform, the number of taxes and the tax rates were reduced and measures were undertaken to fight corruption, resulting in an eight-fold increase in the budget between 2003 and 2006 and reducing the shadow economy from 80% to less than 10%. At the same time, the government elaborated a comprehensive strategy for criminal justice reform that aims at establishing sound procedures and ensuring fair treatment before the law.

Despite the very evident success in all fields, we are well aware that achieving positive results in the most troubled areas does not only involve changing laws or personnel. It requires transforming habits, attitudes, and cultural approaches and it takes time. But the most important point is that we have demonstrated our irreversible commitment to making comprehensive changes that should eventually lead us to success.

2. As you may know, in the fall of 2006 Georgia’s economy experienced enormous pressure: the ban on Georgian wine and mineral water by Russia was followed by an embargo of all Georgian products, the cutting of all transportation links, and other such hardships. However, despite the scepticism of international experts and our economic advisors, we managed to demonstrate incredible results, namely:

- Real GDP growth reached almost 10%
- Trade turnover saw a 40% increase
- Foreign direct investments increased by 155%

According to the World Bank, in 2006 Georgia ranked number one in the world for the intensity of its reforms.

All of these results prove that our economy is developing in the right direction and that we have made very difficult adjustments.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Georgia is quite rapidly evolving as a democratic nation and playing an increasingly important role not only in countering global challenges but spreading the values of democracy. We are committed to further enhancing our contribution to the development of a strong Euro-Atlantic security architecture.
Chapter 17

Major Challenges in the Black Sea Area

Ambassador Borys Tarasyuk

In the Black Sea area, I see five major challenges: the protracted, or “frozen,” conflicts in the area, and here I mean Transdnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh; the foreign military presence in the countries of the region; energy security, which is a challenge not only to the region but to the entire Euro-Atlantic community; regional borders that are being challenged or are in the process of settlement; and of course the various ethnic factors. I am going to focus on the concerted efforts that are needed to tackle all of these challenges.

ISSUES IN TRANSDNISTRIA

To begin, I would like to say a few words about the Transdnistria separatist issue. Separatism in Transdnistria and Moldova resulted from a short civil war back in 1992. Now we are facing a new element in this still separatist regime, which is that the referendum that was held in the fall of 2006, which was not recognized by the international community, resulted in asking the people of Transdnistria if they would like to join Russia. You can imagine what the answer was, adding a new dimension to the situation.

Currently the remnants of the 14th army of the Soviet Union, 1,300 to 1,400 soldiers, are still in Transdnistria. Complicating the situation are the huge stores of armaments left by the 14th army, amounting to 25,000 tons of ammunition and armaments that are not being monitored, or, I should say, that the Russians are not allowing to be monitored, which was suggested by the OSCE. So no one knows what is happening with these stocks of armaments.

Transdnistria is known all over Europe as a kind of black hole of Europe, since it was and still is a source of smuggling of goods and armaments. Also, this is an area in which small and medium-sized armaments and ammunitions are being produced and, because they are not marked, being spread not only throughout this area but throughout Europe and the world for illegal use. Representatives of the Russian nationality are also acquiring Russian passports against Romanians who are acquiring Romanian passports in Moldova, and the same is being done by Ukrainians, which makes for a serious situation.

1 Ambassador Borys Tarasyuk is the former Foreign Minister of Ukraine.
CONFLICT-RESOLUTION EFFORTS

What is being done to settle this conflict? Since 1992, four countries have tried to settle it: Ukraine, Russia, Moldova, and Romania. That group became the so-called five, with Ukraine and Russia as guarantors of a peaceful settlement, OSCE as a participant, and Moldova and Transdnistria. Since 2005, when President Yuschenko put forward his settlement plan called “Settlement through Democracy,” and with the efforts of Ukraine, two major global players—the European Union and the United States—have been part of the settlement process. In December 2005, the European Union began its unique mission on the border between Ukraine and Moldova, known as the EU Border Assistance Mission.

What are the problems here? Recently Russia and Moldova began to deviate from working with the group of five, which is very alarming. They held a summit in which they separately discussed a settlement plan away from the others involved. While there is now a stalemate in negotiations, we need to look at the so-called mechanism of peaceful settlement—I believe the OSCE-led civil observation mission will be the answer. The issues of Abzkhazia and South Ossetia I leave for my colleague, Minister Bezhuzashvili, to discuss.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF PROTRACTED CONFLICTS

What are the consequences of the protracted or frozen conflicts for the entire Euro-Atlantic region? These conflicts undermine the energy security not only of the countries in the region but for all of Europe, and they also undermine the concerted efforts of the international community to curb drug-trafficking, armament smuggling, and organized crime, which are the real challenges to security.

Regarding another challenge, the military presence, one can mention Georgia and Moldova as examples of Russians not fulfilling their commitments under the Istanbul OSCE summit to withdraw their troops. Another example is Ukraine, where the presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet is alarming. We are concerned that the fleet command is not fulfilling both the bilateral commitments and Ukrainian legislation, and as such the fleet may be a destabilizing factor because of noncompliance. While consultations are taking place between Ukraine and Russia, no major solution has been reached at this time. What is needed is compliance with the bilateral agreements and with Ukrainian legislation as well as preparations for withdrawal of the Russian Black Sea fleet by 2017.
Chapter 18

Major Challenges for the Balkan Region: Albania's Contribution

His Excellency Fatmir Mediu

The Balkans region is a very challenging one. It experienced many problems in the past, some of which are still present, but the area now has a very positive prospect: EU and NATO membership for all countries of the region. It is a challenge to face the problems of the past—the ethnic differences and the multi-ethnic societies—but the challenge must be met in order to strengthen democratic institutions, resolve unfinished status problems, build a solid economy, and profit from the beautiful and unlimited resources in the region. I believe that a great message for the Balkans came out of the Riga summit, clearly recognizing the progress made by Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia and encouraging these countries’ efforts towards membership. Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina are now participating in the Partnership for Peace Program, so it seems that all the Balkans, or the western Balkans, are on the same boat looking forward, not back.

MAJOR CHALLENGES FOR THE REGION

There are several challenges the countries of the region now face:

Pursuing international terrorism, organized crime, human and drug trafficking, corruption, residual Cold War arsenals, and ethnic differences, which pose the main threats to the region’s stability. These threats require more active engagement by our countries and close cooperation between them; without this happening, efforts to contain the threats will not succeed.

The final status of Kosovo. Kosovo poses another challenge to the western Balkans. We believe that an independent Kosovo that respects and guarantees the rights of all its citizens and its ethnic and cultural groups provides the most suitable and sustainable solution to this challenge. Within this context, the solution to the status of Kosovo should move ahead in accordance with President Ahtisaari’s proposal package. We believe that Kosovo’s future has and will have a direct impact on all Balkans security and the right solution will improve government capacities and effectiveness. The international community must remain engaged in Kosovo by providing the expertise needed to assist the newly emerging state in achieving its full potential and to proceed down the road to Euro-Atlantic integration.

1 His Excellency Fatmir Mediu is Minister of Defense of Albania.
ALBANIA’S CONTRIBUTION TO BALKANS REGIONAL STABILITY

Albania’s strategic aim is to become a full-fledged member of NATO and the EU. I think that there is simply no alternative for the other countries of the region as well. Euro-Atlantic integration offers the only way forward. The Albanian government is fully committed to a zero-tolerance policy for fighting organized crime and corruption. We are also committed to the international fight against terrorism and have soldiers serving in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Bosnia. On May 24, 2007, we signed the agreement that officially confirms Albanian participation in Operation Active Endeavor. Our commitment to share the responsibility for transatlantic security and to fight against terrorism is reflected in our growing participation in Afghanistan, where we will increase by one company our participation in NATO-led operations.

As far as regional initiatives are concerned, the Adriatic Charter III (the A3), with Albania, Macedonia, and Croatia coming together with the United States, has proven to be an important asset for enhancing regional cooperation. Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia have already made significant progress in NATO integration, which is the primary goal of the A3 initiative. We also welcomed the new PfP countries, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Montenegro, and are cooperating with them, yet another contribution to Balkans security. Building common security systems, compatible and interoperable sea surveillance systems, and training and educational institutions will help to create more trust, a very important element for the security of the region.

An initiative of both NATO and non-NATO countries, the Southeastern Europe Defense Ministerial (SEDM) process, which promotes regional cooperation and good neighbor relations, strengthens regional defense capabilities through collective efforts, and establishes links for facilitating integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions, is helping to increase cooperation and more effectively face regional and global challenges. During the SEDM meeting in Tirana, we opened the door to Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, more evidence of the growing strength of this initiative and the cooperation among nations of the region. We are positive that the SEDM meeting in Ukraine will consider the need for combined training teams from SEDM countries to participate in Afghanistan, a request made at the NATO-ISAF countries meeting in Brussels.

WORK THAT IS YET TO BE DONE

There are six major efforts that need to be undertaken:
1. Coordinating all Balkans countries’ efforts toward facing the security challenges.
2. More active participation and coordination between the EU and NATO and the countries in the Balkans.
3. Increasing and consolidating economic relations within the region, especially concerning the energy crisis, and connecting with the EU energy system.
4. Finalizing the status of Kosovo without delay, based on the Ahtisaari proposal; any attempt by Russia to delay finalization without bringing a concrete solution to the table will be counterproductive.
5. Continuing efforts to fight organized crime with the help of specialized agencies from the U.S. and Europe; tackling with a great deal of seriousness the problems of drug and human trafficking and corruption and increasing intelligence cooperation.
6. Promoting religious and ethnic tolerance in the region as well as facing religious extremism regardless of where it originates.

To sum up, solidarity, regional cooperation, and permanent and sustainable policies must serve as the framework for facing the present challenges and for ensuring the security and stability of the Balkans. I am optimistic about the result because I believe that stability, security, and prosperity will prevail in the region by strengthening democracy, collective integration, and the rule of law.
First, I would like to say a few words on the major topic of my intervention and that is our experience from the participation of the Bulgarian Armed Forces in the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Then I will also add some thoughts about the Balkan region, which is the topic of this panel.

To begin with our experience from the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, which is quite a complex issue, I want to draw a conclusion using the words of Albert Camus—one cannot gain experience by experimenting, nor by creating it, one just has to live it through.

What we lived through in Afghanistan and Iraq has taught us valuable lessons—political, military, cultural, historic and, above all, human. The process of reconstruction will be long and difficult. And a lesson learned is that we need a different approach for our training, equipment, armament and combat effectiveness. This year, when we increase our contribution in Afghanistan almost five times we understand how important it is to talk about these challenges.

Another significant lesson is that we should combine military and civilian expertise and effort. The military alone cannot be successful. We must build confidence in the local populations. Without their help, our missions will not be fully accomplished. Moreover, we need to persuade neighboring countries to work for regional security. It is rather difficult to create an island of security in a single state, be it Iraq or Afghanistan.

And finally – we, as allies, should have in advance of every operation a clear and complex strategy as to how we act to prevent a crisis, to enforce peace in an insecure region, and to build statehood. Effective work should be done for the economic development of the states in which we are involved in an operation.

Now a few comments about the security challenges in the Balkans region, which is the topic of this panel.

The Balkans region continues to be a security consumer, rather than a security generator. The recent NATO accession of Bulgaria and Romania, and before that of Turkey, as well as the membership of Bulgaria and Romania in the European Union are very important for the stabilization of this part of Europe.
Another step should be to give a chance to other countries from the region to follow their European and Euro-Atlantic perspective. I am happy that I often have the opportunity to meet my colleagues from the region. As you can see, today we also have the Albanian Minister of Defence, Mr. Mediu, but I have regular meetings with my colleagues from Macedonia and Croatia as well. In Bulgaria we even initiated a 3+3 format: Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovenia as new NATO and EU member states assist the new PfP countries Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia on their way to accession to the Alliance and the European Union.

Today the Western boundaries of the European Union are the coasts of France, Spain, and Portugal. The Eastern frontiers of the European Union are the shores of Bulgaria and Romania and I assume that the countries from the Black Sea Region have to co-operate in order to secure the Eastern EU boundaries, because we know that around 70% of illegal trafficking in human beings, drugs and arms is being done by sea.

Soon after this workshop, for the first time, we will perform a large-scale military exercise of the land and air forces of Bulgaria, Romania, and Serbia with tasks of safeguarding the common boundaries and overcoming crisis situations and environmental disasters. This is another step forward in involving the new PfP states in our common idea—a more secure Europe. My country, Bulgaria, is working in this direction and I am certain that our joint efforts will lead us to a successful end.
Towards a Stable and Secure Black Sea Region

His Excellency Gela Bezuashvili

It is my genuine pleasure and honor to participate for the second time in this workshop. I would like to share my views on the security challenges in the region that has become one of the most dynamic parts of Europe.

THE BLACK SEA REGION’S TIRES TO EUROPEAN AND EURO-ATLANTIC STRUCTURES

Events in and around the wider Black Sea area in recent years have underscored the region’s deep relevance to the entire European as well as the Euro-Atlantic space. The Rose and Orange Revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine ushered in a period of crucial democratic transformation in the region. Together with other positive developments of recent years, this has helped anchor the entire Black Sea area in the European space.

The EU in particular has a special stake in this region. Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU in January 2007, a watershed event in the history of the Black Sea, which has now fully returned to its traditional European fold. The wider Black Sea neighborhood is now an integral part of the European and Euro-Atlantic space, in political, economic, and security terms, and what happens there will have an impact on all of Europe. The area’s newfound relevance is clearly reflected in the EU’s new European Neighborhood Policy.

In recent years we have seen very vividly that, along with a significant potential for democratic development and economic growth, the region might soon establish itself as an important hub for energy and transportation flows. Within the South Caucasus alone, launching of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipelines as well as the Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku railway are all eloquent attestations to the prospects of the region. The natural quest of the Black Sea states to deepen their cooperation regarding democratic reforms, economic progress, and mutual security has also resulted in new regional formats and initiatives such as the Community of Democratic Choice and the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development—GUAM.

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1 His Excellency Gela Bezuashvili is the Foreign Minister of Georgia.
CHALLENGES IN THE BLACK SEA REGION

Along with opportunities, the unique geographic location of the Black Sea region and its political landscape bring an array of daunting challenges and threats that hinder considerably the positive trends in the constituent countries. The challenges and threats we face are manifold and, because they emanate not only from the Black Sea littoral and neighboring states but from turbulent states beyond the area, they underscore the interdependence of today’s world regions. A number of unlawful activities, including illegal trafficking in human beings, narcotic substances, and conventional weapons, make their way to the west from the Middle East and Asia. It is obvious that if we fail to effectively confront these challenges today, tomorrow’s opportunities will be irretrievably lost.

The biggest security threats are unresolved territorial conflicts in the Black Sea area. They undermine economic cooperation. They breed suspicion and tensions, putting a chill on sorely needed political dialogue. And they considerably undermine the statehood of most of the conflict-afflicted countries. The latter consequence is particularly pernicious, as state weakness renders secessionist entities in these states virtual black holes, plagued by lawlessness and smuggling. The recent seizure of highly enriched uranium in one of the black holes in the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, the breakaway province of Georgia, speaks for itself.

Given this situation, it is clear that if we aim to bring stability to this important region, we will have to focus first and foremost on these conflicts. But this is not a challenge we can resolve on our own—we need the international community to become more actively engaged in the peace process. One overriding challenge facing the international community at the dawn of the new century is strengthening democratic governance in the Black Sea states, which find themselves at a critical juncture in their history.

GEORGIA’S CONTRIBUTIONS TO SECURITY AND STABILITY

Georgia’s successes in democratic state-building and economic reform represent crucial factors for the future of democracy in a number of countries of the post-Soviet space and Black Sea area. Our country has proven its commitment to and its ability to be a reliable member of the international community. We have graduated from being a consumer of aid and security—by virtue of our democratic development, our economic progress, the participation of our forces in global security operations, and our involvement in regional energy projects, Georgia is now a net contributor to international and European stability and security.

Our strategic location and progress in reforms make us a natural partner of the European Union. By stepping up our cooperation, Georgia—together with the other countries of the wider Black Sea area—can more quickly become the bridge that connects Europe with Central Asia, the Middle East, and Asia. We can thus help spread stability to and assist democratic development in these crucial parts of Eurasia.

THE BLACK SEA REGION AND ENERGY SECURITY

The Black Sea region is also an indispensable part of another dimension of European security: energy security, which has gained extraordinary salience recently. With steep growth and demand, energy producers have found themselves in a position of strength and tend to wield their clout as an instrument of political and economic intimidation. This should not be acceptable to us. We need reliable energy providers and we need to diversify our sources of supply and transit. A stable, democratic, and economically prosperous Black Sea area can serve as a natural energy conduit to the markets of Europe for the vast supplies of energy in the Caspian and the Middle East.
In this connection, I would like to elaborate briefly on two important initiatives of the German EU presidency—Black Sea Synergy and the newly articulated Central Asia Strategy. Central Asia, of course, is critical to European energy security, yet recent developments with respect to the transportation of its vast energy resources once again have demonstrated the difficulties the EU faces in engaging with this landlocked region. I believe that these developments underscore how essential it is for the EU to take full advantage of the Black Sea region and the South Caucasus in particular as Europe’s natural gateway to Central Asia. Securing the Black Sea as a stable, prosperous, and democratic region—fully integrated into European and Euro-Atlantic institutions—will help cement cooperation with Central Asian states over the longer term. The Black Sea Synergy initiative serves precisely this goal as it envisages stepping up cooperation in practically all spheres that reflect priorities and where the European Union is already involved.

DEFINING THE BLACK SEA’S REGIONAL IDENTITY

As we deepen and quicken our cooperation with the European Union, it is vital to bear in mind that a coherent, unified Black Sea regional identity has yet to emerge. This means that, up to now, the states of the region still harbor differing and sometimes contradictory conceptions of the opportunities and challenges they face. A number of regional arrangements, formats, and instruments that have been developed over the past 15 years reflect these diverse interpretations and aspirations.

For this reason, in pursuing Black Sea synergy, we should respect and cooperate with all regional initiatives. We should start by focusing on smaller, targeted projects within the framework of the Black Sea Synergy Initiative—projects that at the early stages may involve only a small number of willing states. This gradual approach will eventually lead to more inclusive regional cooperation and contribute to forging a common regional identity.

Georgia is profoundly committed to joint efforts to build stability and foster progress in the region, so that the threats we face today do not become the crises of tomorrow. The Black Sea should be a unifying sea—a region of stability, security, and economic well-being and the bridge that connects the EU with Asia and the Middle East.

May we realize this vision together.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

To conclude, I would like to thank in particular the French Ministry of Defense and the Center for Strategic Decision Research for organizing this workshop. I am convinced that this kind of workshop is of paramount importance for sharing opinions, positions, and experience and hence for finding common understanding and, perhaps, solutions to all of our pressing security issues.
Chapter 21

Security in Southeastern Europe and the Black Sea Region

Ambassador Tacan Ildem

Today we are going to discuss two regions that face important security challenges: Southeastern Europe and the Black Sea Region.

CHALLENGES IN SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE

The first of these, southeastern Europe, is undergoing major realignment and change as a result of the increasing rate of Euro-Atlantic integration of regional countries. For example, Bulgaria, represented by Minister Bliznakov, has become a member of both the European Union and NATO. While others such as Turkey are proud members of just one of these august organizations for the time being, Albania is now actively seeking membership in NATO.

Recently we witnessed a campaign of ethnic cleansing that may have sowed seeds of enmity that will be harvested in years to come. Three countries directly involved in that unfortunate period have joined the ranks of Partnership for Peace—the decision was made to engage these countries in eventually becoming providers of security rather than consumers of it. The European Union also seems to be on this path.

Now we face the issue of Kosovo, which concerns the entire international community. Each Balkan land also faces political, economic, and ethnic challenges as it seeks to vault from times past to the 21st century. All countries in the region must carry out painful reforms to qualify for EU membership by establishing democratic institutions, ensuring the rule of law, and promoting tolerance. They must also carry out defense and security sector reforms to either become members of NATO or to further their relationship with the Alliance.

Essentially, the Balkans have never really been synonymous with projecting stability. Indeed, the International Crisis Group has described the region as “remaining an area of critical strategic interest to Western governments and a potential flash point for further conflicts. The region’s problems are complex, deeply rooted, and unlikely to be resolved without sustained attention and involvement on the part of the international community.”

1 Ambassador Tacan Ildem is the Turkish Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council.
CHALLENGES IN THE BLACK SEA REGION

The second region to be discussed today is the Black Sea region. This is an area that is growing in importance because of the intricate balances in the Caucasus, the wealth of natural resources that are being tapped and transferred to varied markets, and the numerous frozen conflicts that await resolution. Georgia and Ukraine are well on their way to integrating with Euro-Atlantic institutions, while new issues such as missile defense and those related to CFE have the potential to cast greater shadows over regional security and stability. The numerous initiatives that are ongoing in the region, such as GUAM and BSEC, were all launched with good intentions. However, one wonders if they are sufficient to complement the efforts of others such as the OSCE to make the region a bastion of stability and therefore enable economic growth.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

As members of the international community, we are all committed to the territorial integrity of countries that are hosts to frozen conflicts. Moldova and Georgia are such hosts, experiencing persistent conflicts that have negative collateral consequences beyond their borders. The Transdniester conflict is related to the CFE issue of Istanbul commitments whereas the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia are not helpful to Georgia-Russia relations. The international community shares the view that these conflicts need to be resolved through peaceful means. A number of welcome plans, such as President Saakashvili’s Peace Plan for South Ossetia, have been developed to serve as a basis for negotiations and settlement. I believe that it is our collective belief that restraint and reason should be employed to prevent further escalation of the conflicts and that constructive dialogue provides the only avenue for peaceful resolution of disputes.
Chapter 22

The Black Sea Region and the Balkans: a Russian View

Lieutenant General Evgeniy Buzhinsky

The topic of the Balkans and the Black Sea region is of special importance to Russia, especially in the context of challenges and threats. I would like to begin talking about the topic by discussing the problems of the Black Sea region.

CHALLENGES IN THE BLACK SEA REGION

Lately politicians speak more about the expanded Black Sea region, including not only the coastal states but also Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Greece, and, as some say, the United States. We in Russia believe that this region is not some gray zone in the center of Europe, the Eurasian continent, or the expanded Middle East, but an area in which a number of factors converge and influence the relations between countries both inside the region and far outside it.

It is quite obvious that the Black Sea region is an integral part of the old European security and cooperation system. I cannot help but mention that some Black Sea region states are still in the process of painful and stormy state construction and transformation, with multiple unresolved problems, including their territorial integrity. I also would point out that this process is taking place in parallel with the development of a democratic society in these countries, and that sometimes the two contradict each other.

What challenges and threats does Russia see for the region? And what makes this region, which some in the West call a new bullfight arena, so important for the strategy of the European and Euro-Atlantic communities?

Energy and Transportation Issues

The first challenge is the energy resources and unique transit potential of the Black Sea region. Russia is convinced of their importance as guarantors of future energy security in Europe. Should there be a worst-case scenario in the Middle East, the Black Sea region could make an essential contribution to European energy security. At the same time, its energy potential is a challenge, because its infrastructure

1 Lieutenant General Evgeniy Buzhinsky is the Deputy Chief of Main Directorate for Military Cooperation in the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense.
is highly attractive to terrorists of various kinds and cannot absolutely be protected against current threats.

**Globalization Issues**

Second, the risks and threats in the Black Sea region are natural consequences of both global tendencies and the processes taking place in the region. Modern communications and transport facilities, the increased mobility of the population, and economic weakness in the region promote organized crime activities including human, drugs, and arms smuggling.

**Frozen Conflicts**

A third challenge is the so-called frozen conflicts. Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan face deadlocked problems that arose from the aspirations of unrecognized entities, such as administrative units and self-proclaimed territorial entities, for independence, a consequence of the disintegration of a larger state, namely, the Soviet Union. Currently there are four frozen conflicts in the region—in Abkhazia, Transdnistria, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabach—that have lasted approximately the same amount of time.

**SOLVING THE CONFLICTS**

In the West, we often hear that conflicts must be resolved as soon as possible. Withdrawal of Russian peacemakers from conflict zones has been suggested among other possibilities to solve the conflicts. But which is better—to carry out peacekeeping operations to separate conflicting parties or to leave the place, allowing violence to be renewed? Russian peacekeepers remain in conflict zones not just at the will of Russia but at the request of the conflicting parties and with their consent. When people ask, “What is the relationship between the Russian Federation and all the events taking place there?” I believe that the answer is quite clear: Abkhazia and South Ossetia have common borders with Russia. A significant number of Russian citizens also live in the territories. And the Russian Federation acts as mediator and guarantor of settlement conflict in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transdnistria.

What, in my opinion, must be done to solve these conflicts? In Nagorno-Karabach, negotiations under the auspices of the OSCE have been ongoing for more than 10 years to achieve a compromise on Nagorno-Karabach’s territorial domain status. They have achieved no results, and the position of the Russian Federation on Nagorno-Karabach remains unchanged. We oppose any imposition of outside recipes on the participants of the conflict—they should make their own choice.

In Transdnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, unrecognized republics demand recognition of their de facto independence and their right to sovereignty—the Transdnistrian and Moldovan republics, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia have existed for more than 15 years. We are deeply convinced that there are several ways to solve their problems. First of all, the problems should be solved in their own region. I would especially like to emphasize that a double standard would be unacceptable during the course of the solution; for example, you cannot struggle with separatism in the Caucasus and simultaneously encourage it in the Balkans. You cannot divide terrorists into friends and foes. And it is intolerable to demand the return of refugees in one part of Europe and forget about them in another part.

Russia is ready to support any solution to the problems that will suit all parties involved; if a compromise is reached, Russia will also act as a guarantor of the settlement. In our opinion, any decision that will return stability and calm to the South Caucasus, maintain the historical geopolitical balance of power during the post-conflict period, and not return the region to one of international political and military rivalry will be viable and long lasting.
FINDING A MORE PURPOSEFUL APPROACH

All of what I have mentioned show the complexity of the problems, tendencies, and challenges the Black Sea region faces. Resolving and settling these issues will require the joint action of the international community, though, of course, it is impossible to prepare a universal recipe for settling specific conflicts. However, I do suggest that, to return stability and safety to the region, the present political leadership of the countries in the region show a more purposeful approach to regional problems. The major international players should also choose precise, common approaches and standards for solving the frozen conflicts and the international organizations should promote solutions to problems concerning regional safety.

This means fully employing the creative mechanisms in the Black Sea region for countering threats, including terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Specifically I mean the operational naval group BLACKSEAFOR and the anti-terrorist operation Black Sea Harmony. I also believe that the OSCE is not fully performing in the Black Sea region. We should also call on such mechanisms as the Russia-NATO Council, the NATO-Ukraine Commission, the Partnership for Peace program, and the European Union’s recently adopted Black Sea Synergy Concept. Countries in the region should also pay more attention to developing good neighborly relations, trust, and cooperation.

CHALLENGES IN THE BALKANS

Regarding the Balkans, the new European realities are now touching in the most direct way a wide spectrum of national interests of the Russian Federation. In the geostrategic context, the Balkans are for us an important element of communication that connects Russia with Europe and provides us with access to global trade routes. In the geopolitical context, Russia’s interests have historically concentrated there. But the situation in the Balkans now is much more complicated. For the last 15 years, changes have been taking place in the post-Yugoslav ethnic and political space. In addition, I believe that the near future of European development will depend on the solution to the problems in the Balkans. In my opinion, this is a long-term challenge to European stability and security.

There are two closely connected issues regarding these problems: where the borders will be established and on what basis the new countries will be formed—as civil societies or ethnic ones. The agreement on Kosovo between Russia and the West is well known—we are facing a dilemma. Even if the international community and the U.N. Security Council formally establish Kosovo’s status, real life does not guarantee that it will not be applied to other situations. Whether anyone at this workshop wants it or not, Kosovo will unavoidably be perceived as a precedent in many places around the world.

Is there any way out of the Kosovo deadlock? If Kosovo’s independence is proclaimed unilaterally, such a decision will not bring the Serbs back to Kosovo and will not guarantee their rights. Who can guarantee that coming events will not set off the powder keg of Europe? The difficulties of the Balkans situation are also worsening in another way, because of the aspiration of Serb leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina to conduct a referendum and separate themselves from Bosnia Herzegovina. What can Russia and the West do in this situation? It is hardly possible to give you the clear-cut answer that both political leaders as well as international organizations are trying to find. Apparently, the agenda includes a burning question about finding a reasonable compromise and bringing about mutual understanding to stabilize the Balkans. Finding the solution to ethnic and territorial problems within the united Europe is an attractive concept. However, it will probably take a long time to bring it to life.
Part Five

Ambassador Munir Akram
Major General Zhan Maohai
Ambassador Youcef Yousfi
Ambassador Mahmoud Karem
Ambassador Menouar Alem
I would like to dwell on the new and expanding security challenges that we see in my part of the world, the Middle East and south Asia, in which NATO is now very deeply involved.

THE NEW SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

The first challenge is the spread of asymmetric warfare, which is not a traditional problem that we have dealt with in the past. Asymmetric warfare is mainly local, but it also has a regional and even a global context in the form of Al Qaeda and other global terrorist organizations.

The second challenge we face is the use of conventional force brought to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Lebanon by Israel. This has not been successful so far, but the challenge is much more complex than it was in the past.

The third security challenge we face is that crises are now more complex, not only because there are local actors in the form of organizations and factions but because state interests are also involved, sometimes controlling and sometimes controlled by other factions.

The final challenge is that all seven major flashpoints in the Middle East—Palestine, Israel, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Iran, and Afghanistan—are linked. They are linked first by the involvement in and the interest of the principal powers, the United States and the other major powers. Second, they are linked by the fact that each contains a very large element of asymmetric warfare and terrorism. Third, they are linked because the strategic fight, not only the balance of power, is over the oil resources in the region. Last, and perhaps most critically, they are linked because of the pervasive influence and impact Iran has on each crisis.

Ambassador Munir Akram is Pakistan’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations.
THE CENTRAL CONUNDRUM OF THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST

In Afghanistan, the center of gravity for a solution to the crisis may be a little bit lower compared to the other six crises, but in Palestine, Israel, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Iran the central problem relates to the eventual rules of engagement between the United States and its allies and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Although Afghanistan may be slightly different, this is the central conundrum of the security environment in the Middle East, with Iran and the United States the major players. Therefore future events will need to be assessed on the basis of how the relationship between the United States and Iran evolves.

No doubt you have all heard about the recent first talks that were held in Baghdad. Though apparently things have not gone so well since then, there are two dimensions we need to look at to determine which way things will go in the future. The first is Iraq. The second is the nuclear issue between the U.S. plus five and Iran.

Issues for Iran

Regarding Iraq, I think the Iranians are probably sincere when they say they want a stable Iraq. I think it is in their interests to have a stable Iraq but a stable Iraq that is dominated by a Shia government. Regarding that point, U.S. policies in Iraq since the country’s intervention have converged with the interests of Iran because with the elections insisted upon by the U.S., it was inevitable that the government would be dominated by the Shia. Perhaps this result was foreseen in Washington, one does not know, but so far U.S. policies have converged with Iranian interests regarding the Iraqi government.

However, while Iran requires that a Shia government assume power in Baghdad, it also requires that the United States and its allies leave Iraq, and that is where a major divergence arises. Iran, together with some of its allies, perhaps Syria, is trying to bring about conditions that will prevent the United States from staying in Iraq, as the U.S. obviously wishes to do. Those conditions are rapidly being created on the ground. The sectarian violence may have been started by the Sunni—Al Zarqawi and his gang—and it may have been fueled by some of the Sunni insurgents, including the Baathists. Today, however, it is the Shia militia that is carrying out ethnic cleansing in many of the Sunni-majority areas in Iraq and creating new realities on the ground in Baghdad and elsewhere.

Issues for the United States

U.S. forces are also facing new forms of weapons that make for large numbers of casualties, which has been a phenomenon of the surge in troops. Security in parts of Baghdad and elsewhere may be better because of the surge, but the cost in terms of U.S. casualties has been higher—there is a direct correlation between increased numbers of casualties and the kind of weapons and tactics U.S. troops are facing. The conditions on the ground for the U.S. are difficult.

Politically, the Shia-dominated government is obviously reluctant to take the steps that are required for reconciliation with the Sunnis. The Oil Law, the Federation Law, and the other political steps that are required to bring in the Sunnis, bring in the ex-Baathists, and isolate Al Qaeda have not yet been taken in Iraq.

In Iran, many realize that the U.S. is facing a domestic situation in which public opinion is turning more and more toward American withdrawal from Iraq. The perception, perhaps in Teheran, is that if things continue in the direction they are going—the sectarian separation, the lack of consensus within Iraq, the drifting away of the Kurds, the problems between Kurdistan and Turkey, and the ground situation—the U.S. will eventually be obliged to agree to a full withdrawal, be it rapid or gradual. That could be
in exchange for Iranian help, which would be provided in exchange for a deal on the nuclear issue and a security role for Iran in the Gulf.

That deal is obviously possible. The main question is whether a deal could be worked out between the U.S. and Iran on the nuclear issue. There it seems that prospects are not very bright. The U.S. has set down a benchmark, which is the cessation of nuclear enrichment by Iran. The Security Council has endorsed this benchmark twice, and it is now a legal requirement for Iran. But the Iranians have said loud and clear that they will not accept the cessation of enrichment as the basis for an understanding or a package deal that would involve Iraq and Gulf security.

On the other side, I have not heard people in Washington say that they would agree to anything less than full cessation of enrichment by Iran. Of course, if there is flexibility in the positions of the two sides a deal is possible. The definition of enrichment can be quite flexible and the definition of continuation of enrichment on Iranian soil can also be very flexible. So far, however, the U.S. seems determined to have complete, verified cessation and the Iranians are equally determined to continue with nuclear enrichment. According to Dr. El Baradeh, the Iranians already have 1,800 centrifuges running and could have about 3,000 within the next few months. Then, if they were able to throw the inspectors out, they could accelerate and meet the projections that in two or three years they could have enough material for a weapon, although they declare that they do not want weapons.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

These points, then, make up the central crisis in our region, though, of course, I have not dwelled on the other aspects of the crisis: the chaos between Palestine and Israel, the fragmentation in Lebanon, and the immediate challenge in Afghanistan, with which NATO is so deeply involved. Regarding Afghanistan, I will only say that what is required is nothing less than a new strategy, one that perhaps redefines success. The Afghanistan war started as a war of vengeance against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, but now it has mutated into a different kind of conflict and we need to see what our objectives are there and how we can achieve them.
The Security and Future of the Middle East

Major General Zhan Maohai

Its important strategic position, rich oil resources, and unique history and culture give the Middle East an important place in the modern international system. Former U.S. President Eisenhower once pointed out that “even only from the geographic perspective, there is no region more important than the Middle East in the entire world strategy.” The Middle East gave birth to ancient and splendid civilizations. However, because of the intertwining of various and complex contradictions, the Middle East has now become “one of the most troubled, unstable, and harmed regions in the world.”

Up until now, the Middle East has been fragile in terms of the domestic and regional order of the countries in the region. How can we put the Middle East on the road to peace and stability? This is of great significance for maintaining world peace and enjoying growth and development.

THE NEW SECURITY SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Since the end of the Cold War, especially since September 11, the Middle East has been faced with a new security situation. First of all, the U.S. Greater Middle East Initiative has met with setbacks. Since the start of the Iraqi War, the United States has invested huge human and material resources in introducing Western democracy to the Greater Middle East. However, the results are well short of expectations. With complex ethnic contradictions, a strong religious consciousness, a weak democratic basis, and rampant violence and terrorism, things may turn out contrary to American wishes if the United States tries to force democracy on the Middle East in a hurried way. Middle East countries believe that the introduction of democracy should be based on specific conditions in each country, and that democracy should not be imposed from the outside. If the United States pushes from the outside when internal conditions are not ripe, the outcome may be half of what is wanted at twice the effort.

Second, there is the issue of anti-terrorism. At present, the Middle East remains a region that experiences frequent terrorist activities, which not only affect the economic development there but also pose a serious threat to the daily life of the people. There are many causes of terrorism, including poverty, injustice, corruption, and hegemony, but poverty and lack of economic development may be the most impor-

1 Major General Zhan Maohai is Vice Chairman of the China Institute of International Strategic Studies.
tant ones. How can we solve the problem of terrorism once and for all? Every country in the world must channel its efforts to that cause.

Third, complex ethnic and religious issues are involved. The Middle East is a region in which three religions and various religious sects exist. Owing to historical reasons, ethnic and religious misunderstandings and contradictions have arisen, and if mishandled, may lead to bloody conflicts and clashes.

Fourth, there is a lack of regional security mechanisms—the Middle East has not yet set up a regional security framework. The imbalance of regional power may result in additional instability.

THE IRAQ ISSUE

The deterioration of the security situation in Iraq has now caused widespread concern in the international community. Addressing the enlarged ministerial meeting of Iraq’s neighbors that was held in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, on May 4, 2007, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi pointed out that, at present, solidarity, stability, and development, in particular solidarity, are the three prime essentials for resolving the Iraq issue.

China firmly supports the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Iraq, and calls for resolving the disputes of the various Iraqi groups through the political process, in a peaceful and democratic way and through efforts to improve the humanitarian conditions in Iraq. China also supports the acceleration of the reconstruction process in Iraq in accordance with the principles of equality and openness.

In addition China supports the blueprint for Iraq’s development and reconstruction described in the International Compact with Iraq, and proposes the following for its implementation.

- Overall planning and coordination are needed so that assistance from all quarters of the world can converge into effective support for the Iraqi people. China supports the United Nations in continuing to play a leading role in this endeavor. The Iraqi government should work with the international community as soon as possible to shoulder its responsibility for safeguarding its national security to create a peaceful and stable security environment for implementing the International Compact with Iraq.

- A comprehensive and balanced approach should be taken. The various fields covered by the International Compact with Iraq are closely related and complementary and comprehensive and balanced efforts should be made to push forward dialogue and reconciliation among the various Iraqi groups, promote human rights and the rule of law, accelerate economic and social reforms, properly arrange the allocation of resources, and ensure access to basic social services.

- The third point is that the international community should deliver on its promises and pay attention to actual effects. As the old Chinese saying goes, “Give a man a fish and you will feed him for a day. Teach him how to fish and you will feed him for a lifetime.” With the initiation of the International Compact with Iraq, the international community should take practical measures to carry out its commitments concerning reconstruction assistance and help Iraq to restore and enhance its capacity for self-development, enabling the Iraqi people to benefit from peace and development as soon as possible.

- Efforts must also be made to strengthen implementation supervision. A fair and transparent environment is conducive to arousing the various parties’ enthusiasm to participate in Iraq’s reconstruction. China supports regular evaluations of Iraq reconstruction progress and of international assistance, so that they are based on respecting Iraq’s sovereignty and independence and the relevant principles and requirements of the International Compact with Iraq.
China also supports Iraq’s various ethnic groups and religious sects in strengthening dialogue, promoting reconciliation, and establishing a mechanism for Iraq’s self-development. The political solution should have high priority and stability should be realized through comprehensive measures. Continuous efforts should be made to promote reconstruction, improve the livelihood of the people, and ensure that each can equally participate in politics and have a fair share of the wealth. At the same time, Iraq cannot achieve solidarity, stability, and development without the support and participation of its neighbors and the international community. Neighboring countries should strengthen coordination and cooperation with Iraq and their concerns should also be understood and taken care of.

THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR ISSUE

On December 23, 2006, after the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1737 imposing sanctions on Iran, Iran immediately declared that it resolutely rejected the resolution and that it would continue with and accelerate the implementation of its nuclear program, intensifying the conflict over the Iranian nuclear issue. The international community’s current concerns include whether Iran can make major breakthroughs in uranium enrichment technology, how the United Nations should react to the current situation, and whether the United States will decide to resort to force against Iran.

How can we sort out the crux of the Iranian nuclear issue? Therein lies the key to its settlement. China calls for upholding the integrity of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, stands opposed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and holds that the legal rights of countries to make peaceful use of nuclear energy should be respected provided they strictly fulfill their international nonproliferation obligations.

China also maintains that the best option in the interests of all parties concerned is to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue through diplomatic negotiations. This requires not only political willingness but also diplomatic wisdom. All parties concerned should exercise patience and restraint, and stay committed to pursuing a peaceful solution. They should resume their dialogues and negotiations as soon as possible and work for a permanent and comprehensive solution.

China calls on Iran to enhance its cooperation with IAEA and to create the necessary conditions and atmosphere for resuming negotiations. This will break the vicious cycle of the U.N. Security Council adopting new resolutions that impose sanctions and then Iran escalating its nuclear activities. Imposing sanctions is not an end in itself, but only a means to putting Iran back on the track of negotiations. The sanctions adopted by the Security Council this time are limited and reversible. They are strictly confined to sensitive nuclear activities and to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. It is clearly stipulated that if Iran suspends its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and complies with the relevant resolutions of IAEA and the Security Council, the Security Council will suspend and even terminate the sanctions. China hopes that Iran will value negotiation channels with EU countries and Russia.

THE PROSPECTS FOR SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The best option for realizing security is a peaceful solution. History has proven time and again that military force cannot resolve the Middle East issue in a permanent and comprehensive way, and that it can only result in a vicious cycle of fighting violence with violence.

To achieve security, exchanges and cooperation should be strengthened. All parties concerned should enhance mutual political trust and cooperation and increase exchanges and contacts, especially in economic and trade areas, to create a mutually complementary and a win-win situation. China and the Middle East countries can complement each other economically, and there is great potential for developing eco-

The Security and Future of the Middle East 103
nomic and trade cooperation. China is willing to continue to strengthen economic and trade cooperation with countries in the region on the basis of equality and mutual benefits.

Finally, the United Nations should play a leading role. The principle of “land for peace” established by U.N. resolutions on the Middle East issue and the Madrid Peace Conference should be the basis for Middle East peace talks. All parties concerned should take substantive measures to implement resolutions and understandings already reached to realize the peaceful coexistence of “two states for two nations.” This is the key to breaking the deadlock in the Middle East peace talks. Furthermore, we should promote dialogue between civilizations, advocate an open and all-embracing concept of civilization, support the friendly coexistence and equal dialogue between civilizations, and join efforts to build a harmonious world.

**CONCLUDING REMARKS**

The state of instability in the Middle East is unlikely to be resolved in a short time, and its solution will require extended and active efforts by all parties concerned. China actively supports the Middle East peace process and believes that the realization of peace is the common desire of all the people of all the countries in the region, and that it serves their fundamental interests. Steady progress in the Middle East peace process is a guarantee of security for all countries in the region. China will, as always, work with the international community to realize a comprehensive and just peace in the Middle East as soon as possible.
Algeria considers that addressing the problem of security in the Mediterranean region requires a collective strategy based on partnership and cooperation within a Euro-Mediterranean framework, aiming at making this region a zone of permanent peace, stability, and prosperity. Algeria is gratified that most of the states and regional and international organizations already share this concept of collective security, and my country remains convinced that the concept, promoted through various forums, will enable dialogue and consultation alone to lead to rapprochement among the people on both sides of the Mediterranean and to establish regional peace and stability.

ADDRESSING MEDITERRANEAN ISSUES WITHIN A GLOBAL FRAMEWORK

My country believes that issues of concern to the Mediterranean region should be addressed within a global framework that takes into account the interests and concerns of the countries on both sides of the Mediterranean at the political, security, economic, and humanitarian levels. It considers that security in Europe, linked naturally to that of the Mediterranean, must take into account the stability of the southern Mediterranean region. Algeria also believes that integrating the Mediterranean dimension is an indispensable part of any consideration of European security and that cooperation in this area should be based on solidarity-based security.

Working with NATO, the OSCE, and the U.N.

Having met with interest all initiatives to strengthen security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region, Algeria is willing to contribute to efforts aimed at bringing lasting stability and prosperity to the region. In fact, it is regularly and effectively involved in different dialogue frameworks in the region, notably the Barcelona Process, the Mediterranean Forum, the 5 + 5 Dialogue, and the Mediterranean Dia-

1 Ambassador Youcef Yousfi is the Algerian Permanent Representative to the United Nations and a former Algerian Foreign Minister.
logue of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Within the Euro-Mediterranean framework, Algeria considers the dialogue on European security and defense policy an additional forum for discovering better ways to deal with the concerns of the region and to promote cooperation in the security sphere. Algeria also participates in the 5+5 Dialogue, both in meetings of the Ministers of Interior and those of the Ministers of Defense. The 5 + 5 Dialogue framework reflects the awareness of the member-countries of the scope of the stakes at hand regarding regional peace and security and that a comprehensive and solidarity-based approach is needed. In this context, the ministerial meeting held in Algiers on December 12, 2005, provided an opportunity to take concrete measures to cooperate on maritime, air, and land surveillance primarily related to intervening in cases of natural disasters.

Within NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue, Algeria has been seeking, since it became a party to the initiative in March 2000, to promote a serious and constructive dialogue to reinforce peace and collective security in the Mediterranean. My country has called in particular for striking a balance between the political and operational tracks. Our status as Associate Member, which was granted to Algeria in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly during the session that was held from May 27–31, 2005, in Ljubljana, Slovenia, will allow my country to be more actively involved in the work of the assembly’s committees and sub-committees.

With regard to political dialogue, Algeria took part in meetings held by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs, in Brussels in December 2004; the Ministers of Defense, in Taormina (Sicily), in January 2006; and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in Brussels in May 2006.

Within the context of the cooperation process with the OSCE, actions taken by Algeria have been guided by the basic principle of indivisibility for European and Mediterranean security. Political dialogue between the OSCE and the Mediterranean countries is being conducted, particularly within the framework of the Permanent Council in Vienna, through the Group of Contact with the Partner Mediterranean Countries for Cooperation (PMCC), with the aim of facilitating the exchange of information of common interest and proposing new cooperation relationships. Within the PMCC, Algeria has been advocating the development of common responses to the risks and challenges facing the countries of the region in the areas of terrorism, transnational organized crime, smuggling of and illicit trafficking in weapons, racism, xenophobia, migration, and economic disparities.

Algeria fully supports the objectives and actions envisaged by the resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations on “strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region,” and has spared no effort to achieve the objectives called for by this text. My country also attaches particular importance to the disarmament efforts undertaken at the regional level as a step towards achieving the general and complete disarmament sought within the framework of the United Nations. In this regard, Algeria is a party to a set of international and regional legal instruments related to disarmament and the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It is also actively involved in the implementation of the United Nations Program of Action on Illicit Trade in Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. A regional conference was held in Algiers in April 2005 to support the program’s implementation by the Arab States. I would like to note here that tireless effort resulted in the launching of the aforementioned cooperation processes, as well as good will displayed by the advocates of these forums. All contributed significantly to the rapprochement and cooperation among the peoples of this region of the world, which is considered the cradle of civilization and a strategic crossroad for exchange and cooperation.
MISPERCEPTIONS REGARDING THE SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN

In addition to its participation in cooperation frameworks, the Mediterranean region is unique in terms of simplifying the complexity of north-south relationships. Such relationships are uneven—the countries of the south work hard to strike a greater balance in a sometimes hostile and often coercive international environment. The end of the Cold War paved the way for restructuring international relations characterized by a dynamism that resulted from the convergence of old protagonists from both blocs. That process was accompanied, however, by the emergence, in some quarters, of the perception that the Mediterranean was a potential source of threats to security, thus exacerbating the lack of confidence and misunderstanding. An in-depth and serious discussion might iron out differences among the various perceptions. Such a discussion would lead to greater openness and could lay the foundation for consensus in a more realistic and progressive way of the means with which to promote collective security in the region.

The lack of a common view has led to countries of the southern Mediterranean being left behind in the political and economic reconfiguration process that has been taking place in the Euro-Mediterranean region since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the eastward expansion of Europe. Those countries may in fact end up paying the price for that expansion unless solid cooperation can strike some kind of balance.

THE MEDITERRANEAN AS AN EQUAL, UNITED SPACE

Naturally, the southern Mediterranean countries would not oppose the integration of Europe or its expansion. They have even promoted the emergence of a strong and united European group that can contribute to achieving a multi-polar and more balanced world. They wish, however, to be fully involved in the decision-making processes on the political, security, and economic issues that engage their region and that affect their stability and security. In this context, the countries of the southern Mediterranean region consider the Mediterranean a common space that should constitute a privileged venue for the political, economic, and humanitarian convergence of peoples on both sides of the Mediterranean.

Based on that viewpoint, it might be useful to develop policies that are not designed to confirm the old fault line between the north and the south, but to create spaces of solidarity that would help reduce socio-economic disparities between the two sides. That is the challenge facing the Mediterranean countries today, which they need to confront in a positive spirit of solidarity and openness.

From that perspective, the ambitious project of creating a free-trade zone in the Euro-Mediterranean region should not be confined to the free circulation of goods and services. It should also eliminate unbalanced development between the northern and southern Mediterranean countries and be strengthened gradually by the movement of people and through a humanitarian exchange, with the advancement and welfare of people the ultimate objective of establishing the free-trade zone.

REKINDLING SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN HOPES

The emergence of this new context, embodied by globalization, has rekindled the hopes of the countries of the southern Mediterranean to experience growth and development as great as that produced by globalization. Those countries have in fact taken part in historic transformations and made enormous sacrifices, including painful changes and difficult social implications, in order to adapt to the new reality. However, dashed hopes have prevailed, and the heralded changes only benefited industrialized countries. Instead, rural exodus, migration, with all its human tragedies, and violence and intolerance have been exacerbated in the south.

The launch of the Barcelona Process, in November 1995, created big hopes for the people of the southern Mediterranean, but those hopes receded in recent years because of a series of misunderstand-
ings and disappointments. The daily acts of violence in the Middle East and the inability of the international community to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict also adversely affect the security and stability of the Mediterranean and undermine the very spirit of the lofty principles of our partnership and our dream to make the Mediterranean an area of peace and prosperity.
Chapter 26

The Definition of Security: Rehashing an Old Debate

Ambassador Mahmoud Karem

OPENING REMARKS

I have been asked to give a thought-provoking presentation, to explain as well as to shed light on Arab public opinion. I intend to do just that. But in order to fulfil this task I wish to present, before starting, the disclaimer that the views expressed in this presentation are those of the author alone and do not reflect the views of his government.

Globalization has indeed affected us all. The world has become smaller and more intertwined, with reciprocal dependence growing. Most of the present-day challenges and threats are trans-national. They emanate from different sources, not only non-governmental and non-state actors, and they come not only as international terrorism or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems but from regional and interstate conflicts, failing or failed states, energy insufficiency, diseases, migration, water security, cyber-crimes, poverty, infectious diseases, the environment, and organized

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1 Ambassador Mahmoud Karem is the Egyptian Ambassador to Belgium and the European Union and the Egyptian Representative to the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue.
crime, among others. And they have all impinged one way or another on our national security.\(^2\) Some sceptics have argued that the international agenda suffers from a priority disorder, especially regarding the lack of security and the fact that 40% of the world’s population live below the level of $2 a day.

As one historian recently put it, “The 20th century was one of the bloodiest eras in history. Between 167 million and 188 million people died because of violence.” The 21st century could be no better if we overlook the principles on which global security and peace are anchored.

### THE NATURE OF TODAY’S MIDDLE EASTERN CHALLENGES

Today, regional disputes have turned into long chronic conflicts that impact international peace and security, developing into a breeding terrain for injustice and a culture of hatred and despair. Additionally, ethnic and religious intra-regional conflicts have now led to ethnic cleansing and religious cleansing. The Middle East is torn by attempts to incite wars between minorities and factions, such as the Shia and the Sunni, the Christians and the Moslems. A war of conflicting fatwas also exists, exacerbating factionalism and deepening confrontation with the West.

Islamophobia and Europhobia are also alive and well. The recent cartoon crisis in Denmark plus statements by parliamentary figures in some European countries and in the Netherlands have amplified negative stereotypes on both sides. The report of the SG High-Level Group dated November 13, 2006, and entitled “Alliance of Civilizations” stated that “Diversity of civilizations and cultures is a basic feature of human society and a driving force of human progress. Civilizations and cultures reflect the great wealth and heritage of humankind; their nature is to overlap, interact, and evolve in relation to one another. There is no hierarchy among cultures, as each has contributed to the evolution of humanity. The history of civilizations is in fact a history of mutual borrowing and constant cross-fertilization.” It is through concerted and multifaceted inter-cultural dialogue, not through polarized perceptions nor by fueling mutual suspicions and fears, that we work together to address these negative trends. We must end stereotypes and generate common understanding.

Even in the EU-Mediterranean policy or the Barcelona process, the Middle East is perceived more and more not as responding to the southern countries’ development challenges but rather as responding to the imaginary “threats” that these southern countries pose (migration, geopolitical insecurity, religious antagonisms, and so on). Concomitantly, little is being done to develop trade and encourage investment, as noted by a distinguished Arab U.N. official\(^3\).

While the EU is the Arab world’s largest external partner, the Arab region represents only 7% of the EU’s total trade. Investment capital presents another glaring discrepancy. Today, the Middle East’s share of international trade and FDI is less than 1.5%, half of which is with the European Union. Medium-size economies, such as Sweden’s, attract more capital than all the countries of the Middle Eastern world put together.

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\(^2\) Since the end of the Cold War the world community has been introduced to various new concepts of security threats. Our perception of global threats has also evolved during the last few decades to include menaces such as pandemics, heat-trapping gas emissions, changing weather patterns, dwindling energy supplies, poverty, and underdevelopment among the list of other more familiar threats of a political and military nature, notably among which are terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, wars emanating from colliding interests, or strife over land or simply over maintaining primacy or achieving strategic advantage.

\(^3\) Dr. Heba El-Kholy, United Nations Resident Coordinator and UNDP Resident Representative, in a speech before the European Parliament, December 7, 2007.
Another challenge impinging on our region is war by proxy, or the surreptitious management of conflict by proxy. Groups operating in Iraq, Palestine, Lebanon, Somalia, and Sudan, for instance, rely on material support from extraneous as well as regional powers and even occasionally from non-state actors. These powers in turn use these groups to incite violence, derail the direly needed peace process, and delay, for instance, the implementation of a particular U.N. resolution that was painstakingly negotiated.

**Egypt’s Work Toward Peace**

You must acknowledge that Egypt does not stir up, father, nor pull the strings of any such movement, nor does it patronize or condone such a *modus operandi* to forge a particular consequence or outcome. On the contrary, Egypt under President Mubarak has chosen the more difficult path of brokering peace, placing teams on the grounds, making sacrifices while preventing escalation, and diffusing intra-factional disputes—in other words playing an exemplary role of peace building, peace making, and peace keeping. In this context it is necessary to underline the need to revisit collective security, by denying the selective application of charter principles, double standards in place of universal respect for the rule of law, international legitimacy and principles and provisions of the U.N. charter.

**CONFLICTING DEFINITIONS OF SECURITY: A DOCTRINAL DIVIDE IN THE MIDDLE EAST**

At present conflicting definitions of security by the parties in our region remain alive and well and center on whether solving the Arab-Israeli conflict will or will not lead to achieving regional security. The Arab leadership as well as private citizens believe in the symbiotic link between solving the conflict and achieving regional security. This has recently led to Arab peace initiatives reflecting not only a keen desire to achieve a long and lasting peace, but also a deep sense of conflict fatigue. Recent statements by the king of Saudi Arabia in which he noted that the region has long gambled on war and now should gamble on peace are indeed expressive and illustrative. The proponents of the king’s view also believe in the positive correlation between the lack of a political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the rise of terrorism, fundamentalism, and the culture of animosity and hatred.

This setting is inflammatory, especially in young societies such as Egypt, in which about a quarter of its 77 million people are younger than 20. Naturally the presence of foreign forces in the midst of our region, who are there under various pretexts, fuels these sentiments and leads to additional radicalism. However, some Israelis believe the opposite. They argue that the reasons for lack of security in our region as well as the root causes of regional instability remain embedded in economic malaise, terrorism, weak political participation, lack of reform, viable institutionalization, and denial of an active and positive political process.

**Consequences of the Arab-Israeli Conflict**

Whatever the final assessment, it remains axiomatic that the strain of the continuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict on daily lives in the Middle East has forced the region to degenerate into a culture of confrontation, with a sense of insecurity permeating both Arabs and Israelis. Prolonging the conflict by not leveraging historic moments or taking advantage of windows of opportunity to grab peace is a matter of serious concern for students of history as well as for leaders assiduously working for the cause of nation building.

Arab citizens occasionally argue that Israel is working to prolong the conflict in order to keep Israel undivided domestically, to weaken the Arab world, and to push for an unavoidable clash between peoples and leaders, leading possibly to the disintegration of the Arab state and the decay of Arab unity and cohe-
sion. Proponents of this view also argue that such delaying tactics may be used to usurp more land and create a new *fait accompli* (a separating wall, an expansion of settlements, or a change in demographics). For this procrastinating tactic to succeed, they argue, it becomes necessary to play on Israeli domestic politics and U.S. presidential or congressional elections as an alibi to defer and stagnate peace endeavors.

Although some elements in these arguments may be branded as weak and inconclusive, they remain shared by some analysts and a sector of Arab public opinion. The challenge therefore must remain focused on the need to capture time for fostering peace efforts and to avoid making the Middle East a region of successive lost opportunities. In this context a serious divide exists and, until this asymmetry is corrected, the doctrinal defense divide will remain.

The paradox is that regional neighbors living side by side know each other’s weaknesses and strength very well. This knowledge of one’s adversary has sometimes been put into play not for the sake of making peace but for spoiling peace, or for maintaining the status quo, achieving a stalemate, or returning to the status ante. For example, whenever we are close to an agreement, an operation takes place that claims the lives of civilians either by Israeli incursions or firing al-qassam rockets. Such actions reverse or stall the peace efforts of many parties—this has happened many times.

This vicious cycle must be broken. We must stop giving dark forces the chance to manipulate or stall peace attempts and to go against the solid political will of the international community, international legitimacy, and peace building efforts.

**The Rise of Factionalism**

One other factor impinging on the definition of security is the rise of factionalism, ethnic confrontations, and fear of different ethnic or minority asymmetries. To elucidate, political analysts are torn in a comparative analytical schism between Sunni jihadism and Shia transnationalism.

The trend today is appalling; instead of promoting a national homogeneous mosaic in old, traditional societies in the Middle East, we are seeing intervention in the internal affairs of states by playing one minority against the other or one minority against the majority. Minorities are encouraged to find refuge in the outside world and to seek support for their case. In some cases, such actions may be warranted, in order to arrest certain negative activities taken by some governments that violate humanitarian norms, international legitimacy, and the letter and spirit of the charter of the U.N. In other cases, however, such attempts seem to be made in the name of doctrines such as human security, humanitarian intervention, constructive instability, responsibility to protect, or even regime change. Maintaining the delicate balance between the fundamentals of socio-economic and historical factors must be carefully weighed against the consequences of fomenting internal disorder.

**The Fear of Amalgamation**

Note also the diverse threat impinging on the national security of states in our region from fear of disintegration or amalgamation into a wider whole, where a state’s national history and identity do not belong. A classic model is the one offered by the eastern European bloc after the end of the Cold War, in which we saw the emergence of a wide array of new states and the disintegration of an old bloc. This situation led to what the foreign minister of Russia referred to in May of 2007 as “historical revisionism.”

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4 Take the case of Egypt, for example, where the Bedouins, Copts, and Nubians have always been an integral part of the national character and identity, a reason for fomenting national cohesion rather than disunity.
It is interesting to note that some analysts have said that during the Cold War one of the methods used to bring about change and to speed up the downfall of Communist eastern Europe was based on expanding the role of religion. Religion was perceived to foment social unrest, as well as to accelerate the much-sought-after dialectical conversion from communism to capitalism. Since the church proved to be a formidable force in this regard, the argument in the mind of some policymakers has been, Why not emulate the role assigned to religion in the Middle East in the hope of producing a quicker result for change and reform? To this end we argue that doing so would surely result in failure. In the Middle East, the forces of religion are old and deeply entrenched in the ethos of the society. Religion has never been absent, nor will it ever be. On the contrary, the protective role of religion in confronting the sweeping forces of modernization, westernization, and materialism shall always remain. Any attempt to tamper with religion will be considered an attempt to uproot old and traditional values and beliefs anchored in long-time practice. Tampering with religious forces in the Middle East is a recipe for failure, and is tantamount to playing with fire.5 for religion should become a model for compassion and cohabitation rather than manipulation and confrontation. We must underscore the fact that the Middle East was the birthplace of the three holy religions and hence should become a model for coexistence and tolerance.

The Greater Middle East

A few years ago the Middle East was offered a formula that remains alive and well, namely, that of "the Greater Middle East." This scheme is viewed by many scholars in our region as an implicit attempt to melt Arab identity, and possibly the Arab League, into a larger incoherent whole. Countries of the region responded to the idea by deeming it necessary to map their own future. They argued that Arab idiosyncrasies should not be diffused by other identities nor with extra-regional features, since the Arab world is a region fashioned by a common culture, common language, mutual history, joint religion, and shared identity. Diluting this through bordering regions would be tantamount to committing heresy in international relations theory terms, particularly if the tenants of the system's theory were applied. A broader Middle East would be less coherent, less similar, and less prone to change. The distinct and sui generis character of the region must be taken into account, and simplistic groupings or sweeping generalizations of commonalities due to a geographic imperative avoided. Inducing change through electric shocks, especially in old and traditional societies, is a matter of serious concern. Political and economic reform should be carried out but with the pace and rhythm each society chooses for itself.

CONFLICTING DOCTRINES OF DEFENSE SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Defense doctrines are predicated on the overall structure of a region.6 In the case of the Middle East we can posit that defense doctrines remain wide apart, in dire need of restructuring and in want of a series of confidence-building measures. I would argue that the closer we are to a political settlement of

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5 Some analysts argue that President Sadat in the late 1970s sought to offset the rising role of the influential Coptic Pope Shenoda by bringing back to domestic politics political Islam and that, as a result, things got out of hand, leading to his assassination by Muslim fundamentalists.

6 Some scholars ask, Could an Iranian nuclear power situation force regional parity and stability such as is found in the model of the Indian subcontinent, the case of India and Pakistan? Or would such a step lead to a nuclear race in the region, with other players sending the area to the brink of a nuclear arms race? Has the use of force successfully changed the situation in Iraq and Lebanon, where we saw the failure of a regular army in the wake of irregular military resistance? Could the stability of the Gulf
the Arab-Israeli conflict, the less military spending there would be. To understand the link we must assess such a doctrinal divide.

Let us first discuss the issue of WMDs. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons—or rather the fear of such proliferation—is actually one of the major causes of world crises. The few positive developments by South Africa and Libya in dismantling their nuclear programs were overshadowed by crises in the Indian subcontinent, the Korean Peninsula, Iraq, and Iran. Some of these crises not only still simmer but have regrettably denigrated into regional dimensions that undermine world peace and security, similar to crises witnessed during the height of the Cold War.

I would like however to claim that the tensions arising from these crises could be attributed to the policies for dealing with them rather than to the nature of the threats. After all, the nuclear tests in the Indian subcontinent were actions motivated by a strategic choice for parity and security of bilateral and regional perspectives. Despite the initial condemnations, the tests were gradually condoned, sanctions were later lifted, and even a strategic agreement on nuclear issues was signed with one of the relevant parties. Similarly, the crisis in the Korean Peninsula persisted for years, until the DPRK concealed and then tested its first nuclear device. After six talks, a light at the end of the tunnel seemed to appear. In Iraq, proliferation claims were drummed up and nuclear, chemical, and biological threats were dramatized to warrant regime change. Military intervention on a massive scale was carried out, only to reveal later that a rigorous 10-year U.N. inspection system had almost demilitarized Iraq, leading to the assumption that the need for military intervention under that pretext was totally unsubstantiated.

In the case of Iran, almost daily we are bombarded with threats and counter-threats coupled with intransigence and conditional ties over direct talks among concerned parties. Here I wish to state that a negotiated deal must be our target regardless of our individual opinion about the nature of the Iranian political system; Iranians must be the ones to choose the system they need.

**Threat Common Denominators**

Despite the seemingly diverse nature of all these threats, there are common denominators and conclusions that I would like to underline:

1. WMD proliferation was defined to label certain states as security threats and indeed as targets for possible punitive measures, either by the international community or by concerned groups of like-minded countries. Now matters are becoming more rational with the efforts of the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540 committee.

2. International mechanisms and frameworks have been randomly utilized or at best selectively involved. The U.N., IAEA, NPT, and UNSC were sometimes undermined, abused, or completely sidelined. To say the least, their role was always secondary to that of maximizing national power interests and politics.

3. The threat perception has been increasingly shaped by ideology and sometimes cliché. Arguments have floated about concerning the “democratic peace theory” dividing the world into democratic friends and undemocratic enemies. Regime change has been perceived as less expensive and easier compared to multilateral engagements. The application in the last few years of the so-called Doctrine of Preemptive
Strikes and Coercive Democratization has proved beyond doubt that power has its limitations and that such theories have adverse repercussions and produce limited results. We all need to be reeducated that democracy is indeed an evolutionary process rather than a revolutionary one, and that it has to be homegrown to hold ground.

4. Double standards and selective enforcement have been increasingly undermining the NPT nonproliferation system to the breaking point. Serious effort has to be made to bolster the universality and integrity of NPT while ensuring the full use of peaceful nuclear energy in accordance with Article IV of the treaty. Cohesion and predictability are urgently needed to maintain the rule-based order on which nonproliferation heavily depends. No back-tracking on the “fruits” of NPT signatories should be envisaged; on the contrary, means must be devised to enable all signatories to utilize and reap NPT’s full benefits, including enrichment as stipulated in the treaty within a transparent, safe, monitored, and verifiable safeguard system and in full conformity with the tenants of the agency’s additional protocol.

5. No country in the world is powerful enough to prevent future nuclear proliferation violations without the framework of the universal rules that all states accept and enforce. To put it in the words of Dr. George Pekovich, in one of the recent Carnegie Endowment papers, “Any strategy of ignoring international rules to change regimes America does not like and changing rules to reward those America favors is doomed to fail.” I would add that multilateral diplomacy rather than military force should be the ultimate way to deal with the issues at hand.

Weak and Failed States

Regarding weak and failed states, I would like to draw your kind attention to the following elements based on my personal observations of developments in both Afghanistan and Somalia. I believe that these threats have a lot to do with the third group of threat aspects emanating from terrorism and organized crime.

1. The collapse of any given government, resulting in the absence of law and order triggered by or resulting in civil wars, political unrest, or tribal, ethnic, or sectarian strife, are viewed today as catalysts for radicalization and extremism, which in turn give way to the rise of terrorist organizations and fundamentalist ideology. Therefore, there is a need to formulate international understanding on how best to contain such cases, prevent spillovers into neighboring countries, invest in regional and sub-regional arrangements, exert pressure for reconciliation and dialogue, and, finally and perhaps most effectively, support economic and social development.

Egypt has proposed in many instances the need to pursue an in-depth and detailed discussion on political Islam with our European partners. We should not forget that it was the Marshall Plan that rebuilt Europe after the Second World War. Had all or some of its principles been implemented to support the Somali transitional government, we would not have facilitated the emergence of Islamic courts, nor would we have had to deal later with foreign military intervention or aerial strikes from a neighboring state, strikes whose outcome is far from certain. The same applies to Afghanistan. There is no question that the U.N. remains the best-vested and most credible nation-builder that we have. To achieve that, the U.N. has to be politically empowered and sufficiently financed. The success stories in both Kampuchea and Mozambique must be emulated.

2. There are a good number of signs that post-conflict reconstruction efforts are the foreign policy issue du jour in many capitals. The U.S.-led endeavors in Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated that the planning, financing, coordination, and execution for rebuilding war-torn countries are inadequate. I would like to note, though, that focusing on post-conflict reconstruction alone would be a mistake—equal emphasis must be accorded to building good local governance in a large number of weak
and impoverished states. Interstate conflicts and lawlessness in a particular country nurture chaos, creating a breeding ground for terrorism, trade in small arms and light weapons, smuggling, and drug production and trafficking, all with serious effects beyond the boundaries of the country. I even believe that these byproducts of weak and failed states ultimately affect the global economy and global stability.

It was rightly said that state-building through socio-economic development is indeed not an act of simple charity but a smart investment in regional and global security, but there are pivotal areas that are usually neglected. Most of the efforts are geared to the overriding imperative of assembling a strong coalition and a strong military presence. In most cases this is done at the expense of social care, building on local authority, and developing a strong educational and health care system that conforms with local traditions and values. Coalition forces should not be seen as offsetting local values or norms.

3. The fluid nature of terrorist organizations makes them extremely difficult to contain and to understand not only the philosophy and motivations behind their ideology but also their infrastructure and financing network. Ideologies are not fought with traditional armies; they are fought with dialogue, reasoning, and a counter-ideology of values that promises and delivers a better quality of life, security, development, education, and basic needs.

**Clashing Cultural Identities**

Regarding the clash of cultural identities, I would simply like to state that we live in an increasingly complex world in which polarized perceptions, fueled by injustice and inequality, often lead to violence and conflict, threatening international stability. Over the past few years, wars, occupations, and acts of terror have exacerbated suspicion and fear within and among societies. Some political leaders and sectors of the media as well as radical groups have exploited this environment, painting images of a world made up of mutually exclusive cultures, religions, or civilizations, historically distinct and destined for confrontation.

The report presented by the U.N. High-Level Group in November of 2006 in Istanbul (the report that was co-sponsored by the prime ministers of Spain and Turkey) concluded that this issue represents a real danger to discourse among countries and put forward a host of measures that must be taken if we are to increase the margins of consensus and dialogue along with the values of mutual respect among peoples of different cultural and religious traditions. The report stressed that it is of the utmost importance to counter the stereotypes and misconceptions that entrench patterns of hostility and mistrust among societies, a matter that is essential for forging the collective political will to address the world’s imbalances with a view toward diminishing hostility and promoting harmony among the nations and cultures of the world.

**OUTCOMES OF THE RIYADH ARAB SUMMIT**

Coming from the Middle East, I would like to seize this opportunity to shed light on the outcome of the Arab Summit that convened in Riyadh (KSA) on March 27-28, 2007. These three resolutions are relevant to our discussion:

1. The first resolution deals with developing a unified Arab position on establishing a Middle East free of nuclear weapons.
2. The second resolution deals with the development of peaceful programs for nuclear energy.
3. The third resolution deals with the establishment of a pan-Arab program for peaceful applications of nuclear energy.

Without dwelling too much on the specifics of the three resolutions, which are political in essence, I would like to stress several points that the western media always reports on with suspicion and sometimes
with superficial interpretations. The issue of nuclear energy is always reported on in conjunction with two problematic topics—the Iranian nuclear program and Israel's nuclear ambiguity. Moreover some question the reason behind the Arabs' so-called sudden interest in nuclear energy at a time when 25% of proven oil and gas reserves lie in the region. With this in mind I wish to stress the following

1. All 22 member-states of the Arab League are signatories of the Nonproliferation Treaty, therefore all remain entitled to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

2. The Arab states have endeavored for many years to establish an ME zone free of all weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons.

3. The threat to regional and international peace lies with those countries that have covert nuclear capabilities, namely Israel, whose prime minister openly declared in December 2006 that his country possesses nuclear weapons. As long as Israel remains the only country in the region whose nuclear capabilities are condoned based on convoluted assumptions that they are needed for protection from belligerent neighbors or to ensure the country's existence, the whole system of nonproliferation will be severely undermined. Nuclear weapons do not ensure the existence of any country; what ensures Israel's security is peace with its neighbors.

4. The Arab countries' need for nuclear energy is often understated. Countries such as Egypt, whose population doubles every 20 years and whose proven reserves of oil and gas are very modest, certainly need sustained supplies of energy for future development. Other countries such as the Gulf states need cheaper energy to produce drinking water. While they may be rich in fossil fuels they have dire shortages of fresh water. These are but a few examples.

5. One of the resolutions adopted by the Riyadh Summit recommended that all Arab states establish independent national structures assigned to monitor the importing of nuclear materials and isotopes with a view to establishing full clarity and transparency with the international community and international organizations. Compliance with treaties and international obligations are the focus of the Arab drive for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. This must be commended and supported by the international community.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In conclusion, it is clear that today our security is threatened in a number of ways. We are all confronted with the scourge of terrorism. We must collectively deal with the threats emanating from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, because the risks pose potential threats to international peace and security.

Not one nation is immune from these threats. Not one state is capable of tackling them alone. The only way to deal with such threats is through international cooperation. Threats to security know no borders, hence we must use our growing collective efforts and global cooperation to defeat them.

For the past few years, NATO has been trying to promote a modus vivendi of collective and concerted actions, not just among its own member-states but with other nations and organizations as well. NATO has also been trying to build a large network of partnerships with countries throughout the Euro-Atlantic area, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and Australia and Japan.

However, NATO's engagement outside its traditional area of operation has raised several questions in many regions. It is imperative that NATO clarify its intentions toward and goals for the Middle East in order to convince global populations of its goal of cooperation; this would lead to improving NATO's image and to rectifying an historical problem. Explaining the collateral and civilian damages that have resulted from aerial operations in Afghanistan is a challenge NATO must meet.
Furthermore, I would like to outline that in the framework of NATO’s transformation, its activities have become not only limited to military actions, but also that NATO has strengthened its political dimension through intensified political consultations. However, political decisions should always be part of the international community’s response and lead to closer contact with the United Nations.

In 1994 NATO launched the Mediterranean Dialogue initiative with five countries, including Egypt, in the southern Mediterranean region. The aim of this initiative is to foster confidence between the two sides, address common security threats, and dispel any misperceptions about NATO after the end of the Cold War. Egypt strongly supports this dialogue, and over the past few years there has been good progress in relations between the two sides. We have had more frequent and fruitful political discussions on a wider range of issues, and contact and cooperation between NATO and each of the seven Mediterranean countries have increased significantly. Progress has also been made in several areas of practical cooperation.

Egypt and NATO have moved closer in the past few years. We welcome this trend and look forward to reinforcing it. We should discuss the way we look at security today and minimize the doctrinal divide. We need to identify the main risks and threats before us, how we can work together to meet those challenges, and how we can overcome any lingering doubts or misconceptions in our relationship. Much needs to be done.
Chapter 27

The Moroccan View of Global Security

Ambassador Menouar Alem

OPENING REMARKS

To address, in a few minutes, the issue of global security and the challenges it represents for our world in the 21st century is a very ambitious exercise. This is a complex issue, and its root causes as well as its various expressions and the means for tackling it are all important. Therefore I will try to be as concise as possible by addressing only the fundamentals of the topic. Over the course of the workshop we will certainly have an opportunity to have an in-depth discussion of one or more of its points.

A NEW APPROACH FOR THE NEW SECURITY THREATS

Security problems, which were for a long time addressed exclusively through political, military, and security establishments and were conceived entirely within national limits, are now much more complex, since they affect the complete spectrum of our daily lives—energy, transportation, telecommunications, health—and transcend national borders. This mingling of the national and international aspects of security is one of the main reasons that security is so complex at the start of the third millennium.

With the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a globalized society, national security as territorial defense is only one definition of the broader concept, which now includes political, military, economic, environmental, and human dimensions; and political threats, such as terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, so-called collapsed states, and the extension of gray zones, constitute only the visible part of the iceberg. Our collective security is actually now confronted by other risks that are far more devastating. Climate change, risks of pandemic diseases, natural disasters, the frantic world race to control natural resources, and the globalization of the economy, which are marginalizing large parts of the population, are threats that call for a new approach to solutions. This approach must go beyond merely controlling threats by security means to developing a sustainable collective security technique aimed at identifying the causes, roots, and forms of threat and to defining a dynamic approach to preventing future risks to stability.

Ambassador Menouar Alem is the Moroccan Ambassador to the European Institutions and Representative to the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue.
Such an approach is especially necessary because globalization, which carries so many promises and opportunities, also brings challenges and vulnerability, which can result from inequalities that can be generated by wealth redistribution and land reduction. Negative effects can already be seen in terrorist acts, desperate attempts to flee misery, and massive population displacements. Dark scenarios involving the disastrous effects of pandemic diseases such as bird flu and cyber-attacks on strategic sites increase our vulnerability and raise serious questions about our common future.

FOUR CHALLENGES OF THE NEW SECURITY CONFIGURATION

To address the new security configuration and its challenges requires a global cooperative effort in which interdependence addresses globalization’s grave concerns. The four main challenges I see are:

1. Enabling a fair, sustainable settlement of disputes that are permanent threats to regional and international security. I particularly refer to the conflict in the Middle East, which, as everyone knows, and given its emotional tenor, constitutes one of the most fertile grounds for recruitment and radicalization.

2. Socio-economic development in the southern countries and the development of a fair economic order. The vicious cycle in which extreme poverty is closely linked to the propagation of pandemic disease, environmental degradation, and civil war can be tackled only through interdependent, common action by the international community.

3. Stabilization and democratization of the states. A stable, democratic state whose sovereignty is respected and whose territorial integrity is preserved will support the security of its populations as well as that of its neighbors.

4. Promoting an effective human and cultural rapprochement that moves away from ostracizing or being hostile toward a culture, a religion, or a civilization. Is it necessary to underline the proverb that states that a lie becomes reality when strongly repeated? Such is the case with the false prophecy of civilizations, which in my opinion should be fiercely fought because it is part of the set of arguments being used for radicalization and recruitment.

THE NEED FOR COOPERATION AND PARTICIPATION

Before closing my remarks, I would like to discuss two principal aspects of the new approach, namely, its cooperative and participative elements. To enable the approach to be effective, the international community as a whole must engage in a frank, honest, and sincere dialogue on security issues. In this way we will be able to reach a common perception of the threat and to define an appropriate security agenda for all actors on the international stage. And because security issues no longer pertain only to some specific countries, but rather are the core of all citizens’ concerns, we must all participate in and “own” the issues.

Citizen awareness is an essential component of any strategy on global security. All areas of civil society, including education, the media, and policy making, must be involved and participate.
Part Six

Ambassador Stewart Eldon
Ambassador Pablo Benavides Orgaz
Ambassador Stefano Stefanini
Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola
General Franciszek Gagor
Chapter 28

NATO After the Riga Summit

Ambassador Stewart Eldon

The title for this panel is “NATO After the Riga Summit,” and I would like to start off the discussion by being perhaps unfashionably positive. I do not think the Alliance has done badly since that summit. That is not to say that we must not do better, but I think it is important to remember that Riga’s accomplishments were quite substantial in many ways. The summit focused on Afghanistan, and I believe that the agreement that if any ally got into serious difficulty in Afghanistan that the others would come to his assistance was very valuable.

SIGNS OF PROGRESS

A lot of other achievements came out of Riga, including on the Comprehensive Approach and new initiatives relating to Partnership, Training, Heavy Lift and Special Forces. So it is important not to think that Riga was a failure. It was not. It did a lot. And in several respects since then, we have not done too badly. In Afghanistan, for example, many of the major capability gaps that were identified at Riga have been filled. This achievement is very much the result of contributions from the United States—modesty forbids me from mentioning what the U.K. and others contributed—but I think it is important to recognize transatlantic and American input to meeting the gaps in the operation.

On the ground, we are also making strides. An upward trend existed from September 2006 to April 2007. The non-security effort in Afghanistan, which is crucial to success there, is also beginning to deliver. Things are not entirely smooth, and there is a long way to go. We also face difficulties with the EU police mission in Kosovo and potential difficulties caused by NATO/EU tensions involving Turkey and Cyprus—there is growing recognition that Turkey has a point when it argues that in some respects it has been treated badly since the agreement on the 2003 framework for Berlin plus. However, there are two sides to every argument, and we need to work hard to resolve the issues between the two organizations.

1 Ambassador Stewart Eldon is the United Kingdom Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council.
STEPS THAT REMAIN

The outcome of the Defence Ministers’ meeting that took place earlier this week also suggests that the scorecard is mixed. There has been some progress, including a good discussion on the Comprehensive Approach, but a lot remains to be done on the NATO/EU aspects of this concept.

On transformation, Defence Ministers agreed on a tasking on the NATO Response Force, but the substance over the next several months will be highly contested. There has been little progress on the review of the NATO command structure and as I speak a long technical argument, sparked by Allies not participating in the C-17 consortium about how to legally implement that initiative, has not yet been quite resolved.

The difficulty in reaching agreement on all these issues underlines the importance of taking a long hard look at NATO Headquarters structures and working methods to improve the way the Alliance does business. We need to be very careful that NATO Headquarters is not acting as a brake to transformation, when a lot has been done in the military command structure and elsewhere.

Russia is another big issue, which we can cover in the Q and A. I am sure that some of my colleagues will want to cover that subject as well, because it is going to be a big issue, not just NATO’s relationship with Russia but in terms of Russia’s relationship with the West, as a whole.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

I would like to leave you with four questions that I hope will guide my colleagues on this panel and help you form some questions for later.

1. The first one is, What is the Alliance for? I have some sympathy for Jim Jones’s views about the need to take into account a broad definition of security. But should NATO be active and expeditionary, ready to take on the hard security challenges of today’s world, while retaining its core defence role? Or should the Alliance concentrate on the more basic Article 5 functions? I know what my answer is to that—it is the first alternative.

2. How should the Alliance relate to other organizations? A Comprehensive Approach is easy to define broadly but less easy actually to implement. Some Allies’ hesitation about NATO’s engagement with other international organizations needs to be balanced against others’ willingness to allow development of more linkages and civil capabilities. The relationship between NATO and the European Union is a particular case in point.

3. Linked to both of the previous questions is, How far should NATO go in non-traditional security areas such as energy security? A tasking has been agreed to on energy security, but it has taken us months to get that far.

4. A final question concerns how much NATO should interact with other organizations with broader strengths on new security issues such as maritime domain awareness and cyber-defence.
Chapter 29

A View from the South

Ambassador Pablo Benavides Orgaz

I am calling this presentation “A View from the South” because geography and history give added value to NATO that we have to take into account, not only for logical reasons but also because current threats come from the south. I have seven points to make regarding this view.

THE NEED FOR POSITIVE LEADERSHIP

First, I believe that positive leadership on both sides of the Atlantic is very important for the immediate future. This for me is key, because we have to base NATO discussions on healthy political consensus. NATO is basically political. Obviously, its roots are military in nature, but without political debate, operations cannot be sustained. In that sense, let us hope that our sense of leadership will improve in the near future, because it will help Council debates as well as help our ministers and our heads of state and government to deliver.

THE IMPORTANCE OF SYNERGY AND OPENNESS

Second, Ambassador Eldon mentioned the importance of synergy. I would call synergy the vocation of openness that the Riga Summit left with us. If you go through the declaration, you will see that NATO has never been engaged in as many different regions of the world as it is now. This obviously means that the famous global approach or comprehensive approach needs to be carried day to day in our theaters, in our capitals, and in Brussels.

ASSYMMETRIC THREATS

Third, the problem of Afghanistan is an excellent example of the asymmetric nature of today’s threats. In fact, I believe that Afghanistan is going to change our culture of defense because what we have to face in the future has nothing to do with what we have faced in the past. The combination of humani-

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1 Ambassador Pablo Benavides Orgaz is the Spanish Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council.
tarian aspects, the risk of proliferation and terrorism, rogue states, all these categories will be acting together against our values and we have to know how to proceed.

**MAINTAINING ARMS CONTROL**

Fourth, it is very important that, along with providing our legitimate defensive needs, we fight to maintain the present system of arms control. Otherwise, we will open a Pandora’s box that could be extremely dangerous. This point applies not just to the NPT Treaty but also to the CFE Treaty, and, in spite of the fact that in Vienna we could not go very far, we should continue working to preserve transparency and mutual trust, because these are the basis of a good arms control system. I should also point out that people are not always aware that missile defense includes more than only long-range ballistic missiles. Missile defense includes short and medium-range missile attacks but also non-state actors, and this means terrorist groups. The threat is the same for all allies, and therefore all allies should be covered against all kinds of threats, which NATO has taken into account.

**BEING CLEAR WITH RUSSIA**

Fifth, regarding Russia, the allies must remain united, and this is what we are doing. We should look beyond the rhetoric of provocation; in Brussels recently we reaffirmed the importance of keeping an open dialogue and not being afraid of being transparent with the Russians, because that may be the only way to resolve contradictions. Let us not be afraid of being clear.

**MAINTAINING A REGIONAL APPROACH TO THE BALKANS**

Sixth, Riga was the key moment when we opened Partnership for Peace to the three countries of the Balkans. So when we talk about Kosovo, let us not forget that our approach there cannot be separated from a regional approach to the whole Balkans region. In that sense, international community unity is essential, even if we are going through a difficult moment. The Security Council Resolution is important to the Euro-Atlantic perspective.

**TALKING FRANKLY WITH THE SOUTH**

Finally, in Riga we also opened Partnership for Peace to the Mediterranean Dialogue countries. This is proceeding well. There is more trust now, and we are talking more frankly. It is very important that we continue engaging with these countries in order to change misperceptions.

**CONCLUDING REMARKS**

One final point: Our work will make no sense if our societies do not understand what we are doing. We need a much more sophisticated communication strategy.
Chapter 30

Iraq and Afghanistan: Lessons to Learn for NATO

Ambassador Stefano Stefanini

OPENING REMARKS

Security is a matter of perception. The question we have to ask ourselves is whether or not our perception of a secure environment actually reflects a corresponding degree of security. Conventional wisdom (and political correctness) about Afghanistan and Iraq is that because the countries are different, the lessons we draw from them should be different. My point is somewhat different. Leaving aside any comparison of the two nations, there is one simple, common thread to follow—the same that we find in Gaza and in Haiti, for that matter. It is that we have to stay engaged. We may think these countries do not affect our security, but that is wrong. Thinking that way is a security-perception trap that we cannot afford—it is false security.

Today we cannot insulate ourselves at home from insecurity elsewhere. If and when we try to do it, the insecurity outside our borders will come back to haunt us.

Does this fact affect NATO? It does if you take NATO—as I do—to be the main, and possibly the only, institution tying together North America and Europe. If this is the tool for our common Atlantic security, then this is what we have to work with, and we have to make the tool work effectively—we cannot continuously retool international institutions. So when I say lessons that need to be learned for NATO, I mean collective lessons that need to be learned for Europe and America and like-minded friends and that I hope can be learned together.

As for NATO proper, let’s look at its involvement in the specific situations we are discussing—full involvement in Afghanistan, marginal involvement in Iraq, and nonexistent involvement in Gaza. Let’s try to assess each one.

1 Ambassador Stefano Stefanini is the Italian Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council.
NATO INvolvement in Afghanistan

Afghanistan is a work in progress. It is a tough but doable job, especially if the achievements we strive for are realistic. Unfortunately we sometimes pursue goals that are not achievable, certainly not in the short or medium term, and this is something we should not do because then Afghanistan’s and NATO’s performance will be gauged against unattainable standards. However, if we strive for achievable goals, Afghanistan can be a success story. NATO’s presence and leadership in Afghanistan are working both as a cause and as an effect. Indeed, “international legitimacy allows NATO to be in Afghanistan; NATO’s leading role perpetuates such legitimacy.”

NATO Involvement in Iraq

Iraq is in a different league because, a) there was never any prospect of NATO taking a leading role there, and b) if there had been a prospect, NATO, as an Alliance operating by consensus, would have chosen not to take it. Four years into the war, Iraq is in bad shape, but NATO is in better shape not being in Iraq than it would have been being there. So the Iraq issue should not affect NATO, should it? In fact, it does and it will, in more ways than one.

Approximately a year before this workshop, in a data-based, matter-of-fact article in the Washington Post entitled “What Next?”, Daniel Byman and Kenneth Pollack raised the prospect of the many dire consequences of an “American failure” in Iraq:

- A refugee crisis (up to 13 million)
- New breeding ground for terrorism
- Contagious radicalism and sectarianism spilling over into neighboring countries
- Secession breeding secessionism
- Neighborly interventions

The authors’ conclusion was that failure in Iraq would not relieve the U.S. of its responsibilities there; in fact, it could multiply them. If it did, could Europe afford the luxury of sitting out and looking the other way, as if such a disaster would affect only America and not Europe?

NATO Involvement in Gaza

Gaza is in yet another league. There is no involvement whatsoever from NATO, the U.S., or Europe. With no engagement there is no security. Can Europe and America pretend that a Hamas radicalized-at-gunpoint Gaza does not affect them both?

Gaza is the epitome of the failure to engage. By not engaging we risk endangering our security. In Iraq, at least, the U.S. tried and tries hard. Certainly Washington can’t be faulted for not engaging in Iraq—rather, it is the contrary. Moreover, many if not all European allies, as well as NATO regarding the training of the Iraqi army and police (NTMI), are there to help.

Lessons to Learn

1. In Iraq mistakes have been made, but they should be left to the historians, who will have a field day. We should concern ourselves instead with what can be done to correct the mistakes and minimize their consequences. Byman and Pollack’s “What Next?” has yet to come. There is still time—though not much—to work on it. Simply ignoring what comes next and letting come what may is not the answer. That’s lesson one: “Engage.”
2. If NATO had been in Iraq, as it is in Afghanistan, would Iraq have been different? We will never know, but would we all be better off if Iraq had been dealt with as an American–European joint venture from the beginning, as Bosnia and Kosovo were in the 90s? There is no answer to this question, but it is worth more than a passing thought. So lesson 2 is: “Engage together.”

3. We can decide, of course, that we do not want any of it and steer clear of insecurity and crisis. We can decide to ride out the threats that insecurity and crisis cause. But if we do, we would be deluding ourselves, retreating into the comfort of our distance and our affluence.

If we choose not to engage, then yes, NATO is ready for retirement.

But if we, Europeans as well as Americans, decide otherwise—if we decide that our security requires us to confront the issues as we have often done successfully in the recent and not-so-recent past—be the issue Afghanistan, Iraq, Gaza, or Somalia, we had better use NATO to do the job. And we had better use it proactively, together with the array of international institutions (the EU, the OSCE, and the U.N.) that are available to us. Lesson three, then, is “Use NATO when we can to engage.”

4. Lesson four is to realize that NATO is the only Atlantic alliance we have.
Chapter 31

Why the Alliance Needs a New Strategic Concept
And a New Shared Vision

Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola

The point I want to make is that nothing remarkable has come from the Riga summit, just as nothing remarkable has come from the Prague and Istanbul summits. Somehow we are floating over the water but with no clear sense of direction. The communiqués that transmit to people what the summits are for are very nicely crafted, but nothing gives you a sense of what really has come out of them, nothing captures your heart. We are actually just like businessmen, very properly dressed, carrying a briefcase, and very confident, but we are just strolling around, not really knowing where we are going.

THE NEED FOR A NEW SHARED VISION

We use the word “comprehensive” a lot. We have comprehensive guidance, a comprehensive approach, we are comprehensive, but what are we actually comprehensive about? What are we guiding? And what is our approach for? Are we using a nice frame because we do not have a Caravaggio to put into the frame? Sometimes I get the impression that this is what we are doing. I believe Ambassador Eldon described the situation properly: we no longer have, and need to craft, a new shared vision of what to do in the future.

We have new challenges. James Jones talked about some of them, including energy problems, the challenges of terrorism, the challenges of a flattening world, the challenge of globalization, the challenge of the information technology revolution, the challenge of the scarcity of resources, the challenge of the relationship between Western heritage or culture and the emerging Muslim world, the challenge of relations with emerging powers such as China, India, east Asia, Mexico, and Brazil. I do not believe we have the shared vision of how to meet these challenges.

At the core of the issue is the relationship between the U.S. and Europe. If we are not able to define more properly our common vision for the future, we will certainly have a problem, because the words “transformation” and “expeditionary” are very nice mantra words but nothing more. It is nice for the

1 Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola is the Chief of Defense of Italy.
military to be expeditionary, and it is nice for it to be transformational. But then what? Transformations are not missions, expeditions are not missions. They are only tools for missions that we must define.

Now is the time to start thinking about the way to acquire a new covenant, a new strategic concept, between Europe and the United States, but not because we want to have a nice piece of paper. When you sit down to write a new strategic concept, you are forced to think, to reflect, to debate, to discuss, and, eventually, to share. Sharing is critical, because if we do not share, then we will have no shared vision and therefore no shared future. Developing a new strategic concept is really a way to forge a common understanding of how to tackle the future.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Are Europe and the United States as Kagan defined Mars and Venus? I do not know, but if we do not tackle the issues I have just mentioned, then we will go nowhere. During the Cold War, we had a clear vision for confronting and containing the Warsaw Pact countries. I do not believe we have that clear vision now, and it is time to try to find it. Ambassador Jean de Ponton d’Amécourt said there are some great leaders who are able to change the flow of events, and we need their strong ideas to bring us together. What is the mission of NATO? If we do not have a new mission, we do not have a new covenant between Europe and the United States, and we will not have a shared future.
Chapter 32

NATO After the Riga Summit: A Polish Perspective

General Franciszek Gagor1

I have the honor of representing a country for which NATO is the basic security pillar. My country has undertaken an enormous effort to join the Alliance and to adapt our armed forces to its standards. Poland’s ambition has been and still is to be not only the beneficiary of but also a security provider for the Euro-Atlantic area, according to our capabilities and potential. That is the reason why we deeply analyze all the new ideas and changes implemented in NATO and why Poland continues her efforts to strengthen NATO as the most powerful and effective political-military structure based on strong Euro-Atlantic links and supported by necessary military capabilities.

THE POLISH VIEW ON ISSUES THAT AFFECT NATO’S FUTURE

I would like to share with you our views on some of the most important issues that may influence NATO’s future.

The Open Door Policy

Let me begin with general remarks. When we joined NATO, Poland perceived the organization, and still perceives it, as a community of nations sharing the same political, moral, and social values including freedom, a free market, democracy, and observance of the United Nations Charter. We have always recognized NATO as the key stabilizing factor that broadens Europe’s economic and social development sphere. For this reason we give great attention to the “open door” policy and fully support new countries’ aspirations to join the Alliance. We believe that in the foreseeable future our Alliance family will enlarge, strengthening the security of the Euro-Atlantic area.

The Indivisibility of Security

We also support the principle that no nation is entitled to restrain the NATO enlargement process in the name of its own interests. No nation can try to divide Alliance members and treat new Allies as sec-

1 General Franciszek Gagor is Chief of General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces.
ond-class members. We therefore think highly of the Riga Summit Declaration’s affirmation of the indivisibility of security for all NATO members, which, when combined with solidarity, makes the Alliance capable of meeting the challenges of the 21st century.

Collective Defense

As I have already mentioned, Poland thinks of NATO as a fundamental guarantor of our security. We therefore expect that collective defense will remain the Alliance’s core purpose and that NATO will be capable of meeting not only the already defined challenges, but also those that may emerge in the future, including new, complicated, and multidimensional threats in which the military element is not necessarily the most important. Here, I will mention energy security and security from cyber-attack, from which Estonia suffered recently.

Flexibility and Adaptability

Flexibility and the ability to adapt to emerging challenges are two of the critical prerequisites for NATO if it is to remain the pillar of the world’s security architecture. As we face new challenges and threats, including those not yet fully defined, we cannot fall back to the positions occupied during the Cold War, including the Alliance’s narrow range of missions and capabilities. Our people expect that we will ensure their security with all the available means from the inventory of international law, and meet incoming challenges and needs. We believe that such an approach should be reflected in the Alliance’s new strategy. This new strategy should create a foundation for a transformed Alliance that will make the security and defense organization capable of countering the full spectrum of threats. In this context we recognize that the comprehensive approach concept is a step in the right direction.

Military Capabilities

It is in the military capabilities area that strategic ideas and political will are being transformed into tools for implementing the most critical NATO tasks. We are not surprised, therefore, to see that this issue is finding its proper place in the agenda of each NATO summit or ministerial meeting. It was also reflected in the June defense ministers meeting.

In our view, all NATO capabilities can be put into a few groups, depending on the criteria. When we think of usability, the capabilities may be split into those necessary to conduct current operations and those that would allow us, in the future, to preserve NATO superiority over potential adversaries. It is a bit disturbing that, facing tough difficulties in the field, the Alliance focuses mainly on those capabilities needed by operational commanders for current operations while leaving those capabilities needed for the future to the member-nations as their individual problems. As a result we are dealing with duplication of effort and widening the technology gap between our nations’ armed forces. The assumptions of the CDE (Concept Development and Experimentation) are rather difficult to be seen realistically. Some revision of the CDE—not its principles but its implementation policy—may be necessary.

The second criterion might be the amount of financial investment needed to possess or develop certain capabilities, which can be split into those that small and medium-size countries can afford and those that even the most powerful nations can barely afford. Because of the high-tech costs, the first group systematically decreases and the second increases. Thus, the ability to develop the latter group of capabilities will decide the future modernization tempo of NATO forces and whether we can maintain interoperability and technical superiority. Our militaries are facing growing challenges in the areas of interoperability and standardization and we need to create mechanisms that make it possible for every
member-nation to enhance the development of essential future capabilities. Poland is very much interested in enhancing such mechanisms and processes.

The Polish approach to prioritizing military capabilities is in line with that of the Alliance—we are focusing our attention on strategic air transport, NRF, and C4ISR. The “green light” goes to the Lessons Learned from CRO.

The NRF is, for Poland, the only Alliance force of rapid reaction. For this reason we are concerned about ideas that involve restricting or weakening its role. Eliminating the most costly modules from the CJSOR (of the NRF) is not the best way to solve the difficulties. I also don’t understand the hasty aspiration to review the NRF concept when, in reality, we are at the beginning of the road. Why not take more time to better implement the agreed-upon concept?

The PE review of the NATO Command Structure is of particular concern. During the process of rationalizing the NCS and adapting to the new LoA, we sometimes forget that it is the main link joining the NATO military structures and the Alliance’s tool for capabilities management. In this context we notice the growing reliance on the NATO Force Structure for fulfilling command missions.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

As I conclude, I would like to stress once again our strong support for the idea of broadening the area of security stabilization and common values through further NATO enlargement and by transforming NATO into an organization that can better react to the new challenges. Regarding capabilities, Poland is for enhanced and increased cooperation in their development. As for operations, we see the need for deeper political debate and improvement of the efficiency of military activities. Also, public diplomacy should be scrutinized to increase its effectiveness, so that the efforts of our soldiers in the field are appropriately assessed and can be appreciated by the general public. In regard to cooperation with partners, we wish to encourage more of it and to have fewer bureaucratic rules, making it possible for all partners to effectively reform their security sectors and to widen their participation in NATO-led operations.
Part Seven

Ambassador Marc Perrin de Brichambaut

Ambassador Kirsti Lintonen

Ambassador Gabor Brodi

State Secretary Edgars Rinkevics

Ambassador Linas Linkevicius

Ambassador Vladimir Chizhov

Vice Admiral Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte
Our panel has been charged with an important challenge: to think about how the U.N., the OSCE, NATO, and the EU can work together, how they can address the needs of the states that are the central actors of the international community, and how much those states trust those organizations to address crises, both highly intense and prolonged, and to build peace. The responses from the states on these points have varied and reflect the organizations’ different formats, capacities, charters, and tools.

This very distinguished panel, which consists of six speakers with very diverse diplomatic, military, and geographic backgrounds, is going to give us their answers to three key questions about our topic that I will briefly outline here:

1. How should the various organizations act, and how can they work together, when a crisis arises? The organizations I just mentioned need to work together effectively when they address an open crisis. Obviously the U.N. has a central role, as does the OSCE as a regional organization of the United Nations according to Chapter 8 of the U.N. Charter. NATO is also involved, sometimes outside of the U.N. framework, and states are also involved outside of the U.N. framework. How can they work together?

2. When there is a lasting crisis, a frozen conflict, a prolonged cease-fire, the need for peace building or a political solution, or another similar situation, how can the organizations work together? What share of the burden does each take? Who does the political mediation? Who handles the peacekeeping on the ground? Who provides the special representatives as well as the heads of the peacekeeping operations?

3. How can we create frameworks for good governance? You are all familiar with the fact that more and more peace building is crucial, that building the capacities of crisis areas to create trust, links, and frameworks for good governance is absolutely critical. But the four organizations each have a different
game plan. The EU has deep pockets and diversified resources so it is involved in a big way, but the U.N.
also traditionally plays a very important role.

Each of the speakers will address these questions and provide their thoughts and interpretations.
Chapter 34

The EU Cannot Save the World, but the U.N. Can Try

Ambassador Kirsti Lintonen

In a mere 50 years, the EU has exceeded all expectations for making Europe—once one of the world’s worst hotbeds of strife and extremism—into a haven of peace and prosperity. Measured against this benchmark, the U.N. decidedly appears to be an underachiever, struggling with its core mission to keep the world safe and improve the lot of humankind. While the strong normative basis, ever-deepening cooperation, and tangible results have oriented European capitals, administrations, and elites towards Brussels, this may sometimes have been at the expense of a truly global perspective. This is understandable, but it could be dangerous in a rapidly globalizing world—the real threats and challenges faced by our citizens, soldiers, and business people emanate outside Europe.

THE STRENGTHS OF THE U.N.

No one can tackle today’s problems alone, least of all the EU, which was built on the premise of cooperation and multilateralism. To face present-day challenges, we have no option but to seek answers through the U.N., with its old-fashioned structures, often cumbersome bureaucracy, and tedious negotiations. The EU has strongly pledged itself politically to effective multilateralism; we have to be ready to follow through with our commitment.

When it comes to norm setting, working with the U.N. requires commitment and patience. While the EU sets norms for France and Finland, the U.N. tries to do the same for Switzerland and Swaziland. The differences in development and capacity between the U.N.’s member-states are huge, and U.N. norms are bound to be less deep than EU norms. However, they are unrivalled in their legitimacy, and it is worth remembering that for a significant number, if not the majority, of the world’s nations, the U.N. is the only source of international norms.

The inclusiveness of the U.N. is another factor to keep in mind. A reader of the charter is struck by the modernity of its conceptualization: the U.N. simultaneously represents the people and the states. Every one of us has a stake in the U.N.

1 Ambassador Kirsti Lintonen is the Finnish Permanent Representative to the United Nations.
PEACEKEEPING AND OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES

For the last few years the pace of normative work in the international community has been significantly slower than it was during the 1990s. Much more work has been devoted to enhancing international organizations’ capacity to respond to crises, which is evident both in the U.N. and the EU. The U.N. has rethought peacekeeping with ideas that stem from the Brahimi report as well as the debate on the responsibility to protect. The retooling of peacekeeping now underway in New York is required for the U.N. to be able to handle the unprecedented scope of operations.

Peacekeeping—the Blue Helmets—has become one of the most important U.N. brands. The strengths stemming from legitimacy and inclusiveness in peace operations are clear—U.N. operations have demonstrated survivability and the organization seems to be the most cost-effective one to run peace operations. In fact, it would be interesting to see detailed comparisons and analyses of the costs of similar U.N. and EU operations.

However, we need to recognize the constraints of U.N. peacekeeping. Such peacekeeping requires, and will continue to require in the future, the consent of the parties. Planning and deployment will take time, and the military capabilities of U.N. operations will be limited.

The operational complementarities of the U.N. and the EU have been greatly increased by the strides the EU has taken toward developing its capabilities in crisis management—strides that are so well known to those at this workshop that I do not need to flesh them out. The significant increase in EU operational capabilities, including robust operations with air and maritime assets as required as well as the ability to rapidly deploy battle groups, is a major asset since it addresses arguably the biggest constraints of U.N. operations.

EFFECTING COOPERATION BETWEEN THE U.N. AND THE EU

The challenge now is to determine how the EU should best utilize and develop these new capabilities. The best option would be to do so in close cooperation with the U.N. As recent operations in the Congo have demonstrated, the EU has a lot to offer the U.N., especially in terms of rapid deployment. The U.N. in turn can offer the EU its unparalleled legitimacy and cost-effectiveness. Often the price of going it alone is simply too high for the EU, both politically and financially.

No matter what the practical arrangements for cooperation between the U.N. and the EU—a formal strategic reserve or some other arrangement—the most important factor is the strong political will within the EU to look beyond the European horizon and assume global responsibility. It is clear to me that to be true to its multilateral heart, the EU can only fulfil its global destiny through the U.N.
Chapter 35

How the U.N. Can Work with NATO, the EU, and Other International Organizations

Ambassador Gabor Brodi

In our increasingly interdependent global environment, regional issues can be tackled effectively only in a multilateral cooperative framework. This is because the relevance, competence, and capability of regional organizations such as the EU and NATO have increased significantly in the security sector, especially in the fields of human security, peacekeeping, civilian protection, and addressing the new security challenges. The EU and NATO are ready to take on new global missions and to build new capabilities accordingly.

While the international community does recognize regional organizations’ increasing responsibility and capability in meeting global challenges, adapting the multilateral framework for cooperation has been rather slow. Currently the U.N. provides a general framework for political dialogue and cooperation through high-level meetings between the United Nations (the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the Secretary General) and regional and other intergovernmental organizations. Six working groups have been established focusing on peacekeeping, civilian protection, respect for human rights in counterterrorism, dialogue among civilizations, disarmament, and implementation of the U.N. reforms for the U.N.-EU partnership. Secretary General Kofi Annan also involved regional and other intergovernmental organizations in the U.N. reform agenda, but their impact is still weak—strengthening the institutional aspects of the partnership is not yet an integral part of the ongoing reform process.

However, dialogue with the Security Council on specific, related regional issues and new aspects of security and cooperation during thematic debates is now strengthening the partnership and contributing to defining and meeting new security challenges. The key area of cooperation is furthering development of organizational capacities in conflict prevention and resolution, peacekeeping, and peace building, both at the regional and sub-regional levels. Currently under discussion are:

- A 10-year capacity-building plan for the African Union
- Cooperation among NATO, the EU, and the African Union

Ambassador Gabor Brodi is the Hungarian Permanent Representative to the United Nations.
• The joint political and military experience gained by the EU and the U.N. in enabling the A.U. to participate in peacekeeping tasks in Darfur, Sudan (AMIS)
• The implementation of the U.N. Security Council resolutions on the “heavy package” and hybrid force
• Dialogue is also having not only an immediate, positive security impact but is providing solutions and a framework for long-term cooperation.

PARTNERSHIPS WITH THE OSCE AND THE EU

A more structured relationship between the U.N. and regional organizations would take advantage of their genuine complementarity, based on their comparative advantages. Agreements with individual organizations would enable:
• The OSCE: Institution building in post-conflict situations and diplomatic management of “frozen conflicts”
• The EU: Tangible progress in crisis-management areas; handing over of responsibilities from the United Nations International Police Task Force to the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina; rapid deployment at the request of the Security Council of the EU military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Artemis); EU assistance in the establishment of an Integrated Police Unit in Kinshasa; a joint U.N.-EU consultative mechanism at the working level to enhance mutual coordination and compatibility in the areas of planning, training, communication, and best practices; and, when battle groups are fully operational, enhancing the EU’s capacity for crisis management operations requiring rapid military response, providing the possibility of deployment of new EU-led crisis-management operations in response to Security Council requests.

POSSIBLE AREAS OF FUTURE COOPERATION

In the future, joint disaster relief and disaster risk-reduction activities involving interested regional and sub-regional organizations could be held under the umbrella of high-level meetings under Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter. The U.N. could also significantly improve the general framework for cooperation, but the evolution of the internal process of the individual organizations is setting the pace. Currently there are differing philosophies regarding the role of political and interest groups in decision-making.
Chapter 36

The U.N., the EU, NATO, and the OSCE: How Can These International Organizations Work Together?

State Secretary Edgars Rinkevics

TWO DIMENSIONS OF COOPERATION

The short answer to how the U.N., the EU, NATO, and the OSCE can work together is, I do not know. But I am very much looking forward to this workshop’s addressing this issue and will offer solutions for closer cooperation. There are two main dimensions of cooperation between the U.N., the OSCE, the EU, and NATO: the political and the practical. Regarding the political dimension, it is important to stress that all four organizations are considered to be very influential in global security processes in conducting missions and preserving peace. All four organizations also need to reform in order to adapt to the security requirements of today and to be more effective in responding to global security challenges. The U.N. needs to reform its Security Council, NATO needs to complete all transformation tasks, and the EU needs to settle problems regarding its constitutional reform.

To achieve successful cooperation between organizations that are different, we need to strengthen not only external cooperation but also work toward better internal cooperation between all member-states. The test case for cooperation between the U.N., the EU, the OSCE, and NATO will be Kosovo. Settling this sensitive political issue will prove how effectively all four international organizations can cooperate. Therefore at this workshop we should try to find an answer to the question, “How will we react if violence breaks out in Kosovo?”

The next issue of key importance is cooperation between NATO and the EU. Today NATO and the EU are engaged in common international operations, both in Afghanistan and in Kosovo. The main problem between the two, however, is that, while there are no serious problems with practical cooperation, there is a lack of progress with political cooperation.

This touches on the second dimension of cooperation: practical cooperation. Previous cooperative experiences between NATO, the EU, and other international organizations on the ground proves that

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1 Mr. Egars Rinkevics is State Secretary in the Latvian Ministry of Defense.
the bottom-up approach is the most effective in dealing with different cooperation initiatives. Afghanistan is a good example—there it is possible to observe close coordination between NATO and other organizations.

Currently there are many good initiatives and ideas not only on how to improve relations between international organizations but on how to enable them to contribute together to global security. Sometimes these initiatives are complementary, and sometimes competitive. Today, there is a need to achieve more practical cooperation.

**CONCLUDING REMARKS**

Finally I would like to mention that all international organizations are formed by member-states. In NATO there are 21 EU member-states that are also members of other international organizations. The question we must ask is, “How can we all coordinate our national positions in these different organizations?” Experience shows that it is challenging to obtain one common opinion from various organizations when each organization has a different position and different overall goals.
Chapter 37

The EU, NATO, and the U.N.: How Can These Vital International Organizations Work Together?

Ambassador Linas Linkevicius

The EU is celebrating its 50th anniversary, NATO will soon turn 60, and the U.N. is approaching retirement age. In light of these facts, the lack of common-sense wisdom found in the relationship among these three organizations is all the more striking. The very fact that we are still struggling with the question of how NATO, the EU, and the U.N. can work together signifies a rather lamentable state of affairs.

Many great minds have pondered this question countless times and it has been the subject of a great many conferences and seminars. I myself had the opportunity to address this issue in this workshop three years ago. On many occasions, many excellent suggestions and recommendations were put forward and most nations that are members of all three organizations agree that much closer cooperation among the EU, NATO, and the U.N. is necessary. Most of us would also agree that a true NATO-EU strategic partnership would be a great asset for the U.N., indeed, for the entire international community. And yet there are few best practice examples of cooperation when they should be the rule.

Instead, worst practice examples are numerous. For example, although NATO has deployed in operations some 50,000 troops under the U.N. mandate, the visit of the newly appointed U.N. secretary general to the North Atlantic Council lasted only 20 minutes—just enough time to meet and greet. Despite the vested interests NATO and the EU share in the Balkans and Afghanistan, and despite all the talk about a strategic partnership between the two organizations, NATO’s secretary general famously labeled the relationship a “frozen conflict,” and rightfully so.

For every step NATO and the EU take forward, they take two steps back. As a result, the late Western European Union probably had a better and more productive relationship with NATO than the EU has. Because in both NATO and the EU one or two countries can block any cooperation initiative, the NATO-EU capability group, which potentially could be an excellent and practical cooperation tool, is deadlocked.

1 Ambassador Linas Linkevicius is the Lithuanian Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council.
CONCLUDING REMARKS

I believe that both organizations could put more effort into removing the persistent obstacles. For a start, the EU could consider granting Turkey a seat at the EDA—this would instantly help improve the NATO-EU relationship. In addition, bureaucracies of both organizations, which have competing interests and agendas and tap the same limited group of experts, could consider changes. While direct staff-to-staff dialogue is important, the direction the NATO-EU relationship follows should be defined by the member-nations themselves.
I am particularly impressed, as a professional diplomat representing a very peaceful country to a very peaceful institution with a relatively minor military capability, by the interest of the Euro-Atlantic defense community, so widely represented at this conference, in the issue that is now under discussion. That interest has actually led me to two alternative conclusions: that the defense community is in search of a mission for itself, and that it concedes that security in today’s world is a much broader issue than just military security.

DEFINING THE ELEMENTS OF INTERACTION AMONG SECURITY ORGANIZATION

Addressing the point of our discussion—to define modalities of interaction between the various security organizations and institutions active in the Euro-Atlantic field—is not a theoretical exercise; it is a very practical issue. And given the issue’s practical dimension, we need to begin by defining two basic elements:

- The global and regional environment in which those organizations operate.
- The set of goals on which their cooperative efforts should focus.

I must admit that it is easier to address the second element. Obviously, the goals are to enhance global and regional security and to provide a joint or at least a common response to the risks and challenges of the 21st century. The issue concerning the international security environment, the international context, is much more complicated, and I would say the context itself is becoming increasingly complicated. Old divisions have become history though they can still provide useful lessons if we will learn them. And although no ideological conflicts similar to those that dominated the Cold War era are now in sight, new threats keep piling up, demanding new approaches and concerted action.
EMERGING MULTIPOLARITY

One of the problems we all face is that many of the instruments at the disposal of the international community today remain largely the same as they were years ago; they were inherited from old times. Another point I would like to make is that no single existing organization, whether the United Nations nor NATO nor the European Union nor the OSCE, is now capable of dealing with the new security agenda alone. But that is not the case only because at least some of those organizations are products of different times and were meant to operate in a totally different environment. I believe that one of the key features of the world we live in today is its emerging multipolarity. I do not know if everybody at this workshop likes that term, but indeed it is a fact. I would add that all concepts of a unipolar world that mushroomed after the lapse of the bipolar world were doomed from the outset because they cannot fit into a world of increasing globalization and an already global economy. Globalization and unilateralism are hardly compatible.

Having said this, let me stress that multipolarity does not automatically entail confrontation. On the contrary, it has been proved by recent developments across the globe that unilateral approaches combined with an overestimated role of military force has led to an increase only of conflict potential across the world. As far as multilateralism is concerned, history, including the more recent history of the 20th century, has shown that multilateralism only counts when it is effective. Otherwise, there is a danger of repeating the ill-fated example of the League of Nations and various holy alliances of the 19th century.

BUILDING ON PREVIOUS SUCCESSES

No one expects a symphony of synergy (using the current phrase, based on the Greek language) to be established overnight. It may only come as a result of concerted and persistent efforts by all countries concerned. But we do not have to start from scratch. Let me remind you that it was eight years ago at the OSCE Summit in Istanbul, which for some dubious reason is only remembered because of some side events, that an unduly forgotten document called the Platform for Cooperative Security was adopted. Let me also remind you that it was the European Union that initiated this document and unfortunately was among the first to forget about it.

The essence of the platform was the idea of complementarity between interacting European and Euro-Atlantic organizations on the basis of equality and respect for each other. But the sole basis for such cooperation can only be international law, as enshrined in collective U.N. decisions. I agree with Ambassador Lintonen that the U.N. remains the main pillar of multilateral world diplomacy. It has proven its authority in much more difficult times than those we live in today, and, with the Cold War behind us, it has all the prerequisites to play its role.

THE NEED FOR REFORM

I should add that this does not mean that the U.N. is not in need of reform. U.N. reform is an issue that needs to be addressed with proper care, and, actually, all the organizations we are discussing are in need of reform and transformation. NATO has evolved from debates on its own viability in the modern world, which was the focus of attention in the 1990s, to a new and, I say with all due respect, a false sense of self-confidence created by the smokescreen of euphoria over enlargement. I am sure that the current problems that the Alliance faces in Afghanistan and elsewhere are a good indication that enlargement did not bring additional efficiency to the Alliance.

The OSCE, which is supposedly an organization of sovereign states bound together by a balanced set of 10 principles and values as outlined in collective decisions by participating states, still has no legal capacity. That is why I am referring to participating states rather than to member-states. What is impor-
tant about this, however, is that too often the prerogatives of participating states are in fact usurped by institutions that boast of their autonomy and work on the basis of self-proclaimed rules and procedures.

**EFFECTING A COMMON FOREIGN POLICY**

Recently I participated in a discussion entitled “Will the EU Ever Have a Common Foreign Policy?” at one of the Brussels think tanks. I was surprised that the overwhelming majority of the participants, including some EU officials, concluded that the answer is more to the negative. Perhaps I am more optimistic. I think the EU Common Foreign Policy (CSFP) has a future, though of course it still faces serious difficulties: When we have a situation in which two European Union member-states conclude separate deals with a third country on an issue as sensitive as missile defense behind the backs of the European Union, then something is wrong with the CSFP and the ESDP. But of course the ultimate success of a European Union Common Foreign Policy will come and will be proven when the EU has a single seat in other international organizations like the United Nations.

**CONCLUDING REMARKS**

Overall, the picture is mixed. The tools to deal with the risks and challenges of the 21st century, though imperfect, are there. But adapting them to the evolving realities of the 21st century as well as enhancing their efficiency will require the concerted will of the countries involved. It is true that any international organization is as effective as its member-states want or can afford it to be, which makes me optimistic that, through the political will of the countries that belong to the Euro-Atlantic community, we indeed have a chance of successfully promoting cooperation among the various organizations active in the security area on the basis of already agreed-upon principles such as the Platform for Security Cooperation.
This is an historic moment. The U.N. is making its second attempt to launch and direct on its own a complex operation, aptly labelled the “second generation of peacekeeping.” While the U.N. has been encouraged by its apparent success, NATO and ESDP are in apparent disarray. Unfortunately, their troubles are taking place while the world is experiencing significantly increasing tension.

NATO AND EU ISSUES

NATO, a survivor of the Cold War success, is in fact bogged down in a war of attrition in Afghanistan. Reconstruction efforts are only now being coordinated, after too many years, while stabilization and counter-insurgency operations are being carried out in the same battle space. Thus, the two efforts are hindering each other.

But this is not the only internal clash the Alliance is experiencing. A serious divide exists:

- There are the nations that are willing to accelerate the pace toward a global NATO, clearly at the expense of collective defense, which in the face of growing asymmetric threats has assumed a completely different form—now it deals with air policing, energy security, cyber defence, maritime security operations, and ballistic missile defense;
- There are other nations that are convinced that Article 5 is the only real and durable glue, as well as a shield whose importance is growing apace with the increasing world tension.

The consequence of this clash is an endless series of mutually contradictory projects. The chain of command wants to re-structure itself, in order to have more deployable HQs. At the same time, it is willing to forsake the key expeditionary capabilities of response forces. At NATO headquarters, the same committees also discuss how to deploy HQs on one day and for the rest of the week deal with the new forms of Article 5 operations.

The EU, which resembles an elderly couple unable to understand the needs of their newborn child—ESDP—is working hard to allow the latter to implement the still experimental concept of

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1 Vice Admiral Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte is the Italian Military Representative to the NATO Military Committee.
multi-disciplinary operations, which means that ESDP, like any construction yard in which a skyscraper is being built, is quite messy. Like two people experiencing difficulties in their relationship, EU and NATO, while intent on resolving their internal difficulties, are at present unable to cooperate.

If I could summarize this situation in a snapshot, I would use a photograph of a trench in Gallipoli, with plenty of barbed wire, machine gun posts, and minefields just in front of it. The trouble is that NATO appears to me to be on the ANZAC (the Australia and New Zealand Army Corps) side, with its back to the sea, as its international credibility and **raison d’être** are presently based only on its military effectiveness—unless and until it understands the importance of Article 5 for its longevity—while the EU has plenty of leeway available.

ESDP is building, slowly but steadily, a more coherent military instrument, through both a rather effective force planning process and the capability development mechanism. Its excessive willingness to mount as many operations as possible, wherever an opportunity arises—something that may be seen more as an attempt to vindicate the failures of the past 50 years than a desire to gain relevance—appears to be a minor sin, tempered by the prudence of member-states already stretched too thin by their multiple commitments of overseas forces.

It is ironic, therefore, that now NATO is less able to cooperate with ESDP than vice versa. The key reason is NATO’s inability to do anything beyond the so-called agreed framework, also known as Berlin Plus, which was designed to foster purely military-military cooperation, and is thus unable to provide a clear reference for ESDP civilian operations.

It is true, however, that ESDP could be more active in convincing some of its member-states to do their homework in order to remove some of the existing stumbling blocks and that the EU could be more imaginative in finding specialized sectors of partnership with some non-EU NATO members, just as the Alliance did with Russia. It is also true, however, that, in NATO, some countries see ESDP as a powerful and dangerous competitor to be kept at bay.

**THE NEED FOR THE U.N.**

Only the U.N., at present, can bring both organizations together, because it is in its primary interest to do so. NATO can provide what the U.N. lacks, namely, an experienced command structure and powerful response forces, while the EU has an outline framework for collaboration that has withstood, rather successfully, its first live test in D.R.C.

Is there enough time to have this happen? I doubt it. Time is running against the western countries. Apart from the growing risk of asymmetric attacks, the magnitude of the crises is now far greater than it was 15 years ago. At that time our nations operated in relatively small territories, such as Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor. Now the areas of crisis involve Afghanistan and Darfur—both larger than France—as well as Somalia, an ulcer many international organizations have vainly attempted to pacify during the last decades.

It is mediation by the U.N. that would eventually provide the final seal to a structure for keeping peace in the world that was envisaged 60 years ago but is still to be fully implemented—a U.N. that interfaces with all regional organizations.
Part Eight

Mr. Marwan Lahoud
Mr. Kent Schneider
Mr. Patrick Auroy
Mr. Alfred Volkman
Dr. Hilmar Linnenkamp
Mr. Jan-Olof Lind
Dr. Edgar Buckley
Dr. Robert H. Trice
Ing. Giovanni Bertalone
Chapter 40

Global Security—How Defense Industries Can Cooperate Better

Mr. Marwan Lahoud

It is a great pleasure to be here and I wish to thank Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon for gathering such a distinguished group of defense and security leaders not only from NATO and EU member-states but from other countries that share the same values and work together to foster peace and stability in several parts of our troubled world.

My colleagues and I are proud to host the International Workshop on Global Security in Paris for the second time. After the success of the 2005 conference as well as the workshop in Berlin in 2006, there is no doubt in my mind that these meetings will continue to be enlightened events and are bound to contribute to strengthening international cooperation.

THE NATURE OF SECURITY TODAY

Security cooperation is an old concept that deserves to be revisited with a fresh view. Today, security encompasses more than the traditional military, law enforcement, and policing dimensions; it covers economic aspects including energy, the environment, health, and humanitarian assistance in case of disasters. It is also no longer limited to being addressed by alliances formed to counter an identified, common adversary—the new alliances are more like loose partnerships underpinned by common interests shared by states with various stakes. When oriented towards crisis management that requires the use of military force, the new alliances are described as “coalitions of the willing.” Forty-two nations are currently work-

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1 Mr. Marwan Lahoud is Chief Operating Officer, EADS (European Aeronautic Defence and Aerospace Company).
ing together to stabilize and reconstruct Afghanistan, with representatives of some 30 participating in this workshop.

But cooperation is not limited to the military and law enforcement agencies of the different states that participate in a coalition. It also involves international organizations, NGOs, donors, and enterprises working to reestablish normal living conditions.

FOSTERING COOPERATION

As the scope of security threats as well as new missions continues to enlarge, it is more and more important to develop a dialogue between policy makers, security experts, and the military in order to understand clearly the answers that industry can provide to the various challenges we face.

EADS is a large group with a full array of technologies for large systems, space assets, commercial aircraft that can be converted into mission aircraft, combat and military transport aircraft, helicopters, missiles, and transporting information. It is a young company born of European “parents” with more than 40 years of experience with European programs, and is now looking forward to expanding cooperation with friendly states. As I discuss cooperation, however, I am not going to address the current EADS/Airbus restructuring, because it is not a topic of this workshop. However, it is a challenge like those that all companies working in the very competitive aeronautic and space businesses will have to face one day, so I am certainly open to questions about it.

There are two approaches to fostering cooperation. The first is “top down,” and is based on common requirements of military or government agencies. The second is “bottom up,” and comes from the industrial sector. When establishing operational requirements for new equipment, both approaches deserve to be considered, as do three main trends:

1. The development of dual-use technologies, which is mainly driven by commercial investments and the industry.
2. The growing interpenetration of the security and defense domains.
3. The need for seamless interoperability, particularly between engaged military forces.

ISSUES WITH THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK

Ideally, defense industries from friendly states should be able to work together innovating, sharing technologies, and using common components. However, governments do need to protect national interests and avoid unwanted proliferation of military and security technology, but how can they do this without impeding needed cooperation? Is the current situation satisfactory?

Globally, the answer is no, but we need to look separately at the situation inside the EU and at the Atlantic Alliance framework. In Europe, a good deal of progress has been made with the consolidation of a large part of the European defense industry, including EADS, Astrium, MBDA, and Thales Alenia Space, even if much remains to be done within the land and naval sectors. But streamlining exchanges among the six signatories of the Letter of Intent, the so-called LOI of 1998, has not yet delivered on all of its promises. We hope that the recently established European Defense Agency will rapidly become efficient, particularly in the field of R&D and with new programs, with the full support of European governments.

As a fully European group, EADS has not only increased its footprint in the U.K. but has also extended its roots beyond the borders of its founding nations, France, Germany, and Spain. It now has a strong partnership with Patria in Finland, OKEJCE in Poland, and OGEMA in Portugal, and Eurocopter has refreshed its links with Romania. We are also developing cooperation with Russia and with other friends outside Europe.
All of us are working within the framework of international cooperation, but, in my view, all friendly states should keep some defense industry of their own, because it is a fundamental component of the national spirit of defense and security. However, the U.S. was harshly criticized recently by the Coalition for Security and Competitiveness, which consists of eight U.S. industry associations, for its policy of protecting its defense industry and maintaining its advantage in national security technology. This coalition is asking for fundamental reform of U.S. export policy “in order to facilitate joint actions in the fight against terrorism and to account for the fact that defense procurements are increasingly dependent on an industrial base that cuts across national borders.”

However, encouraging steps are being taken toward developing a better balance in transatlantic cooperation, such as the U.S. Army’s recent choice of the EADS Lakota Light Utility Helicopter and EADS’s cooperation with General Electric and Northrop-Grumman to jointly propose using a U.S. Airbus A330-200 derivative as an air tanker for the U.S. Air Force. We are also working closely with our European and U.S. partners to develop the NATO Theater Layered Missile Defense, and are ready to take the second step should NATO members decide the Alliance has to protect Europe’s territory and populations against the proliferation of ballistic missiles possibly tipped with weapons of mass destruction.

**CONCLUDING REMARKS**

I am convinced that in this globalized world a large part of our security is embedded in the security of our partners. This situation requires strong cooperation among the industries involved in the defense and security domains and will see significant gains in costs as well as schedule through global leveraging of shared information, R&D, and investment. However, the smart management of secrecy still matters in maintaining combat superiority. We need to adjust our regulations quickly and find balance between conflicting strategic objectives.
Chapter 41

Resolving the Paradox of Having a Good Spectator Experience In a Safe Environment

Mr. Kent Schneider¹

It is inevitable that, as we talk about global security, we are going to be focused mainly on the Middle East and south Asia. We are going to talk a lot about Iraq and Afghanistan, so I thought I would talk here about a different scenario that embraces all of the issues associated with the variety of threats we face today, a true international problem. That is the Olympics, and I am going to discuss the 2012 London Olympics and the preparation that is going on there, though I think my points could be applied to any of the Olympic games. In fact we might be able to get General Zhan to share a little bit about what is going on with the Olympic games that are coming up in 2008 in Beijing.

THE CHALLENGES OF THE LONDON OLYMPICS

Preparing for and holding the London Olympics is truly an exercise in counter-terrorism over a six-week period. The games will be held in a very vibrant city that already has a number of security issues. There are about 23,000 events requiring public safety that take place in London on a regular day. That number goes up if any of the local sports teams happens to lose on a given day, and you can imagine what happens when the Olympics are held. And events involve many people, from athletes to the media to Olympic officials to government officials to service workers—all the many people it takes not only to make an Olympics happen but to support all the people who attend as well as watch on television. For the 2012 London Olympics, 9 million tickets will be issued, to give you some sense of scale.

The Threats

The current threat profile is very broad based, and extends from cyber-threats to physical threats, both direct and indirect. One possibility during the London Olympics is that the power grid could be taken down, which is not as difficult as you might think. We have profiled and modeled some major regional power grids—we looked at one in the U.S. at the request of the local homeland security officials and

¹ At the time of the Workshop, Mr. Kent Schneider was President, Northrop Grumman Information Technology Global.
found that we were able to bring the entire power grid down in 12 1/2 minutes. There are also chemical, biological, radiological, and public health threats to consider as well as the normal criminal element that is always present.

The People and Venues

There is also a very broad set of players: the military is involved as well as national homeland security, the resilient forces, as they refer to it in the U.K., public safety, health, Olympic officials, and a myriad local government personnel. Adding to the challenge in London is that the games will be held over a widely dispersed area. The Olympic park and the Olympic village will be in East London down near the docks and the venues will be spread out around central London, some inside and some outside the orbital. For those of you who are familiar with Washington D.C., think about having the Olympic park and the Olympic village in Anacostia and then having the events taking place all around the beltway, some inside and some outside, with some 27 local jurisdictions housing venues. You can see how complex that would be. You can also imagine how gathering intelligence and controlling operations there would be very similar to what you would experience in a military theater of operations.

As far as the environment goes, there will be about 200,000 people involved in holding the Olympics, from officials to service workers to Olympic staff, volunteers, concession workers, and athletes, plus the 9 million spectators. And there are actually two back-to-back events—the Olympics are held, then there is about a week's break, and then the Para-Olympics are held, which is why the games stretch out over a six-week period. A balance must be struck as always between providing security and providing an environment that is respectful of individuals' rights and cultural heritage while adhering to local law, Olympic policy, and international law, for both individuals and data.

APPLYING TECHNOLOGY

Certainly we are starting to see more technology being applied to the Olympics. For the Beijing Olympics, more technology is being applied than ever before, which General Zhan may wish to comment on. Obviously everyone has high hopes that the additional technology will have a positive impact on security. Certainly London wants to leverage what is happening for Beijing and for the 2010 Olympics in Vancouver. To smooth this process New Scotland Yard's assistant commissioner for central operations has had added to his portfolio all special events and dignitary protection and is being made a security lead for the 2012 Olympics. The idea is that by developing capability around special events for the next five years, by 2012 the Olympics will be just one really big special event and the wherewithal to provide security and to do what needs to be done will be available.

GOVERNING THE PROCESS

Despite improved technology, you can probably see that providing security is less about technology than it is about how you govern the process, the rules you put in place, and how you oversee those rules. It is also about intelligence—intelligence in the same sense as we apply it in a military environment. A program is being developed now in the U.K. called e-Borders, which is an effort to provide advanced warning of the arrival of people at border crossings so that data can be checked, backgrounds can be checked, and manifests can be applied against criminal and terrorist databases for a better basis for border crossings. As you can imagine, there are huge problems with data mining, data fusion, and situational awareness when large numbers of people cross a border in a very short period. So we are beginning to work on these kinds of programs now, but again you have to balance providing security against respecting data
protection rights and all those kinds of things. There are real challenges from both a legal and a cultural standpoint.

**CONDUCTING SURVEILLANCE**

There are also huge surveillance problems, and the U.K. is dealing with them by using a variety of existing sensors and adding some sensors. London is perhaps the most monitored city in the world. There are 78,000 public domain closed-circuit television cameras in London today, and that does not count those in department stores. If you remember the July 7th bombings, you will remember how quickly you saw a video of the perpetrators on TV, which is because of the very extensive surveillance system in London. They are trying to put more intelligence behind that surveillance now, but more surveillance is also needed in other areas. A lot of vehicles will be moving in and out of the Olympics area so it will be necessary to have some kind of surveillance done on vehicles’ contents as well as the vehicles themselves. There is also a need for chemical, biological, and radiological sensors and testing and for ways of tracking people.

I can tell you today that no one has any idea who is actually sitting in a sports venue at any given moment. A new soccer stadium was just opened in London and one of the things that concerns people there is that while they know who buys the tickets they have no idea who actually sits in the seats. One of the ideas for the London Olympics is to issue essentially a master ticket to everyone who arrives. That ticket would be a smart card tied to biometrics that would then be encoded with the tickets that people buy and with transportation tokens, and people could also use the card to make purchases. This would allow us not only to understand the flow of people through the Olympic venues but actually know people by name—who is where, when, which entrance the person went in through, the exit the person left from, the transportation he or she took. You can see the obvious advantage of this system if a sports venue turns into a crime scene.

Such a process is in the works, but how can you network so that the process can be operated in a very timely way across the very wide venue area? The answer, of course, is a federated system very much like the one used in the financial world today. When you go to an ATM or you process a credit card, the standard for the transaction is five seconds end to end. We need that same kind of performance metric in a widespread identity management system, and it can be done—we build those kinds of systems. But the issue is the network. When you have a very widely distributed arrangement like the London Olympics, how can you extend the network?

A lot of work is being done right now looking at both wired and wireless networks. A whole new family of secure wide-band wireless networks is emerging around the world whose capability London will need. The city has a wireless system now but it is a very narrow-band system—some kind of wide-band overlay will be needed. Very much like in a theater of operations, there are narrow-band and wide-band systems and the ability to move information where you need it. The Olympics are going to have a combination of surveillance measures, data that needs to be moved, command and control information that needs to be moved, and a whole body of identity-related information that will provide awareness of how and where people are moving.

**THE USE OF SMART CARDS**

What are the overall requirements? Vetting and role-based access will be needed for the Olympics family. For example you don’t want people going into venues for which they are not authorized—you don’t want people going into the Olympic village if they are not athletes, for instance. So every member of the Olympics family, those 200,000 people I talked about earlier, will go through a background check.
and be issued a smart card based on a variety of multi-modal biometrics. Then those cards will be used to provide role-based access to networks and venues both on a cyber basis and a physical basis. A less robust system will be used to track spectators—the current thinking is that kiosks will be used to enroll people in a process to link their master ticket to a couple of biometrics, though issues are still being worked out regarding exactly which combination of biometrics. Right now the thought is to use a digital photograph and a fingerprint, although in some cultures facial photographs are an issue, so perhaps two fingerprints or a fingerprint and an iris scan may be used.

It is very important to set up a system that will facilitate throughput while at the same time provide necessary security—if people don't get into a venue until the event is half over, then the system has failed. Tickets need to be controlled through the identity-management system to prevent misuse. Obviously scalping will be a big issue, as it is at any sports event, but scalping will be more difficult if we have a biometrics-based card that houses the ticket. It will be very hard to pass that off to somebody else.

Transportation tokens will be used as well. Current thinking is to take the oyster card that is used today for the London Underground, extend it to other methods of transportation, and then embed that token on the master card. The idea is that the card could be used for service trains, buses, the Underground, even for taxis if you put the readers there. Of course, we want to eliminate the need for cash, not only to speed up processing but also because we would then be able to monitor activity such as the consumption of alcohol across the Olympic venues.

The idea is to do all of these things and still make the Olympics an enjoyable experience. Obviously, in order to do that, we need to have a kind of in-the-background process that does not affect the individual experience. That is doable in terms of technology, though obviously there are some associated cultural and legal issues that need to be worked through.

**ACCEPTING THE LEVEL OF SCRUTINY**

The U.K. might be a unique environment in this regard because its citizens have historically been willing to submit to things that many other NATO countries would never tolerate. I already mentioned the 78,000 closed-circuit TV cameras. You cannot scratch your head in London without it being recorded on at least two cameras. But in addition to that, if you are arrested in the U.K., whether it leads to a conviction or not, a DNA sample is taken and it is not given back, even if you are not convicted. For a traffic stop, your fingerprints are taken whether or not you get a ticket, and they are not given back afterwards. We run the biometrics database for the U.K. and the numbers in that database are climbing very quickly because they can be collected under circumstances that most other NATO countries would not tolerate. I know that in the U.S., for example, people simply would never be willing to submit to that kind of thing, but in the U.K. they are willing to do it because New Scotland Yard has demonstrated an ability to solve crimes almost in TV time. You saw a recent example of that with the July 7th bombings, which were solved very quickly, though, interestingly, the U.K. citizenry was critical of the way the bombings were handled and felt they should have been solved quicker than they were. There is a trade-off in the U.K. between being willing to submit more information than others and receiving in return some very effective policing. Now the question is, Can you extend that to the Olympics, with people from many places? Will those people be willing to submit to the same level of scrutiny that U.K. citizens do?

**CONCLUDING REMARKS**

The information-sharing requirements across this very complex environment are also very difficult. As I said, it is really a problem of data mining, data fusion, and situational awareness, things that we do in the military environment all the time but that here involve different numbers of players and data that is
subject to privacy laws—security personnel would like to have information on people’s travel into the country, they’d like to know where people are staying, they’d like to know the transportation they take. Gathering that information, pulling it together, and then applying it to security for the Olympics will be a challenge.

To summarize, I think the solution is to leverage existing systems. A lot of technology is out there today that monitors the movement of people internationally, everything from travel manifests to associated criminal terrorist databases. There is also a lot of surveillance capability that can be applied to the problem effectively and without infringing on people’s rights. It is going to be very important, however, to link this capability to existing financial and transportation systems, because that is where efficiency lies for the kinds of transaction rates we are talking about.

Situational awareness is going to be a challenge, and it is already being tested. As an example, a data-fusion situational awareness pilot is being conducted in conjunction with the Wimbledon tennis tournament this year as a way to see how effective it can be and where the gaps are, both in intelligence and in operations.
Chapter 42

Responding to New Threats: a Long-Term Vision For Developing Armaments Technology And Cooperation Strategies

Mr. Patrick Auroy1

François Lureau, the French National Armaments Director, would have been very happy to give this address. Unfortunately, he is unable to do so and has asked me to deliver it, focusing mostly on armaments matters related to security issues. To introduce the address, I would like to recall that threats have now become diverse and global.

THE NATURE OF THREATS

First, let me discuss the military threat. I believe we can say that large-scale aggression against a European member-state is currently quite unlikely and that the new threats we face include terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which are more diverse, less visible, and less predictable. The new threats are also global. For example, we now face complex natural risks that can cause cyber damage worldwide as well as major disorders within our societies. Against this backdrop, the line between homeland and foreign security is quite blurred.

Even when threats are at a rather low level, we must keep in mind that they can return to a high-intensity level at any time. To cope with the uncertainty, the answer to threats must be global and coordinated at an international level. The following is the French view, or the French minister of defense’s view, of the way we in the armaments field try to contribute to a global answer to security issues in a way that works at the international level.

The French view is that we will not succeed without a radical change in the way we deal with threats, based on three main ideas:

- Developing a long-term vision of threats and the capabilities we need in the future;

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1 Mr. Patrick Auroy is Director for Force Systems and Industrial, Technological, and Cooperation Strategies, Délégation Générale pour l’Armement, French Ministry of Defense.
Acquiring more technology—in the face of multiple threats and a culture of human resources and procedures, we need to adopt a culture of technology and investment;

All stakeholders must develop federated approaches—security can no longer rely upon the aggregation of fragmented, dispersed, non-coherent local and specific solutions nor rely upon solutions devised in a reactive manner and inherited from yesterday’s practices—we definitely need to improve synergy between defense and security.

**Developing a Long-Term Vision**

For armaments, a long-term vision is essential for guiding us in solving all the various issues we face going forward. We need a structured process to plan tomorrow’s programs. In order to develop this vision for the security field, we must analyze needs based on a capability approach that is global and targets both defense and security issues. By doing so, we can define in a precise way the minimum capabilities needed for all users and imagine new solutions that are more innovative, more efficient, and also cost-effective.

I am not so sure that we can successfully extend to the security field the tools that we developed in the armaments field. I am thinking, for instance, about what we call Battelle labs or technical-operational labs. These are virtual or hybrid design platforms that offer the possibility of immersing very diverse and dispersed users in future environments and solutions. Thanks to these tools, we can better understand future capabilities and systems and so obtain better and cheaper designs. In other words, using all available tools, we must establish with all stakeholders a shared and across-the-board long-term vision of the policies and capabilities needed.

**Acquiring More Technology**

Going deeper into the need for more technology, global security issues lead to new technological challenges; as we enlarge defense research and technology and keep a close synergy with it, we will need to deal with specific research and technology needs. Some of the most demanding technological challenges, for example, include enhanced performance for all the new types of sensors, explosives detection, imagery of hidden objects, automatic speech processing, detection of weak signals for warning purposes, exploitation of data, using robotics, integrating organizational and human factors, and designing complex systems.

All of these challenges require new research initiatives. We must follow a fully transverse approach that involves all stakeholders. We also need to act within a multidisciplinary framework, allowing and developing synergies, combining and guaranteeing cross-consistency, and successfully integrating numerous components. We also need to develop the important core of existing military research and methodology. At present, 15% of research and technology contracted by the French MOD contributes directly to security issues.

Mastering technologies, of course, is essential for developing capabilities in due time but it also ensures the competitiveness of our technology providers and consequently the availability at both the national and European level of such things as space systems, pictography, the Internet, and control of sensitive information of every kind.

The development of technology should therefore be pursued with the clear objective of developing an autonomous and competitive European industrial and technological base with strong, complete cooperation. Our strategy is based on three points: developing industrial capabilities to guarantee strategic autonomy; rationalizing the European defense and technology industrial base around centers of excellence; and taking part in the implementation of a competitive autonomy policy. We in France aim to
combine the best economic efficiency of Ministry of Defense investments with access to the technological and industrial capabilities needed by the armed forces. All of this implies the need for a high technological level in security and defense systems.

**Developing a Federated Approach**

Regarding the need for a federated approach for all stakeholders, the security dimension has already changed. This breakthrough includes two main trends, the first of which relates to the emergence of standards for security products and practices and the second to the emergence of wide systems that already exist in defense. Both trends can be seen in such areas as surveillance and intervention in the maritime domain; surveillance and integrated management of borders; the overall security of the logistics chain; and major crisis management, communication, and interoperability. The interesting point to note concerning these wide systems is that most of the time they are both civilian and military in nature. Because insuring security is a vast and complex task that involves many actors and components, it is essential to put in place transverse approaches that efficiently link these actors and multiply effectiveness.

So far I have detailed the way we are trying to build a global solution by developing a long-term vision, one that must be sustained by technology and a federated approach. But in a world in which crises are definitely international and in which countries must be able to intervene worldwide to protect their own interests and to contribute to international security, a global solution must be coordinated. Regarding armament matters, France has chosen to cooperatively prepare and procure the military equipment needed for its armed forces except for a small amount of equipment and systems related to sovereignty.

**WORKING WITH NATO AND THE EUROPEAN DEFENSE AGENCY**

In the next part of my address I am going to focus on two main multilateral frameworks within which France cooperates: NATO and the European Defense Agency. For more than 50 years, NATO has been the framework for collective defense in Europe. Beside being a military alliance, NATO is a necessary framework for defining interoperability requirements. It is also the natural framework for large transatlantic programs based on multinational systems of national systems logic; the recent active layered theater ballistic missile defense program and the promising Magic Demonstrator are good examples of such an approach. However, from time to time we are quite skeptical about procuring a NATO-owned system whose freedom of use may be limited in non-NATO operations. France supports a NATO network-enabled capability (NEC) approach as a way to improve the interoperability and efficiency of our military systems when used in a coalition environment.

While transatlantic cooperation, either bilateral, multilateral, or through NATO, contributes to essential capabilities, it is in need of improvement to better balance the two sides of the Atlantic. Of course, the framework in which to improve this balance can no longer be at the national level for Europeans—the European Union must be a leading actor especially regarding security. Because the European Union is a global actor, it has its own global security strategy, which was adopted in December 2003 and has since been developed in full cooperation with the European command security policy. For major security issues, such as border management and data policy, the European Union has become the main framework for ensuring vision, consistency, effectiveness, and synergy for the member-states.

The European Union is determined to develop at both the council and commission levels the tools, instruments, and programs necessary to assume a major role. The number of European security agencies reflects the dynamism, the market stimulation, and the catalytic effect that the European Union wants to give to this process. To mention just one of the key federative actions that the European Commission took, there is the new European security research program within the seventh framework program that
addresses major security missions. Another example is the preparation of pre-operational services for the global Monitoring Earth GMS program, which will be effective in 2008. Of course, I also have to mention the work undertaken to adjust European internal market regulations to take into account defense and more broad security interests. This work will lead to a package of initiatives expected to be released by the end of 2007. As you can see, the European Commission is important in developing the vision and instruments that will partially shape our security, in particular at the capabilities and system level.

Within this framework, the European Defense Agency must be the source of the impulse, and significant results have been achieved since its creation in July 2004. For example, defense ministers of European Defense Agency member-states approved in November 2005 the voluntary code of conduct on defense procurement, which entered into operation in July 2006.

By creating an internationally competitive European defense equipment market, the agency aims to strengthen the European defense technology industrial base. The code now represents 22 countries, that is to say, almost all European Defense Agency member-states. Bulgaria, Hungary, Spain, and Romania will not join, though they may do so later, and Hungary will join on July 1, 2007.

In terms of business opportunities, the agency represents more than 140 contract opportunities in 14 countries, all published on the agency’s electronic bulletin board. The total value of these contracts is estimated at over 6.5 billion euros and the contracts cover the spectrum of defense procurements: helicopters, missiles, sonar systems for submarines, UAVs, and so on. There is also a best practices code for the supply chain. This code extends competition throughout the supply chain, especially to lower-tier companies and SMEs that might not be able to bid for contracts directly but could act as subcontractors.

**ONGOING SUPPORT AND PROGRAMS**

I would like to mention the long-term vision report of October 3, 2006. This very interesting document provides shared views on the state of the world in which European security and defense policy operations take place and the kind of capabilities that are needed to conduct those operations successfully. This long-term vision is the basis of an ESDP capability development plan whose principles were agreed to by the ministers at the end of 2006.

I would also like to mention the joint investment program on force protection. This three-year research and technology program involving almost 55 million euros, which was signed by the 20 members in May 2007, covers 18 specific research and technology goals within five main capability areas and is very much related to our security challenges. As Javier Solana pointed out, clearly the necessary restructuring of the defense and technology industrial base must be assisted by market forces, more competition, and more effective government action.

In May 2007 European Union defense ministers endorsed the strategy for Europe’s defense technology industrial base. This is a fundamental underpinning of Europe’s security and defense policy with a series of practical steps to take to achieve a European vision of a more integrated and competitive Defense Technological and Industrial Base (DTIB). The French approach clearly aims to foster the rationalization of European industries as centers of excellence while taking into consideration national industry assets and developing mutual dependencies with European partners.

**CONCLUDING REMARKS**

Security has today become a major issue. In our changing world, risk can be found anywhere and any time. Ensuring our security will take continuous effort. We face many challenges, including threat identification, future system design, technology, better interoperability, autonomy, and so on. To meet these
challenges, as I tried to share with you, I believe we need to encourage new ways of thinking. We must promote new design methods. We need to federate civilian and military needs for more efficiency. And, of course, we need to strengthen the defense and technology industrial base, not choosing between European defense and NATO defense but including both. There is an obvious need to rely on the impressive military experience of NATO while building a European security and defense policy.

The recent Paris air show celebrated the 50th anniversary of Sputnik, so I cannot finish this address without saying a few words about space. Space armament issues are closely linked to security issues. Space offers fast and autonomous global answers. Space control is this century’s challenge and European nations need to face it together.
Chapter 43

Remarks on International Armaments Cooperation

Mr. Alfred Volkman

It is an honor for me to introduce this panel on International Armaments Cooperation. When Roger Weissinger-Baylon asked me to chair this panel, he requested that I choose the title. I have always been a fan of Clint Eastwood movies and my first thought was to give the topic the title “Globalization: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly”—not such a bad title when you consider that the movie was an Italian language movie about the American West with an Italian and American cast and that it was filmed in Spain. Also, globalization has all the characteristics of being good, bad, and ugly.

THE GOOD

I must confess that in my personal opinion globalization is mainly good. It brings our world closer together. It provides a basis for closer cooperation. The Joint Strike Fighter Program is an example of this cooperation—the governments and industries of nine nations are cooperating in the development of this aircraft. When the first aircraft was assembled in Fort Worth, Texas, components from all over the globe fit together perfectly. The global industrial base works.

Globalization results in greater competition with all the benefits in costs and quality that competition produces. The U.S. warfighter benefits from access to the best technologies and equipment produced outside the United States. The president of the United States will soon fly to Camp David in a helicopter of foreign origin. Recently the Department of Defense selected for its Joint Cargo Aircraft a product produced outside the United States. Globalization is making it possible to provide our warfighters with equipment that serves them well in combat and they get that equipment quicker and cheaper. However, not all the consequences of globalization are good.

1 Mr. Alfred Volkman is Director for International Cooperation in the Office of the U.S. Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.)
THE BAD

Globalization costs many people their jobs. If you have ever lost a job, you know that all the arguments about the benefits of globalization will not convince a displaced worker that it is a good thing. Globalization results in a loss of expertise and pride. For example, Philadelphia and Baltimore were once proud shipbuilding cities. Now apartment buildings are going up where shipyards once stood. Globalization results in a loss of self-sufficiency. The interdependence that globalization creates also creates the uneasy feeling that we are no longer completely independent. This is especially troubling for many nations when they realize they are dependent on others for the equipment necessary for their national defense. Globalization is both good and bad, and, unfortunately, the way governments react to it is often ugly.

THE UGLY

Governments often react to the bad aspects of globalization by resorting to protectionism, which can take many forms. In the U.S., it frequently shows itself in legislation designed to prop up threatened industries, so we have laws that protect manufacturers of textiles and anchor chain and stainless-steel flatware. Laws like these are the equivalent of keeping a hopeless patient on life support.

In Europe, frequent calls are made to protect industry from foreign competition by restricting purchases to European sources. Of course, this is usually presented as a temporary measure in order to strengthen the European industrial base so it can stand as an equal against its American competitors—but it is still protectionism. Calls for protectionist legislation in the U.S. and for an industrial fortress in Europe are more talked about than practiced, but these are dangerous sentiments and they need to be confronted.

However, there is one pervasive practice that is growing: demands for offsets. I realize that offsets are unlikely to go away in the near future, but we should recognize that they increase the costs of defense equipment and make it more difficult to give the warfighter the tools he needs and deserves to prevail against our adversaries. At the very least, nations need to find ways to limit the adverse effects of offsets.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Globalization is not without its difficulties, but it is a reality of life in the 21st century. We need to find ways to take maximum advantage of its good qualities and to minimize the bad and eliminate the ugly.
THE NEED FOR EUROPEANIZATION

I would like to start by saying that for European NATO member-states of the European Defense Agency—26 out of the 27 members (Denmark is not with us yet)—we cannot talk seriously about globalization until we have talked about Europeanization. That is because 26 or 27 Pentagons need to come together in Europe. For those of you from the United States, you know what it means to have a Pentagon and how difficult it can be to structure relationships between government and industry. Imagine how difficult it would be with a 26-member-state consortium of public administrations. So the global industrial base in my view requires a strong contribution from the European industrial base, which is exactly what I am going to talk about.

Traditionally, in Europe, governments and the member-state industrial bases are very close. It is normally quite a national affair to have governments act with their industries. There is even a legal precaution to protect this special relationship, the famous article 296 of the European Union Treaties. This important protective national device supports not a “Fortress Europe” but national closeness between member-state governments and their industries.

There is also national closeness between member-states and the equipment their armed forces use. But as General Joulwan and Al Volkman mentioned, we want to give our war fighters the best equipment possible as well as the best equipment for working together, which means standardized or common equipment. It is not heartening to see that currently in Europe more than 20 different armored fighting vehicles are in the plans of member-states, though not yet on the order books. There are also 15 different versions being planned for equipping the 21st-century soldier, which is not the best way forward, since these soldiers will need to be able to fight together. It is economic nonsense, obviously, but it is also operational nonsense, because interoperability is going to be a big subject and logistical diversity is going to be very expensive.
EFFECTING INDUSTRIAL CONSOLIDATION

Everyone knows that a lot of consolidation has taken place in the air force and in the air and space industry. But there has not been enough industrial consolidation. The European Defense Agency has been called on to change that, which will be difficult, but let me tell you about the work that the agency is now engaged in to create a truly European defense technological and industrial base.

When I spoke about this in 2006, it was still just a plan for getting the member-states together to merge their views on a European industrial base. Since then we have come together. For example, the armaments directors of all 26 member-states got together and defined some important characteristics of such a European base. We also invented the “Three Cs”: the armaments directors and the governments said that a European base needs to be capability driven, to serve the needs of the war fighter; it needs to be competent; and it needs to be competitive, because on the global market, European member-state industries will not survive if they do not work together.

This has nothing to do with creating a fortress, and I am grateful that Al Volkman has always understood that this is not the case. The idea is to make the European defense technological and industrial base a stronger one, to get our act together and, if need be, to get our conviction together. In this way we will be both a better partner and a better competitor on the global market.

WORKING TOWARD THE THREE Cs

Clearly a responsibility of the agency is to work toward the Three Cs.

Regarding capability, a major goal of the agency through mid-year 2007 is to create what we call a capability development plan, a plan that looks much further than the current European Union force planning mechanism. Although the Headline Goal goes until 2010—2010 is yesterday in technological and armament procurement terms—we need to go well beyond that and try to consolidate and harmonize the requirements side of the armaments and defense technology business.

Regarding the second C, competence, here we are making major efforts on the research and technology side, which was not the case in 2006. We have been able to create a fund that concentrates on force protection activities in research and technology. For the first time, European member-states have committed to putting money into a fund without knowing ahead of time where the money will end up. This is not a juste retour exercise, but a global balancing exercise, and is a small revolution in European affairs.

Concerning the question of competition, I like very much the metaphor Al Volkman used when he spoke about creative destruction, which is a concept that the famous German-American Joseph Schumpeter invented. Competition needs to be strengthened on the European market. The borders between the member-states need to become lower, a point that the agency is working toward with the famous voluntary code of conduct for defense procurement in Europe. The member-states seem to be taking the code seriously, and we currently have roughly 10 billion on the “border crossing bulletin board” of the European Defense Agency. However, the proof of the pudding is in the eating, and we do not yet have many cross-border contracts. But this is still a young exercise and we are quite hopeful that cross-border contracts will increase and become a real step toward change in European defense procurement.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

All in all, I think that the contributions of the European NATO member-states are bringing about not a bad and not an ugly but a good globalized defense market by strengthening their own base. Europeans are taking the needed major step towards Europeanization, which must precede globalization.
In my introduction I would like to share some of my thoughts regarding the relationship between governments and industries through the following question: Is the progress we see in Europe on the right course in a global context?

**A STRONG FOCUS ON DEFENSE AND INDUSTRIAL ISSUES**

First of all, I think the political attention that defense and industrial issues are currently being given is quite remarkable. However, the reason for this is not difficult to understand, and was stated earlier in the conference: a strong security and defense policy needs a strong European defense and technology industrial base as well as a well-functioning defense equipment market. The DTIB is consequently one of the cornerstones of the security policy, and one of the main instruments for achieving it in Europe has of course been the creation of the European Defense Agency.

However, there are other explanations of why great attention continues to be paid to defense and industrial matters:

- Pressure on defense budgets
- The need for further harmonization and consolidation
- Increasing costs for using materiel and systems
- Broad consensus among MSs that action needs to be taken

But questions regarding the DTIB are not new. Ten years ago the agreement between the six LoI countries was signed to facilitate the reconstruction of the industrial base by creating the necessary political and legal framework for promoting a more competitive and stronger industrial base. A number of European countries have similar agreements with the U.S. under the Declaration of Principles. The main difference we see today is the attention we give these matters in a global context.

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1 Mr. Jan-Olof Lind is National Armaments Director of Sweden.
THE NEED TO ACT

I would say that if we do not act now, we might not reach the goals we defined both from a political and an industrial point of view. We know what the problems are and what the goal is. It is now a question of implementation. But have we made any substantial progress so far? My answer would definitely be yes.

Earlier we heard about the need for leveraging technologies. But other issues we are dealing with are extraordinarily complex and time consuming, including issues regarding the security of supply, the security of information, and harmonization of military requirements. These are all prerequisites for a DTIB and a DEM that truly function, but they cannot and will not be solved in a day. These issues have to be solved through common rules and regulations, through transparency, and through mutual confidence.

However, we need to recognize that there are 26 countries in Europe that have different industrial structures and demands for defense products and systems. We also need to recognize the challenge that the different industrial bases were created for a totally different purpose than what we need today. The EDA is of course the locomotive for dealing with these issues as well as the melting point for unifying different opinions.

In my opinion it is important that we take stock of the results we already have achieved in different organizations and under existing co-operation agreements. The one simply must not exclude the other, both from a European perspective as well as from a global perspective. Working together we could gain the added value that is necessary and progress we make in Europe could definitely benefit the transatlantic link and vice versa.

In the defense and equipment market, we need to recognize that it is a far from perfect market and ask ourselves if it ever will be, given its features. But the introduction of harmonized rules and regulations is fundamental. Such rules and regulations will allow governments to use more instruments for running cost-efficient programs and assist industry by making companies more competitive on the global market.

ATTRACTING THE RIGHT COMPETENCIES TO THE DEFENSE SECTOR

Finally, I would like to bring up one other issue, perhaps for consideration by my colleagues from industry. One challenge that we all face is how to attract the right competencies to the defense sector. This is most certainly not a question of Europe versus the U.S. but a question that has to be seen in a global context. We all know that growing economies in the east are graduating many more students from their universities than the U.S. and Europe together. Should we regard this as a problem and, if so, what can be done?
Chapter 46

The Relationship between Governments and Defense Industries in a Global Industrial Base

Dr. Edgar Buckley

My company’s analysis of this subject has been consistent over a number of years: defense companies need to maintain the closest possible, trusting relationship with their government customers, respecting of course all relevant security and ethical requirements. Such a relationship needs to exist in order to:

- Help customers develop their concepts and requirements, including through experimentation
- Deliver the necessary capabilities
- Maintain their customers’ sovereignty of action by constituting a modern and competitive defense technology and industrial base

All modern procurement trends—CD&E, spiral development, capability-based procurement, outsourced extended service contracts, public-private financing—depend on this close customer-company relationship. Neither customer nor supplier can manage the process without it.

WHY GOVERNMENTS NEED INDUSTRY

Governments depend on strong and healthy defense industries for satisfying their security needs and, in the case of major states, to maintain their long-term sovereignty of action in defense and security affairs. There is no example I know of of a nation that has a strong defense capability while lacking a strong defense industry.

If Europe intends to play a strong security role, it needs a strong European defense industry supported by a strong defense technology base. And since the U.S. needs Europe to contribute strongly to defense and security operations in order to share the burden of maintaining global security and stability, I believe that the U.S. also needs and should support a strong European DTIB. Not all Americans may agree with that statement, but I am not saying that the European DTIB needs to fully duplicate all areas

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1 Dr. Edgar Buckley is Senior Vice President, Thales.
of America’s defense technology capability. I believe that Europe should maintain strong capabilities in key areas.

**HOW TO IMPROVE THE EUROPEAN DEFENCE TECHNOLOGICAL AND INDUSTRIAL BASE (DTIB)**

What does improving the European DTIB entail? Fortunately we know the answer: it entails supporting the EDA in its efforts to increase and coordinate R&T spending, harmonizing capability requirements, consolidating the defense industrial base, and establishing a competitive European defense equipment market. Action in all of these areas is already underway through the EDA and with the support of governments and the European Commission. Action is also underway to explore the ability to pool efforts among nations in parallel with increased cooperation at the European level. There is every reason to believe that pooling among countries with similar capabilities is the best way to consolidate capabilities in Europe in the shorter term.

So, we have made a start. But there is one other thing we need to do to secure the future of the European DTIB: we need to improve transatlantic defense industrial cooperation. We need to do this in the interests of both Europe and the United States.

**THE EFFECTS OF REGULATION ON INDUSTRY**

What stands in the way of improved transatlantic cooperation? The answer is clear: export licensing and technology transfer regulations. I recently discussed these subjects with Al Volkman and his staff in Washington as part of a NIAG team that was asked to report on how things could be improved on both sides of the Atlantic.

Our team found that several efforts are being made in the U.S. to improve the U.S. regulatory process, which is currently creaking under the weight of industry’s needs to cooperate and exchange technology. Yet there is no immediate prospect of fundamental change. The situation in Europe is not much better, with a thoroughly useless and bureaucratic system of licensing for intra-European Union transfers that is resistant to attempts to reform it.

Industry is not to blame for this state of affairs; we have put forward ideas for change and we are ready to internalize and respect all government security and export restrictions. This is a case in which governments and legislatures must improve their performance, and there is every reason to do so because the same industry is increasingly present on both sides of the Atlantic. There is also growing interdependence between the European and the American defense industries.

**HOW TO EFFECT EUROPEAN AND U.S. CHANGE**

So what do governments and legislatures need to do to make it happen? First, it would be extremely helpful if governments collectively recognized the need for strong DTIBs on both sides of the Atlantic. I don’t really imagine that anyone doubts the need for a strong U.S. DTIB but, as I said earlier, I am not sure the same goes for the European DTIB. Do Americans accept the need for a strong European DTIB? They should—but if they do accept it they should surely give it a higher priority and put more effort into facilitating transatlantic technology transfer.

Second, governments need to recognize that the nature of defense industries has changed. We are multinational now and need to be treated as such. We want to be treated equally depending on our presence in different countries and we want to be good citizens in each, and be treated accordingly. The U.K. government has set the standard for the treatment of foreign-owned defense companies, and we hope others will follow its example.
CONCLUDING REMARKS

To sum up here, I would like to reiterate my points:

• Governments and defense industries need to work increasingly closer together.

• We need strong DTIBs in both the U.S. and Europe. A single globalized industrial base controlled by the U.S. Congress will not work.

• In Europe we need to push ahead strongly with market convergence and pool our capabilities as much as possible in order to improve efficiency and maintain key technological capabilities.

Finally, we need to explain clearly to our American friends that all this does not make a Fortress Europe and take steps together to free up the regulatory processes and support our technology bases on both sides of the Atlantic.
Two basic trends regarding the relationship between governments and defense industries in a global industrial base need to be kept in mind. The first is that the imbalance in defense spending between the United States and its European allies continues, and we see very little prospect that the Europeans will increase spending significantly in the near term. Even if spending in the U.S. slows or decreases slightly, the gap is going to remain large, especially on the R&D side.

The R&D spending gap between the U.S. and all the rest of NATO is at least seven to one annually, which has the same effect as compound interest. Every year—and we have been saying this for ten years—that capability gap gets wider. As members of this workshop heard from our NATO military colleagues and from Jan-Olof Lind, the operational pressures on NATO forces in Afghanistan and other places are adding to the increased strain on member-states’ budgets, making it even harder to increase the investment accounts.

The second trend, which is a new one, I think, is that we are more and more a software- and IT-driven industry in both the defense and homeland security realms of our industrial markets. And I argue that IT is inherently already globalized and is the clear leader among an increasingly globalizing set of relevant technologies.

THE RESULTS OF THE TRENDS

I believe we can identify at least two results of these trends. The first is that the entire aerospace and defense industry is globalizing. The combination of reliance on software and IT and budget pressures cause industry to search globally for the best and most affordable solutions, just the way every other industry does—we just do it a bit slower in an area that is a little more complicated politically and is governed by more export controls. Nevertheless, it is happening, and, particularly at the subsystems and components level, a considerable global supply chain exists.

1 Dr. Robert Trice is Senior Vice President for Business Development, Lockheed Martin Corporation.
The second result is that European industry is aggressively seeking access to the U.S. market to compensate for the lack of growth in its home markets. I think a good case could be made that many industries have already moved beyond the objectives of the European Defense Agency for Europeanization. Industries are doing what they need to do in order to survive and grow in two ways. The first is that European companies are increasing their footprint in the United States—they are gaining market share the old-fashioned way, by buying it. Forty percent of BAE Systems’ total sales now come from the United States; the company has more American workers than British workers. BAE Systems, Thales, Smiths, Rolls-Royce, Finmeccanica, EADS—they are all coming into the U.S. and buying market share.

The second way is through transatlantic defense cooperation. In terms of specific programs, Giovanni Bertolone is going to tell us about the C-27J joint cargo aircraft. We have an Italian-British helicopter that is going to be flying the U.S. president, we have Europeans competing for tankers, we have the CN-235 for the U.S. Coast Guard’s Deepwater program, and we have European helicopters for the U.S. Army and the Coast Guard.

THE NEED FOR GREATER GOVERNMENT SPONSORSHIP

You would expect that all this transatlantic defense cooperation would be encouraged by governments, and there are some examples: the NATO ACCS, the Air-to-Ground Surveillance system, the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS), and of course the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. But what is surprising is that there are not more good examples of government-sponsored transatlantic defense cooperation. Basically, what has happened is that our governments have set requirements, but then turned the work over to industry. American and European industries are successfully working together despite all the constraints Edgar Buckley relayed. There is also a continued focus on maintaining a European defense technology and industrial base, but it appears that local industries continue only to be protected from American competition, rather than more European-wide governmental investment taking place. Without investment, there will be no growth. There simply is no magic. Policies must be backed with actual programs, and programs will only be developed with political will and money.

I would argue that this cannot happen in Europe in isolation. Just as European industry is looking to the U.S. for opportunities to invest, collaborate and sell, so should European governments be looking to access the American industrial capabilities created by U.S. defense spending and make sure they are available to Europe. The best way to do that is to have greater transatlantic cooperation and more programs created at the initiative of governments, not just by the drive of industries to survive and thrive.

DEVELOPING NEEDED TALENT

The last point I would like to make, and here I agree with Mr. Lind, is that there is a mutual threat to the western defense industrial base and that is the difficulty in attracting talent. Lockheed Martin hires 5% of all the undergraduate scientists and engineers produced in the United States every year, some 4,500 people. That is both good news and bad news. It is certainly good for Lockheed Martin in that we are constantly reinvigorating our intellectual capital. But the bad news is that a nation of three hundred million people is producing fewer than 90,000 young scientists and engineers a year, compared with 500,000 in China and 300,000 in India. I believe that the challenge is true for all western nations and is transatlantic in scope, and something we all need to tackle if we are to retain our competitiveness in the 21st century.
Chapter 48

The Relationship between Governments
And Defense Industries

Ing. Giovanni Bertolone

THE NEED FOR COLLABORATION

I would like to outline one aspect of our topic, “The Relationship Between Governments and Defence Industries,” that I believe needs to be taken into account. The first point is that there is no doubt that, increasingly, at every stage of the development of a new programme, we need to look to intimate collaborations, even regarding requirements. While there are a lot of formal rules and procedures now that require a certain behaviour, these procedures must be changed, because the reality is that it is no longer possible to separate the world between customers and industries. This is true for every important phase of every programme, whether it lasts five years or 30. This must be clear to all companies in the defence industry.

Let me use as an example the aeronautics field. During the last 10 years, consolidation took place, but de-consolidation was required because the then-current models of collaboration were no more affordable or deliverable. Now I believe that the level of consolidation is quite deep, which is why in aeronautics we can spend a lot of time discussing the way forward and are able to look at new and flexible models. Industries must adapt themselves so that they can collaborate in some areas and compete in others in pragmatic ways.

The next challenge for me is to establish rules that will enable flexible joint ventures and collaborations and ways to work in each programme as one unique body. To do so it will be necessary for the big companies to take on more responsibility toward both customer and supplier. What does that mean? In my opinion, it means that, for example, we need to use our know-how to anticipate the next steps and to have a vision of what will really be needed in the future. Since our position is at the international level, I think we have to interact actively with our customers early on in order to balance affordability with requirements.

1 Ing. Giovanni Bertolone is the CEO of Alenia Aeronautica S.p.A.
There are two ways to improve the present situation. One is to let the European and the international agencies move quickly forward; the other is to let industry make the proposals and interact to make progress. I believe we now are in a time in which we need to speak more about flexibility and globalisation than about consolidation in certain areas—for example, we have to look at what is happening in Russia, what is happening in Asia, and what our collaboration is with India. We need to concentrate on the different requirements for security and defence and to actively propose solutions.

**RECONSIDERING OFFSET**

The second point I want to speak about is that the bad word “offset” has to be reconsidered. But in what way? I believe it must be considered in a way that may let local industry become more competitive through its participation in our programme, because, at the end of the day, that means reducing the cost of the programme, making it more affordable. In Finmeccanica and in Alenia Aeronautica, we are trying to develop a way in which we can collaborate with certain countries, in particular Eastern European countries. For example, we have the opportunity not just to sell a product in Turkey but to establish a long-lasting relationship with local industries there and to enable those industries to increase their competencies through different kinds of involvement. Now we will launch a master not only with engineers in Turkey but with Greece, Lithuania, Bulgaria, and Romania. The idea is that we need to change the concept of offset to the concept of valuable industrial return, which gives local industry the ability to be autonomous in supporting programmes during their lifetime, to keep from spending money for nothing, and to establish relationships that let them develop competencies and move forward in a way that satisfies them. There is the matter of VPR, there is the matter of transferring know-how, and there are differences between European companies and American companies, but through overview and experimentation I believe we should succeed.
Part Nine

Ambassador Zoltan Martinusz

Ambassador Dumitru Sorin Ducaru

General Harald Kujat
Chapter 49

The Way Ahead

Ambassador Zoltan Martinusz

THE APPROACH TO SECURITY

The statement that Mr. John Grimes made, “Global security can mean a lot of things to a lot of people—it is all about perception,” is definitely true, and reflects the fact that security is subjective: it is in the eye of the beholder. Unless we have a shared vision of security, how can we approach it?

The term “comprehensive approach” is certainly the buzz-phrase of the day at NATO, but all of us need to apply limits to the meaning of security at a certain point. Otherwise, everything in our global society will be a security issue, which could be interesting from a theoretical point of view but impractical in the real world. If security policy became an all-encompassing superpolicy, there would be doubtful consequences and ultimately the notion of security would be diluted.

Right at this workshop, where security policy and defense-industry professionals sit together, a gap exists in the meaning of security. Non-NATO ambassadors may be wondering why NATO ambassadors are preoccupied with the issues they are focused on, and the same may be true for MD/South representatives. Perception is important, but incompatible and incomparable terms make it all the more difficult. The gap in global perception is a challenge in and of itself.

Lawrence Freedman talked about the transformation of strategic affairs. We are also witnessing a transformation of the notion of security. But while certain tendencies and directions are clear, the overall picture is not clear yet. For example, new tendencies are often described in mutually exclusive terms, but in reality new tendencies co-exist both with each other and with old tendencies as well. In addition, the newfound power and self-confidence that often are closely related to some of the new types of tendencies can lead to old, familiar-sounding threats and rhetoric.

Although we have tried to identify some of the most characteristic tendencies based on presentations from different panels, we are still desperately looking for a single, simple description. Descriptions are often presented in mutually exclusive terms: new versus old challenges, expeditionary warfare versus ter-

1 Ambassador Zoltan Martinusz is the Hungarian Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council.
ritorial defense, Westphalian versus post-Westphalian, stabilization versus counterinsurgency. However, these are not truly mutually exclusive concepts, but rather exist in parallel and are closely interlinked.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

Robert Lentz talked about moving from guns to blankets to information. These three concepts can co-exist in the same time and space, for example, they do so in Afghanistan. But if we cannot win in the information/media environment, all our victories in the other environments—the guns and blankets environments—may be in vain. The information environment exists 24x7. Therefore we must deal with it 24x7, just as we do the physical and operational environments, and we must win it. Strategic communications are of extreme importance and we cannot have value-based wars in a value-neutral information environment.

IDENTIFYING CHALLENGES

Currently there is uncertainty in the institutional approach. Specialized security alliances can create biases and jealousy, with bilateral and national political issues manifesting themselves as institutional problems. But out of the wish to be politically correct, we often do not call a spade a spade.

Minister Aaviksoo told us that one of the problems of cyber-defense is identification. Traditional security issues had a rather firm, clear identity, but this is not the case for the new security challenges—even hardcore security challenges such as terrorism and IED attacks are often faceless, and organized crime can be hidden. Cyber-attackers often use stolen identities and illegal mass migration is the migration of millions of faceless people. Global warning, an existential threat to many countries and the security threat for them, has no face at all.

But the rise of new challenges does not mean that the old challenges are fading away. Their continuous evolution requires continuous adaptation. Therefore we must not give up the old instruments and approaches, especially before the new ones have been proven. Old tools may still come in handy in the new environment because arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation will remain important.
Chapter 50

The Global Security Environment—Some Practical Issues

Ambassador Dumitru Sorin Ducaru

I am going to move from the theoretical and philosophical debate that Ambassador Martinusz put on the table to some more practical points related to the global security environment, its challenges, and NATO’s immediate agenda. I have been working on this issue since I was asked by my political bosses in Bucharest to see how we can shape NATO’s agenda based on its existing full menu and to have some deliverables at the 2008 summit in Romania and at the 2009 summit that will mark NATO’s 60th anniversary. The topic of this panel, “Global Security—the Way Ahead,” is indeed a challenging one. We do face global threats, we do face global interdependence, and we do have opportunities, but we also have many responsibilities.

NATO’S PHILOSOPHICAL DILEMMA

Now NATO also has a philosophical dilemma. The organization is probably the most successful transatlantic security organization, having survived not only the Cold War but the period that followed, with some breakthrough evolutions: the partnerships that have developed, enlargement, out-of-area operations. Now, because it is seen as so successful in many areas, as well as quite far-reaching, the perception is that the Alliance might offer more responses to the increasingly global landscape of international security. For example, in Afghanistan, because ISAF, the international security force led by NATO under a U.N. mandate, is responsible for all security in the country, the perception is that “NATO owns the problem of Afghanistan.” In fact, the Alliance is best equipped for solving essential security elements, especially the kinetic security element, and is trying to do much more than fight for stabilization and reconstruction. But because some of the work that NATO is doing has never been done before, it is essentially starting from scratch.

The question is, then, How far can we go transforming NATO so that it can respond to the new challenges yet keep its essence and not move into territory that is the responsibility of other organizations like the U.N., and the EU? We also need to ask, What kind of strategic dialogue and strategic partnership can

1 Ambassador Dumitru Sorin Ducaru is the Permanent Representative of Romania on the North Atlantic Council.
be established that can function somewhat automatically between NATO and, for example, the EU or the U.N. so that the comprehensive approach we preach every day can actually function?

Without answering those questions, we will continue to have a kind of “split political personality,” with countries that are members of more than one organization not being able to bring those organizations together. NATO now has 21 EU members and all NATO members are part of the U.N., but it is very difficult to obtain a coherent joint view and to openly share responsibilities. For example, the U.N. is present only in three of the four regions in Afghanistan, and the debate continues as to when the NATO Secretary General will make a symbolic visit to Afghanistan to show interest. We also hope to have more EU involvement in the training of Afghan police.

**KEY CHALLENGES TO DISCUSS**

The main challenges I see and want to structure in the agenda of the NATO Bucharest Summit are:

- Operations, both in Afghanistan and Kosovo
- The comprehensive approach that we have to put to work
- The evolving partnerships of NATO, including building on the existing partnerships that started with Partnership for Peace in the early 90s, the Mediterranean Dialogue, partnerships based on the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative with the Gulf countries, and the partnerships with Ukraine and Russia, as well as the partnerships with the contact countries which reflect NATO’s global outreach
- Enlargement—currently there are three Membership Action Plan countries that could be ready for membership but there are many philosophical questions about the limits of enlargement
- The NATO-Russia relationship
- CFE
- Missile defense, where we have the possibility of moving beyond just the American project. At the last NATO defense ministerial, an agreement was reached that by the spring 2008 summit NATO would present a report about how to complement the American project with a NATO project.

**CONCLUDING REMARKS**

I would like to wrap up by saying that I think NATO’s attractiveness is visible. You can see it in the countries that are pursuing partnership—those that want to be members are driven by the Alliance’s strength; values; capacity to deliver on missions; capacity to adapt, including to the increasing global security challenges; and to its merits-driven and demand-driven process of transformation.

I believe that demand to address the security threats of the 21st century will force us to better equip NATO as an organization that can respond to the globalization of international security. Even though there is no agreement that NATO should have a full set of global responsibilities—there actually is an agreement that NATO should not become a global policeman—because of its capacity to deliver and because there is so much demand on the international security market, I believe that NATO is going to remain the pillar to the adaptation in the face of the new complexity of the international security environment. I also think it is going to be the organization that will push a strategic partnership with the international organizations that have global security responsibilities, especially the U.N. but also the EU.

Sometimes, things that do not work in theory do work in practice, and the experiences of the last few years, especially NATO’s transition from the Cold War era, is proving just that. So, NATO at 60 might prove to be even stronger, more flexible, adaptive and effective in our complex 21st century world than many even dared to hope at the time of its establishment in the mid 20th century.
Chapter 51

Global Security: The Way Ahead

General Harald Kujat

Global Security—the Way Ahead is the topic we have been asked to discuss. But to discuss the way ahead we need to know where to go and where we have been. These are not easy things to know, but the days of the workshop have shown me two things.

First, the world is more complex than ever before: there are areas of hot conflicts, including Iraq and Afghanistan; there are frozen conflicts in Moldova, Transnistria, and the Caucasus; there are old security risks, including the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, unsuccessful arms control, drug trafficking, illegal immigration, poverty, hunger, ethnic and religious conflicts, and international terrorism; and there are new security risks, including cyber attacks, the use of energy as a strategic asset, and the unknown consequences of climate change.

Second, the multipolar world is becoming more diverse. New world powers are becoming more and more influential. China, India, and Russia’s economic and military power is growing, which means more self-confidence and perhaps more nationalism. At the same time U.S. influence in world affairs is declining, a consequence of the prolonged Iraq conflict. In addition, and above all, globalization is producing advantages and risks and winners and losers, and creating new antagonisms.

CREATING A MORE STABLE WORLD

What can we do to create a more stable, more secure, and more just world? In answer, let me share six points with you.

1. No country, no group, no ally, nor no group of countries has the power to design a world according to its needs or interests.

2. Existing organizations and alliances—and I refer only to the United Nations, the EU, and NATO—must be used to the best of their capabilities and in a way that is compatible and creates the necessary synergies.
3. The U.N. provides legitimacy to act but does not have the operational planning capability, the standing command and control structures, or the necessary strategic enablers.

4. The EU is in the process of acquiring these capabilities, based on national contributions, but it lacks the overwhelming power projection capability that the U.S. is contributing to NATO. However, the EU can provide all the civilian, economic, and monetary support needed for a comprehensive security strategy that includes economic recovery; the establishment of a functioning administration, including police; and a countrywide judicial system. Please note that I did not mention democracy.

5. The logical approach is to overcome legacy national problems within the EU and NATO and to cooperate in the best possible manner, knowing that security is indivisible. It is no longer a question of territory—risks do not stop at our borders. Is that achievable? Yes. How do we get there? Through vision and leadership, and we lack both.

6. The final word about NATO is that it has been declared obsolete or even dead several times. However, it is still alive and will be for many years to come. The Alliance succeeded during the Cold War and shaped the geopolitical map of Europe. It also established a strategic partnership with Russia to the benefit of both, something I think will last for the foreseeable future. Although there is turbulence from time to time, we know that together NATO and Russia will contribute to lasting and stable peace in Europe.

However, the Alliance has become less dynamic, less visionary, and less determined to provide the military means we need to underpin a constructive security policy. In short, the Alliance is losing the power to shape the future. An earlier discussion illustrated the extent to which the Alliance is occupied with its own problems: the comprehensive approach, the new strategic concept, new membership. Is collective defense still a core function? I have heard this question for 17 years, so allow me to be a bit cynical.

THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH, A NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, AND ENLARGEMENT

In November of 2006, heads of state and government decided to work on a comprehensive approach, but it was only a few days ago that the Alliance started to discuss it—and no one has found out so far that this concept was developed in 1838. It will take some years to learn that it is impossible for an alliance to implement such a concept—it can only be done by individual nations. The U.S. has recognized that it is using it in Iraq, but only nations implement it, not alliances.

Prior to 1991 we did not have a strategic concept in the Alliance—on November 3, 1991, in Rome, we developed the first strategic concept. I believe that those who are arguing for a new strategic concept did not read the existing concept, which is a very good one. Of course, we can discuss all the related issues and, if we arrive at a new concept, fine. However, if we don’t arrive at a new concept, it means that the Alliance will lose credibility for many years to come.

Regarding new memberships, how far do we want to go with enlargement? With the number of states that are now in the OSCE, do we want to have an OSCE in uniform? And would it be possible to implement the core functions of the Alliance—security and defense for its member-nations—and still handle risks and challenges? Or do we import risks and challenges into the Alliance and then continue this way? If you look at the candidates that are at our front doors you will understand what I mean.

FOCUSING ON WHAT IS RELEVANT

If the Alliance wishes to continue contributing to shaping the future, other questions need to be asked—and answered. What are the operational capabilities our security policy needs to implement? What investment is needed in modern equipment? Are nations prepared to spend what is necessary for defense? We need yes or no answers, or we will just continue to discuss things that are not really relevant.
Here is one example. Some years ago NATO launched a new program to improve the usability of our forces. Nations continuously praised their efforts: 20% of our forces are now usable, 25% are usable, 30%, and so on. My question as a taxpayer is: When a nation declares 30% of her forces usable, what are they doing with the 70% that is useless? My point is that we are concentrating a lot of effort on things that are not really relevant.

Regarding ballistic missile defense, do you really think that our parliaments will agree to missile deployments that are designed to protect only our deployed forces and not our populations? Is that realistic? And if you deploy your forces close to the enemy’s border, will the enemy limit his threat to your forces or will he threaten your population as well? I believe we need to have more fundamental, more strategic thinking in the Alliance. We also need closer cooperation between North America and Europe and between North American and European industries—we need less isolated research and development and less waste of money on both sides of the Atlantic. Every single dollar or euro we can spend together will improve our common capability.

We also need an accelerated political and military decision-making process and we need to expand our Partnership for Peace program both substantially and geographically. Why don’t we include the seven Mediterranean countries in Partnership for Peace? I would put more emphasis on Partnership for Peace and less emphasis on new membership. I think that is the future.