Global Security

IN TIMES OF ECONOMIC UNCERTAINTY

Proceedings of the 26th International Workshop on Global Security

Turkish Minister of National Defense Vecdi Gönül

Workshop Patron

Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon

Chairman

Anne D. Baylon

Editor
Global Security

IN TIMES OF ECONOMIC UNCERTAINTY

Proceedings of the 26th International Workshop on Global Security

His Excellency Vecdi Gönül
Minister of National Defense of the Republic of Turkey
Workshop Patron

Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon
Chairman

Anne D. Baylon
Editor
His Excellency Vecdi Gönül
Minister of National Defense of the Republic of Turkey
Patron of the 26th International Workshop on Global Security
The 26th International Workshop on Global Security is presented by the Center for Strategic Decision Research in partnership with the Turkish Ministry of National Defense.
PRINCIPAL SPONSORS

TURKISH MINISTRY of NATIONAL DEFENSE

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (NII)
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
Net Assessment

NORTHROP GRUMMAN

Microsoft

MAJOR SPONSORS

LOCKHEED MARTIN

EADS

URS

CISCO

THALES

MITRE

GENERAL DYNAMICS

THE UNIVERSITY of TENNESSEE
National Defense Business Institute

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS OF PAST HOST AND SPONSORING GOVERNMENTS

Czech Republic
Kingdom of Denmark
Federal Republic of Germany
Republic of Greece
Republic of Hungary
Kingdom of the Netherlands
Kingdom of Norway
Republic of Poland
Republic of Portugal
Ministry of Defense of Austria
Ministry of Defense of France
Ministry of Defense of Italy
Canadian Armed Forces
Russian Ministry of Industry, Science, and Technology
T O P  R O W
Opening session of the 26th International Workshop.

from left to right
Dutch Minister of Defense Eimert van Middelkoop;
Turkish Minister of Defense Vecdi Gönül;
Workshop Chairman Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon;
Hellenic Minister of Defense Evangelos Meimarakis;
Portuguese Minister of Defense Professor Dr. Nuno Severiano Teixeira.

M I D D L E  R O W
left photo
Latvian Minister of Defense Imants Liegis (l)
and Slovenian Minister of Defense Dr. Ljubica Jelusic (r).

right photo
Turkish Minister of Defense Vecdi Gönül gives the Workshop opening address.

B O T T O M  R O W
left photo
Hellenic Minister of Defense Evangelos Meimarakis.

right photo
Workshop Chairman Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon (l)
and Portuguese Minister of Defense Professor Dr. Nuno Severiano Teixeira (r).
**Top Row**

Welcome reception in the Turkish and Islamic Art Museum courtyard and gardens with a view over the Blue Mosque.

**Bottom Row**

*left and right photos*

Participants visit the museum collection of ancient carpets, tiles and calligraphy.
TOP ROW
left photo
Dr. Linton Wells (l)
and Dutch Minister of Defense Eimert van Middelkoop (r)

right photo, from left to right
Romanian ambassador to NATO Dumitru Sorin Ducaru;
Georgian Minister of Defense Vasil Sikharulidze;
Georgian Vice Prime Minister Giorgi Baramidze.

MIDDLE ROW
left photo, from left to right
Turkish Minister of Defense Vecdi Gönlü;
Montenegrin Minister of Defense Boro Vučinić;
U.S. Defense Attaché Gregory Broeker;
Montenegrin Ambassador to NATO Veselin Šuković.

right photo, from left to right
Indian Deputy National Security Advisor Dr. Shekhar Dutt;
Mr. Julius Coles, President and CEO, AFRICARE;
Workshop Chairman Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon.

BOTTOM ROW
left photo
Mr. Henri Serres, French Ministry of Defense.

right photo, from left to right
U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense John Grimes;
Mr. Tim Blochel, Microsoft Corporation;
Mr. Terry Morgan, Cisco Systems, Inc.;
U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert Lentz.
Views of the reception hosted by the Turkish Ministry of Defense in the gardens of the Çırağan Palace.

Slovenian Minister of Defense Dr. Ljubica Jelusic (l)
and Workshop Chairman Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon (r).

Estonian Minister of Defense Jaak Aaviksoo (l)
and General Håkan Syrén, Chairman of the EU Military Committee (r).

Mr. Hikmet Cetin, former Turkish Foreign Minister;
Lieutenant General Veysi Ağar, Turkish Military Representative to NATO;
Professor Dr. İlber Ortaylı, Director of the Topkapi Palace Museum;
General Ünal Önsipahioğlu (Ret.), MKEK;
Mr. Kaya Yazgan, Secretary General of SASAD.

Another view of the reception hosted by the Turkish Ministry of Defense in the gardens of the Çırağan Palace.
Dinner hosted by the Turkish Ministry of Defense at the Çırağan Palace.

Performance by the Mehter Band, the Ottoman Empire Janissary Band.

The Mehter Band performs in front of the workshop guests.
**TOP ROW**

*left photo*
Kuwaiti Ambassador to Belgium and the EU Nabeela Al-Mulla (l)
and Egyptian Ambassador to Belgium and the EU Dr. Mahmoud Kareem (r).

*right photo*
Uzbek Ambassador to Turkey Ulfat Kadyrov (l)
and Russian Ambassador to the EU Vladimir Chizhov (r).

**MIDDLE ROW**

*left photo, from left to right*
Mr. Daniel Maly, Mr. Tim Bloechl, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Kosla (Ret.), Mr. Wayne Phillips, of Microsoft Corporation.

*right photo*
Jordanian Ambassador to Belgium and the EU Dr. Ahmad Masa’deh (l)
and Moroccan Ambassador-at-large Hassan Abouyoub (r).

**BOTTOM ROW**

*left photo*
Colonel Robert Dickey (Ret.), Defense Threat Reduction Agency (l)
and Dr. Edward Ifft, Georgetown University (r).

*right photo, from left to right*
Polish Ambassador to NATO Boguslaw Winid;
British Ambassador to NATO Sir Stewart Eldon;
Canadian Ambassador to NATO Robert McRae.
TOP ROW
left photo
Turkish Minister of Defense Vecdi Gönül (l)
and Rear Admiral Nadir Hakan Eraydin, Turkish Ministry of Defense (r)
in conversation with Latvian Minister of Defense Imants Liegis (back).

right photo, from left to right
Dutch Minister of Defense Eimert van Middelkoop;
Dr. Werner Fasslabend, Former Austrian Minister of Defense;
Mr. Raymond Haller, MITRE Corporation.

MIDDLE ROW
left photo, from left to right
Afghan Ambassador to the U.N. Zahir Tanin;
Mr. David Swindle, URS Corporation;
German Ambassador to the U.N. Thomas Matussek.

right photo
Workshop participants during the Istanbul Strait cruise.

BOTTOM ROW
left photo
Admiral Jean Betermier, EADS (l)
And Lieutenant General Pascal Vinchon, French Military Representative to NATO (r).

right photo, from left to right
Mr. Rabih Torbay, International Medical Corps;
Ms. Renée Acosta, President and CEO, Global Impact;
Mr. Julius Coles, President and CEO, AFRICARE.
TOP ROW
from left to right
Pakistani Ambassador to the U.N. Abdullah Hussain Haroon;
Afghan Ambassador to the U.N. Zahir Tanin;
Workshop Chairman Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon;
General George Joulwan (Ret.), former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe;
General Karl-Heinz Lather, Chief of Staff, SHAPE;
General Vincenzo Camporini, Chief of General Staff of Italy.

MIDDLE ROW
left photo, from left to right
General George Joulwan (Ret.), former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (l)
and General Karl-Heinz Lather, Chief of Staff, SHAPE (r).

right photo, from left to right
General Vincenzo Camporini, Chief of General Staff of Italy (l)
and Admiral Luciano Zappata, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander-Transformation (r).

BOTTOM ROW
left photo, from left to right
U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert Lentz (l)
and Brigadier General Christine Turner, Allied Command Transformation (r).

right photo, from left to right
Afghan Ambassador to the U.N. Zahir Tanin (l)
and Pakistani Ambassador to the U.N. Abdullah Hussain Haroon (r).
**TOP ROW**

*left photo, from left to right*
Dr. Edgar Buckley, THALES *(l)*
and NATO Assistant Secretary General Peter Flory *(r).*

*right photo, from left to right*
Mr. Thomas Homberg, EADS *(l)*
and Dr. Scott Harris, Lockheed Martin *(r).*

**MIDDLE ROW**

*from left to right*
Mr. Timothy Shephard, Northrop Grumman ESI;
NATO Assistant Secretary General Peter Flory;
Mr. Alfred Volkman, Office of the U.S. Undersecretary of Defense;
Mr. James Heath, Northrop Grumman ESI.

**BOTTOM ROW**

*left photo, from left to right*
Ms. Hélène de Rochefort, Secretary General, France Amérique *(l)*
and Ing. Gen. de l’Armement Robert Ranquet, Armament General Council *(r).*

*right photo, from left to right*
Swiss Ambassador to Belgium and NATO Jean-Jacques de Dardel;
Mr. Fred Spivey, Defense Consultant;
Mr. J. David Patterson, University of Tennessee.
**Top Row**

*From left to right*
VADM Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte, fmr Italian Military Representative to NATO;
Rear Admiral Gerald R. Beaman, Allied Joint Force Command, Naples;
Ms. Elaine Dezenski, INTERPOL;
Lieutenant General Pascal Vinchon, French Military Representative to NATO.

**Middle Row**

*Left photo*
Mr. Jan Fulik, Czech Deputy Minister of Defense

*Middle photo*
Colonel Pierre-Jean Arbod, French Defense Ministry (l)
And Mr. Hikmet Cetin, former Turkish Foreign Minister (r).

*Right photo*
Mr. William Ennis, Northrop Grumman International Inc.

**Bottom Row**

*Left photo*
Ms. Renée Acosta, President and CEO, Global Impact (l)
Ms. Rebecca Bash, Net Assessment (r).

*Right photo, from left to right*
Major Soydan Görgülü, Turkish Ministry of Defense;
Ms. Elcin Şanli, Turkish Ministry of Defense;
Colonel Oktay Şenyiğit, Turkish Ministry of Defense.
TOP ROW
Dinner in the courtyard of the Archaeological Museum at Topkapi Palace.

MIDDLE ROW
left photo
Another view of the dinner in the Archaeological Museum courtyard.

right photo
Estonian Defense Minister Jaak Aaviksoo addresses the participants from the steps of the Archaeological Museum main building.

BOTTOM ROW
left photo
Lieutenant General Mike McDuffee with a Lycian sarcophagus from the second century BC.

right photo
Hungarian State Secretary József Bali. The sarcophagus is known as the Sarcophagus of the Mourning Women, circa 350 BC.
# Table of Contents

**Chapter 1. Keynote Address of the 26th International Workshop On Global Security**

*His Excellency Vecdi Gönül, Minister of Defense of Turkey*

- OPENING REMARKS ............................................................................................................................................. 1
- THE EFFECT OF GLOBALIZATION .................................................................................................................... 1
- THE NEED FOR NEW SECURITY COOPERATION .......................................................................................... 2
- STABILITY IN THE BALKANS, THE CAUCASUS, AND THE MIDDLE EAST ................................................ 2
- TURKISH SECURITY INITIATIVES ..................................................................................................................... 2
- AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN .......................................................................................................................... 3
- TURKISH CONTRIBUTIONS TO COOPERATION ........................................................................................... 3
- CONCLUDING REMARKS.................................................................................................................................... 4

**Chapter 2. Global Security in Times of Economic Uncertainty**

*His Excellency Evangelos Vassilios I. Meimarakis, Hellenic Minister of National Defence*

- CURRENT THREATS TO GLOBAL SECURITY .................................................................................................. 5
- ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGES: THE NEED TO WORK TOGETHER ...................................................... 6
- SECURITY IN THE BALKANS AND IN THE MEDITERRANEAN ................................................................... 7
- THE WAY AHEAD: RESTRUCTURING, RE-PRIORITIZATION, RATIONALIZATION ..................................7
- THE CORE ISSUE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: ................................................................. 8
- CONCLUDING REMARKS.................................................................................................................................... 8

**Chapter 3. Issues that NATO’s New Strategic Concept Must Address**

*His Excellency Professor Dr. Nuno Severiano Teixeira, Minister of Defense of Portugal*

- SECURITY IN THE 21st CENTURY ....................................................................................................................... 9
- THE PILLARS OF MULTILATERAL ORDER ....................................................................................................... 9
- POINTS THE NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT MUST ADDRESS ...................................................................... 10
  - Enlargement ........................................................................................................................................................ 10
  - Operations Outside the Traditional Area ............................................................................................................. 10
  - The Transformation of NATO—Structures and Concepts .................................................................................... 10
  - The Relationship Between NATO and Its Strategic Partners ........................................................................ 10
- PROMOTING CHANGE ...................................................................................................................................... 11
- SOME WORDS ABOUT PORTUGAL ................................................................................................................. 11

**Chapter 4. The Future of Our Armed Forces**

*His Excellency Eimert van Middelkoop, Minister of Defense of the Netherlands*

- THE ARMED FORCES OF THE NETHERLANDS............................................................................................ 13
- ARMED FORCES REQUIREMENTS.................................................................................................................. 13
- A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH ................................................................................................................ 14
- NATO ...................................................................................................................................................................... 14
- CONCLUDING REMARKS.................................................................................................................................. 14
Chapter 5. The True Battlefield

His Excellency Jaak Aaviksoo, Minister of Defense of Estonia

NEW WAYS OF THINKING ........................................................................................................ 15
AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT IN STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS ........................................ 15
PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY.................................................................................................. 16
CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................................................... 17

Chapter 6. Russia’s Conflict with Georgia: Uniting for the Way Ahead

His Excellency Giorgi Baramidze, Vice Prime Minister of Georgia

OPENING REMARKS ............................................................................................................. 19
RUSSIAN AGGRESSION TOWARD GEORGIA ........................................................................ 19
GEORGIA’S INTEGRATION WITH THE EURO-ATLANTIC COMMUNITY ..................................... 20
STEPS FORWARD ................................................................................................................ 20
UNITING FOR THE WORK AHEAD ........................................................................................ 21

Chapter 7. Security Challenges in the Western Balkans

Her Excellency Dr. Ljubica Jelusic, Minister of Defense of Slovenia

SOURCES OF INSTABILITY IN THE BALKANS ........................................................................ 23
OUTCOMES OF THE INTERNATIONAL EFFORT IN KOSOVO .................................................. 24
SLOVENIAN PRESENCE IN KOSOVO ........................................................................................ 24
CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................................................... 24

Chapter 8. Georgia’s Current Security Situation

His Excellency Vasil Sikharulidze, Minister of Defense of Georgia

THE SITUATION IN GEORGIA ................................................................................................ 25
TURNING THE ENERGY CORRIDOR INTO A COMMERCIAL AND SECURITY CORRIDOR ............ 25
GEORGIAN SUPPORT OF SECURITY AND PEACE ................................................................. 25
CONCLUDING REMARKS .................................................................................................... 26

Chapter 9. Security in the Balkans—A Montenegrin Perspective

His Excellency Boro Vučinić, Minister of Defense of Montenegro

OPENING REMARKS ............................................................................................................. 27
THE NEED FOR INTEGRATED SECURITY ............................................................................... 27
MONTENEGRO’S ACHIEVEMENTS ......................................................................................... 27
CONCLUDING REMARKS .................................................................................................... 28

Chapter 10. Black Sea Security and the Importance of a New NATO Strategic Concept

His Excellency Imants Liegis, Minister of Defense of Latvia

NATO MEMBERSHIP AS AN EXERCISE IN REGIONAL COOPERATION .................................. 29
IMPORTANCE OF THE REVISION OF THE NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT ................................ 29
MODES OF COLLABORATION .......................................................................................................................... 43
PARTNERSHIPS AND STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS ..................................................................................... 43

Chapter 17. The Middle East, Israel, and Palestine: A Brief Overview 45

Ambassador Dr. Mahmoud Karem, Egyptian Ambassador to Belgium and the European Union

CAUSES OF MIDDLE EAST TENSIONS ........................................................................................................... 45
ROLE OF THE U.S. AS A MEDIATOR ................................................................................................................ 45

Chapter 18. Israel and the Arab World 47

Ambassador Hassan Abouyoub, Ambassador-at-Large of the Kingdom of Morocco

NEW FORCES IN THE ARAB WORLD ............................................................................................................. 47
THE ROLES OF THE U.S. AND EU .................................................................................................................... 47
IRAN & THE UNION FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN AS REGIONAL ACTORS................................................. 48
CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................................................... 48

Chapter 19. Gulf Security in Light of Regional Developments in West Asia 49

Ambassador Nabeela A. Al-Mulla, Ambassador of Kuwait to Belgium and the European Union

LOOKING AT THE CHALLENGES..................................................................................................................... 49
GREATER COOPERATION: THE WAY FORWARD .......................................................................................... 49

Chapter 20. Strategies for Dealing with Regions in Crisis: Israel, Palestine, the Middle East 51

Ambassador Dr. Ahmad Masa’deh, Jordanian Ambassador to Belgium and the European Union

THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS AND SECURITY ..................................................................................... 51
THE CORE ISSUE: THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT ....................................................................... 51
SECURITY, ECONOMIC GROWTH, AND SOFT SECURITY ........................................................................ 52
THE UNION FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN .................................................................................................... 52
CONCLUDING REMARKS .................................................................................................................................. 52

Chapter 21. Cyber Resilience for Mission Success 53

The Honorable John G. Grimes, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense (NII)

DEPENDENCE ON FRAGILE UNDERPINNINGS ........................................................................................... 53
INCREASING THREATS AND DEPENDENCE ................................................................................................. 53
CYBER RESILIENCE ............................................................................................................................................. 54
OPPORTUNITIES AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR NEXT STEPS.................................................................. 54

Chapter 22. Promoting Trust and Security in the Digital Economy 55

Mr. Henri Serres, Director General for Information and Communication Systems, France

EDUCATION AND TRAINING .......................................................................................................................... 55
Chapter 23. Cyber Security

Mr. Robert Lentz, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (NII)

CYBER SECURITY AS A HIGH PRIORITY .............................................................. 59
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE INTERNET ................................................................. 59
CONCLUDING REMARKS ...................................................................................... 60

Chapter 24. New Cyber Strategies for Military Operations

Mr. Tim Bloechl, Managing Director, Worldwide Public Safety & National Security, Microsoft

COMPPELLING NEW TECHNOLOGIES FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS ............. 61
VULNERABILITIES OF THE NEW TECHNOLOGIES ........................................... 62
CONCLUDING REMARKS ...................................................................................... 63

Chapter 25. Cyberspace—A New Area of Knowledge

Mr. Terry Morgan, Director, Net-Centric Strategies, Global Government Solutions Group, Cisco

DEALING WITH THE REALITY OF CYBERSPACE .................................................. 65
CONCLUDING REMARKS ...................................................................................... 66

Chapter 26. Dealing with Crises in Afghanistan and Pakistan

Ambassador Dr. Zahir Tanin, Afghanistan’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations

OPENING REMARKS ............................................................................................ 67
THE NEED FOR A COMPLEMENTARY CIVILIAN-MILITARY STRATEGY ............. 67
TURNING BETTER UNDERSTANDING INTO BETTER ACTION ............................. 68
TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE RENEWED FOCUS ON AFGHANISTAN .......... 69

Chapter 27. The Afghan Conflict: A Perspective from Pakistan

Ambassador Abdullah Hussain Haroon, Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations

THE INSURGENTS .................................................................................................. 71
BACKGROUND ........................................................................................................ 71
ASSESSING THE SITUATION .................................................................................. 72
A NEW STRATEGIC DIRECTION ............................................................................ 72
Chapter 28. Dealing with the Crises in Afghanistan and Pakistan  75

General Vincenzo Camporini, Chief of General Staff of the Italian Armed Forces

OPENING REMARKS ........................................................................................................................................... 75
THE ITALIAN APPROACH TO NATIONAL SECURITY .................................................................................. 75
MANDATORY LEGAL FRAMEWORK CONSTRAINTS ON MILITARY OPERATIONS .............................. 75
ITALY AND AFGHANISTAN .......................................................................................................................... 76
MILITARY ENGAGEMENTS ............................................................................................................................ 76
NATIONAL CAVEATS ........................................................................................................................................... 76
TRAINING AFGHAN FORCES ......................................................................................................................... 76
COUNTER-NARCOTICS ACTIVITIES ............................................................................................................... 77
CONCLUDING REMARKS .................................................................................................................................. 77

Chapter 29. Dealing with Crises in Afghanistan and Pakistan: Strategic Issues  79

General Karl-Heinz Lather, Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)

LONG-TERM ENGAGEMENT ......................................................................................................................... 79
AFGHAN ENGAGEMENT ................................................................................................................................... 79
THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH ............................................................................................................... 79
CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................................................................................... 80

Chapter 30. Afghanistan and Pakistan—Looking Ahead  81

Admiral Luciano Zappata, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Transformation

OPENING REMARKS ........................................................................................................................................... 81
GOING FORWARD IN AN INTERCONNECTED WORLD .................................................................................. 81
Being Flexible ...................................................................................................................................................... 81
Maintaining the Human Element .................................................................................................................... 82
Maintaining Ambition and Capabilities ........................................................................................................... 82
CONCLUDING REMARKS .................................................................................................................................. 82


Mr. Al Volkman, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics)

SPEED OF TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION.............................................................................................................83

Chapter 32. NATO’s New Strategic Concept, Economic Crises, & Implications for Industry  85

Mr. Thomas Homberg, Corporate Vice President, Head of Strategic Coordination, EADS

THE NEW NATO CONCEPT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR INDUSTRY .................................................. 85
THE ECONOMIC CRISIS AND ITS IMPACT .................................................................................................... 86
CONCLUDING REMARKS .................................................................................................................................. 86

Chapter 33. Challenges in Afghanistan & Pakistan: How Can Industry contribute?  87

Mr. Peter Flory, NATO Assistant Secretary-General for Defense Investment
## Table of Contents

FINANCIAL AND STRATEGIC CONTEXT ....................................................................................................... 87
CREATING NATO-INDUSTRY SOLUTIONS ..................................................................................................... 87
WHAT WE NEED FROM EACH OTHER ........................................................................................................... 88

### Chapter 34. The NATO–Industry Partnership

Dr. Edgar Buckley, Senior Vice President, Thales

MAJOR CHALLENGES IN AFGHANISTAN....................................................................................................... 91
BOOSTING EFFICIENCY AT NATO .................................................................................................................. 92

### Chapter 35. Industry Perspectives: Technological Development and Human Resources

Dr. Scott Harris, President, Continental Europe, Lockheed Martin Global, Inc.

RAPID DEVELOPMENT OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES ...................................................................................... 93
INDUSTRY-PROVIDED HUMAN RESOURCES................................................................................................ 93
THE NEED FOR INDUSTRY CONSOLIDATION ............................................................................................ 94

### Chapter 36. The Way Ahead for the International Defense Industry

Mr. Tim Shephard, Regional Vice President, Northrop-Grumman Electronic Systems International

CONNECTING WITH THE PUBLIC ................................................................................................................. 95
THE NEED FOR CLARITY .................................................................................................................................. 95
SEEING THE CHALLENGES AND SEEING “AROUND THE CORNER” ............................................................ 96
CONCLUDING REMARKS.................................................................................................................................. 96

### Chapter 37. Afghanistan: The Organizational Challenges

General George A. Joulwan, former Supreme Allied Commander Europe

INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................................................... 97
THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT .............................................................................................................. 97
THE CHALLENGE............................................................................................................................................. 98
CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS ......................................................................................................................... 99
Clarity of Mission............................................................................................................................................... 99
Unity of Command......................................................................................................................................... 99
Robust Rules of Engagement .......................................................................................................................... 99
Timely Political Decisions .............................................................................................................................. 99
CONCLUSION.................................................................................................................................................. 100

### Chapter 38. NGOs, Governments, and the Private Sector: Increasing Cooperation

Ms. Renée Acosta, CEO, Global Impact

THE CHALLENGES OF PROVIDING DEVELOPMENT AID ................................................................. 102
A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY IN AFGHANISTAN............................................................................................ 102
BUILDING TRUST AND CONFIDENCE...................................................................................................... 102
WORKING TOGETHER ............................................................................................................................... 102
Chapter 39. Planning for Long-Term Benefits

Mr. Julius E. Coles, CEO, Africare

LOOKING BACK TO LESSONS LEARNED ................................................................. 105
THE NEED TO RE-ENVISION OUR PROGRAMS ......................................................... 105
CONCLUDING REMARKS ....................................................................................... 106

Chapter 40. Bridging the Gap: The NGO Role in Promoting Development and Security

Mr. Rabih Torbay, Senior Vice President for Programs, International Medical Corps

WORKING TOGETHER ......................................................................................... 107
NEW APPROACHES ............................................................................................... 107
FINDING COMMON GROUND .............................................................................. 108
MAKING A LONG-TERM COMMITMENT AND PROMOTING SOCIAL SERVICES ......... 108

Chapter 41. The Security Situation in the Balkans and Kosovo

Rear Admiral Gerald Beaman, Joint Force Command Naples Operations

THREATS TO SECURITY IN THE BALKANS ........................................................... 109
CONCLUDING REMARKS ....................................................................................... 110

Chapter 42. Illicit Human Trafficking, Smuggling of Arms, Drugs, and WMD Materials

Ms. Elaine Dezenski, Managing Director, INTERPOL’s Global Security Initiative

POLICING AND THE MILITARY ............................................................................ 111
INTERPOL AND THE GLOBAL SECURITY INITIATIVE ........................................... 111
HUMAN TRAFFICKING ......................................................................................... 111
ILLEGAL NARCOTICS/DRUGS .............................................................................. 112
SMUGGLING OF ARMS AND WEAPONS .............................................................. 113
HOW CAN INTERPOL HELP? .............................................................................. 113
WHAT DOES INTERPOL PLAN TO DO GOING FORWARD? ................................. 114
CONCLUDING REMARKS ....................................................................................... 114

Chapter 43. Dealing with Illicit Human Trafficking and Smuggling

Vice Admiral Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte, Former Italian Military Representative to NATO

THE RESULTS OF GAPS IN SECURITY ................................................................. 115
THE NEED FOR BETTER CONTROL OF THE SEA ................................................. 115
INITIATIVES TO STRENGTHEN MARITIME POWER ........................................... 116
DANGERS OF DISREGARDING UNWRITTEN LAWS OF THE SEA ......................... 116
CONCLUDING REMARKS ....................................................................................... 116

Chapter 44. Concluding Remarks

Dr. Linton Wells II, Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense

UNITY OF COMMAND ........................................................................................... 117
Chapter 45. Which Way Ahead for NATO’s Partnerships?

Dr. Jean-Jacques de Dardel, Ambassador of Switzerland to the North Atlantic Alliance

THE FUTURE OF NATO ..................................................................................................................................... 119
THE BENEFITS OF THE EAPC AND PFP ....................................................................................................... 120
THE ROLE OF PARTNERS IN THE NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT ............................................................. 120
THE CHALLENGES OF PARTNERSHIP .......................................................................................................... 120
VISION FOR THE NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT ......................................................................................... 121

Chapter 46. The Business of Global Security in a Stressed Global Economy

Mr. David Patterson, College of Business Administration, University of Tennessee

THE EFFECT OF ECONOMIC PRESSURE ON GLOBAL SECURITY .......................................................... 123
THE MYTH THAT AEROSPACE AND DEFENSE ARE IMMUNE TO ECONOMIC PRESSURES ............. 123
THREE STEPS TO TAKE .................................................................................................................................... 124

Chapter 47. Wrap-Up Remarks

General Karl-Heinz Lather, Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)

OVERVIEW .......................................................................................................................................................... 125
THE COMING YEAR .......................................................................................................................................... 125
AN ANECDOTE ON AFGHANISTAN .................................................................................................................. 126
Contributors

His Excellency Jaak Aaviksoo
*Estonian Minister of Defense*

Ambassador Hassan Abouyoub
*Ambassador-at-Large of the Kingdom of Morocco*

Ms. Renée S. Acosta
*President & CEO, Global Impact*

Lieutenant General M. Veysi Ağar
*Turkish Military Representative to NATO*

Mr. Fuat Akçayöz
*Group President, ASELSAN*

Ambassador Nabeela Al-Mulla
*Ambassador of Kuwait to Belgium and the EU*

Colonel Pierre-Jean Arbod
*Department of Strategic Affairs, French Defense Ministry*

Colonel Berkani Bachir
*Director, Institut Militaire d’Evaluation et Prospective, Algerian Ministry of Defense*

Mr. Alexander Bakradze
*Head of Euro-Atlantic Integration, Office of Georgian Vice Prime Minister*

State Secretary József Bali
*Hungarian Ministry of Defense*

His Excellency Giorgi Baramidze
*Vice Prime Minister of Georgia*

Mr. Wim Bargerbos
*Deputy Director, General Policy Affairs Directorate, Ministry of Defense of the Netherlands*

Mr. Recep Barut
*General Manager, STM*

Ms. Rebecca Bash
*Office of the Director, Net Assessment*

Ms. Anne D. Baylon
*Co-Director, Center for Strategic Decision Research*

Rear Admiral Gerald R. Beaman
*Deputy Chief of Staff Operations, Allied Joint Force Command Naples*

Admiral Jean Betermier
*Advisor to the CEO, EADS*

Lieutenant General David Bill
*United Kingdom Military Representative to NATO*

Mr. Tim Bloechl
*Managing Director, Worldwide Public Safety & National Security, Microsoft Corporation*
Brigadier General Renato Bocchetti
Office of the Italian Military Representative to the NATO Military Committee

Lieutenant General Jürgen Bornemann
German Military Representative to NATO Military Committee

Dr. Edgar Buckley
Senior Vice President, Thales

General Vincenzo Camporini
Chief of General Staff of Italy

Mr. Hikmet Çetin
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Former Speaker of the Turkish Parliament

Major General Mehmet Çetin
Head of the International Security and Foreign Relations Division, Turkish General Staff

Ambassador Vladimir Chizhov
Russian Ambassador to the EU

Ambassador Dimitrios Chronopoulos
Director General of Defense Policy & International Relations, Hellenic Defense Ministry

Mr. Julius Coles
President and CEO, AFRICARE

Dr. João Paulo da Costa
Diplomatic Advisor to Portuguese Defense Minister

Ambassador Jean-Jacques de Dardel
Swiss Ambassador to Belgium and to NATO

Lieutenant General Christopher Davis
Canadian Military Representative to NATO

Ms. Elaine Dezenski
Managing Director, INTERPOL’s Global Security Initiative for the 21st Century

Colonel Robert Dickey
Defense Threat Reduction Agency

Ambassador Dumitru Sorin Ducaru
Romanian Permanent Representative to NATO

Dr. Shekhar Dutt
Indian Deputy National Security Advisor

Sir Stewart Eldon KCMG, OBE
British Ambassador to NATO

Mr. William Ennis
Northrop Grumman International Inc.

Rear Admiral Nadir Hakan Eraydin
Chief of Plans and Policy, Turkish Ministry of Defense

Dr. Werner Fasslabend
President, Political Academy of Austrian Peoples’ Party; Former Austrian Defense Minister

Assistant Secretary General Peter Flory
NATO Assistant General for Defense Investment
Contributors

Deputy Minister Jan Fulík
Czech Deputy Minister of Defense

Mr. Frans Godschalk
Political Assistant to the Minister of Defense of the Netherlands

His Excellency Vecdi Gönül
Minister of Defense of Turkey

The Honorable John Grimes
U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense

Major General Giacomo Guarnera
Director, Centro Alti Studi per la Difesa, Rome

Mr. Raymond Haller
Senior Vice President, (C2C), MITRE Corporation

Ambassador Abdullah Hussain Haroon
Pakistani Ambassador to the United Nations

Dr. Scott Harris
President, Continental Europe, Lockheed Martin

Mr. James Heath
President, Northrop Grumman Electronic Systems International, Inc.

Vice Admiral Michiel B. Hijmans
Assistant Chief of Staff for International Military Cooperation, Defense Staff, the Netherlands

Mr. Thomas Homberg
Corporate Vice President, Head of EADS Strategic Coordination

Dr. Edward Ifft
Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University

Ambassador Kire Ilioski
Macedonian Ambassador to NATO

Colonel Zeno Jahaj
Military Advisor to the Albanian Defense Minister

Her Excellency Dr. Ljubica Jelusic
Minister of Defense of Slovenia

General George Joulwan
Former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Deputy Minister Draško Jovanović
Montenegrin Deputy Minister of Defense for Policy

Ambassador Ulfat Kadyrov
Uzbek Ambassador to Turkey

Mr. Andreas Kaju
Advisor to the Estonian Minister of Defense

Colonel Muhterem Karataş
Secretary General, Turkish Ministry of Defense

Ambassador Dr. Mahmoud Karem
Egyptian Ambassador to Belgium and the EU
Contributors

Mr. Nadar Kharshiladze
**Head, Planning and Policy Department, Georgian Ministry of Defense**

Ambassador Kamil Khasiyev
**Azerbaijani Ambassador to NATO**

Undersecretary Stanislaw Komorowski
**Undersecretary of State for Defense Policy, Polish Ministry of Defense**

Lieutenant Colonel Robert Kosla
**Director, Defense, Central & Eastern Europe, Microsoft Corporation**

Mr. Kemal Köprüüli
**ARI Movement, Istanbul**

General Karl-Heinz Lather
**Chief of Staff, SHAPE**

Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert Lentz
**U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary (Cyber, Information, and Identity Assurance)**

His Excellency Imants Liegis
**Minister of Defense of Latvia**

Ms. Alexandra Abreu Loureiro
**Press Advisor to Portuguese Minister of Defense**

Ambassador Jüri Luik
**Estonian Permanent Representative to NATO**

Mr. Daniel Maly
**Director, Government, Central & Eastern Europe, Microsoft Corporation**

Ambassador Dr. Ahmad Masaideh
**Jordanian Ambassador to Belgium and the EU**

Ambassador Thomas Matussek
**Permanent Representative of Germany to the U.N.**

Colonel Alessandro Mauriello
**Deputy Director, Centro Altis Studi per la Difesa, Rome**

Lieutenant General Mike McDuffie
**Vice President, U.S. Public Sector Services, Microsoft**

Ambassador Robert McRae
**Canadian Permanent Representative to NATO**

His Excellency Evangelos Meimarakis
**Minister of Defense of Greece**

Professor Dr. Holger Mey
**Vice President, EADS Defense & Security Systems**

His Excellency Eimert van Middelkoop
**Minister of Defense of the Netherlands**

Mr. Terrence Morgan
**Director, Net-Centric Strategies, Global Government Solutions Group, Cisco**

Mr. Bert Oltmans
**Director, Defense, Middle East & Africa, Microsoft Corporation**
Contributors

General Ünal Önsipahioglu
General Manager, MKEK

Professor İlber Ortaylı
Director, Topkapi Palace Museum

Mr. J. David Patterson
Executive Director, National Defense Business Institute, University of Tennessee

Mr. Wayne Phillips
Director, Global Defence Solutions, Microsoft Corporation

Mr. Paulo Vizeu Pinheiro
Director for Defense Policy, Portuguese Ministry of Defense

Ing. Gen. de l’Armement Robert Ranquet
Special Advisor, Armament General Council, French Ministry of Defense

Mr. Airis Rikveilis
Chief of Cabinet of Latvian Minister of Defense

Lieutenant General Gian Piero Ristori
Italian Military Representative to NATO

Ms. Hélène de Rochefort
Secretary General, France Amérique

Vice Admiral Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte
Former Italian Military Representative to NATO

Mr. William Schmieder
Vice President International, General Dynamics

Colonel Oktay Şenyiğit
Chief of International Relations, Turkish Ministry of Defense

Director General Henri Serres
Director General for Information and Communication Systems, French Defense Ministry

His Excellency Dr. Nuno Severiano Teixeira
Minister of Defense of Portugal

Mr. Timothy Shephard
Vice President, Europe, NATO, Israel, and the Americas, Northrop Grumman ESI

His Excellency Vasil Sikharulidze
Minister of Defense of Georgia

Mr. Fred Spivey
Defense Consultant

Ms. Cynthia Sturm
Head, MITRE European Operations

Ambassador Veselin Šuković
Head of the Mission of Montenegro to NATO

Ambassador Shuhrat Sultanov
Ambassador of the Republic of Tajikistan to Turkey

Mr. David Swindle
Executive Vice President, URS Corporation, EG&G Division
General Håkan Syrén  
*Chairman of the EU Military Committee*

Ambassador Zahir Tanin  
*Afghan Ambassador to the United Nations*

Mr. Rabih Torbay  
*Senior Vice President for Programs, International Medical Corps*

Brigadier General Christine Turner  
*Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, Defence Planning ACT, Staff Element Europe*

Mr. Joop Veen  
*Director of the Directorate of Information and Communication, Ministry of Defense of the Netherlands*

Mr. Vitor Rodrigues Viana  
*Chief of Cabinet, Portuguese Minister of Defense*

Lieutenant General Pascal Vinchon  
*French Military Representative to NATO*

Mr. Alfred Volkman  
*Director for International Cooperation, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense*

Ambassador Aivars Vovers  
*Latvian Ambassador to Turkey*

His Excellency Boro Vučinić  
*Minister of Defense of Montenegro*

Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon  
*Workshop Chairman and Founder, Co-Director, Center for Strategic Decision Research*

Dr. Linton Wells  
*National Defense University*

Ambassador Bogusław W. Winid  
*Polish Permanent Representative to NATO*

Mr. Kaya Yazgan  
*Secretary General, Savunma Sanayii Imalatciları Denergi (SASAD)*

Admiral Luciano Zappata  
*Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Transformation*
Preface and Acknowledgements

Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon
Workshop Chairman and Founder

WORKSHOP PATRON AND SPECIAL ADDRESSES

Turkish Defense Minister Vecdi Gönül’s Patronage of the 26th International Workshop. At the invitation of Turkish Defense Minister Vecdi Gönül, this year’s 26th International Workshop on Global Security took place in Istanbul, Turkey on 25-28 June 2009. We are deeply grateful for Minister Gönül’s outstanding support of the workshop in his role as patron and key opening speaker. Minister Gönül first attended the workshop series in Berlin, Germany in 2004 and we would like to warmly thank him for his numerous contributions since then.

Special Addresses of the 26th International Workshop. We would also like to thank some of the principal speakers of the workshop, including Greek Defense Minister Evangelos Meimarakis, Dutch Defense Minister Eimert van Middelkoop, Portuguese Defense Minister Prof. Dr. Nuno Severiano Teixeira, and Georgian Vice Prime Minister Giorgi Baramidze. In addition, we greatly appreciate the presentations by Georgian Defense Minister Vasil Sikharulidze, Slovenian Defense Minister Dr. Ljubica Jelusic, Montenegrin Defense Minister Boro Vučinić, and Latvian Defense Minister Imants Liegis centered around the theme of “Security Challenges from the Baltic to the Black Sea.” Estonian Defense Minister Jaak Aaviksoo also gave a much-applauded closing address during the final dinner held in the courtyard of the Archaeological Museum at Topkapi Palace.

WORKSHOP VENUES

Çırağan Palace. Defense Minister Gönül hosted a workshop opening reception and dinner on 25 June at the Çırağan Palace, a beautiful Ottoman imperial palace on the shores of the Bosphorus which also briefly served as the site of the Turkish Parliament. A special performance of the Mehter military marching band, whose origins date back to the 13th Century, rounded out the evening.

Istanbul Strait Boat Cruise and Archaeological Museum at Topkapi Palace. On the evening of 26 June, workshop participants enjoyed a reception and dinner held aboard a boat cruising the Bosphorus strait, which separates the European and Asian parts of Istanbul, while on 27 June a closing reception and dinner took place at the Archaeological Museum in Topkapi Palace. It also included a private visit of the museum’s extensive collections of Turkish, Hellenistic, and Roman artifacts. Some of the museum’s most famous pieces include the Alexander Sarcophagus, adorned with carvings of Alexander the Great, and the Treaty of Kadesh, the world’s oldest peace treaty which was signed in 1258 BC between the Egyptian Pharaoh Ramses II and the Hittite King Hattusilis III.

Museum of Turkish and Islamic Art, Post-Workshop Events, and Ceylan Intercontinental Hotel. For early arriving participants, there was a reception and private visit on 24 June at the Museum of Turkish and Islamic Art, which is housed in the former palace of Ibrahim Pasha, the Grand Vizir of Sultan Suleyman the Magnificent, and directly overlooks the Blue Mosque and ancient Roman hippodrome. The museum possesses an important collection of ancient carpets, tiles, and calligraphy. Those staying on after the workshop were able to take advantage of a post-workshop visit on 28 June to Topkapi Palace, the primary residence of the Ottoman sultans from 1465-1856. Its collections include the famous Topkapi dagger and Spoonmaker’s Diamond as well as the cloak and sword of the prophet Mohammed. Finally, we would like to thank the Ceylan Intercontinental Hotel, where all of the workshop sessions took place, for their excellent assistance.

PRINCIPAL SPONSORS

We would like to gratefully acknowledge the principal sponsors of the 26th International Workshop:

- The Turkish Ministry of Defense, with the patronage of Defense Minister Vecdi Gönül
- The United States Department of Defense (Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration; Office of the Director of Net Assessment in
the Office of the Secretary of Defense; Defense Threat Reduction Agency)

- Microsoft Corporation
- Northrop Grumman Corporation
- Center for Strategic Decision Research, which instituted the workshop series and has presented workshops annually for 26 years.

Turkish Defense Ministry Organizing Committee. The contributions of the Turkish Defense Ministry, which not only provided financial support but also allocated a large team to work on the logistical arrangements, were tremendous. We would like to especially thank Rear Admiral Nadir Hakan Eraydin, Chief of Plans and Policy, who was the point of contact for our collaboration. In addition, Colonel Muhterem Karatas and Colonel Oktay Şenyiğit played major roles in the organization, and Major Soydan Görgülü also put in long hours in the months leading up to the conference to arrange many of the practical details.

Other members of the Turkish Defense Ministry involved in the planning include Major Hamdi Abanoz, Major İmdat Çeçeli, Master Sergeant Ali Acar, and Master Sergeant Hakan Naroglu. Alpay Danişman—a Bilateral Relations Specialist—as well as Seda Özel Gürkan, Elçin Şanlı, Taceddin Erbaş, and Perihan Dinç Meriç—all Political Affairs Specialists—worked especially hard on the Çırağan Palace opening dinner and on the spouses’ program. We also appreciate the efforts of Perihan Atalay and Levent Gümişoğlu, who served as interpreters, as well as Zeynep Güzelsan, Fatih Subaşı, and Erol Mercan, who was especially helpful in administering the budget.

Turkish speakers and participants. Turkey also contributed a number of important workshop participants, including Major General Mehmet Çetin, Head of the International Security and Foreign Relations Division at the Turkish General Staff; Lieutenant General Mehmet Veyisi Ağar, the Turkish Military Representative to NATO; Hikmet Çetin, a former Foreign Minister; Colonel Erdal Dodurga and Colonel Adil Ayaz from the Defense Ministry. We would also like to thank Professor İlber Ortaylı, Director of the Topkapı Palace Museum, for his wonderful welcoming toast on Turkey’s diverse cultural history at the Çırağan Palace opening dinner. In addition, we were delighted to have representatives of Turkish industry, including Akin Duman, General Manager of TEL; Fuat Akçayöz, Group President of ASELSAN; General Ünal Önsipahıoğlu, General Manager of MKEK; and Kaya Yazgan, Secretary General of SASAD.

Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics). Alfred Volkman, Director for International Cooperation in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for AT&L, has been a sponsor of the workshop for close to 10 years now as well as a key advisor. He chaired an outstanding panel on promoting international cooperation in Afghanistan this year. We also appreciate the many efforts of Roger Golden, Colonel Mark Price, and Rita Bidlack in support of the workshop over the years.

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Networks and Information Integration). We are grateful for the support of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for NII, who was represented by Robert Lentz, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber, Information, and Identity Assurance, a longtime contributor to the workshop. We also appreciate the participation and involvement of former Assistant Secretary of Defense for NII John Grimes. Their efforts have highlighted the importance of network-centric operations in the security arena and discussions on these topics have become an important centerpiece of the workshop series.

Office of the Director of Net Assessment. Andrew Marshall, Director of Net Assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, has sponsored the workshop series from the time it was first founded 26 years ago. We are extremely grateful for his many years of loyal support, as well as for the important advisory role which he has played in the evolution of the workshop series. In addition, Rebecca Bash has overseen the administration of the project for many years and we are delighted that she was able to attend the workshop again this year for the second time.

Defense Threat Reduction Agency. DTRA has been a sponsor of the workshop for some 25 years, dating back to the time when they were known as the Defense Nuclear Agency. Major General Randy E. Manner, Deputy Director of the agency, gave us valuable support and planning advice. We also appreciate the hard work of Colonel Bob Dickey, Senior Strategic Planner-Operations Enterprise, who has coordinated DTRA’s participation as well as attended the workshop for many years now.

Microsoft Corporation. Microsoft was a principal sponsor for the fourth time. We appreciate the many efforts of Tim Blochel, Managing Director, Worldwide Public Safety & National Security, on behalf of the workshop as well as his important address on cyber strategies for military operations. We were also delighted to welcome back General Mike McDuffie, Vice President, U.S. Public Sector Services; Daniel Maly, Director, Government, Central & Eastern Europe; Wayne Phillips, Director, Global Defence Solutions, as well as to have the participation of Bert Oltmans, Director, Defense, Middle East & Africa and Colonel Robert Kosla, Director, Defense, Central & Eastern Europe.
Northrop Grumman. Northrop Grumman was a principal sponsor for the sixth time this year and has been a sponsor for some 15 years in all. We appreciate the participation of Northrop Grumman executives William Ennis, Director, International Business Development; James Heath, President, Electronic Systems International; Timothy Shephard, Vice President, Europe, NATO, Israel & the Americas, ESI, as well as their advice. They also played a major role in developing an excellent panel on NATO transformation and in expanding the number of senior military participants.

MAJOR SPONSORS

Lockheed Martin Corporation. We would also like to thank Lockheed Martin for its many years of sponsorship. Dr. Scott Harris, President, Continental Europe, has been a long-term contributor to the workshop, both as a speaker and as a participant. We appreciate his excellent presentation discussing defense industry perspectives on technology and consolidation this year.

European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company. EADS has been a supporter of the workshop for many years. Thomas Homberg, Corporate Vice President, Head of Strategic Coordination; Dr. Holger Mey, Vice President, Defense & Security Systems; and Admiral Jean Bettermier, Senior Advisor to the CEO, were all able to attend again this year. We appreciate their advice in the workshop planning process, and would also like to thank Dr. Stefan Zoller for his long interest and support.

Cisco. We are very happy that Cisco was able to become a sponsor of the workshop for the first time this year. The company was represented by Terrence C. Morgan, who is Director, Net-Centric Strategies of the Global Government Solutions Group at Cisco as well as Chairman of the Executive Council of the Network Centric Operations Industry Consortium.

Thales. Thales has also been a long-term supporter. We would like to thank Edgar Buckley, Senior Vice President, for his workshop address and participation. He is also a former NATO Assistant Secretary General and is therefore able to bring both political and business perspectives to the discussions.

URS Corporation, EG&G Division. URS Corporation’s EG&G Division was a sponsor of the workshop for the first time this year. We were delighted to have the participation of David Swindle, Executive Vice President, EG&G Division.

MITRE Corporation. We would like to thank MITRE for its sponsorship of the workshop over the past two decades. Raymond Haller, Senior Vice President, C2C, has attended for a number of years now, and we also appreciate the participation of Cynthia Sturm, Head of European Operations, this year.

General Dynamics. We are grateful for the continued sponsorship and participation of General Dynamics, which was represented once again by William Schmieder, Vice President, International Business Development, and General George Joulwan, former Supreme Allied Commander Europe. While at NATO, General Joulwan served as the Honorary General Chairman of the workshop from 1994-1997 and has remained a pillar of the conference since then.

University of Tennessee, National Defense Business Institute. The University of Tennessee has become a sponsor for the first time this year and was represented by J. David Patterson, Executive Director, National Defense Business Institute.

PATRONS, ADVISORS, AND PARTICIPANTS

Workshop Patrons, Honorary Chairmen, and Keynote Speakers. We greatly appreciate the support of our past and present workshop patrons and general chairmen:

- His Excellency Ignazio La Russa, Minister of Defense of Italy (Workshop Patron, Keynote Speaker, 2008)
- His Excellency Hervé Morin, Minister of Defense of France (Workshop Patron, 2007)
- His Excellency Franz Josef Jung, Minister of Defense of Germany (Workshop Patron, Keynote Speaker, 2006)
- His Excellency Peter Struck, Minister of Defense of Germany (Keynote Speaker, 2004)
- His Excellency Rudolf Scharping, Minister of Defense of Germany (Workshop Patron, Keynote Speaker, 2002, 2000)
- His Excellency Jan Trojborg, Minister of Defense of Denmark (Workshop Patron, 2001)
- His Excellency Arpád Gúncz, President of Hungary (Workshop Patron, Keynote Speaker, 1999)
- His Excellency Dr. Werner Fasslabend, Minister of Defense of Austria (Workshop Patron, Keynote Speaker, 1998)
- His Excellency Václav Havel, President of the Czech Republic (Workshop Patron, 1997; Keynote Speaker, 1997, 1996)
- His Excellency Aleksander Kwasniowski, President of Poland (Workshop Patron, 1996; Keynote Speaker, 2002, 2000,

His Excellency Volker Rühe, Minister of Defense of Germany (Workshop Patron, 1995)
Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola, Chairman of NATO Milit. Committee (Honorary Chairman, Keynote Speaker, 2008)
General Vincenzo Camporini, Chief of General Staff of Italy (Honorary Chairman, Keynote Speaker, 2008)
General Henri Bentégeat, Chair of EU Military Committee, former Chief of General Staff of France (Keynote, 2007)
General John Shalikashvili, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (Keynote Speaker, 1993)

Advisory Board. Our Board of Advisors, which has provided excellent input in helping to develop the workshop agenda over the years, includes:

His Excellency Valdas Adamkus, former President of Lithuania
Ing. Giovanni Bertolone, CEO, Alenia Aeronautica S.p.A.
Admiral Jean Bettemier, Senior Advisor to the CEO, EADS
Mr. Tim Bloechl, Managing Director, Worldwide Public Safety and National Security, Microsoft
Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola, Chairman of NATO Military Committee, Former Italian Chief of Staff
His Excellency Mikulas Dzurinda, Former Prime Minister of Slovakia
Sir Stewart Eldon KCMG OBE, United Kingdom Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council
The Honorable Gordon England, Former United States Deputy Secretary of Defense
His Excellency Dr. Werner Faslabend, Former Minister of Defense of Austria
His Excellency Vecdi Gönül, Defense Minister of Turkey
General George A. Joulwan (Ret.), Former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Ambassador Mahmoud Karem, Egyptian Ambassador to the EU
Ambassador Jaromir Novotny, Ambassador of the Czech Republic to Japan
Ambassador Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, Secretary General, OSCE
Dr. Andrey Piontkovskiy, Director, Strategic Studies Center, Moscow
Ing. Général Robert Ranquet, Special Advisor, Armament General Council
Vice Admiral Sanfelice di Monteforte, Former Italian Military Representative to NATO
His Excellency Borys Tarasyuk, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine
His Excellency Dr. Alexandr Vondra, Deputy Prime Minister of the Czech Republic
Ing. Dr. Giorgio Zappa, COO of Finmeccanica and Chairman, Alenia Aeronautica

Contributors of the 26th International Workshop. The workshop brought together contributors from some 30 countries and organizations, including representatives from the U.N., NATO, EU, and Mediterranean Dialogue:

His Excellency Jaak Aaviksoo, Estonian Minister of Defense
Ambassador Hassan Abouyoub, Ambassador-at-Large of the Kingdom of Morocco
René S. Acosta, President & CEO, Global Impact
Ambassador Nabeela Al-Mulla, Ambassador of Kuwait to Belgium and the EU
His Excellency Giorgi Baramidze, Vice Prime Minister of Georgia
Rear Admiral Gerald R. Beaman, Deputy Chief of Staff Operations, Allied Joint Force Command Naples
Tim Bloechl, Managing Director, Worldwide Public Safety & National Security, Microsoft Corporation
Dr. Edgar Buckley, Senior Vice President, Thales
General Vincenzo Camporini, Chief of General Staff of Italy
Ambassador Vladimir Chizhov, Russian Ambassador to the EU
Julius Coles, President and CEO, AFRICARE
Ambassador Jean-Jacques de Dardel, Swiss Ambassador to Belgium and to NATO
Elaine Dezenski, Managing Director, INTERPOL’s Global Security Initiative for the 21st Century
Ambassador Dumitru Sorin Ducaru, Romanian Permanent Representative to NATO
Dr. Shekhar Dutt, Indian Deputy National Security Advisor
Sir Stewart Eldon, KCMG OBE, British Ambassador to NATO
Assistant Secretary General Peter Flory, NATO Assistant General for Defense Investment
His Excellency Vecdi Gönül, Minister of Defense of Turkey
The Honorable John Grimes, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense
Ambassador Abdullah Hussain Haroon, Pakistani Ambassador to the United Nations
Dr. Scott Harris, President, Continental Europe, Lockheed Martin
Thomas Homberg, Corporate Vice President, Head of EADS Strategic Coordination
Her Excellency Dr. Ljubicja Jelusic, Minister of Defense of Slovenia
General George Joulwan, Former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Ambassador Dr. Mahmoud Karem, Egyptian Ambassador to Belgium and the EU
General Karl-Heinz Lather, Chief of Staff, SHAPE
Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert Lentz, U.S. Dep. Assistant Secretary (Cyber, Information, and Identity Assurance)
His Excellency Imants Liegis, Minister of Defense of Latvia
Ambassador Dr. Ahmad Masadeh, Jordanian Ambassador to Belgium and the EU
Ambassador Robert McRae, Canadian Permanent Representative to NATO
His Excellency Evangelos Meimarakis, Minister of Defense of Greece
His Excellency Eimert van Middelkoop, Minister of Defense of the Netherlands
Terrence Morgan, Director, Net-Centric Strategies, Global Government Solutions Group, Cisco
Professor İlber Ortaylı, Director, Topkapi Palace Museum
J. David Patterson, Executive Director, National Defense Business Institute, University of Tennessee
Vice Admiral Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte, Former Italian Military Representative to NATO
Director General Henri Serres, Director General for Information and Comm. Systems, French Defense Ministry
His Excellency Dr. Nuno Severiano Téixeira, Minister of Defense of Portugal
Timothy Shephard, Vice President, Europe, NATO, Israel and the Americas, Northrop Grumman ESI
His Excellency Vasil Sikharulidze, Minister of Defense of Georgia
Ambassador Zahir Tanin, Afghan Ambassador to the United Nations
Rabih Torbay, Senior Vice President for Programs, International Medical Corps
Lieutenant General Pascal Vinchon, French Military Representative to NATO
Alfred Volkman, Director for International Cooperation, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
His Excellency Boro Vučinić, Minister of Defense of Montenegro
Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon, Workshop Chairman and Founder; Co-Director, Center for Strategic Decision Research
Dr. Linton Wells, National Defense University
Ambassador Boguslaw W. Winid, Polish Permanent Representative to NATO
Admiral Luciano Zappata, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Transformation

CSDR TEAM

Workshop International Staff. The Center for Strategic Decision Research (CSDR) workshop staff included Dr. Ania Garlitski, M.D., a cardiologist and Assistant Professor at Tufts-New England Medical Center, who started working with us more than 10 years ago when she was a student at Stanford and was responsible for coordinating many of the evening social events: Grace Wong, another Stanford graduate now working for CNN, who handled the greeting of VIPs; and Pinar Atayol, a graduate of Galatasaray University in Istanbul, who was in charge of negotiations with suppliers. Jean Lee, a graphic designer who also started working with CSDR soon after her Stanford graduation, was responsible for all of the workshop’s printing, graphics, and photography, including the cover design of this book. We also appreciate the dedicated work of Eugene Whitlock, J.D., a graduate of Stanford University and University of Michigan Law School, who was in charge of billing and contributed several photos in these proceedings. Caroline Baylon, an economics graduate of Stanford University, was the overall director of the workshop staff. Caroline has led the staff for the last five years and has contributed as a staff member for more than 13 years. CSDR Co-Director Anne D. Baylon, a graduate of the University of Paris Law School and a Master degree graduate of Stanford University, oversaw the coordination of the workshop as a whole.

Workshop Publications. Anne was also responsible for the editing of these Proceedings. As Head of Publications, Anne coordinated the editing process and the obtaining of publication approvals with the chapter authors. She gratefully acknowledges the assistance and contributions of Carol Whiteley and Caroline Baylon, who transcribed and copy edited a number of the chapters.
In Istanbul, Turkey, the 26th International Workshop on Global Security brought together defense ministers, diplomats, and other senior leaders from government, industry and academia from more than 30 countries, the U.N., the EU, NATO, and other international organizations. They discussed the security challenges unleashed by globalization in the context of the current financial crises as well as the ongoing regional crises in the Balkans and Black Sea Region, in the Middle East, and in Afghanistan and Pakistan. From the threats of religious extremists, security concerns have steadily broadened to include a host of new challenges ranging from climate change and competition for resources to cyber-war.

Globalization brings new security threats

In his opening address to the 26th International Workshop on Global Security in Istanbul, Turkish Defense Minister Vecdi Gönül emphasized that all nations now recognize the importance of globalization as a truly vital “…means of opening up economies, lifting people out of poverty, and promoting democratic values.” Yet, though it brings important benefits, globalization also has some unpleasant side effects—including a seemingly endless series of new security challenges. Although there is a long and bloody history of terrorist attacks by religious extremists and other groups, it seems certain that globalization has made it easier for Al-Qaeda to reach far beyond Afghanistan’s borders, attacking the Pentagon and New York’s Twin Towers on 11 September 2001 and mounting the London, Istanbul, Madrid, and other attacks that followed.

Globalization even brings new threats—such as the global financial crisis and cyber attacks against Estonia, Georgia, and a growing list of other countries—that were not anticipated until quite recently. According to Minister Gönül, these new concerns include:

• Climate change, which “will put many of our key resources, like food, water, and land, under considerable strain”;
• Competition for energy and natural resources; and
• Information Technology—a powerful engine for growth that, nonetheless, will “make our societies more vulnerable to cyber attacks.”

Minister Gönül’s Hellenic counterpart, Minister Evangelos Meimarakis, warns of exactly the same dangers while also emphasizing the additional risks of nuclear arms proliferation, piracy, and financially driven immigration (an especially grave problem for Greece). He says that the “…classical concept of threat is now obsolete” and has been largely replaced by “the new concept of the asymmetric threat.” Latvian Defense Minister Imants Liegis agrees that these new challenges of globalization “…have become the bigger threats to global security in today’s age.” Jordan’s EU Ambassador, Dr. Ahmad Masâdeh, points out yet more threats:

…regional conflicts,…failed states, organized crime,…degradation of the environment,…world food security, securing sustainable and social development, economic growth, and maintaining successful intercultural dialogue at the grass-roots level.

Dr. Masâdeh’s views may be especially important since they reflect the perspective of his country, at the center of a region of hot spots.

Though many of these threats could not have been anticipated, a number of globalization’s risks were predicted decades ago, but they were overshadowed by the seemingly graver dangers of the Cold War and, later on, by the international euphoria and hopes for a more peaceful and prosperous future that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall. NATO’s former Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General George Joulwan, summarized this period of transition from the Cold War, with its emphasis on deterring a massive Soviet attack across Germany, to a post-Cold War period that has been “anything but peaceful.” As he points out, the world was not prepared for the “atrocities, tribal warfare, and ethnic cleansing” that
arrived instead of the peace that was hoped for, and that the costs of not being ready for this new situation have been steep:

In the past we were concerned about deterring a multi-echelon Soviet attack in the famous Fulda Gap of Germany. We arrayed ships, tanks, and planes to make it difficult for the Soviets to succeed in an offensive move against NATO. Our primary objective was deterrence, but we were prepared to fight and win if deterrence failed. And deterrence worked. Twenty years ago the Berlin Wall and Iron Curtain were torn down, Germany was reunited, and the Soviet Communist Empire was no more. However, the post-Cold War period has been anything but peaceful. Long-simmering ethnic and religious strife came into full bloom. Atrocities, tribal warfare, and ethnic cleansing placed millions of innocent men, women, and children at risk. The international community was slow to respond to these new threats, and, when it did, it lacked the doctrine, force structure, and political will to do so effectively.

The global financial crisis as security threat. The emergence of the global financial crisis, from which many countries are only beginning to recover, was surprising in its scale, the number of countries affected, and its harsh impact on tens of millions who lost jobs, homes, and/or a large part of their savings as a result. Even pension plans and municipalities, which are typically restricted by law to investments in only the most conservative securities, suffered from investments that turned out to have been outrageously risky, marketed, in many cases, by some of the largest and most prestigious financial institutions. Some smaller countries such as Iceland and Ireland were economically devastated, and even wealthy Dubai has encountered severe financial problems.

Unfortunately, many of the perverse incentives and structural factors that led to the current crisis are still in place, while proposed reforms appear to be relatively limited in scope. Consequently, it appears to be only a matter of time before another global crisis occurs. Minister Meimarakis warns:

...social conditions, the terms of international controversies and conditions for cooperation, as well as the ongoing global multi-level financial, credit, and funding economic crisis have come upon us like an avalanche. The international financial crisis that we know today, which admittedly is the greatest global crisis of the last 80 years, not only reflects the actual dimensions of the situation we are experiencing in the economy, but also in our society and civilization as well. Indeed, the ongoing international financial crisis is a parameter that feeds instability, which consequently affects global security.

Minister Meimarakis shares this assessment with other leaders, including Portugal’s Defense Minister, Dr. Nuno Severiano Teixeira, and Dutch Defense Minister Eimert van Middelkoop. According to Minister Severiano Teixeira, this economic crisis “…began by shaking markets and financial institutions” and in a short period of time created “…visible pockets of social instability and a breakdown in confidence.” Moreover, he says, the effects will be felt broadly and “…particularly in the more vulnerable regions of the world.” According to Minister van Middelkoop, this means that “current financial and economic circumstances” add to the importance of prudent budgeting, and it is more important than ever to direct spending to the “highest priorities.” Britain’s Ambassador to NATO, Stewart Eldon, points out an additional factor: The financial crisis reduces the resources available to deal with other more traditional security challenges, creating the need for “…balance between our level of ambition and the resources available to fulfill it at a time of global economic difficulty.”

Jordan’s Ambassador Mas‘ādeh offers a perspective on the global financial crisis from the Middle East, where this crisis is currently at “the top of the list.” Although various countries in the Arab world are affected in different ways, the crisis shows the need for a “new economic world order” in order to bring more accountability, increased attention to the “notion of good corporate citizenship,” and, especially, the “implementation of a developmental factor that includes the needs…of developing countries and markets.”

Fighting poverty and improving governance. Ambassador Mas‘ādeh also warns that the above changes are necessary to prevent radicalization, which is likely to grow out of poverty if the appropriate steps are not taken. He states:

The situation in the Middle East clearly demonstrates how radicalization is close to poverty and thus how security and economic growth are interlinked. If poverty is not tackled in an exemplary manner, radicalization will always occur. That is why the developmental factor is of utmost importance. Cooperation between the north and the south to create a more stable and hospitable economic environment in the south will gradually eradicate milieus where radicalization and desperation breed.

According to Minister van Middelkoop, security threats are especially dangerous in “failed and fragile states.” For this reason, the Dutch government’s policy favors “…fighting poverty and improving governance worldwide.” According to Minister van Middelkoop:

As Kofi Annan pointed out, unless we assume our responsibility toward fragile states, the world cannot enjoy peace and prosperity. Continued involvement in these states will be necessary in many respects. But prolonged involvement does not imply continued warfare. We must be ready and able to intervene when necessary, but intervention alone is often not enough. Stabilization and reconstruction are just as important and can pose even greater
challenges. We therefore must also invest in conflict prevention and reconstruction. We need our armed forces to stabilize failed states, but also to build and strengthen security institutions. Investing in security sector reform will therefore help to prevent conflicts as well as to end them. In short, to be effective we need the integrated deployment of all resources at our disposal.

The dangers of radicalism. Another unfortunate consequence of globalization is the increased spread and influence of religious radicalism. According to Minister Gönül:

...globalization is also, unfortunately, a vehicle for importing radicalism and the techniques of terrorism into our societies. It has also facilitated the free flow of material, including the most dangerous ones, supporting nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs. For example, New York, Madrid, London, and Istanbul have all been the target of terrorist attacks. Instability in Iraq and Afghanistan affects all of us, no matter how near or far we are geographically. Iran's nuclear intentions constitute another problem that needs intensified diplomatic efforts for a solution.

As to the Israel-Palestine conflict, Morocco’s Ambassador Hassan Abouyoub advocates so-called soft approaches, including Arab state initiatives to bring the two Palestinian factions together as well as possible initiatives by the U.S. (President Obama’s Cairo speech raised hopes and expectations), the EU, perhaps the Union for the Mediterranean, and even Russia. Ambassador Abouyoub feels that soft approaches are likely to be far more effective than military means and that, in reality, there are “…limits on any hard security policy device option or conception.” According to Ambassador Abouyoub, it is because of Israel’s militaristic approach that Israel has not succeeded in “accomplishing its strategic aims” in the region. Moreover, he believes that “even the Israeli people are losing confidence in the superiority of the Israeli military system and technology.”

Dangers are also arising from conservative Muslim teachings and Israel’s treatment of Palestinians. A serious concern continues to be posed by very conservative Muslim teachings that are exported by Gulf State countries, especially Saudi Arabia, and that seemingly pass through Pakistan—very powerful actors are exporting very, very conservative views into the region. A second, equally grave, problem is Israel’s treatment of Palestinians, which is bitterly resented by Muslims all over the world. This “cocktail” of spreading conservative beliefs and the perceived mistreatment of the Palestinian people can result in disaster. Is it possible for Afghanistan to be reconstructed successfully as long as this dangerous mix persists?

The Balkans and the Black Sea Region

Given the extreme dangers of radicalism, there is a natural tendency to focus security efforts on the Middle East, Afghanistan, or other areas where the menace of radicalism appears the greatest. Nonetheless, the Balkans and the Black Sea offer valuable lessons. In particular, violent conflicts in the western Balkans arising from the breakup of Yugoslavia testify to the risks of allowing crises to spin out of control—timely interventions by the international community might have prevented much destruction, saved lives, and permitted healthier societies and more prosperous economies to emerge. Slovenia’s Defense Minister, Dr. Ljubica Jelusic, warns that many in the region do not yet “enjoy full security” and wisely points out several consequences of ignoring the situation in the Balkans:

Losing interest in the Balkans in the past has proved disastrous for the stability of the region. It happened at the beginning of 1990 and in 1991, when the international community was not very aware of what was going on in the Balkans. There were big changes happening there, but the attention of the international community was diverted elsewhere...Some larger issues were taking place in the eastern part of Europe...While [the Balkans were] being overlooked in the shadow of bigger events, war began. The disintegration of Yugoslavia came about, and we are still suffering the effects of the upheaval. In the western Balkans, especially in countries that were formed out of the former Yugoslavia, we still cannot say that we enjoy full security.

Kosovo is one of the region’s areas that has suffered greatly. Of course, there is undeniable progress in that the country has achieved a certain level of stability, as clearly demonstrated by NATO’s plans to draw down its forces from 16,000 to only 2,500 over the next couple of years. Yet, life in Kosovo is far from acceptable to those who must live there. Rear Admiral Gerald Beaman of Allied Joint Force Command Naples, which has responsibility for the area, describes the situation as follows:

...economic stability and corruption are probably the two largest threats throughout the area...If we want to identify the main threats to stability and/or security, we could list them in three areas: (1) political—the political parties, in Kosovo in particular, form along clan lines, each one striving for primacy through rhetoric and not through physical means; (2) religious culture, which forms along ethnic lines; and (3) economics, which is the most likely cause of instability in not only Kosovo but the entire Balkans region.
Kosovo is the poorest country in Europe, with a 58% unemployment rate. Thirty percent of its Gross Domestic Product is generated by remittances from the diaspora. The country has an inflation rate of 13% and lacks investment in infrastructure—the people of Kosovo, especially in terms of energy, live with 1950s and 1960s technology. The high unemployment rate and instability in the economy pose a large threat, and generate organized crime, smuggling, and corruption. So economic factors have a direct impact on other things as well.

Fortunately, some countries in the region are prospering. According to Montenegrin Defense Minister Boro Vučinić, Montenegro has done better than some countries in the western Balkans and “is much more stable today.” He says that, “Montenegro has achieved great economic growth. The 2008 state budget…had a surplus, and, for a short period of time, we have been one of the fastest-growing tourist economies in the world.” Moreover, Minister Vučinić considers that the presence of NATO contributes to the “the permanent stabilization of the western Balkans area.”

As an example of NATO’s potential importance in the broader region, including the Black Sea, Latvian Defense Minister Imants Liegis describes the concerns of his countrymen over the 2008 conflict between Georgia and its larger neighbor, Russia. According to Minister Liegis, if Russia is able to occupy Georgian territory, many of his countrymen are concerned that there may be risk for his country as well—especially since Latvia’s Russian population is not insignificant. He notes:

...Latvia witnessed our joint neighbor Russia actually militarily intervening for the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union on the sovereign territory of a neighboring country. And one of the pretenses that was used for this intervention on the Russian side was to protect their nationals living in Georgia. For us, this was a very worrying lesson...and it made our membership in the Alliance even more relevant. It certainly set among the Latvian population alarm bells ringing and recalled memories of how we had been taken over by the Soviet Union in 1940 as a result of the Hitler-Stalin pact.

Georgian Defense Minister Vasil Sikharulidze describes his country’s situation following the conflict with Russia, which resulted in Russian troops remaining in Georgian territories:

Today, the security situation in Georgia is tense. Russian armed forces occupy the Georgian territories of Abkhazia, the Tskhinvali region, the Akhalgori district, and the village of Perevi. Russian occupation forces deny the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) access to the occupied territories...Russia also vetoed the renewal of the U.N. Observer Mission in Georgia and the OSCE mission in Georgia.

Nonetheless, Georgia has the potential to make enormous contributions to the “energy security of the entire European continent,” as Minister Sikharulidze observes:

...we now have the prospect of linking the Caspian Sea, the Eurasian heartland, Europe, and the North Atlantic in a single 21st-century zone of prosperity and democracy...On the eastern shore of the Black Sea, Georgia is part of Europe and a gateway to and from Central Asia. It is a vital conduit for energy supplies from the Caspian Sea and from potential Central Asian suppliers beyond.

That corridor is usually referred to in the context of energy, particularly the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and South Caucasus natural-gas pipelines. However, these energy conduits form the critical mass required to promote and sustain a broad east-west commercial corridor. With commerce comes people, so this east-west corridor will also become a pathway for ideas, which is perhaps the most important prospect. Also, the strengthening and developing of this energy corridor will greatly contribute to the energy security of the entire European continent. In the immediate term, this corridor is also vital as an alternative supply route to Afghanistan. All at once, a South Caucasus route offers another alternative and a chance for independent NATO diplomacy with the Central Asian countries.

**Afghanistan**

At the Istanbul workshop, the understanding of defense ministers; ambassadors; flag and general officers; officials of NATO, the EU, the U.N., and other international organizations; and industry leaders seemed unanimous: Afghanistan is a place where the U.S., its NATO allies, and the supporting international community has to succeed. The very destiny of the Alliance and perhaps even future global security depend on it. What a difference a few months make! It is now clear that the situation in Afghanistan is serious and that, despite successes in some areas, the Allies are not winning. Worse yet, as Estonian Defense Minister Jaak Aaviksoo points out, “...some of the countries in the international alliance...are showing increasing Afghan fatigue, and this poses a great challenge for all of us.”

At the Istanbul workshop, concerns already existed regarding the gravity of the conflict in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s Ambassador to the U.N., Abdullah Haroon, gave perhaps the sternest warning:

You are dealing with an implacable foe who has a world design. Unfortunately, history has shown that when a civilization is threatened, it is often by forces [like the Taliban] which are diminished or that do not have the wherewithal and the finances to sustain such an attack on a civilization. If you read the annals of Rome, Greece, or other civilizations, this is what happens every time. So I warn you: Do not take this as a limited or a regional
move. This is a move for the world, no matter how absurd it might seem to all of you living in the west.

Given the importance of success in Afghanistan, the country’s Ambassador to the United Nations, Dr. Zahir Tanin, emphasized that it would be necessary to acquire a better “…understanding of the situation in Afghanistan in order to improve our actions.” According to Ambassador Tanin:

I believe we need to cultivate two understandings: one, an understanding that rejects defeatist assumptions about the politics of Afghanistan; and, two, an understanding that better identifies the enemy so that we can defeat it. Far too often, I am asked about the ‘likelihood’ or the ‘possibility’ of building a successful state and political culture in Afghanistan. To understand my country’s history is to recognize that there is no question about a possibility—there is only the actuality of a stable, democratic state in our country’s history.

In his wrap-up remarks, SHAPE’s Chief of Staff, General Karl-Heinz Lather, related an anecdote—very much in line with Ambassador Tanin’s recommendations—that highlights important dimensions of the situation:

Very recently, I was in Kambu and had a chance to talk to two elders: one Pashtun and one Uzbek. And I put this question to them: ‘Our intelligence has told us that it is mostly local people who fight themselves and fight us. Well, these are your children, these are your sons. What can you do to talk to them, and to stop them?’ They each gave their own arguments as to why this is not feasible and were very adamant about it. One response was, ‘There is too much corruption in our country.’ The other was, ‘There is no real governance in our country. We do not see any effects trickling down from the center of government to our province, to our district, to our village, or to our city. We do not see investment, so the international money does not come here.’ And the result of that is, there is no work for the youngsters.

There only need to be a few extremist Taliban coming from either Pakistan or the south of the country, and then these youths become inflamed. They want to have something meaningful to do, or at least something that they think is meaningful. This is a vicious cycle. And on top of all that, in that particular province the governor does not use the instrument of the Sharia, which is part of the Afghan culture, to resolve problems on a local level. So they are disappointed about that as well.

Where are the U.S., NATO, and their allies headed in Afghanistan?

At the end of August, concern escalated dramatically following the leaking of a confidential report by General Stanley McChrystal, commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan and ISAF (International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan). In this report, General McChrystal told NATO and the U.S. Secretary of Defense that “to succeed in Afghanistan” he needs approval for a “new strategy”—with an increased focus on reconstructing and rebuilding the country—and as many as 40,000 additional troops. According to General McChrystal’s report:

The situation in Afghanistan is serious; neither success nor failure can be taken for granted. Although considerable effort and sacrifice have resulted in some progress, many indicators suggest the overall situation is deteriorating. We face not only a resilient and growing insurgency; there is also a crisis of confidence among Afghans—in both their government and the international community—that undermines our credibility and emboldens the insurgents.

With U.S. public support for the war in Afghanistan hovering slightly under 50%, and with considerable political opposition to the war within other countries, there was immediate speculation that President Obama was deciding between General McChrystal’s recommended military-civilian surge, withdrawal from Afghanistan, and a completely different approach.

One much-publicized option was U.S. Vice President Joe Biden’s plan to compensate for large troop reductions in Afghanistan by focusing on fighting Al-Qaeda (especially in Pakistan). Among the many other suggestions were those of former President Jimmy Carter’s National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, who recommended a significant reduction in troops provided the U.S. and the international community were willing to commit to a large-scale rebuilding of the country to demonstrate international concern for the well-being of the Afghan people.

In an address to Congressional leaders in early October, President Obama ruled out the possibility of a large-scale withdrawal, and he specifically excluded Vice President Biden’s proposal. Until the eve of his West Point address on 1 December, it was not certain that President Obama would decide in favor of the proposed “surge.” We now know that at least 30,000 additional troops are committed to Afghanistan—at least until 2011, when their withdrawal is projected to begin. It also seems that there will be some kind of political-military surge, with an emphasis on training Afghan troops, fighting corruption in the government at all levels, and rebuilding the country.

As to support from NATO and other sources, it seems nearly certain that the Allies will not provide as much support as the U.S. is requesting. In fact, they will probably not offer a great deal more than 5,000 additional troops. So, it is likely...
that the burden of increasing troop levels will fall mainly on the United States.

Whatever happens, we can assume that there will be an intensive push to train more Afghan police and military forces as replacements for U.S. and allied troops, and there may even be a renewed effort to tackle corruption. Yet, success may be limited by the almost unprecedented difficulty of the task, the reality that the Afghan government does not actually control the whole country, and other factors. One extremely discouraging factor is President Karzai’s contested election. He is now dogged by questions as to the legitimacy of his election, including allegations of fraud and charges of vote buying. Despite his post-elections promises to clean up his government, his progress so far is not encouraging.

Is reconstruction a practical strategy for Afghanistan?

According to military doctrine, success in Afghanistan requires the allocation of 80% of the resources to reconstruction, rebuilding, and related areas. While the actual level is unknown, it surely falls far below 80%, and the plans that were recently announced to achieve that end do not seem adequate to do so.

Is the doctrine, then, simply impractical—or even impossible—to implement? The obvious question is, “Where will the required reconstruction resources—the 80%—come from?” While the military and the defense industry do have powerful lobbying forces in many countries that help assure support from troop levels and weapons acquisitions, there are relatively few influential lobbying forces for reconstruction and development. Moreover, since reconstruction funds are normally spent in remote parts of the world—far from Europe, the United States, or other potential donors—they would be spent neither in the home district of a Member of Parliament nor in a congressman’s backyard nor in the state of a senator, making such funding unattractive to most. Under these circumstances, how would it be possible to generate the necessary political will to support the goal?

Even if the necessary funding can be found, the cost of delivering the resources is another concern. Only 25% of allocated resources for rebuilding and reconstruction are typically spent in Afghanistan; in some cases, the figure may be as low as 10%. So we are talking about delivering resources that are often of U.S. or European origin—i.e., from high-labor-cost regions—into areas such as Afghanistan—low-labor-cost regions. In addition, transportation costs will be high because of the remote areas involved, the long distances, the logistical complexity, and, in some cases, vulnerability to terrorist attacks. Knowing this, does the approach make any economic sense at all?

Another problem with reconstruction is reliance on donors and NGOs. Typically, the U.S. military and other militaries are not good at reconstruction—and they are not really interested in acquiring such capabilities. In addition, the efforts of donors and NGOs tend to be fragmented, staffers are often on short-term assignments, and funds are often awarded for political motivations. In addition, many NGOs are reluctant to work with the military.

Nonetheless, there are a few rays of hope. India and China have done considerable civil work in Afghanistan. These countries are competent and they have lower costs. So, perhaps, reconstruction can happen if the proper distribution of efforts is worked out among participating countries.

The way ahead

Finding the right way to move forward in Afghanistan will not be easy. In fact, U.S. National Security Advisor General James Jones believes that success in Afghanistan is impossible without vast improvement in security, the economy, and governmental corruption. Improving each and every one of them will be a hard task. In addition, there is an extreme shortage of willing actors among nations, which is likely to be exacerbated by the current economic crisis. In his workshop wrap-up remarks, SHAPE Chief of Staff General Karl-Heinz Lather summarizes the challenge:

To break this vicious cycle, we need to proceed just as we discussed [at this workshop]: comprehensively, collaboratively, and cooperatively addressing all of the surrounding issues. If we are successful, then Afghanistan will be better off in the end. But Afghanistan has to do its part as well.
Chapter 1

Keynote Address of the 26th International Workshop
On Global Security

His Excellency Vecdi Gönül
Minister of Defense of Turkey

OPENING REMARKS

I would like to extend a very warm welcome to all of you. It is a great pleasure for me to have you in Turkey on the occasion of the 26th International Workshop on Global Security. I believe this workshop will provide an invaluable opportunity for exchanging views on global security and defense industry cooperation in such a period of economic uncertainty.

I also would like to extend my personal thanks to Workshop Chairman Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon for offering to hold this useful forum in Turkey.

We all are serving or have served at one time during our careers in leading positions of state or private organizations. So, we are all well aware of how important it is to have confidence in the personnel we work with and in the organization as a whole, which reminds me of a joke I once heard:

Twenty CEOs board an airplane and are told that the flight that they are about to take is the first ever to feature pilotless technology: It is a crewless aircraft. Each one of the CEOs is then told, privately, that his or her company’s software is running the aircraft’s automatic pilot system. Nineteen of the CEOs promptly leave the aircraft, each offering a different type of excuse. One CEO alone remains onboard the jet, seeming very calm indeed. Asked why he is so confident in this first crewless flight, he replies, “If it is the same software that is developed by my company’s information technology systems department, this plane will never take off anyway.”

That is called confidence!

Building confidence among members of the international community has particular importance these days. This was, perhaps, the magic word behind the maxim of the founder of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, when he famously said, “Peace at home, peace in the world.” It is particularly important when the first decade of the 21st Century is drawing to a close and the world is facing a rapidly changing security environment. Especially with the spread of globalization, this process of change has gained momentum.

THE EFFECT OF GLOBALIZATION

Globalization will continue to affect security dynamics in many ways. Climate change will put many of our key resources like food, water, and land under considerable strain. The global competition for energy and natural resources will redefine the relationship between security and economics. In addition, our growing reliance on information technology will make our societies more vulnerable to cyber attacks.

Increasingly, over the past few years, all our nations have come to realize that globalization is not only a means of opening up economies, lifting people out of poverty, and promoting democratic values. We have seen that globalization is also, unfortunately, a vehicle for importing radicalism and the techniques of terrorism into our societies. It has also facilitated the free flow of materials, including the most dangerous ones, that support nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs.

For example, New York, Madrid, London, and Istanbul have all been the target of terrorist attacks. Instability in Iraq and Afghanistan affects all of us, no matter how near or far we are geographically. Iran’s nuclear intentions constitute another problem that needs intensified diplomatic efforts for a solution. And we also have a common interest in energy security, whether we are energy suppliers, transit countries, or energy consumers.
THE NEED FOR NEW SECURITY COOPERATION

So how do we respond to all this? There is really only one answer, and that is to pursue new approaches to security cooperation—bold and innovative approaches that go beyond established geographical, cultural, religious, or institutional boundaries and that promote a qualitatively new level of cooperation between nations and organizations.

This means we urgently need change and fresh approaches to enduring problems and to new threats as well. As the eminent Canadian physician William Osler said, “Security can only be achieved through constant change, adapting old ideas that have outlived their usefulness to current facts.” The fact that demands on security are increasing means that we must all have a clear vision and a common understanding of our roles and tasks. This will then enable us to take the necessary political decisions to prioritize the tasks and identify the resources in order to provide security all over the world.

Security and stability demand a coordinated application of economic, political, and military measures. In the framework of capabilities for providing security, I firmly believe there is a valuable role for enhanced U.N., NATO, and EU cooperation. Unfortunately, there is still considerable room for improvement on this front. That is why we need a qualitatively new level of cooperation among all international security-providing institutions.

STABILITY IN THE BALKANS, THE CAUCASUS, AND THE MIDDLE EAST

As you know, Turkey is a crossing point and a central hub of three continents, with its location between Europe and Asia and with nearby Africa across the Mediterranean Sea from Turkey’s southern coast. Therefore it is a country that has long traditional, historical, cultural, and economic ties with the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean region, and in this context it plays a significant role.

The Balkans consist of many different ethnicities, religions, and languages. So what we need for the Balkans is a common set of values and ideals. The European Union and NATO are essential for the Balkans in order to bring stability, prosperity, and sustainable peace to the area. The complexity of the political atmosphere in some states in the region is still a cause of concern for all of us. Any major challenge to stability, particularly in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina, puts the hopes of general peace in the Balkans at risk. So I believe that prospects for EU and NATO membership are the most important incentives for a promising change in the region.

Stability in the South Caucasus is essential for the stability of the whole Euro-Asian region. However, achieving enduring stability in the South Caucasus has until now been a distant dream because three of the four frozen conflicts in the OSCE area are located in this small geographical area.

The unresolved conflicts in the Caucasus, namely the problems of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh, continue to be the main obstacles for developing a favorable environment for peace and stability in this region. It is our conviction that the lack of confidence among states directly or indirectly related to the conflicts in the South Caucasus region has so far hindered the well-intentioned attempts to resolve these conflicts.

TURKISH SECURITY INITIATIVES

Hence, Turkey’s new initiative, namely the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform (CSCP), which brings together Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Russia, and Turkey, aims to rebuild mutual trust and develop a genuine regional political dialogue. Despite the serious problems that currently exist, the fact that we have managed to bring together these five states around the same table for three preparatory meetings and that they express their continuing support for this initiative gives us hope for this initiative, a cooperation platform, and the region.

In addition to issues in the Balkans and the Caucasus, we are heavily engaged with issues in the Middle East. The dynamism of events and the pace of developments in the area require the international community to be alert and active at all times. As the problems in the region have become interrelated, it is not feasible to address them in isolation. We therefore need a comprehensive approach, and we believe that the peace process should be reinvigorated in all its tracks without further delay.

We attach utmost importance to Iraq. Our main goal is the establishment of a peaceful, stable, democratic, western-oriented country that can be a factor of stability and security in the region while maintaining its territorial integrity and political unity. It seems that Iraq will remain a common agenda item for the foreseeable future. The only negative factor in our relations with Iraq is the presence of the PKK terrorist organization in the northern part of the country, targeting
Turkey and thus harming regional stability.

As you may know, Turkey attributes a special importance to the Middle East peace process. Therefore, we played a mediator role in the Israeli-Syrian indirect peace talks, in which four rounds were held. Turkey also remains committed to contributing to peace efforts through political and economic processes. Accordingly, Turkey has pledged $150 million to economic and institutional capacity building in the future Palestinian state.

Turkey attributes utmost importance to the realization of the Industry for Peace projects of the Ankara Forum, a tripartite group established at Turkey’s initiative in 2005 that includes Turkish, Israeli, and Palestinian private sector representatives in Erez in the Gaza Strip and in Tarqumiyah in the West Bank.

To ensure close cooperation that is results oriented, Turkey has also given impetus to its efforts to institutionalize its relations and consultations with the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council.

AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN

Afghanistan and Pakistan are two countries with which we have special historical relations. We initiated the Ankara Process in 2007 and we held the third Trilateral Summit among the presidents of Turkey, Afghanistan, and Pakistan on April 1, 2009 in Ankara. Turkey has been at the forefront of efforts aimed at establishing security, stability, and development in Afghanistan. We believe that our aim, as part of the international community, should be to build Afghan capacity for Afghans to find lasting solutions to the challenges they face. We are pleased to see the international community reacting to the same understanding that military instruments alone are not enough to achieve this goal. Political, diplomatic, economic, and social instruments need to be used as well.

On the other hand, the democratically elected government of Pakistan needs to be supported in its fight against terrorism. It quite often goes unnoticed that Pakistan is the country most negatively affected by developments in Afghanistan. Indeed, we welcome the efforts to deal with Afghanistan and Pakistan in a coordinated manner. However, we should not overlook the fact that the challenges faced by Pakistan are not all linked to Afghanistan. The current situation in the North West Frontier Province is at risk of becoming a humanitarian tragedy. Therefore we urge the international community to do its utmost to assist Pakistan. As I mentioned before, cooperation in every field is essential for all of us, more than ever before in our history.

TURKISH CONTRIBUTIONS TO COOPERATION

Now, let me give some examples of Turkey’s endeavors in the area of cooperation.

• Turkey was elected to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as a non-permanent member for the 2009–2010 period and also has taken over the rotating UNSC presidency.

• We attribute particular importance to the fact that President Obama made his first overseas foreign visit to Turkey. We consider his visit a significant sign of the importance the U.S. government attaches to Turkey.

• Turkey organized the Alliance of Civilizations forum, a Turkish-Spanish initiative, in Istanbul on April 6 and 7, 2009. With more than 100 countries participating, it was a beneficial platform for discussing various international matters within a broad perspective.

• As a member of NATO for 57 years, and having guarded the longest border with the former Warsaw Pact countries throughout the Cold War, Turkey has been making substantial contributions to missions and operations of international organizations and aims to enhance cooperation.

• As a negotiating candidate country to the European Union and a strong supporter of and contributor to the European Security and Defense Policy, Turkey remains the biggest non-EU European contributor to ESDP missions and operations.

• Turkey is currently taking part in Operation Althea with more than 250 personnel. It is also contributing to the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to EULEX Kosovo.

• Turkey was given observer member status in the European Gendarmerie Force since May 13, 2009.

• Turkey actively contributes to international counter-piracy efforts off the Horn of Africa and Somalia as a founding member of the Contact Group. A Turkish frigate with two helicopters onboard was deployed to the region on February 17, 2009 within the framework of the Combined Task Force One Five One. On May 3, 2009 a Turkish rear admiral took over the command of this naval force. We have also decided to contribute to NATO’s upcoming Operation Ocean Shield with an additional frigate.
• As one of the major contributors to NATO operations, Turkey continues to provide personnel and equipment to Kosovo and Afghanistan, where security situations remain fragile. Within this framework we sent 560 people to the KFOR mission in Kosovo and almost 800 to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan.
• Turkey has also been actively engaged in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) since 2006. We have provided maritime assets since September 1, 2008. We are currently contributing to the UNIFIL operation with 261 people and two assault boats.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

I believe that Franklin Roosevelt was right when he said, “True individual freedom cannot exist without economic security and independence.” As you are well aware, we are currently going through a significant financial crisis that has adverse effects on the economic security of the entire world. As a result of this crisis, I admit that we have tough decisions to make as to what to spend the available defense budgets on. We have a double funding challenge of maintaining battle-born assets for current operations while investing in programs for future systems.

A delicate balance must be struck between keeping current assets serviceable and investing in brand-new development programs for the future. In this context, we have to focus on both the present and the future. If we do not address the current challenges today, they will reappear even larger tomorrow.

Experience shows that global problems require global solutions, rather than isolated measures. In terms of using our forces in ongoing operations more effectively, I believe that we should try to achieve better collaboration on the ground. Such an approach will enable us to better combine our efforts within the framework of our agreed-upon principles of cooperation. However, while doing so, to counter future challenges effectively, we must continue to transform our forces accordingly. We need better interoperable forces and capabilities that can be used in the most remote regions of the world, which reminds me of another joke. It is one that emphasizes the importance of bringing the equipment needed by our troops to the remotest areas where they operate. The joke is:

A man was given the job of painting the white lines down the middle of a highway. On his first day he painted six miles, the next day three miles, and the following day less than a mile. When the foreman asked the man why he kept painting less each day, he replied, “I just can't do any better. Each day I keep getting farther away from the paint can.”

One of the important advantages of this international forum is that it brings together the members of different countries’ defense industries. Having these companies’ chairmen and representatives among us today will definitely help to establish closer relations between defense industry companies.

No doubt, enhanced defense industry cooperation among our countries will help facilitate the negative effects of the current economic crisis. To this end, we should focus more on substantiating technological cooperation, co-developing programs and joint projects, removing obstacles to defense industry cooperation, establishing cooperation networks, and launching concrete collaboration programs in a mutually beneficial way. Such efforts will also ensure better interoperability among us. I hope that at the end of our discussions within the margins of this workshop we will be able to achieve concrete results in terms of defense industry cooperation.

Now I would once again like to say that we are very pleased with your participation in the 26th International Workshop on Global Security in Istanbul. I believe your visit and the productive discussions we will have during the workshop will add new perspectives to our cooperation and solidarity.

I also ask that you perceive this workshop not only as an event for conducting official and serious talks but also as a chance to take a historical and cultural tour around the 2010 “European Capital of Culture”—Istanbul. I wish you an enjoyable time during your stay in this beautiful city.
Chapter 2

Global Security in Times of Economic Uncertainty

His Excellency Evangelos Vassilios I. Meimarakis
Hellenic Minister of National Defence

It is a great pleasure and honour for me to be in this wonderful city on the banks of the Bosphorus on the occasion of the 26th International Workshop on Global Security, in response to the invitation of the Workshop Chairman and my Turkish counterpart Mr. Gönül. The visit to this city is always a pleasant experience. And the exchange of views on international security in today’s difficult global economic climate is a particularly interesting challenge.

Recent conditions formulated a new and highly uncertain international environment characterized by new threats. The classic concept of threat is now obsolete. What is predominant today is the new concept of asymmetric threat. Moreover, social conditions, the terms of international controversies and conditions for cooperation, as well as the ongoing global multi-level financial, credit and funding economic crisis, have come upon us like an avalanche. The international financial crisis that we know today, which is admittedly the greatest global crisis of the last 80 years, not only reflects the actual dimensions of the situation we are experiencing in the economy, but also in our society and civilization as well. Indeed, the ongoing international financial crisis is a parameter that feeds instability, which consequently affects global security.

CURRENT THREATS TO GLOBAL SECURITY

If someone wanted to record the threats facing the global security system of today, he should then refer to:

• Terrorism. The September 11th events in New York marked the conception of modern threats and the sense of security for all mankind. Since that tragedy, the international community has invested thousands of human lives and billions of euros to counter terrorism.

• Nuclear arms proliferation and armaments control. The unjustifiable insistence of some countries to acquire a nuclear arsenal clearly affects the current international security system; in the same context, the often uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear technology, materials and weapons, constitutes a substantial threat to international security.

• Energy security. The concentration of control regarding energy sources and their transportation nets also constitutes a potential threat to international security, which often intensifies the economic crisis and creates instability between nations. Greece supports the EU and NATO strategy to diversify energy sources and the demarcation, if possible, of the energy resources ownership from the transport management, thus aiming toward an unhindered movement of such energy resources.

• Threats in cyberspace. The evolution of technology and certainly the dependence of modern defence systems and governmental organization function on electronic technology offer an action environment to those who would want to plan a cyber attack on the defence systems and governmental organization operations.

• Piracy. Almost two centuries after its first appearance, the problem of international piracy has emerged again in an intense way—a contemporary modern threat to international trade and the global economy with political, legal, and social implications.

• Climate change. The problem of climate change, the consequences of which confront us more vividly every day, not only has economic and social impacts but also constitutes a threat to global security because the whole situation results in a forced population displacement. Today, we use the knowledge from our past experiences in having had to manage many times the consequences of forced population displacement between neighboring countries in Africa.

• Financial Immigrants. A particular parameter which influences international security is the wave of illegal financial immigrants; it must be addressed as such, particularly the high percentage of illegal immigrants deriving mainly from countries with prevailing instability, lack of democracy, and ongoing crisis. The wave of illegal immigrants is a potential
threat to the more developed Western societies which has serious social, economic, and political impacts. As an indication, I will mention that Greece receives about 150,000 immigrants annually. The vast majority come from Pakistan, Iraq and Afghanistan, out of which we currently host 46,000 illegal economic immigrants.

It is easy to understand the potential risk of directed malevolent elements infiltrating into this impoverished population of illegal immigrants. The same illegal immigrants can easily become subject to recruitment from various groups for terrorist purposes.

ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGES: THE NEED TO WORK TOGETHER

Specifically in order to address this problem of illegal immigration, Greece and the European Union are looking to Turkey for further effective and efficient cooperation.

In light of the above, mankind as a whole—societies, governments and institutions and individuals as well—are all obliged to work collectively in a good cooperative spirit and with solidarity. Only with understanding and comprehension and the right effort can we overcome the crisis. Only by working together as communities, states, and institutions, can we achieve progress and consolidate security and development.

Among the means we have today to deal with the situation and the potential threats described above, NATO, which celebrates its 60th anniversary this year, holds the dominant position. It is undoubtedly a key factor of stability in an international environment which is characterized by fluidity and in which regional areas of tension and conflict pose potential risks to stability and security in the world. Six decades after its inception, the North Atlantic Alliance, which unites the two sides of the Atlantic, remains the primary force to guarantee peace and security worldwide. With the collaboration of Europe and America, we continue to defend our common values and principles and our common security.

Over time, the Alliance has proven able to adapt to changing conditions in the field of global security. In recent years and in order to respond as efficiently as possible to the challenges of the post-Cold War era, especially after September 11, the Alliance has inaugurated among other measures a process of political and defence transformation. This transformation constitutes the basis for improving the operational readiness and effectiveness of NATO forces and for NATO’s evolution from an Alliance in the strict sense into an international security Organization.

Toward this goal, moreover, the enlargement of NATO with countries that share common principles and values with the Member States and respect the rules of good neighborliness and the peaceful settlement of disputes is particularly important. In this framework, Greece has consistently supported the Euro-Atlantic prospect of the Western Balkan countries, which relates to stability and development in the broader area.

Greece has been a NATO member for more than half a century and its contribution to the Alliance is known and proven, for example, our participation in Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean and the ongoing peace efforts of KFOR in Kosovo and ISAF in Afghanistan. ISAF is the primary mission of the Alliance. Its success depends on the continuation of coordinated and intensive efforts to establish a secure and democratic state with the goal that the Afghan people will assume the management of the affairs of their country (Afghan ownership).

In this respect, Greece is among those supporting a comprehensive approach, believing firmly that there can be no exclusive military solution to the complex challenges we confront in that country.

Furthermore, being a maritime country, Greece participates in the international developments on combating the piracy problem, supporting and participating in NATO’s efforts, promoting the cooperation of all international bodies operating in the region, and avoiding duplication of activities.

In particular, I refer to Greece’s contribution of one frigate to the EU-led international force in Operation ATALANTA to fight piracy in Somalia, and the recent contribution of one more frigate to the NATO-led operation under the code name Ocean Shield with the same objective.

Along with the international activation of NATO in the security field, the EU activities in the same direction are of crucial importance. The presence of the EU in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Congo and the international effort to tackle the problem of piracy make the EU one of the guarantors of global security.

Please allow me at this point to make a specific reference to the position of my country in the broader region where Greece leads in promoting cooperation on concrete initiatives, recognizing that modern concerns in geopolitical, geo-strategic, and economic fields require commitment from all of us to deal with them effectively.

The security policy being implemented by Greece is based on the following principles:

- The security of one is the security of the other.
• Europe’s security is closely related to security and stability in the Balkans.
• To invest in a country’s development is equivalent to investing in the security of the country and of the broader region as well.

In recent years, Greece’s foreign policy has been playing a particular role in the region. We consistently monitor the developments in the Balkans and actively participate with adapted programming, planning and implementation, as required by the country’s geostrategic and geopolitical position in the broader region.

Our position coincides with our unwavering dedication to the values of democracy and peace and has been proven by our country’s significant contribution to international security and stability through its participation in peacekeeping operations.

The main axis of our policy is the development of equal bilateral relations and our country’s activation in the framework of international organizations, actively participating in both their political planning as well as in their activities. Being an old member of NATO and the EU, Greece is constantly seeking and working at all levels in order to achieve security, stability, development, and progress in the broader area.

SECURITY IN THE BALKANS AND IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

I must stress that Greece is now an important economic factor in the Balkans, contributing with investments and allocation of national resources to stability, development, and progress throughout the region. Indicatively, Greece has invested in the region of Southeastern Europe (the Balkans, including Turkey) 13.25 billion euros. For example, the banking sector alone employs 34,757 personnel from the local populations.

The security of Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean region. For this reason, Greece attaches particular importance to promoting cooperation between countries of the Mediterranean Dialogue. The overall objective of the Mediterranean Dialogue is to contribute to regional security and stability through stronger practical cooperation, interoperability, intelligence, defence reforms, counter-terrorism, natural disaster response and humanitarian aid, as well as through education and science. A review of the Mediterranean Dialogue from 1994 onwards demonstrates the significant efforts concerning confidence-building and mutual understanding and enhancement of cooperation, not only within the Alliance, but also between the Mediterranean partners.

We do not desire and cannot tolerate any new situations that might create obstacles again in the path towards a better future. We aspire to play an essential role in a difficult but necessary venture, namely the transformation of the broader area into a neighborhood of peace, stability, and development. For this reason, we are working systematically to establish an environment of trust, mutual understanding, and cooperation aimed at fostering progress and prosperity for our countries and peoples.

The promotion of democracy and the consolidation of peace and stability in Southeastern Europe is a primary goal for Greece, especially given the fact that national conflicts and financial losses in some parts of the developing world result in the creation of migratory flows towards Europe. Up to a certain point, the absorption of financial immigrants may not be problematic; however, the E.U.’s willingness to accept them is not unlimited.

The international environment and the potential resulting risks and security requirements I have described require large investments in the fields of security and defence.

Unfortunately, these demands do not coincide with the current economic crisis management requirements at the national and international level. The economy ministers and the communities themselves demand cuts in defence funding in order to cover other social needs. Therefore, the equation to be solved by the defence ministers is very difficult. In other words, this means that with fewer funds we have to cover broader and more expensive requirements of defence and security.

THE WAY AHEAD: RESTRUCTURING, RE-PRIORITIZATION, RATIONALIZATION

In order to manage the situation, three courses of action must be implemented by defence ministers at the national level or by international security organizations (e.g. NATO) at the international level:

• Restructuring of the defence mechanism organization
• Re-prioritization
• Rationalization of defence expenditure and military investment.

Especially in the case of multinational peace operations, we can save significant amounts at the national level so that through multilateral cooperation we can address the costs of joint multinational operations.
However, as far as the financing of international humanitarian and development projects is concerned, Greece is seeking to maintain the rate of funding without being influenced by the economic crisis. Our decision follows the principles of our foreign policy according to which investments in the economic development of a region constitute investments in the stability and security of this region and the international environment in general.

In this context, Greece has invested 62 million euros in Afghanistan since 2002, specifically for development aid. We intend to continue at the same pace with the anticipation that stability and development in the country will help prevent a considerable percentage of the country’s population from immigrating in search of new, safer places of living. I believe that if we adopt this policy, it will help my country save the costs currently paid for 46,000 illegal immigrants from Afghanistan due to the lack of security and stability in their country.

THE CORE ISSUE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES

From all of the above, it is clear to what extent the current international economic situation affects or could affect international security. It would be a mistake to only depend on the amount of available defence funds to secure world peace and security. Governments are required to invest large political capital in order to confront the crisis. Concerning the problem in the Middle East, I believe that the investment of political capital by the interested parties could lead to a solution which would create the conditions for economic growth in the common region, while part of the defence funds currently available might also be invested in economic and social development.

In this spirit—meaning the need to politically invest in the relations between countries—the development of friendly relations, good neighborliness, and cooperation between neighboring countries, does not only work well for them. It also works positively to build stability, security, and economic prosperity in the broader neighborhood and region and, thus, to consolidate world peace and security.

In my opinion the core of the problem of international security lies in bilateral relations between neighboring countries. Therefore, I believe that the cultivation of good neighborly relations is the primary duty of every government. From my position I make every effort possible in this direction and I assure you that this is a fundamental principle of Greek policy towards its neighbors.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

I would like to stress that Greece will continue to function as a useful and reliable source and strategic partner of the international community, actively participating in efforts to achieve peace and stability in our broader region and worldwide and assuming important roles for the restoration of peaceful living conditions in countries that have been tested by conflict.

We are deeply concerned by any development that could create instability and insecurity in our immediate and broader surroundings. On our end, our policy is to moderately and prudently confront any crisis through dialogue and peaceful means, especially in view of the increased responsibilities we have undertaken since January 1, 2009 when we assumed the OSCE presidency.

To the extent of our capabilities and despite the increased pressures and necessities at the national level, we will continue to contribute to the efforts of international organizations to progressively establish a stable and secure international environment, free from threats of destabilization.

It is my belief that regular dialogue and the exchange of views at all levels and on a broad spectrum of issues contribute to strengthening and improving the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation as well as the mutual understanding and perception of military issues of high interest for each country.

Having expressed these thoughts, I am sure that fruitful conclusions will emerge from our proposals and discussions, leading to further creative cooperation in order to ensure peace and security in the world, without cutting back on the level of prosperity we have achieved.
Chapter 3

Issues that NATO’s New Strategic Concept Must Address

His Excellency Professor Dr. Nuno Severiano Teixeira
Minister of Defense of Portugal

When one speaks about global security concerns in present times, the primary issue is the need to define a strategy to respond to today’s international crisis scenarios. This response depends, first, on understanding the nature of that crisis, a crisis that is more than strictly economic and financial and that has political consequences. Among those consequences is the possibility that international conflicts and divisions will worsen.

This crisis began by shaking markets and financial institutions but it quickly affected states and citizens, creating visible pockets of social instability and a breakdown in confidence. The crisis will have much broader repercussions, particularly in the more vulnerable regions of the world. This is why the response to it inevitably involves addressing international security issues.

SECURITY IN THE 21st CENTURY

The international environment is plagued by uncertainty and volatility, and it is changing at a dizzying pace. As a result of the transformations shaped by a globalized world, with shorter distances, ever more innovative technologies, and the proliferation of new actors, our societies face new threats and new asymmetries that, together with traditional risks, are creating a complex reality that is very different from the familiar Cold War context.

Security in the 21st Century, then, is characterized by a multiplicity of nonconventional risks and threats that are simultaneously transnational and at the substate level and that affect both international and state security. At the international level, there is terrorism, fundamentalism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and organized crime, including trafficking in human beings. At the substate level, we witness the multiplication of violent conflict and civil wars and the emergence of failed states, now a quite common phenomena that constitutes direct and indirect threats to international security and stability.

To address all of this, guaranteeing security today means operating well beyond the geographic frontiers of the state. Security is ensured by projecting stability across regional frontiers and by helping to build and consolidate the rule of law in a politically and economically sustainable way at the international level. In order to attain this goal, joint action by states that share the same principles, values, and security concepts is essential.

Because of the existence of cooperative security arrangements, it is likely that we shall see an increase in international peace missions in order to address the current context of crisis and uncertainty. As a consequence, the demands for participation of our states’ armed forces in such operations will also increase.

THE PILLARS OF MULTILATERAL ORDER

In this strategic context, it is essential to identify poles of stability enablers to promote international security that can act as fundamental pillars of a multilateral order. Without a doubt, two of these poles are the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union. These organizations have shown a sustained ability to adapt to new strategic realities: Both have evolved according to the demands of a new international order and both have asserted their status as fundamental pillars of the Euro-Atlantic defense community.

The Atlantic Alliance was established in 1949 in the thick of the Cold War to ensure the territorial defense of Europe against the Soviet threat. Today, nearly 60 years later, NATO’s main mission is in Afghanistan, beyond its traditional area of intervention, and it faces an international security environment that is marked by diffuse and multiple threats and new actors, including non-state actors. Throughout its history, NATO has successfully survived various crisis periods. Contrary
to pessimistic predictions, it outlasted the end of the Cold War. It also has had to deal with new crisis moments since the Cold War, not least among them the disagreement between the Allies over intervention in Iraq. But the Atlantic Alliance survived that crisis as well. Its essential dimensions—the shared values of democracy, liberty, and the rule of law and the indivisibility of Allies’ security—has also survived, and remains as it did in the 1990s. These shared values are the permanent basis of the Atlantic Alliance.

POINTS THE NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT MUST ADDRESS

We are at a key moment in our thinking about the future of the Atlantic Alliance; this will culminate with the formulation of the Alliance’s new Strategic Concept, which we hope will be presented at the NATO summit in Portugal. This new Strategic Concept must address four questions that are essential to the future of NATO and that, it must be admitted, the Allies have not forged consensus on. These issues are:

- The enlargement of the Alliance and new members
- Operations outside the traditional Euro-Atlantic area
- The transformation of NATO structures and concepts
- Strategic partnerships, namely, with the European Union

Let me now briefly reflect on each one.

Enlargement

The debate on enlargement is probably one of the most complex within the Alliance, and is an absolutely fundamental issue. I believe NATO should not definitively close the door to new members, but it must clearly define the conditions and requirements for membership. The consolidation of a democratic regime and associated institutions is a must, of course, as is the contribution that states can make to reinforce international security. Beyond that, it is equally vital that NATO reject any enlargement that puts at risk or diminishes the credibility of the collective defense guarantees that are and will remain the raison d’être of the Atlantic Alliance.

Operations Outside the Traditional Area

One of the main debates within NATO during the last few years has been the geographical limits of the Alliance’s missions. In fact, what is at stake is the question of whether we want NATO to focus exclusively on territorial defense and the Euro-Atlantic region or whether we want it to contribute with its partners to global security. In short, do we want an Alliance for collective defense or to promote global security?

At its last summits, the Alliance shifted toward a global security agenda. To pursue that goal, NATO should develop structures and capabilities to ensure that it is prepared to intervene in operational theaters within and beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. The definition of these scenarios and the choice of partnerships should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, in accordance with international security demands and international law.

The Transformation of NATO—Structures and Concepts

NATO has been engaged in a significant transformation process that began with the approval of the revised Strategic Concept in 1999 and continued with the concept’s current revision. The Atlantic Alliance must adapt to the new international security demands and ensure that it has the capabilities, interoperability, and training as well as other necessary requirements to be successful in the full range of missions. For these reasons, the process of NATO transformation should follow a key internal debate and a shared vision among Allies, focusing not only on geographical issues but also on how to adapt institutional structures to established policies and missions.

The Relationship Between NATO and Its Strategic Partners

The Atlantic Alliance today does and should rely on the support of and complementary action by the European Union. The Alliance and the EU are the two fundamental pillars of multilateral security and defense structures. For this reason, they must find the institutional means to permanently articulate their priorities, to coordinate their missions, and to maxi-
mize their security and defense capabilities. The Atlantic Alliance and the European Union should not compete but work together as mutual, credible, and useful allies. This is the basic principle that should guide the European Security and Defense Policy development as well as its military capabilities. Like any other strategic concept, this development must clearly specify the main threats and risks to European security as well as the necessary instruments to respond adequately.

The first step toward a definition was taken in 2003, with the presentation of the European Security Strategy. This document was a first in the history of European integration: It established a European strategic vision and doctrine about external action for the first time. Six years later, in the light of the current international context and the new challenges the union faces, it is necessary to adapt this strategic vision so that it can serve the goals and ambitions of the EU for the coming decade.

PROMOTING CHANGE

Given the current international context, it is important to promote change in several ways. In addition to including the definition of threats in the current Strategic Concept—terrorism, proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, failed states, and transnational organized crime—we must examine how these threats are interrelated and how the EU can respond to them effectively. For this it is essential to promote coordinated action between the three pillars of European policies, so that the vision put forward in the strategy has practical consequences through the establishment of integrated policies and mechanisms for global action.

The European Security Strategy must also include the new challenges and risks emerging from the current international context, and assert the position of the EU as an actor that shares responsibility for promoting international security. In terms of challenges, the EU must take into account the importance of relations with Russia and new emerging powers such as India, China, and Brazil as well as issues arising from globalization, such as information and financial flows.

Regarding risks, in addition to those already identified, we need to address the issues of energy security, maritime security, food security, cybersecurity, and the risks arising as a result of climate change, such as natural disasters and pandemics. All of this is necessary because the security concept we work with today includes not just the security of states but also the security of people.

The main objective of the European Security Concept is to provide the union with a coherent vision that allows it to become an international actor with a decisive role promoting a safer and more stable world. For this goal to become a reality, it is absolutely essential that the Treaty of Lisbon enter into force.

SOME WORDS ABOUT PORTUGAL

Portugal is a founding member of the Atlantic Alliance and a member of the European Union. It has participated in the main NATO missions and from the outset in the formulation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Security and Defense Policy. It is simultaneously a European and an Atlantic country. It is on the basis of this “dual identity” that Portugal has carved a place for itself within the international system as a responsible state, a partner, and an ally that fulfills its commitment to promote international stability, security, and peace.

To that end, the Portuguese Armed Forces have actively participated in a set of important international peace missions within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, the United Nations, and the European Union. During the 1990s, Portugal was systematically the first European state to contribute to U.N. peacekeeping missions, committing troops to such operations. Thus, we have taken on board the international commitments that arise from our system of alliances as well as the demands of a new system of collective security.

Over the last 20 years, almost 25,000 members of the Portuguese Armed Forces have participated either individually or as part of a unit in more than 50 missions throughout 20 countries in Africa, Europe, Asia, and, more recently, the Middle East. The Portuguese Armed Forces currently participate in foreign missions, deploying a total of 800 individuals in 11 operation theaters such as Kosovo, Lebanon, Afghanistan, and afloat off Somalia’s coast.

These efforts allow us to assert with all legitimacy that the Portuguese armed forces’ external commitments have produced excellent results, and that our forces have contributed unequivocally to the promotion of Euro-Atlantic stability and security as well as to assert Portugal’s position in the international political system. We are ready and willing to pursue the collective and coordinated effort for the permanent adaptation of our armed forces. This is an indispensable effort that should be developed and shared among Allies and partners in NATO and the European Union.
For Portugal it is clear that the European defense community can only be built up by strengthening the Atlantic Alliance, and vice versa. We are aware that the essential conditions for our national stability and security depend on the stability and security conditions of the Euro-Atlantic community. In moments of crisis, as we face new and old threats alike, convergence among Allies and eliminating the possibility of division are priorities to be pursued for the benefit of all. We need a shared strategic vision, without which complementarity between the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union in the defense and security domains cannot be established in a stable and permanent way. So this is the goal we should seek to attain: a stable, effective, and permanent complementarity between NATO and the EU.

The present period provides a great opportunity for pursuing that goal. The position of the U.S. administration as well as the positions of the European allies provide us with an opportunity that we cannot and should not waste.

It is a positive that the U.S. recognizes the need for a strong and cohesive Europe, and the need to reinforce autonomous European defense capacities in a framework of shared European Union-Atlantic Alliance responsibilities for collective defense. It is also good that Europeans and the EU member-states reiterate their determination to put aside strategies that are detrimental to the internal cohesion of the union as well as to the internal cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance. This commitment is fundamental for the Atlantic Alliance to take on its growing international security responsibilities and for the European Union to take on its new European defense and near-neighborhood security duties. Certainly, Portugal can and will contribute to these goals.
Chapter 4

The Future of Our Armed Forces

His Excellency Eimert van Middelkoop
Minister of Defense of the Netherlands

In a volatile world in which disruptive conflicts cannot be ignored, the demands placed upon our armed forces will likely remain high. In the last two decades the number of missions aimed at the stabilization and reconstruction of failed states has increased markedly, and it does not seem likely that this will change in the near future.

This development stems largely from a broad consensus that failed and fragile states are a threat to security. Fighting poverty and improving governance worldwide is therefore of direct national interest to us all. As Kofi Annan pointed out, unless we assume our responsibility toward fragile states the world cannot enjoy peace and prosperity. Continued involvement in these states will be necessary in many respects. But prolonged involvement does not imply continued warfare.

We must be ready and able to intervene when necessary, but intervention alone is often not enough. Stabilization and reconstruction are just as important and can pose even greater challenges. We therefore must also invest in conflict prevention and reconstruction. We need our armed forces to stabilize failed states, but also to build and strengthen security institutions. Investing in security sector reform will therefore help to prevent conflicts as well as to end them. In short, to be effective we need the integrated deployment of all resources at our disposal.

THE ARMED FORCES OF THE NETHERLANDS

As one of the first NATO Allies, the Netherlands initiated a fundamental change in the direction of its armed forces in the early 1990s. Since then, our armed forces have been transformed from an organization with a massive and static defensive posture into a modern and well-equipped organization with extensive expeditionary capabilities. The fact that, as a relatively small nation, we can act as lead nation in Uruzgan for an extended period of time is testimony to the success of this transformation.

But there is no time to rest on our laurels. The world is changing and so is the role of the armed forces. We must continuously adapt our forces to changing circumstances and new technology. We are currently working on a future policy survey, which in early 2010 will present policy options for the future of the Dutch Armed Forces. Our approach, involving all relevant ministries, allows us to develop a vision that is built upon the knowledge and expertise of all those involved in issues related to security and the rule of law.

ARMED FORCES REQUIREMENTS

Flexibility. In a world in which conflicts come in many shapes and sizes, I think that the central tenet for structuring our armed forces is flexibility. We must be able to adapt quickly to new threats and be able to implement new technology or tactics as they develop. Afghanistan has proven that the armed forces are able to adapt quickly if the circumstances demand it. To give you an example, The Netherlands bought 48 Bushmaster armoured vehicles in three years. Normally, the acquisition and subsequent introduction in the field of an important vehicle takes about a decade. Fast-track approaches have enabled us to incorporate the Bushmaster in the ongoing operations in Uruzgan, and those vehicles substantially improve the safety of our military men and women there. Quicker procedures are essential if we are to adapt quickly to new and rapidly changing areas of operations.

Innovation. Another vital aspect is innovation. The role of technology in warfare is still growing fast. Cyberwarfare and robotics will change the face of battle, although exactly how remains unclear. The way we use our forces is increasingly determined by technological capabilities. These can be complex and expensive but also simple and inexpensive. The success of the Predator UAV is a perfect example of this. The number of UAVs used by U.S. forces has risen from only a handful
in 2003 to around 7,000 at the time of this workshop.

However, our opponents are also learning fast. They are likely to develop low-cost capabilities for increasing technological ingenuity. For instance, insurgents have already used UAVs—their most important assets are their flexibility and ingenuity. They will avoid engaging us openly and directly but focus instead on exploiting our weak points. They adapt and so must we!

The forces of NATO Allies have shown great ingenuity in combating insurgents around the world as well as closer to home. Soldiers on the ground and commanding officers also have quickly developed effective strategies to fight insurgents in urban areas. In Uruzgan, our own troops have proven their ingenuity, especially in countering improvised explosive devices. We have come a long way, but still every incident reminds us of our vulnerability.

Our increasing use of technology can be both an advantage and a liability. Technology has enabled us to save the lives of many soldiers and increase our effectiveness against adversaries. But if our technology fails or is bypassed by an adversary, we become increasingly vulnerable. We need to be aware of this and develop strategies to reduce this vulnerability.

A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

The way in which we deploy our forces will demand ever-increasing cooperation and coordination with other actors. Military operations alone will not bring lasting stability. If government structures are weak or nonexistent and crime is rampant, military successes will be short-lived. This is the essence of the comprehensive approach. We must aim to improve governance, build an army, create a national police organization, and develop the judicial system. Success can only be attained if we achieve tangible results in all of these areas.

This long-term commitment to stabilize and rebuild failed states makes the role soldiers will play more diverse and demanding. The soldier of the future will still be a warrior, but it is clear that more often he or she will be expected to perform other tasks as well. Civil-military cooperation is a term much in use these days and is not an empty phrase. In Afghanistan, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams are essential in order to initiate a reconstruction and development effort and our security sector reform efforts in Africa are aimed at conflict prevention.

NATO

NATO is still at the heart of our security strategy. Collective security is still our common goal. In April 2008, in Strasbourg, the heads of state and government decided to review NATO’s Strategic Concept before the next summit in Lisbon. In doing so, it is of vital importance that we avoid the trap of once again setting ambitious goals and finding out later that we are unable to afford them. This would be extremely damaging to NATO’s public image and credibility.

In order to ensure that we create a realistic strategic concept and level of ambition, I believe the concept should contain a chapter that brings our ambitions in line with our financial capabilities right from the start. This financial chapter should also address the currently unbalanced budget distribution within NATO and the way we finance our operations. Our current method is ineffective, inefficient, and bound to fail sooner or later. Therefore I deliberately put this topic on the agenda of the recent July 2008 meeting of ministers of defense in Brussels. An organization that spends almost half of its annual budget on infrastructure projects and its headquarters cannot call itself fit to face the challenges of the future. I understand that there are national interests at stake here, just as in my own country. But these fundamental problems will not solve themselves if we disregard them and let national interests prevail.

Important as it may be to develop long-term solutions, they should not keep us from prioritizing our current budget as well. The current financial and economic circumstances make it even more important for us to spend our budget prudently and to spend it on our highest priorities. It is essential for the future of the Alliance, but it is also a responsibility we have toward the people we represent.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In conclusion, we need flexible and well-equipped forces that are able to operate under many different circumstances and to perform a variety of tasks. In the interest of our national security we need to be able to act in fragile or failed states but also address potential conventional threats that may develop in the coming decades. To do all of these things simultaneously we need to be as cost-effective as possible.
Chapter 5

The True Battlefield

His Excellency Jaak Aaviksoo
Minister of Defense of Estonia

The crucial role of communication in the global security arena has been evoked repeatedly during our deliberations of the past few days and can only continue to grow in importance in the decades ahead. As an introduction to the topic, I would like to take a look at three remarks made during the workshop. First, we learned that defense spending is declining relative to GDP in most NATO member countries, and in a number of other countries as well. Second, a public poll carried out in a major NATO Partnership for Peace country less than a year ago found that over 70% of respondents considered or perceived NATO to be a hostile entity. At the same time, over 80% of respondents did not understand NATO’s purpose or mission. Third, some of the countries in the international alliance, which goes way beyond the 28 NATO countries to encompass 44 nations at present, are showing increasing Afghanistan fatigue, and this poses a great challenge for all of us.

“Winning the hearts and minds” is a high priority for the international community. As you know, the term was coined in reference to the Afghan people. But it is a much broader notion. It encompasses winning the hearts and minds of our colleague ministers, especially those of the ministers of finance in our own governments—of vital importance, as highlighted by the first remark above. It is equally important to win the hearts and minds of our constituencies. As politicians and leaders in our own countries, we have a duty to inform and educate our people and also our soldiers, whose lives are being risked far beyond our borders. I do not think we have been successful. In fact, I do not even think we have paid enough attention to these matters.

NEW WAYS OF THINKING

One of the reasons is that we have not been able to keep up with the developments of the information society, its networking components, its factual mobilization, and the way it handles truths and beliefs. The realities of the modern world are increasingly virtual. Going back some 30 to 50 years, our frame of reference was limited to what we saw and eyewitnessed. We based perhaps 70% - 90% of our attitudes and our decisions on what we knew from personal experience. Today, this part of knowledge-based decisionmaking is diminishing, and we are increasingly relying on information acquired through communication means. This is only natural since in the modern world, with all of its diversity and all of its challenges, we are called upon to answer hundreds and even thousands of questions in short time periods in both our personal lives and professional capacities. Thus it is to be expected that we would turn to off-the-shelf attitudes, we might even call them stereotypes. But I strongly feel that too many things which I say and do have not been digested by me personally to the extent that I feel comfortable, at least not according to the standards which we were used to in the not-so-distant past.

Strategic communications are much more important than we realize. How good we are at getting our ideas, values, accomplishments, and achievements through to those who need or should receive this information will have a significant impact on their practical decisionmaking and on the formation of their own attitudes with regard to us. How much of our defense spending goes towards strategic communication? Do you think it is proportionate to the importance of getting our ideas through to those we need to reach?

AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT IN STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS

I try to be very practical concerning the example of Afghanistan. The fighting has seen a high number of civilian casualties: This part of the problem has been effectively communicated to the global community. Yet our joint effort with the Afghan government, the U.N., NATO countries and partners, and a number of NGOs has sought to do everything
possible to avoid these civilian casualties. This issue is intimately related to the insurgents’ use of human shields to attack locals, the international community, ISAF, and other forces. When we look at the global public’s strong condemnation of the civilian casualties in Afghanistan, for which it largely holds the international alliance responsible, versus the little-publicized underlying problem of human shields being used by the insurgency, it is not hard to see that we are on the losing side in these strategic communications.

Another problem we should address is our political willingness to coin and discuss concepts that are premature, thus launching ideas that start to live on their own lives before they are fully formed. One of these is the concept of comprehensive approach. I am sorry that the load of the concept is falling upon the shoulders of NATO and allied soldiers. They are unable to carry that weight; it is the responsibility of politicians to develop a much more mature concept and allocate resources to carry out that concept.

Equally so—and this has been mentioned several times during the past few days—a military solution cannot be a solution. We all know that. But by expressing this too often we entrap ourselves and make ourselves vulnerable; it gives the impression that we are somehow the ones who think this is how we proceed. This is not the case, but nonetheless requires us to defend ourselves against people who criticize us.

Or let us take another problem, the serious issue of corruption in the Afghan government. The Afghan government recognizes the problem, we recognize the problem, and we duly criticize them for it. But we cannot be satisfied if the global community, 6.5 billion people, looks at us as if we were supporting a corrupt government. This is not the message. How have we managed to create this impression? Why is corruption the first thought that comes to the mind for a number of people when they think of the Afghan government? Neither the Afghan government nor our joint effort deserves this.

When it comes to strategic communications, because of our history and our culture born in Europe during the Reformation, we are theoretical and conceptual people. That is, we try to communicate general values and ideas. Yet when we look at how people behave in modern society, they are not particularly interested in general ideas. Rather, people relate to concrete facts and events, what actually happens, how John feels or Ahmed feels under certain circumstances. They do not care much what happens in the generalized community of all Ahmeds or all Johns or all of the Estonians down in Afghanistan.

We have not been good enough at getting out the practical messages, the true experiences, and the real facts of life to those who are interested in what is going on in that somewhat forgotten part of the world. On the axes of active and reactive communication, we have not done enough to be active. On the axes of hierarchical and network communication, we have been too inclined to adopt the hierarchical approach of having a Chief Information Officer in charge of handling all communications. We also have not been able to respond in due manner to the mood of the global and local communities: They are much more interested in news than facts. I am not saying that we have to give up being factually correct, but we should try to balance the speed and news component with factual accuracy. This is something that our adversaries have been doing much more successfully than we have.

**PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY**

A second dimension of my deliberations concerns the concept of security. In discussing the issue of global security, we have been much more focused on the objective side of security—number of conflicts, level of casualties, balance of power, interests, dominance, winning and losing. I do not think most people around us both back at home or further away in third countries also perceive security as an objective quality. They are much more interested in their own subjective understanding of security, based on their personal perceptions of threats which are much nearer to them than those that we are addressing.

I do not think we need to adjust our attitudes concerning global security, which are as objective as possible, in exchange for a multitude of different personal perceptions of security. No, that is not my intention. But if we want to reach the hearts and minds, if we want to win these people to our side and expect them to understand what we are doing, want to do, and have achieved, we have to find the harmony between their subjective perceptions of what security means to them and what security means to us as professionals in various capacities, whether we be military officers or members of an administration or politicians.

This subjective perception of real threats is a natural phenomenon that sits in human psychology. Throughout history, and especially in the modern era, we must recognize that all threats beyond personal experience can only be communicated through strategic communication. Some governments have done this through methods of indoctrination. In fact, some of our adversaries do this today. I am not inviting you to indoctrinate your constituencies. But let us realize that people do need leadership in order to understand the threats. Otherwise, they focus on the threats that are near them and are inclined
to blame us if we fail to address them. This is of course understandable, yet it is something that we need to keep in mind.

CONCLUSIONS

Most countries participating here, especially those from the Euro-Atlantic area, are still living in the dream of the post-Cold War era and believe that the evil has been put down and that we are facing a much brighter future. We are all convinced that the 21st Century will be less violent than the 20th Century has been. The First and Second World Wars and the potential threat of an even more disastrous Third World War are hopefully further and further behind us. While I personally think this is true, this does not free us from the need to look at and guard against the violence and insecurity that is still present in the world and that threatens us. It is the responsibility of the developed world, whatever that term may mean, to concern ourselves not only with what is going on in our areas of engagement, be they the western Balkans, Middle East, or Afghanistan, but also in the forgotten or almost forgotten continent of Africa. Real threats take a long time to develop and when they remain for too long unnoticed they can lead to even greater problems, ones that it may be too late to solve when we wake up from the comfort of the present.

I wish for all peoples to live in peace, but unfortunately this is not yet the case today. We need to voice what we are doing to assist the regions that are concerns at present. We need to empower our Afghan friends and to communicate loudly and clearly what is going on in Afghanistan. I have not heard better news in quite a long time— that Afghanistan, for the first time in 30 years, is able to feed its people. This is a sign of progress. Let us share this with all those who want to hear. Let us remain committed to all those peoples who are in need of our help. Let us be able to win the hearts and minds of all peoples, those back at home, those further away in countries that we are assisting, and those throughout the rest of the world.
Chapter 6

Russia’s Conflict with Georgia:
Uniting for the Way Ahead

His Excellency Giorgi Baramidze
Vice Prime Minister of Georgia

OPENING REMARKS

It is a pleasure to be here and I am glad to speak in front of you once again. Since the seminar in Rome, many things have happened in the world, particularly in and around my country. Unfortunately, many of the things that we anticipated happening last year did happen. Russia, our neighbor and a country with which we have long historic ties and many positive things in common, decided to go beyond just trying to manipulate the separatists and use them to maintain leverage over Georgia. Russia tried to be assertive and control the region, particularly Georgia, because the region is important and because Georgia is important as a gateway not only to the South Caucasus but to Central Asia as well. Geography determines many things, and, given Russia’s desire to be a strong player in the world and to return as a world power, the country needs to control the means and resources of oil and gas delivery. We, the civilized world, see Russia’s extension and enlargement of its security zone as not beneficial for Russia.

RUSSIAN AGGRESSION TOWARD GEORGIA

Unfortunately, very soon after the last seminar and many long discussions and arguments, on August 7, 2008, the active phase of the war started, although for 17 or 18 years Russian troops have been present as peacekeepers in the occupied areas of both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. They were only so-called peacekeepers, however, because they never were neutral, impartial, or tried to meet their mandate—that is, to facilitate confidence-building and protect those on the ground; support Georgia’s statehood, territorial integrity, and human rights; and also make it possible for refugees and internally displaced persons to return to their homes and live side by side with their friends and neighbors as they used to. We know that they supplied the separatists with weapons; supported them politically, financially, economically, and with propaganda; and also in general supported separatism.

Regrettably, it went beyond this. Right after the NATO Summit, when NATO declared that Georgia, along with Ukraine, would become NATO members but failed to provide them with Membership Action Plans, this NATO decision sent a signal to Russia that, indeed, one day, these countries will become members of NATO. It also sent a signal that the Alliance is not fully united, that there are disagreements and no real opportunities to protect these two countries sufficiently, thus creating a window of opportunity for Russia to block the process. As I said, extending areas of security and democracy is viewed by Russia as a kind of threat. The Russians believe that if Georgia enters NATO, Georgia will be gone forever. Then Russia will not be able to realize its plan to have its hands on the oil and gas resources and delivery means in the region. It will also be very difficult for Russia to put pressure on the neighbors it seeks to control, and this would be a bad precedent for Russia.

Of course, it was simple to create a situation in which it was difficult for the world community to determine who shot first. Sadly, this became the main issue, although we know who crossed the border first and who shot first; the fact is that war happened on Georgia’s territory—we never entered Russian territory. Georgian citizens died, and Georgian citizens now suffer. Ethnic cleansing is being conducted by Russian forces and their proxies in South Ossetia and upper Abkhazia. Many villages in South Ossetia that were under the control of the local government loyal to the central government have
been bulldozed to the ground. There are no signs left of the people who lived there or of these villages.

Right now, despite the cease-fire accord signed by three presidents—Medvedev, Sarkozy, and Saakashvili—in practice Russia is violating all six points of the cease-fire agreement. Not only has Russia not withdrawn to its pre-August 7 position, but it has put additional forces on the ground, which fully occupy all those areas plus the Akhalgori region, the village of Perevi, in Upper Abkhazia. The Russians have claimed that events occurred in South Ossetia but they never answered the question about Abkhazia: Why did they attack us in Abkhazia and why now do they try to prevent a European Union monitoring mission from entering the areas defined by the cease-fire six points accord? This is very regrettable, and everyone has condemned Russia's blocking of the OSCE mission in the Tskhinvali region of South Ossetia and, more recently, Russia's veto in the Security Council of a U.N. mission in Abkhazia.

We believe that Russia wants to eliminate the international presence and not have anybody there to see the atrocities that are taking place, and the gross violations of human rights on the ground, especially in the Gali and Akhalgori regions, where the greatest majority of ethnic Georgians live. Russians are also targeting those who are against the occupation policy; ethnic Abkhaz and ethnic Ossetians are being suppressed and their human rights violated. Every day there are killings, kidnappings, and violations of human rights.

GEORGIA'S INTEGRATION WITH THE EURO-ATLANTIC COMMUNITY

In the face of all this, Georgia tries its best to coordinate its efforts with the international community. The European Union monitoring mission is now even more vital, and is practically the only real deterrent against Russia's efforts to wage another war and start another wave of aggression. Prior to August 7, Russians conducted Caucasus 2008 military exercises at the border with Georgia, and their agenda was to put down Georgian forces. They plan to have the same kind of exercises again, even larger, in the North Caucasus, in the immediate vicinity of the Georgian border. Of course, we worry that a second wave of aggression might occur because their goal has not been accomplished. Their goal was not just to control tiny South Ossetia, which became in effect a military camp, but to control all of Georgia, and put down the legitimately and democratically elected Georgian government. Last year, I said that there is no hidden agenda: I said that we just need to see what the Russians are doing and what they are saying, and when we put all this together there will be a clear picture of what their next step is likely to be. That is exactly what happened. Therefore, for us, European and Euro-Atlantic integration has become even more critically important.

One positive thing is that Georgian society consolidated around Georgia's ideal of Georgian democratic statehood—a state that belongs to the community of democratic nations of Europe and the Euro-Atlantic community, united around the idea of joining NATO and, in the future, the European Union. That is what we share with most of the political parties, even the radicals who rallied for several months in front of the Parliament and the Presidential and Government Chancelleries, blocking the streets. Georgian society is very firm in its desire to continue to build democracy according to genuine European standards and to become a NATO member, grow closer to the European Union, and harmonize its legislation.

STEPS FORWARD

Therefore, we took some major steps forward after the war. The NATO-Georgia commission was created, which will lead us toward NATO membership. An annual national program was started in December 2008, enabling us to concentrate on our homework and the further reform of our defense and security institutions, as well as to continue the fight against corruption and to develop economic, educational, health care, and environmental reforms. All of this works in parallel with the European Union ENP (European Neighborhood Policy) action plan that we are implementing and that has similar goals: Strengthening our democracy, strengthening the rule of law, strengthening the judiciary, and harmonizing legislation with that of the European Union. But we are not doing it for NATO or for the European Union: We are doing it for ourselves and for the well-being of our people, because we know that there is no other way to unite our country, contribute to peace and security, build a modern state, and give our citizens a chance to live in a normal and flourishing European country.

This work is indeed very beautiful, with a great deal of potential. Because of our vigorous reforms, the World Bank declared Georgia Europe's number one reformer, based on our five-year reform activities. We are also among the world's five best reformers in terms of financial and economic reforms. Of course, now we need to continue these reforms. We are committed as far as Georgia's domestic policy is concerned, and we are committed to continuing to work with both the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary opposition. To strengthen our democracy, we have offered and are pushing forward
a wide range of reforms, including a constitutional reform, an electoral reform, and a local governance reform. We hope that Georgian society will be united and more mature. Probably to the surprise of the entire world, the Georgian government handled the protest waves very peacefully and in a mature way, and received the full support of the European and North American ambassadors as well as ambassadors from the democratic nations.

UNITING FOR THE WORK AHEAD

There are very positive developments in our country, but the Sword of Damocles still hangs above our necks, because Georgia is still unprotected. We do not believe that anyone can come and physically protect Georgia by sending troops, but we do believe that the international community must be united and that the European Union and NATO must speak with one voice to make Russia understand that having a peaceful, united, democratic, European Georgia as a neighbor is a benefit, not a disadvantage, for Russia. That is what we seek and look forward to. Unfortunately there are no diplomatic ties between our countries and there is only one venue in which we discuss things, the so-called Geneva talks. However, the Geneva talks are downplayed by Russia because, again, at this point, it is not in their plans to speak with Georgia as an equal partner and as a country whose sovereignty, territorial integrity, and freedom must be respected. Therefore, they don’t welcome any kind of activity concerning Georgia in which the international community is involved.

However, we are absolutely confident that, if we in Georgia are united and if the international community is united, we can deal with these issues. Russia is an important country for the international community and it is important for us as well. We believe that one day, when Georgia is on the safe side, Russia will behave pragmatically and constructively and will seek to have the benefits of a peaceful, united, democratic, European Georgia that is a member of NATO and therefore will establish a better relationship with us. We hope that this will materialize and look forward to it taking place.
Chapter 7

Security Challenges in the Western Balkans

Her Excellency Dr. Ljubica Jelusic
Minister of Defense of Slovenia

I would like to turn our attention to the situation in the Western Balkans. Although all of us in the international community agree that our main priority is to solve the security challenges in Afghanistan, I would like to stress that the international concerns in the Western Balkans are not yet resolved. Losing interest in the Balkans in the past has proved disastrous for the stability of the region. It happened at the beginning of 1990 and in 1991 when the international community was not very aware of what was going on in the Balkans. There were big changes happening there, but the attention of the international community was diverted elsewhere at that time. Some larger issues were taking place in the eastern part of Europe and we in the Balkans felt that we were slightly forgotten. While being overlooked in the shadow of bigger events, war began. The disintegration of Yugoslavia came about, and we are still suffering the effects of the upheaval. In the Western Balkans, especially in countries that were formed out of the former Yugoslavia, we still cannot say that we enjoy full security. The war in Yugoslavia clearly demonstrated that the uncontrolled security challenges and instability in the Western Balkans have an important impact on European security and on the security of Slovenia as well. Despite being a country in the region, I must say that sometimes in the past Slovenia has tried to deny that it belongs to this area. Now, however, we are fully aware that our security is influenced by the security of the Western Balkans. This is why we are so in favor of the efforts currently underway in the Balkans that are pushing the region towards Euro-Atlantic integration. I would say that these integration moves are giving the populations in our part of the world a feeling of peace, stability, democracy, and of being among civilized nations. If anything, the new Strategic Concept must count on the aspirations of all countries in the Western Balkans to become NATO members. Currently we have Slovenia, Croatia, and Albania within NATO, we have Macedonia in a halfway position, and we have Montenegro which is fully engaged in trying to become a NATO member. In comparison to Afghanistan—where after eight years of armed conflicts and post-conflict reconstruction, we as an international community are still searching for a new Strategic Concept which could also be called an exit strategy—the current situation in the Western Balkans is much more optimistic.

SOURCES OF INSTABILITY IN THE BALKANS

But there are still at least two sources of instability that will likely impact our common security in the years to come. First of all, I would like to mention Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnia and Herzegovina went through 17 years of United Nations, NATO, European Union, and OSCE presence and all of these organizations influenced its security and stability situation. If we were to talk to politicians today, they would be rather optimistic and say that Bosnia and Herzegovina is a stable country. Although they might admit that it has some economic problems, with regards to the security situation they would say that it is stable enough to transform the remaining military operation there into a different type of mission that is more constructive and less military-focused. However, if we were to talk to ordinary people from Bosnia and Herzegovina, they would say that the political situation today is more fragile than it has been at any other time in the past ten years. In addition, they would say that the security situation in the past six months has been more fragile than it has been at any other time in the past ten years. So on the one hand we have the confident-sounding politicians and on the other hand we have the local people who do not feel as secure as we would like to think. Then in addition we have all of us in the international community who seem to think that we are going to be able to pull out of Bosnia and Herzegovina soon.

The second source of instability is Kosovo. It has now been ten years since the implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244 which deployed NATO peacekeeping forces in Kosovo. When the international community first entered Kosovo in 1999, it actually used a new approach termed a “comprehensive political-military approach.” I cannot say this was a comprehensive approach as we understand it today; when we are talking about Afghanistan today, we also think
about the economic aspects of the comprehensive setting. But we did have different international military and political organizations that all pursued their own jobs within Kosovo. The United Nations, NATO, the European Union, and the OSCE each worked in parallel on a different aspect of security: Each organization had its own role. Each organization has also evolved and changed during the course of the past ten years. Indeed, over time the international community has transformed its presence into a new model of presence. The most recent example is NATO, which is transforming the KFOR operation into a so-called “deterrence presence” next year.

**OUTCOMES OF THE INTERNATIONAL EFFORT IN KOSOVO**

What are the results of our international presence in Kosovo? The security situation is better, the economy is improving, and Kosovo declared independence. It has received some 50 recognitions from different countries around the world. In addition, the educational infrastructure for young people has been established in secondary schools and also at the university level.

But what are the setbacks? First of all, there are problems with respect to the rule of law on the side of the government and also on the side of the population. There have also been failures in creating job opportunities. Earlier today, we talked about problems of poverty and lack of jobs in the context of the Middle East: The situation in Kosovo is very similar. Although the establishment of the educational infrastructure in Kosovo is undoubtedly a positive step, I do fear that this may actually be a prolongation of the inability to provide people with enough jobs, especially in regard to young people. Again, you will find the same demographic trend: The majority of people in Kosovo are young people, and the majority of young people are without jobs. Many of them are now in schools and at universities, both private and government-funded. But in the future when they finish their studies, they may again find themselves without the possibility of getting a proper job.

The second issue which is important in Kosovo is that we did not as an international community help to improve the educational level of the female portion of the young population. We know that women are very successful at finishing primary school and primary education. Unfortunately, it is still too risky for them to travel to far distant secondary schools and to universities. So no matter how clever they are, they end up staying at home. If we want to have the whole population democratized and educated in the new values, we also have to do something for the young female population.

**SLOVENIAN PRESENCE IN KOSOVO**

If I can say a few words about Slovenian efforts to introduce a kind of comprehensive approach on our micro-level within Kosovo: We are trying to assist Kosovo by providing military, police, and development aid, along with different civilian experts who are able to implement projects to help people use this development aid. We are rotating now on a sustainable basis approximately 400 military troops, we are contributing 15 policemen to the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), and we were contributing policemen to the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). We are also contributing experts to NATO training teams for the Kosovo Security Forces (KSF) because we believe that the country must be able to provide its own security forces. It must be able to protect itself. This means that it is important for us to build up KSF as a new force, of course shaped according to the modern standards of a security force. (I would not say “military” because KSF is not meant to become a military force.)

We are also deploying a large Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) group which consists of military and civilian experts. They are now executing projects all over Kosovo, especially at Multinational Task Force West in the western part of the country, which is where Slovenian military troops are engaged. These CIMIC teams are very important for winning hearts and minds. It is also paramount to have such teams dialogue with the local population regarding what our standpoints are concerning their security, their situation, and their future.

**CONCLUSIONS**

I will conclude with my vision of the future of Kosovo. Lasting peace in Kosovo is possible, but the economic situation must improve in order for this to happen. We as an international community should help to improve the economic situation and we should also help to establish the rule of law and the rule of tax-paying, which is not yet introduced in Kosovo—or at least not fully. Lasting peace is also possible if young people are given more job opportunities and—as I have already said and will repeat again—if the government is able to respect the rule of law.
Chapter 8

Georgia’s Current Security Situation

His Excellency Vasil Sikharulidze
Minister of Defense of Georgia

Our globalized world faces multifaceted security challenges ranging from weapons of mass destruction to transnational crime, terrorism, and everything in between. The challenges and complexities might seem insurmountable but the first step in solving problems is to recognize that they exist. Because recent events show that at least some of these challenges may be linked to traditional geopolitical gambits of aggressive states, please allow me to draw your attention again to the current security situation in Georgia. I apologize if I repeat certain points that have been already mentioned.

THE SITUATION IN GEORGIA

Today, the security situation in Georgia is tense. Russian armed forces occupy the Georgian territories of Abkhazia, the Tskhinvali region, the Akhalgori district, and the village of Perevi. Russian occupation forces deny the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) access to the occupied territories, thwarting the EUMM mandate, which covers the entire Georgian territory. Recently Russia also vetoed the renewal of the U.N. Observer Mission in Georgia and the OSCE mission in Georgia.

Let me be clear: Russia is in complete violation of the six-point cease-fire agreement brokered by French President Sarkozy on August 12, 2008. Such behavior undermines the security of every country represented at this workshop. As democracy moves east, we need to pay attention to the dynamic security situation in a sort of swish that begins at the Baltic Sea, moves south through the Balkans, and pivots eastward at the Black Sea. Georgia stands at the pivot point of this swish.

TURNING THE ENERGY CORRIDOR INTO A COMMERCIAL AND SECURITY CORRIDOR

From that perspective, we now have the prospect of linking the Caspian Sea, the Eurasian heartland, Europe, and the North Atlantic in a single 21st Century zone of prosperity and democracy. The Black Sea region to which Georgia belongs is key to the security and stability of this zone. On the eastern shore of the Black Sea, Georgia is part of Europe and a gateway to and from Central Asia. It is a vital conduit for energy supplies from the Caspian Sea and from potential Central Asian suppliers beyond.

That corridor is usually referred to in the context of energy, particularly the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and South Caucasus natural gas pipelines. However, these energy conduits form the critical mass required to promote and sustain a broad east-west commercial corridor. With commerce come people, so this east-west corridor will also become a pathway for ideas, which is perhaps the most important prospect. Also, the strengthening and development of this energy corridor will greatly contribute to the energy security of the entire European continent. In the immediate term, this corridor is also vital as an alternative supply route to Afghanistan. All at once, a South Caucasus route offers another alternative and a chance for independent NATO diplomacy with the Central Asian countries.

GEORGIAN SUPPORT OF SECURITY AND PEACE

In the context of Afghanistan, I would like to emphasize that Georgia has opened its territory and facilities to the Alliance and offers all logistical support within its means. Moreover, following the serving of nearly 10,000 Georgian soldiers in different NATO and coalition-led peacekeeping operations, Georgia is set to rejoin ISAF. In autumn 2009, we will
send a Georgian infantry company to Afghanistan and, in early 2010, we will send a Georgian battalion, with no caveats attached.

Despite our challenges, we are determined to do our part in support of world peace and stability. Although we face many threats, let us not forget that they are the consequence of a very positive development—a peace after the Cold War, democracy spread eastward with remarkable celerity. The new democracies of Eastern Europe aspire to join Western institutions, not only for their own security and prosperity but also for shared values. This is the institutionalization of freedom, not a sinister plot to redraw lines on the map.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

At this point I would like to recall the words of EU High Representative Javier Solana: “Security in Europe has schemes, has organizations, has structures that are working properly.” In this regard, membership in NATO remains a top Georgian policy priority, and we very much appreciate the Alliance’s commitment to us at the April 2008 Bucharest Summit, reiterated in April 2009 at the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit. Georgia is—and always will be—indeed independent and democratic. Our security, as well as our stability, in the Black Sea and the Caucasus regions must not be seen as being in our interest alone, but also as being in the interest of all countries that champion peace and stability. Indeed, I would argue that a stable Black Sea and a functioning east-west corridor would bring peace, prosperity, and democratic development to all countries in the region.

In that spirit, Georgia remains steadfast in its commitment to strengthening its democracy, accomplishing its defense reform program, and contributing to international peacekeeping operations. If we stand up for our security today, we will build a brighter, more cooperative future for tomorrow.
Chapter 9

Security in the Balkans—A Montenegrin Perspective

His Excellency Boro Vučinić
Minister of Defense of Montenegro

OPENING REMARKS

I would like to thank the 26th International Workshop on Global Security and the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Turkey for my invitation here. It is a great honor and a privilege to have an opportunity at such a high-level gathering to present the perspective of a small country, one that became independent in 2006 after almost 90 years of existence. It is also a special pleasure for me to speak in a country that, in the late 19th Century, was the first with which Montenegro, after being internationally recognized at the Berlin Congress, established diplomatic relations. As far as historic importance is concerned, Istanbul is the right place to talk about the issues of global security.

THE NEED FOR INTEGRATED SECURITY

When we talk about global security today, we have to state that the dynamics of modern international relations stipulate different approaches for solving emerging problems. First of all, developing cooperation between states in all fields is an important prerequisite for global security. In the 21st Century, it is almost unimaginable to be able to resolve security issues only through military means. The strategies that used to yield results and that successfully challenged security issues are less and less efficient today. It is clear that the current national security concept obtains its full meaning only in the broader framework of security integration.

The region to which Montenegro belongs particularly experienced these changes in the late 20th Century. Even though our country is much more stable today, we think that NATO’s presence is very important for the permanent stabilization of the Western Balkans. In line with the security changes that have taken place lately, NATO transformed itself from a clearly military alliance to an organization with a very strong political aspect. The fact that NATO recently celebrated the 60th anniversary of its existence is the best indicator of the adjustments it has made to the new conditions. Other indicators include the NATO expansion process and the fact that almost all the countries of Eastern Europe have expressed their readiness to meet the criteria necessary for full-fledged membership in NATO. A large number of them have already met these criteria.

MONTENEGRO’S ACHIEVEMENTS

After regaining its independence, Montenegro defined its membership in NATO and the EU as a foreign policy priority. Since that time, Montenegro has achieved great economic growth. The 2008 state budget always had a surplus, and for a short period of time we have been one of the fastest-growing tourist economies in the world. Such a robust trend of positive changes and integration processes has involved the security sector. Immediately after we regained our statehood, we received an invitation to the Partnership for Peace program. Since then, we have worked intensively on defense system reform and building a new army. As an affirmation of the progress we have made we received an invitation from the Bucharest Summit to begin an Intensified Dialogue. At the Strasbourg / Kehl Summit, Montenegro’s progress in its foreign processes was clearly recognized, which opened the way for us to meet at some of the upcoming regular sessions of the North Atlantic Council at the ambassador level.

The best indicator of what we have done in a short time regarding the building of our ministry and army is the fact that, besides a large number of obligations we successfully met, we submitted our country as a candidate to host the Cooperative Marlin 2010 exercise. We also submitted our country as a candidate to host the MEDCUR 2010 exercise in cooperation...
with EUCOM. At the time of this workshop, one of our most important activities is preparing our army personnel to participate in peacekeeping missions. Montenegro is determined, in line with its capacities, to contribute to keeping peace and stability in crisis regions. We have been working intensively on preparing a three-member medical team and one platoon to participate in the ISAF mission, and we plan to deploy them by the end of 2009.

**CONCLUDING REMARKS**

Even though we are a small country, Montenegro plays an important role in enabling peace and stability in the Western Balkans. I think we also can benefit the most from stability in the region. When it comes to regional cooperation, Montenegro’s center for training helicopter pilots was nominated to become a regional center because of its remarkably favorable and unique geographic and climatic conditions.

We are convinced that the Western Balkan states, in line with their individual agreements regarding reform processes and their expressed desire to join the Euro-Atlantic community, will have an open path to full-fledged membership in NATO. Since there are still some unresolved issues and since the past has been full of conflict, the memory of which is still fresh in the minds of these states’ citizens, only complete integration in a stable structure such as NATO is the best guarantee of permanent stability and prosperity. With such a vision, Montenegro is stepping into the future.
Chapter 10

Black Sea Security and the Importance of
A New NATO Strategic Concept

His Excellency Imants Liegis
Minister of Defense of Latvia

It is good to be back in Istanbul because in my former capacity as Latvian Permanent Representative to the Alliance, I had the privilege of being here when Turkey hosted the important 2004 Summit in which Latvia, along with six other aspiring members to the Alliance, was admitted to NATO. That was of course the big bang: people have probably forgotten about the big bang but for us it was extremely important. From the Northern perspective and Latvian perspective, certainly it was a critical accession to the greatest military alliance that history has known. So, we were very proud to become members of the Alliance, having fulfilled all of the requirements of the Membership Action Plan and the requirements of democracy and human rights that accession demanded vis-à-vis both the Alliance and the European Union.

NATO MEMBERSHIP AS AN EXERCISE IN REGIONAL COOPERATION

It is important to recall that this happened five years ago. Our accession was also an important exercise in regional cooperation. Originally, this panel was going to be focused on security challenges from the Baltic to the Black Sea, but of course we have got the three Bs now—the Black Sea, the Baltic Sea, and the Balkans—I will focus more on the Northern European aspect and then come on to the Black Sea regional element because as I mentioned, for us, integrating amongst our three small countries of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania, actually was very important. It was a major part of the process of moving into the Alliance where we were able to show that the interests of our three countries together were mutual and, at a very early stage, we were able to recognize that this was an additional value that we brought into NATO. I would argue that this is still very much the case because Baltic cooperation has continued to flourish. A few days ago, my Estonian colleague, Jaak Aaviksoo, was visiting a town in Latvia where we celebrated the 90th anniversary of a joint Latvian/Estonian victory over Germany, then the enemy; and I have been in office for just over 100 days and I have already had five bilateral meetings with my Estonian counterpart during that time. So this just gives you an idea of how close the Latvian/Estonian and the Latvian/Lithuanian cooperation is. It is particularly close in the area of defense and military cooperation where we have a number of joint projects. We have a very successful defense college, the Baltic Defense College based in the ancient university town of Tartu in Estonia. We have a Diving School on the Latvian coast that also trains Georgians. It is a Baltic project. We also have an Aerospace Initiative and the fact that the Alliance has been able to deal with the air policing of the NATO airspace in Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania is very important with regard to the tangible presence of the Alliance in our countries. I describe this as a NATO aspect because we are members of the Alliance so it is not just their patrolling of the Baltic airspace; they are helping us because of the lack of capabilities that we have to deal with air policing. NATO is very present in our countries through air policing.

IMPORTANCE OF THE REVISION OF THE NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT

As we get into this next phase of our membership after the important Strasbourg / Kehl Summit, I would like to stress that, for us, the Strategic Concept that is being revised is also extremely important. This was discussed yesterday and our Portuguese colleague, Minister Severiano Teixeira, mentioned the priorities that he saw, including enlargement. From our perspective, the core function of the Alliance for us is still crucial, i.e., the collective defense aspect, along with the new threats that have emerged since the existing Strategic Concept was drawn up. These new threats relate to things like energy security, cyber attacks, and terrorism which have been in focus during the last several years and which have become the
bigger threats to global security in today’s age. We are looking forward to being engaged in discussing the Strategic Concept and having some input. We have a candidate for the group which will be focusing on the Strategic Concept. In fact, we have a joint Baltic candidate and hope that he will be accepted in the group of wise persons working on this new document.

SECURITY IN THE BLACK SEA REGION

Linking into the Black Sea region and the question of security within this part of Europe, Turkey is very much a part of Europe. Latvia fully supports Turkey’s aspirations for joining the European Union. As to the August 2008 events between Georgia and Russia, Latvia felt that Europe was now facing a new security situation. This was really a wake up call that we were no longer in a status quo following the last enlargement and the lessons that we learned were very traumatic. The people in Latvia witnessed our joint neighbor, Russia, actually militarily intervening for the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union on the sovereign territory of a neighboring country. One of the pretexts that was used for this intervention on the Russian side was to protect their nationals living in Georgia. For us, this was a very worrying lesson to be learned and it made our membership in the Alliance even more relevant. The fact is that there has been a refusal to continue the ongoing presence in Georgia of two important international organizations, the United Nations and the OSCE. The EU Monitoring Mission as we have heard is performing an important but limited role because it is not allowed into the territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia despite the cease-fire agreement that was mentioned also in the discussion earlier this morning.

So I agree with Giorgi Baramidze when he said that NATO brings greater stability and security. Certainly that is the lesson that we have learned. We have made a contribution to NATO and we have 164 soldiers serving in Afghanistan at the moment, 30 of them in the east of the country in the Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT) in a very dangerous environment. We have had some casualties recently. But our sense is that the Alliance does bring security and stability to the region. We are fortunate in the Baltic region that it is now a secure and stable area and we hope very much that this security and stability will remain in the Black Sea region in the years ahead. We must continue to engage with Russia. We do feel that it is very important to continue the dialogue with Russia, our important neighbor and strategic partner. We thought that there had been a slight halt in the relationship with the EU and NATO as a result of this event but are pleased that the partnership and cooperation is back on track.
Chapter 11

How to “Reset the Matrix” of European-Atlantic Security

Ambassador Vladimir A. Chizhov
Russian Ambassador to the European Union

In today’s world, “Global Security in Times of Economic Uncertainty” is a rather equivocal title for a conference held. The current global economic and financial crisis can be rightfully considered a blessing in disguise for the security sphere. It vividly illustrates that we are living in a world of interconnection and interdependence, where no one is secure against the negative consequences that affect us on a global scale.

THE RESULTS OF A “FRAGMENTATION OF SECURITY”

What we face in these “times of turmoil,” 20 years after the end of the Cold War, is fragmentation of security, particularly in the Euro-Atlantic space. We have failed to establish a system of international mechanisms that adequately correspond to the new and evolving world realities, bringing together East and West, North, and South.

Ever since World War II, Europe has been a beacon of peace, stability, and cooperation for the rest of the world. Even at the height of Cold War rhetoric, countries situated on our continent and those closely connected with it managed to temper their ideological zeal and reach consensus on the Helsinki Final Act. It was then that Russia and Western Europe became linked with the increasingly famous network of oil and gas pipelines that have served everyone’s economic interests so well.

But can Europe claim it still remains that beacon of peace today? Certainly not. It is still haunted by ghosts of its Cold War past, and still unable to free itself from a bloc mentality and to overcome its lack of trust.

A real paradox lies in acknowledging the obvious failure of financial and economic instruments to prevent the current crisis and in insisting there is nothing substantially wrong with the system of Euro-Atlantic security. This system claims to be healthy, requiring only, if anything, some fine-tuning of EU-NATO interaction, the primary (or even the only) pillar of security in the Euro-Atlantic space. Russian concerns, meanwhile, can supposedly be addressed by explaining to Moscow the virtues of the present-day security architecture and by helping it to “accommodate” itself within that structure.

Alas, the real picture is substantially different. A series of events during the last few years—including the conflicts in the Balkans, the Kosovo Unilateral Declaration of Independence, the August 2009 catastrophe in the South Caucasus, the stagnation of confidence building and the CFE Treaty crisis, and ABM plans—confirm that Russian concerns are well-founded, to say the least.

As challenges become more global in nature, the answers that are offered are still limited in scope and suffering from Cold War era psychological constraints. Attempts to build a new Euro-Atlantic order exclusively on the basis of NATO, the EU, and the OSCE, each responsible for its own segment of security, are similar to the ancient cosmogonist theory that placed the Earth on the backs of three whales.

NATO centrism has led the Alliance toward a dangerous trap of perceived infallibility, yielding to the temptation of unilateral actions and lowering the threshold for the use of force. As a closed membership club created in a different era for totally different reasons, NATO is by definition unable to provide security for everyone in the 21st Century.

The EU is certainly less ambitious and less arrogant in that respect, focusing on “soft security.” But it is also a limited-membership union, increasingly reluctant to incorporate new members and taking up instead the policy of “near abroad,” renaming it the European Neighborhood Policy.

The OSCE, as designed by its founding fathers, was much better placed to play the role of a broad-based centerpiece of a Euro-Atlantic security architecture. But it was prevented from ever rising to the task. The OSCE Istanbul Summit in 1999 produced the Charter of European Security, but even that significant document was virtually forgotten overnight.
The balance of the famous three baskets was refocused—and ultimately lost. As a result, a recent OSCE Ministerial Council failed to agree on a document because one delegation refused to accept references to the decalogue of the Helsinki Final Act. The OSCE never became a full-fledged international organization with adequate legal capacity, and a founding member’s capital suffered bomb attacks by other OSCE-participating states. A vivid confirmation of this point is the fact that the Vienna Confidence Building Measures (CBM) document was updated four times in the 1990s and never again since 1999.

REVITALIZING CONFIDENCE AND PREVENTING NEW LINES OF DIVISION

The most perishable commodity in international affairs is confidence. It is best established on the basis of legally binding obligations, rather than vague political commitments or gentlemen’s agreements. This conclusion is based on hard facts: The commitments not to expand NATO eastward and to ratify the adopted CFE (just two examples) were never adhered to by members of the North Atlantic Alliance.

The issue at stake is how to revitalize confidence, prevent multiplication of dividing lines, be they on the ground, in political or military planning, or just in the minds of those involved in decisionmaking, and revitalize public opinion across the Euro-Atlantic space. By now it has become almost universally accepted that the world we live in is multipolar. It is high time to get rid of any Cold War remnants that affect the relations between players in the Euro-Atlantic area and to concentrate on common efforts to address global and regional challenges to security. In fact, the current financial-economic crisis may indeed serve as a positive incentive, stimulating not only concerted efforts to establish a healthier world financial and economic order, but also a more pragmatic approach to security, untainted by an outdated bloc mentality.

This pragmatic innovative thinking underpins the now well-known proposal by President Dmitry Medvedev to develop and ultimately conclude a new Treaty on European Security. Judging by initial reactions from various quarters, we believe that this proposal has come at an appropriate moment and has addressed outspoken or lingering concerns over deficiencies of the current security system. In spite of some reservations and objections, in general it has been received with genuine interest. I am sure that, whatever the political considerations of the moment, any serious and unbiased analyst would agree that there is no alternative to collective solutions for security problems and that there is no way to provide for one’s own security at the expense of the security of others.

The proposed treaty is intended to ensure that the principle of indivisibility of security is adhered to by all. In fact, we are not trying to invent any new principles of international behavior. The gist of the proposal is to transfer well-known and widely accepted political declarations into respective legal obligations.

We consider it prudent to, first, employ all relevant formats of political dialogue (including the OSCE, the Russia-EU political dialogue, the Russia-NATO Council, and bilateral contacts), and, second, to launch formal negotiations engaging all states in the broader Euro-Atlantic region as well as all international organizations active in the security field. And this is not just to show that we do not intend to sideline or undermine NATO or the EU. It reflects our belief that each of those organizations has indeed a role to perform in the new Euro-Atlantic security architecture.

ENABLING DIALOGUE TO “RESET THE MATRIX” OF EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY

With all of the above in mind, we propose to convene in 2010 a pentalateral meeting of the OSCE, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), NATO, the EU, and CIS high-level representatives in order to compare their security strategies. The appropriate format for this will be provided by the Collective Security Platform, which, I remind you, was established 10 years ago in this city of Istanbul. In preparation for this meeting we are prepared for frank brainstorming discussions at the informal OSCE ministerial meeting in Corfu with the participating above-mentioned organizations. A dialogue on “resetting the matrix” of Euro-Atlantic security has in fact already been launched. We expect it to help all states and all security organizations within our common space agree on the way we should live and how we can ensure our security without posing risks and threats to the security of others.

Russia is ready for a wide-ranging and frank discussion. We invite our partners to put forward concrete ideas.
Chapter 12

Globalization, the Economy, and Security

Mr. Shekhar Dutt
Deputy National Security Advisor of India

GLOBAL CHANGES

It is a very difficult task to address you after the addresses made by such eminent speakers—strategic thinkers and security specialists who have shared their views with you. I consider it a singular privilege to be invited to share my thoughts to an audience as eminent as this one. I would like to offer a few observations on global security in times of economic uncertainty.

So as not to repeat anything that may already have been stated, let me provide you with an overview, one that will accommodate all dimensions of security, external as well as internal, and that includes technology. It will focus on the very issues that have engaged you in these proceedings so far.

The disappearance of bloc policies was expected to end all global tensions; unfortunately, along with this change, came the preclusion of traditional regulators. Therefore, while risks to international peace were reduced, the situation did not result in an end to violence. Without going into the dynamics of the shift and the global changes that have continued to date, I will now cover the broad themes of the universal changes that we see today. I will group them under three headings, which can loosely be termed “revolutions,” for want of a better word. Their impact on security will become obvious as I outline them.

The Geo-Strategic Revolution

Currently we are going through a stage of asymmetric multi-polarity. I call it this because, while we are not unipolar, the U.S. pole is the strongest and ideology is no longer a divisive force. Even nationalism is tempered by the desire to build market economies. Tensions are transnational, and they do not stem from the actions of one particular government nor do they remain restricted to a regional sphere. Capitalism and communism can fruitfully work together, a historical change. In a nutshell, economics is becoming as or even more important than political ideology.

The Technological Revolution

This revolution is an obvious instrument of change. Newer technologies are now emerging at a pace that provides access to an array of information, something that could not have been imagined earlier. More open sources are becoming available, which has led to the emergence of distinct themes of national power. Such technological facilitators are, in fact, a prerequisite for economic growth. The ubiquity of global communication is also creating avenues of cross movement of interests and values.

The Government Revolution

The third and final group of changes can be called the government revolution. The power of international business has increased at the cost of the power that governments exercised earlier. In many ways, the sphere of state control is shrinking, and central governments are, therefore, on the retreat. However, lately, the economic recession is not permitting states to remain so detached and is mandating more proactive intervention. Yet, this intervention is being made through existing institutions of market forces and not as an obsessive form of control.
DISSONANCE CAUSED BY CHANGE

Let me briefly and very broadly touch on the dissonance these impulses of change are causing. Currently security has a far more comprehensive connotation than a purely military construct. Today, individuals and society as a whole think of themselves as an equal and complementary matrix of national security. The bandwidth of the security dimension, therefore, is impelled to include social, political, economic, agricultural, environmental, and energy ingredients.

The Aspirational Dilemma

The first element of social dissonance is what I term the aspirational dilemma. The information technology revolution as well as the growth of awareness has led to rising expectations while reality has lagged far behind. Such a sense of disillusionment and its concomitant problems can cause sociopolitical upheaval. At the individual level, the easiest exit from this vexation is militancy. At the collective level, the manifestation of societal anger gets directed against the state. The trend lines of conflict, therefore, have moved from regular war to an irregular confrontation, all within the purview of what the military chooses to call the genre of asymmetric warfare.

The focus seems to have changed toward the exploitation of internal alienation or discord in another state to reduce its comparative power, and a host of facilitators encourage this process. These range from the portability of potent arms to the resources of mercenaries and terrorists. Siege mentality and reactive attitudes only assist in discord’s spread.

The Ethno-Religious Dimension

In any diverse and democratic country, an ethno-religious dimension exists. Ethnicity and religion should actually help nation building, but when political aims and processes exploit them, they become tools of assertion. Ideological underpinnings then result in violence and crime. Globalization needs to reverse this tendency, and can do so by promoting and aiding civil and cultural identities. A universality of ideas should be more important than traditional moorings for seeking collective identity. If universality is not reached, instability and demographic shifts only increase.

GLOBALIZATION AND ECONOMIC SECURITY

Let me once again touch on globalization and economic security. A nation’s economic weight in the world decides its international, political, and military position, and food security, infrastructure, and energy needs are part of this definition. The speed of economic growth, however, cannot be viewed independently but needs to be seen through the prism of cooperative security. This will define that growth’s permanence and longevity. If growth is not seen in this way, the self-interests and restrictions of certain quarters in the world can create uncontrollable turbulence. Therefore we need to accommodate the aspirations of the developing world. This is quite akin to the consideration shown to a pedestrian who is crossing a fast lane of traffic.

All of this forces me to think of the incipient agitation in the minds of nuclear families that are impacted by the economic downturn. Adding to their dilemma is the reality that the world is not uniformly developed. Breeding grounds of turmoil and violence exist wherever institutions of stability have not evolved or where governance issues need attention. With technology facilitating an unrestricted flow of ideas that can be further networked, problems can mutate to increasingly complex forms. This emerging malaise can be tackled only through the strengths of global interdependence.

BENEFITS OF AN INTERCONNECTED WORLD

I have highlighted the problems of an interconnected world, but I would now like to mention the great advantages of this epiphenomenon. Interconnection has increased interdependence, connection, and integration on a global level—a connection that covers all social, cultural, political, technological, economic, and ecological levels. It has enhanced the flow of information between geographically remote locations and has consequently increased the aspirations of people, especially those living in developing countries. Globalization has thus increased economic prosperity and opportunity in developing countries; there is no longer a clear distinction between “foreign” and “domestic,” “internal” and “external,” “national” and “international,” or “global” and “local.”
CHALLENGES FOR POLICY MAKERS

However, along with benefits also come acute challenges for policy makers. Because of globalization, if some nations fail to cooperatively engage with global economic, security, and environmental challenges, all nations will simultaneously fail to deal with those challenges’ impact on their individual countries.

The implication is that, in order to advance our individual nation’s interests at home, we must increasingly engage with other nations to work out a composite response to challenges. It is no longer possible to believe that problems abroad do not affect countries internally. A nation’s foreign policy, economic policy, and national security policy must increasingly be seen as natural expressions and extensions of that nation’s domestic policy interests, not as some sort of exotic policy removed from reality and alien to the interests of the common people.

In the past, economic cycles of boom and bust left their indelible mark on individual families, altering the lifestyles of successive generations. Economic depressions brought unparalleled hardship to all regions of affected countries, placing entire communities at risk. The current economic recession has similarly affected almost everyone in the global community, either directly or indirectly. It has affected small local businesses, large industries and companies, as well as individuals and families.

Economic risk indicators such as high levels of unemployment and a sudden severe worsening of economic conditions can be important drivers of conflict. Many states in Africa and Asia already face such conditions. As such conditions drive weak states and divided societies over the edge, we cannot wish away the violence and political instability that spills over to other countries in the neighborhood. The situation can also be exploited by terrorists and those engaged in transnational crime, principally in drug and weapons trading for economic survival.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Today, security issues do not remain confined within a single country. As situations in some countries become critical, relatively stronger countries will inevitably be drawn to respond either through military intervention or through financial and logistical support to others, or both. The message is very clear: All nations need to be more capable of adapting successfully to economic uncertainty and change.

The international community must not wait for trouble to break out. It must make commitments to preventive action to contribute to global economic growth and international stability. The wealthy states must not turn inward and indulge in protectionism in the face of tight fiscal conditions at home. Greater international coordination and mutual support are needed more than ever before. Action is needed now to help poor countries grow in a way that is robust, sustainable, and equitable. Measures to protect core expenditures on health, education, water, sanitation, and other basic services are vital.

In a very simplistic way, I find the laws of physics work in development models as well. The effects of action in one location are automatically transferred to another location, even without any perceptible movement. Social chemistry also must be simultaneously harmonized—the universality of ideas has to prevail over restricted identities. Leaders of the world must continue to participate in the process so that the collective will prevails over the short-term challenges we face.

Although the picture may appear gloomy, the answer to our problems is clear: The measures we take today will shape our tomorrow. Current technological and social trends are global and cannot be stopped. Our answers and responses must also be global. The long-term interests of each country are linked to the long-term interests of the world. We cannot afford to think in any other way.
Chapter 13

NATO’s New Strategic Concept

Ambassador Stewart Eldon
Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom on the North Atlantic Council

THE NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT

I thought I would say a few words about a very big item on the NATO agenda this year: the new Strategic Concept. As you know, the Strategic Concept is in essence NATO’s mission statement, or, in military speak, its strategic directive. The present Strategic Concept was agreed to in 1999. The great majority of it remains valid, and highly relevant. But some of its aspects, in particular, NATO’s approach to new threats and challenges such as cyberattacks and energy security and how it should relate to other international organizations (the Comprehensive Approach), manifestly need updating. There is also an increasing feeling, which came through quite strongly at the Strasbourg / Kehl Summit, that more work is necessary to explain to Allied publics—indeed to the wider world—what NATO is and what it does. Too many people still think in terms of Cold War stereotypes. A new Strategic Concept, written in the right way, would be an excellent way of doing that.

At Strasbourg, heads of state and government adopted a declaration on Alliance security, which can essentially be seen as the foreword to the new Strategic Concept. It is only one page and a half long, and I hope you will read it. Unlike many NATO documents, it was not drafted line by line, but rather through a process of iterative discussion between the Secretary General and ambassadors. It contains some important points:

• A reaffirmation of NATO’s place as the essential transatlantic forum for security consultations among Allies. I sense that, particularly following the advent of the new U.S. administration, the consultation element is becoming more important for many Allies.

• Confirmation that Article 5 of the Washington Treaty remains the cornerstone of the Alliance. This is coupled with a determination to strengthen NATO’s capacity to play an important role in crisis management and conflict resolution wherever its interests are involved.

• An important reference to strengthening NATO’s cooperation with other international actors, including the U.N., EU, OSCE, and African Union, combined with recognition of the importance of a stronger and more capable European defense and determination to ensure that the NATO-EU relationship is a truly functioning strategic partnership.

• Important language on new threats, including, for the first time, climate change.

The declaration concludes by tasking the Secretary General with developing a new Strategic Concept and submitting proposals for its implementation and approval at the 2010 Summit in Lisbon. The Heads of state and government asked him to convene and lead a broad-based group of experts to help him do this, and to keep the Council in permanent session involved throughout the process. The Heads drafted this language themselves with the aim of avoiding a lowest-common-denominator approach to the Strategic Concept and to producing a document that will make a real difference.

KEY POINTS

Work on the new Strategic Concept will have to cover some important and fundamental issues. I will not go into them all now, but I will just give a flavor of what I think will be some of the key points. These include:

• The right balance between the effort and the resources devoted to collective defense and expeditionary activity. The truth is that in this day and age, when the classic military threat to Alliance territory is negligible, broadly the same capabilities are needed to do both things.

• How to deal with the new threats and challenges, many of which are not NATO’s prime responsibility. Could a
cyberattack, for example, ever escalate to an Article 5 scenario?
• Linked to this is how NATO should relate to other international organizations, in particular to the EU. The fact that we are meeting in the glorious city of Istanbul should remind us that this is not straightforward.
• Finally, how do we manage the balance between our level of ambition and the resources available to fulfill it at a time of global economic difficulty? This has fundamental implications for capability development, including avoiding overlap between the work underway in NATO and in the European Defense Agency.
All of that will, in all honesty, give us more than enough to go with.
I would like to address the new Strategic Concept from a few standpoints. The 1999 Strategic Concept is actually not a bad document. It is fairly forward-looking and much of it is still relevant. But the principal difference—as I think everyone recognizes—is the September 11th attacks which have occurred in the meantime. The significance of September 11th, and the declaration by NATO of Article 5, was that international terrorism constituted and was seen as a strategic threat to the Alliance for the first time, despite the fact that terrorism had been endemic to many of our societies for a very long time indeed.

I think that the nature of this threat—of international terrorism—has led to a number of considerations which will be reflected in the new Strategic Concept which we are about to begin negotiating. The first consideration is the enduring role of collective defense and the transatlantic link. Second, threats are now seen as emerging well beyond the immediate territory of the Alliance and an expeditionary capacity is required to meet them. Third, we have learned that we need to be flexible in the way in which we address these threats. Military force is often necessary but clearly not sufficient, and the diplomatic capacity of the Alliance I think if anything will be given greater weight in the new Strategic Concept. Fourth, we have learned through experience that NATO has to work with others to achieve its objectives.

**IMPLICATIONS OF AFGHANISTAN FOR THE NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT**

Based on these broad considerations, I would like to identify some of the lessons of Afghanistan for the new Strategic Concept. I think the most important issue is the comprehensive approach. There is no solution that can rely solely on military force for Afghanistan, and NATO cannot work in isolation. We learned this lesson in the Balkans. Perhaps not sufficiently well, however, because it took some time to flesh out a similar approach with Afghanistan, though in a much different context.

Second, future expeditionary missions need to begin with a comprehensive approach at the front end. This approach needs to lay out the roles of the various actors going in, whether it be the U.N., NATO, EU, or others. We are in a sense creating this as we go along, as you have seen through the various strategies that have been proposed along the way. NATO requires better docking mechanisms to civilian component contributors.

Third, building indigenous security capacity is something we began doing in the Balkans and we are doing in a major way in Afghanistan. This has included the training of both indigenous armed forces and police. We should have begun doing this from the onset in Afghanistan. We are doing it well now, however. As you all know, the ISAF Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OML Ts) have been a creative and decisive means of extending this training. The NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A) institutionalizes this approach in a cross-theatre aspect. But one of the questions we will have to consider in the debate over the new Strategic Concept is whether we need a standing command in NATO, a new command, devoted to the training of indigenous forces now and in future missions. This is an important issue to address.

Finally, we need to consider the principles of Allied solidarity and strategic unity. The use of restrictive geographic and operational caveats hampers military effectiveness. This cannot be overlooked in light of the corrosive effect caveats have had on Allied solidarity. We need to ensure that in future operations we take measures which avoid turning NATO into a “two tiered” alliance, which would be very negative from our perspective. Once a mission is agreed, the obligations which flow from it need to be fully and equitably implemented by all.

To conclude, the new Strategic Concept could help us avoid such a scenario by drawing closer links between collective defense, as reflected in Article 5, and the expeditionary capacity needed to meet emerging threats at strategic distance.
Chapter 15

Rethinking NATO’s Strategic Concept: A View from Poland

Ambassador Boguslaw Winid
Permanent Representative of Poland on the North Atlantic Council

Before delving into the new Strategic Concept, let me briefly discuss one area where Turkey and Poland have recently worked together. This is in the creation of the new NATO Signal Regiment. We completed the process just last week during the NATO Ministerial. In this new structure, for the first time in history we will probably have a Turkish colonel commanding a signal battalion in Poland. This aptly illustrates the growth and capability development currently underway at NATO. The Signal Regiment will allow our troops in Afghanistan and elsewhere to perform better and is an ideal illustration of transformation and the manner in which we should continue to develop new technology.

THE NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT

Regarding the new Strategic Concept, this is our priority for the coming weeks and months and we hope to complete the project before the NATO Summit in Lisbon next year or by 2011 at the latest. This is a challenging task since we have to find the common denominator for the strategic interests of 28 nations, which means 28 different perceptions of security and 28 different levels of sensitivity. But we have done this successfully in the past and I am certain we will be able to find common ground in this situation as well.

In terms of our vision, we of course attach great importance to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty as well as to capabilities related to collective defense. As discussed by previous panelists, there are no urgent threats looming on the horizon right now but we have to be ready for the future. We have absolutely no idea what will happen 10 years from now or what our security environment will be then. But we must find the proper balance between Article 5 and operations. As I mentioned above, with 28 different members and viewpoints we will probably have 28 different definitions of what balance or proper balance means, but that is the beauty of NATO.

We also agree that the forces participating in operations should be used for collective defense. There may be some tailoring needed, but this is the way forward and we understand that, should a situation arise in a few years time where one ally must be aided by the other allies, units which are more mobile will make it easier to do so. It is thus especially important for us to agree on the proper balance between units in terms of which ones are assigned to which roles.

From our perspective, operations are becoming increasingly important right now. We have more than 2,000 troops and are responsible for providing assistance to Afghans in the province of Ghazni. In terms of our plans to further develop our structure in Ghazni, we will probably go up to the brigade strength. Unfortunately right now we have to create a composition from different units coming from different structures. The goal is to create a system where we are able to rotate brigade for brigade, and the true measure of the success of the transformation of our land forces will be when we are able to do so. This is of course provided that the situation on the ground requires such a large structure. There is much progress currently underway and we hope that it will become even more visible in the coming months.

THE PRT AND CIVILIAN ACTIVITIES IN AFGHANISTAN

I would like to conclude with a few words about our Provincial Reconstruction Team in the province of Ghazni. We were faced with a situation where our forces and civilian employees were erecting public building projects during the day, and then during the night the OMF (opposing militant forces) or Talibans were destroying what we had just built. So our work was not very effective. We therefore analyzed what the Talibans were destroying—and especially what they were not destroying—and found that while of course their first targets were educational institutions, they were not touching any medical facilities or religious sites. So this gave us some options to work with.
In 2013 the city of Ghazni will be the world capital of Islam under the auspices of UNESCO. We are therefore implementing building and reconstruction projects which will help to showcase Ghazni in this role. It also means that we can put to this project many smaller initiatives which will benefit the overall development of the region as a whole. Most importantly, it is much safer for our Afghan colleagues building these roads and buildings as it does not put them in any personal danger from the Taliban. This is a highly effective way of helping Afghanistan.
Chapter 16

Establishing the New Strategic Concept

Ambassador Sorin Dimitru Ducaru
Permanent Representative of Romania on the North Atlantic Council

In speaking about how to address the new Strategic Concept, I am going to build upon some remarks made by others in this panel. First, Stewart Eldon raised the issue of finding the right balance between collective defense and expeditionary forces—a topic echoed by Robert McRae. As a corollary, I would like to add the idea of ensuring balance between territorial proximity and strategic distance. Just think about what the instability in the Balkans at the beginning of the last decade has meant not only for the region in the vicinity but also for the whole of Europe. From the perspective of a country at the frontier of the Alliance, this is a particularly important issue.

The question of how to deal with the new threats and challenges is enormously interesting as well. This is not just from the philosophical point of view—issues like whether to include cyberdefense or how to include terrorism in Article 5—but also with regard to more practical matters. Is the way we are doing business today conducive to responding properly and efficiently to the new challenges like counterterrorism, cyber attacks, energy security issues, and the like?

MODES OF COLLABORATION

Another question now being asked is whether we should consider bringing more homeland defense-type of cooperation efforts into NATO. If we were to implement this in the manner in which it is done in the United States, for example, this would mean greater sharing between countries and NATO Allies, both in terms of exchanging information and in terms of holding common activities.

Or maybe we should expand towards a more complex and more multidisciplinary approach? This would involve having more meetings in NATO with specialists that are highly focused on issues like cyberterrorism or energy or missile defense. If we want to bring this to the attention of our leaders, why not have ministerial meetings in NATO at the level of interior ministers, IT ministers, energy ministers, and—even more importantly—finance ministers? (We have discussed how important it is to have the backing of the financial arm of the government.) My last corollary to this point regards whether our speed of adoption of technological change at NATO is appropriate in terms of how we operate, both as an international staff and as a military staff?

PARTNERSHIPS AND STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS

Stewart Eldon mentioned a comprehensive approach and how NATO should relate to other organizations, the EU, and especially the United Nations. We are very keen on this and think we should go further, not just by signing a Memorandum of Understanding but also by establishing genuine strategic structured relationships with these organizations if we really mean it.

Another element that is essential when speaking of the new Strategic Concept is the future of our partnerships. These partnerships have been extremely successful, not only for driving the enlargement process but also by adding value through the dialogue dimension, practical cooperation, and participation in operations. So, how do we go forward to make these more efficient to respond to the requests of our partners, and to make the network of partnerships more coherent?

Last but not least, I would like to raise the issue of how we can extend NATO’s soft power. In the last two decades—and especially since the last Strategic Concept—NATO has developed a soft power dimension. Partnerships are an important part of this, but it is also about strategic communications outreach. If this becomes established as a priority, we can readily transform the perceptions of NATO.
Chapter 17

The Middle East, Israel, and Palestine: A Brief Overview

Ambassador Dr. Mahmoud Karem
Egyptian Ambassador to Belgium and the European Union

CAUSES OF MIDDLE EAST TENSIONS

In some of the preceding workshops in Rome and Paris, we spoke of the transnational character of present-day challenges. We spoke of regional disputes developing into a breeding terrain for injustice and a culture of hatred and despair. We spoke of ethnic, religious, and intra-regional conflicts which led to wars by proxy, ethnic cleansing, and religious cleansing.

The Middle East region is torn by continuous attempts to incite wars between minorities and factions, between Christians, Jews, and Muslims, and between Shiites and Sunnis. A war of conflicting fatwas separates moderate Islam from those who use Islam to manipulate minds and commit actions in the name of Islam that the religion expressly forbids. Other actors work on exacerbating factionalism, deepening confrontation with the West, and spreading Europhobia while elements in the West are working to spread Islamophobia.

In our part of the developing third world, threat perceptions are incited by cliché moulding, resulting amongst other things in new policies such as constructive instability, democratic peace theory, regime change, pre-emptive strikes, and coercive reform. Hezbollah was checked in the elections that just ended in Lebanon. But how long will this remain the case? We will have elections in Palestine next year and in Egypt the year after. The recent election results in Iran are not meeting internal and external acclaim. Other actors in the region are waiting to see how this domestic dissatisfaction will unfold. One thing is certain, however: All of the parties are using the unresolved Palestinian conflict to advance parochial aims and selfish political needs.

ROLE OF THE U.S. AS A MEDIATOR

But we are now in a new era. Expectations run high as we feel that peace, justice, and international legitimacy shall return. U.S. President Barack Obama’s speech at Cairo University brought hope for a more assertive and even handed U.S. involvement and ushered in a new beginning with regards to the Islamic world. The U.S. has previously brokered peace between Egyptian President Anwar El Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin at Camp David in 1978 and a permanent peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1979. It continued to mitigate successfully between Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat and then Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and also helped to improve relations with the Kingdom of Jordan. President Obama has underlined a two state solution in the Middle East and we all anticipate the assertive, catalytic, and peace-making role of the United States.
Chapter 18

Israel and the Arab World

Ambassador Hassan Abouyoub
Ambassador-at-Large of the Kingdom of Morocco

The values that underpin the state of Israel are under strong stress and erosion. This explains to a large extent the evolution of domestic policy in Israel and is a new factor that needs to be taken into account in the development of future strategies. I wholeheartedly agree with those who have pointed out the limits of any hard security policy option or conception. Israel itself, as a military superpower in the region, has failed completely in terms of accomplishing its strategic aims. In fact, it has failed to the extent that even the Israeli people are losing confidence in the superiority of the Israeli military system and technology.

First, the hard security concept is facing the emergence of non-state actors. This challenges all of the tactics and methods that we have been using since World War II. Second, the current situation also shows the failure of any unilateral approach to conflict resolution. This applies to the Israeli initiatives, it applies to Iraq, and lastly it applies to Gaza. These unilateral steps and measures increase the threats to the stability of the Arab regimes and Arab nations, and at the end of the day they also increase the global insecurity of Israel. There are growing public opinion forces in Israel and elsewhere highlighting the fact that the post-Rabin policies—or unilateral public-based policies—are not positive and are counter-productive to the interest of Israel.

NEW FORCES IN THE ARAB WORLD

Another issue is the emerging forces in the Arab world. The gender factor is one of these forces, not only in Kuwait but in many other countries as well. In addition, there is a strong unionist trend appearing in the Arab political market, mainly because of the widespread feelings of humiliation experienced by the Arab peoples after Iraq, after Gaza, and elsewhere. Nobody can ignore this—particularly not our nations and particularly not the ruling regimes. They are facing considerable threats to their survival. This is a consideration which we must factor into the equation when developing new strategies for dealing with the Arab-Israeli crisis.

Changes in demography are another increasingly important element—probably the most important in fact. There is now a global consensus that the world is converging towards demographic transition or even post-transition. Translated into the Arab world or the regional Arab issues, it means that the traditional divides and delimitations are no longer valid; North-south and east-west approaches will not be effective any longer because this converging demographic factor jeopardises not only Israel but all of the tradition-based political systems and governance systems in the region. These demographic changes are therefore one of the major issues affecting the way we must deal with this conflict.

THE ROLES OF THE U.S. AND EU

I will not go beyond what was said on the economic crisis and on the global challenges. These are elements that all add even more complexity to the equation. What the current politico-economic problems do mean, however, is that the Middle East conflict is once again becoming a regional conflict. This is because the traditional backing of the U.S. to Israel is being revisited; there is no doubt about this. It is also because the EU, despite its involvement in defending the welfare of the Palestinians in the past decade, has not yet resolved its leadership problems. The EU needs to tackle a number of questions regarding its mission, such as “What is the role of the EU in the world?” and “What are the EU’s capabilities in order to master its destiny in conflict resolution and in peacekeeping?” before it can be truly effective.

All of these issues set aside, however, there is strong feeling among the Arab public opinion that the EU is needed as a major player in the region. We cannot ignore this and I do not think that Brussels will ignore this either in the years ahead.
IRAN AND THE UNION FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN AS REGIONAL ACTORS

In saying this, let us go back again to the nature of the conflict and to the efforts required from the regional actors. We now know how the map is drawn as far as the actors in the Middle East are concerned. One of these players is Iran. The result of unilateralism, both on the part of the U.S. and Israel, has allowed Iran to re-emerge for the first time in 2,500 years as one of the major players in the Mediterranean. Whether we want this or we do not want this, the situation is such and all of us in the countries on the shores of the Mediterranean are aware of it.

So if this is a regional conflict more than ever, what is needed is a framework—a new framework. I agree with Ambassador Masa’deh in highlighting the role of the Union for the Mediterranean. It could also be enlarged to include perhaps two or three additional major players of the region. Dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict could be one of the main scopes of the renaissance of the Union for the Mediterranean.

CONCLUSION

We have a lot of assets and a lot of tradeoffs to consider in the establishment of a framework. If this particular framework is not possible, we of course still need to invent a new framework because the U.S. role in the region is most definitely shifting, especially after President Obama’s speech in Cairo. Beyond his speech, having been in Washington recently my strong feeling is that the U.S. needs allies—not only players but allies. In parallel, the Arab world needs to sustain the new philosophy developed by President Obama, at least in regards to unifying the Palestinians once again. Nothing can evolve if we do not involve or commit ourselves more than ever to bridging the gap between the two Palestinian camps. It is entirely possible to do so, particularly on the eve of the new elections. We will not have reasonable, positive elections or any chance of peace if the Arab world is not playing its role as a mediator, facilitator, and honest broker between the two Palestinian camps.

Finally, what could the Russian contribution be to this process? This is a key issue, especially if we consider Iran as a major player and if we consider other players like Syria, etc. Whatever we may think about Russian diplomacy’s past track record in the region, in the same way that the EU is needed, we also need Russia to play a more proactive role in balancing the forces that can contribute to a new era in this region.
Chapter 19

Gulf Security in Light of Regional Developments in West Asia

Ambassador Nabeela A. Al-Mulla
Ambassador of Kuwait to Belgium and the European Union

In discussing the importance of the Gulf in security matters, I would like to point out that three elements need to be considered. One, the Gulf’s vital role as a source of energy and energy reserves. Two, its strategic location including its importance for freedom of navigation. Examples of this include the Tanker War of the 1980s, the Gulf War of 1990-1991, and the ICI International Compact with Iraq in 2004. Third, its preeminence, especially in present days, as a financial center.

LOOKING AT THE CHALLENGES

First of all, crises or issues need to be identified. I invite you to think of a crisis, wherever it occurs, as a blip on a radar screen. I believe that what I am about to state is under Chatham House rules. What is going to be said need not represent the collective position of the Gulf Cooperation Council States (GCC). From our perspective in the Gulf, the major issues affecting security are the failure to resolve the Palestinian problem, securing a stable Iran without the threat of a military nuclear program and that does not exert excessive influence abroad, and maintaining security in Iraq and Afghanistan. Naturally we are concerned about the safety of maritime navigation, the security of the energy supply, the threat of proliferation and terrorism, food security, climate change, and the state of the world economy.

Second, the importance or danger of these crises depends on how strong they appear on the radar screen; how they are rated. It is unfortunate that as world actors, we do not share the same reading of a radar screen. An exception was Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the global reaction to it. I think this was the only case in modern history where the entire world community came together to confront such a challenge.

Taking the Palestinian problem as an example, the blip stayed static until the latest tragedy in Gaza alerted the world to the dire consequences that will arise if the situation remains unresolved. The central role of the Palestinian problem cannot be disputed.

Taking Iran as another example, the danger of proliferation overrode all other issues—even the threat of growing Iranian influence in the region and beyond. In attempting to resolve the issue of the nuclear program, the actors (5 + 1) in a way conceded to the global importance of Iran. We saw this in the recent invitation by the Foreign Minister of Italy to the Foreign Minister of Iran to attend the G8 meeting. In our view, such actions need careful consideration because they lend respectability and legitimacy to Iran and boost its role on the world stage.

Turning to Iraq, Kuwait is wary of the internal security situation. While we extend all of our support to the Iraqi government to help them reintegrate into the world community, international commitments made by Iraq still need to be implemented.

GREATER COOPERATION: THE WAY FORWARD

Third, I would like to pose a question: Are there strategies for dealing with these crises? Are there any balanced and global approaches? From our perspective in the Gulf, it is questionable that this is the case. Although again, this is with the exception of the Gulf War.

The approaches seem to be reactive rather than proactive. Look at Somalia—a failed state for many years now—and the question of maritime piracy. Only when there is a flare up do we try to deal with the problem. The approaches, also, appear to be partial rather than comprehensive, as the Palestinian problem indicates. If you look at the examples of Iraq and
Afghanistan, they also tend to be confined to peacemaking rather than nation-building.

Lastly, what is the way ahead? How do we draw up strategies for regions in crises? We have seen the engagement of non-traditional powers in an attempt to resolve the world economic problems. This came a little bit late in the day but nevertheless, it was done.

We also underline for the first time the presence of NATO vessels in the Gulf and the involvement of Turkish and German frigates under the unified NATO flag in November 2008. More of this needs to be capitalized on—and promptly so—with regards to the issues and crises referred to earlier.

Regional powers, individually or collectively, need to be involved. I am referring here to the necessity of touching base and coordinating with the GCC, for example, on the question of Iraq. We are usually informed of actions after the fact, whereas prior consultations would be more beneficial. In addition, the focus should be on basics and on agendas that are already drawn. It should not shift to modifications of plans, as is the case with the Palestinian problem.
Chapter 20

Strategies for Dealing with Regions in Crisis: Israel, Palestine, and the Middle East

Ambassador Dr. Ahmad Masa’deh
Ambassador of Jordan to Belgium and the European Union

My presentation, which tackles the Middle East crisis, departs from conventional notions that are often used to address this issue and presents a more contemporary approach. This approach is based on the relationship and interaction between economic prosperity and security on the one hand and poverty and radicalization on the other. I believe this approach is crucial to finding a solution to the issues of the Middle East.

THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS AND THE ISSUE OF REGIONAL AND GLOBAL SECURITY

Border crossing challenges are leaving their mark on global security in today's world. Terrorism remains one of the top challenges in this context, as are regional conflicts, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failed states, organized crime, energy, degradation of the environment, migration, world food security, securing sustainable and social development, economic growth, and maintaining successful intercultural dialogue at the grass-roots level. These challenges continue to compel states and international bodies to enhance their cooperation in a bid to collectively brave such perils. As one examines these challenges, the link between security and economic growth becomes ever more evident.

Most recently, however, the credit crunch and the global economic crisis have come to the top of the list. In the Arab world, the effects of the global financial crisis have manifested themselves in a divergent manner on countries' economies, depending on each country's economic structure and the extent of its openness to the American economy.

The economic debacle has underscored the inevitability of coming up with a new economic world order, one that is built upon more solid and sustainable foundations and that takes the developmental factor into consideration. Any formulation for such a new financial and economic international regime must take two things into account: (1) more accountability and adherence to the notion of good corporate citizenship, and (2) implementation of a developmental factor that includes the needs and situations of developing countries and markets.

The situation in the Middle East clearly demonstrates how radicalization is close to poverty and thus how security and economic growth are interlinked. If poverty is not tackled in an exemplary manner, radicalization will always occur. This is why the developmental factor is of utmost importance. Cooperation between the north and the south to create a more stable and hospitable economic environment in the south will gradually eradicate milieus where radicalization and desperation breed.

THE CORE ISSUE: THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT

Security in the Mediterranean and in the world at large hinges on resolving the core issue of the region: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Without resolving this conflict, it will not be possible to address the region's other problems and associated crises. Turmoil and instability will continue to be the hallmark of the Middle East.

However, Middle Eastern peace, security, and stability will only be realized by reaching a negotiated solution that leads to the establishment of the Palestinian state and addresses Israel's security concerns. Otherwise the conflict will continue to be exploited and to fuel extremism that spills over to countries in the Middle East and Europe. If the peace process does not move forward, extremism and radicalization will continue to advance, at the expense of proponents of peace, dialogue, cooperation, moderation, and cohesion.
President Obama’s position regarding the Middle East, especially his speech in Cairo, created a positive atmosphere after a long period of pessimism and standstill in the region. This is expected to pave the way for a comprehensive and lasting solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. But to reach this place, it is paramount for all stakeholders to play a positive role by immediately kick-starting serious negotiations based on a clear action plan to realize the two-state solution within a regional context and in accordance with the relevant terms of reference and the Arab peace initiative. Time is of the essence, and the region cannot afford to waste any more.

**SECURITY, ECONOMIC GROWTH, AND SOFT SECURITY**

In addition to the traditional political terms of reference previously mentioned, we should not lose sight of the economic factor. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict illustrates once again how security and economic growth are interlinked—you cannot have one without the other, and one does not lead the other. Military means have always failed to uproot extremism. The economic and social factors and other root causes of this abhorrent phenomenon need to be addressed properly in order to fully eradicate extremism and its manifestations. Afghanistan can teach us many lessons in this context. We must apply a wider notion of security, one that moves from hard security to soft security, and which comprises economic and cultural means in addition to traditional security activities.

This must be done through a just peace agreement for the Palestinians—one that promises true independence embodied in a sovereign, contiguous state capable of fruitful economic life and secure sustainable national development. For the Israelis, such an agreement would provide true security and normalization with 57 Muslim countries, which in turn would bring an end to the conflict and establish relationships of respect and cooperation across the region.

In this context, we need to move from the theoretical notion of security in the Middle East to security that has practical tools. On the ground this means Israel taking tangible and serious steps to improve the living standards and economic conditions of the Palestinian people, in addition to removing obstacles that hinder progress in the peace process. The foremost of these obstacles are settlement activities in the West Bank, unilateral procedures in Jerusalem, and the economic blockade and other violations against the Palestinians.

Israel must have a vision for peace and an answer to the question of what will be the fate of the five million Palestinians and five million Jews who currently live between the river and the sea. Visible progress on the ground has yet to materialize. Palestinians must experience an improvement in their daily lives and economic conditions and Israel must enable the Palestinian economy to recover.

**THE UNION FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN**

Another example of a wider security initiative is the Union for the Mediterranean, which is a very ambitious, multilateral forum that can enable true soft security and serve as further proof that economic and social factors can become more instrumental. The Union strives to support the economic welfare of people on both rims of the Mediterranean, taking on all of the above-mentioned problems including physical security and regional stability. It should play an important role in addressing the common challenges facing Euro-Mediterranean partners.

**CONCLUDING REMARKS**

The political realities of the Middle East continue to reflect negatively on its security and its social, economic, and business environments. Bringing about peace will create a more conducive life for the peoples of the region. This in turn will have a positive effect on Europe and the world at large. Once prosperous economic conditions and a stable political environment prevail, security will be a natural result.
Cyber Resilience for Mission Success

The Honorable John G. Grimes
U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Networks and Information Integration)

and

Mr. Robert Lentz
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

Our governments, societies, and economies depend on the unimpeded flow of information through cyberspace. Information is a catalyst for successful missions and enables greater opportunity for advancement through knowledge sharing.

We share threats, vulnerabilities, and together face the cascading impacts of attacks on our shared cyberspace to include the critical information infrastructures that individuals, the private sector, and civil society depend on as much as governments. But, are we prepared to operate in contested cyber environments, and do we work together effectively on protection and defense—both nationally and internationally, and among public and private sectors?

I would like to talk about the critical information infrastructure that we share, dependencies on fragile underpinnings, collective threats we face, concepts for resilience, and considerations for potential trust-and-confidence-building initiatives to address these challenges. My goal is to further develop discussions on lessons learned, share best practices, and facilitate opportunities between nations, both in the public and private sector, to contribute to cyber resilience for mission success.

DEPENDENCE ON FRAGILE UNDERPINNINGS

The overall security of a nation is dependent on the unimpeded use of cyberspace. One construct to describe the capabilities of nations is to discuss the capabilities in terms of Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economics or “D.I.M.E.”. The underlying Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) which facilitate collaboration are prerequisites for all four of these capabilities. ICTs depend on the underlying Critical Information Infrastructure (CII) to facilitate connectivity. In the United States, as well as in other developed nations, most critical infrastructure assets are owned and operated by the private sector.

Within the CII, there are complex interdependencies and cascading effects with are not fully recognized. For example, consider the growing interconnectivity between the internet and the electrical grid through Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems with SMART GRID technologies. This was done to deliver electricity from suppliers to consumers using digital technology to save energy and reduce cost but this also greatly increases the consequence of cyber attack with unknown cascade effects.

Information and Communication Technologies and the supporting Critical Information Infrastructures are enabling capabilities that have a greater and broader value than the other three components of national missions. Our economic and national successes are linked through information capabilities and the fragile underpinnings we have created.

The ability to operate through adversity and recover quickly to a trusted environment or, put simply, the ability to be cyber resilient is paramount to national security.

INCREASING THREATS AND DEPENDENCE

Building on the previous discussion on dependence, let us briefly consider the growth of the cyberspace security threat. The increased complexity of our information infrastructures coupled with our growing dependence equates to lower entry barriers and an increased number of malicious actors in cyberspace.
The sophistication of most malicious actors is decreasing while the sophistication and number of attacks is increasing. While early malicious actors required unparalleled skills in the early days of this type of activity, today's technology has not only facilitated greater computing reliance, it has also exponentially lowered the entry barrier for potential malicious acts in cyberspace. The recent Conficker virus, as an example, demonstrated the potential impacts of automated threats. The end result is a tremendous and continuing growth in the number and depth of threat capabilities.

**CYBER RESILIENCE**

Sophisticated adversaries have the resources and capabilities to exploit our Information and Communication Technologies, impacting our ability to accomplish missions. Best efforts to keep the adversaries at bay may fail and they will succeed in degrading, denying, or manipulating the technology underpinnings. Together we must put in place the necessary insurance that allows our shared critical information infrastructures to:

- Operate through adversity
- Deflect attacks
- Restore trust when information has been manipulated
- Recover to a trusted state quickly
- Be prioritized to support essential missions

As we pointed out earlier, the ability to be cyber resilient is paramount to national security. Cyber resilience includes people, the physical environment (e.g., building networks, cables) and, importantly, the information and its enabling capabilities (e.g., Enterprise IT Services). To be resilient all must work together to operate through and recover from sophisticated cyber attacks, and be flexible, adaptable, and trustworthy.

**OPPORTUNITIES AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR NEXT STEPS**

There are insufficient resources to protect and defend all aspects of our shared critical information infrastructure at all times from the growing and asymmetric threats. We must collectively participate in the responsibility towards building resilient capabilities through protection and defense of the ICTs we depend on. When our best efforts in defense have failed, joint contributions towards recovery and reconstitution are key to ensuring that our most vital resource is there when we need it. Below are a few trust-and confidence-building initiatives that countries can take to cooperate bilaterally and multilaterally on cyber security matters:

- Improve defense-in-depth capabilities
- Improve Information Assurance and Computer Network Defense (CND) interoperability
- Share cyber situational awareness and early warning information
- Link watch center to watch center operations and exercises
- Ensure interoperability to protect and share CND/IA information
- Foster relationship with collective security institutions

Perhaps the most important and a good starting point to facilitate cooperation is to conduct training exercises under realistic cyber scenarios. Militaries have a unique appreciation of the benefit of training and conducting exercises and are a good resource to begin dialog in this area to:

- Increase awareness of stakeholders regarding their interdependence on cyber space
- Improve understanding of procedures that should be implemented
- Increase trust between all the players

As leaders from across the world, we must encourage the international community to be good stewards of our shared critical information infrastructure and to make the cyberspace a safer place for our citizens, our businesses, and our national interests.
Information and communication technologies and the digital economy are a driving force of growth and development in modern societies. They have a major impact not only on industrial competitiveness and the distribution of resources but on promoting social cohesion, health, education, culture, transport, security, and, more generally, the development of knowledge and the new economy.

The French planning agency reporting to the Prime Minister recently carried out a study on the digital economy’s structure and evolution, which I contributed to on behalf of the Ministry of Defense. It used a model based on six components: socio-economic context; users; companies as well as public and private organizations; technologies; markets; and the regulation-rule-governance triple factor. After conducting an analysis of these components, the study recommended five measures in order to help further the development of the digital economy over the next fifteen years: 1) Educate and train, 2) Work at the European level, 3) Innovate, 4) Reinforce confidence, and 5) Promote a secure critical infrastructure.

**EDUCATION AND TRAINING**

- Allow everyone to access digital tools and share in the culture which results from this, so that they can use them efficiently in both personal and professional capacities
- Provide training so that everyone can acquire the necessary skills to develop digital tools
- Put digital systems (hardware, tools, and content) at the heart of early education
- Develop new digital tools for the training and management of pedagogical projects
- Increase exemptions on copyrights for multimedia documents used for pedagogical purposes

**WORKING AT THE EUROPEAN LEVEL**

- Build a European market, which means adapting the laws of trade and labor for digital products, contents and services, and information technologies
- Give high priority to information and communication technologies, in order to develop applications for the great challenges that our society will face, including access to primary resources, sustainable development, population aging, security, and competitiveness
- Adapt the protection of intellectual propriety to a society based on knowledge sharing and the new economy

**INNOVATION**

- Foster and sustain innovation, both technological and non-technological, notably in organizations
- Implement innovation-friendly public policies by creating a demand for products that meet societal targets such as sustainable development, health, transport, and defense
- Encourage the creation of digital enterprise through active measures on the public market and also by promoting exportation
- Favor the rise of e-democracy (including cooperative creation) and e-administration (simplifying procedures and reducing costs)
REINFORCING CONFIDENCE

In order for these measures to have maximum impact, users must have a high degree of trust in the tools and networks of the digital economy. Trust is engendered by providing proper regulation and governance—some of which already exists and some of which needs to be created—at the national, European and world levels. This requires precise knowledge of vulnerabilities and critical installations, especially in times of crisis.

Long-term recommendations:
A) Establish effective world governance of the Internet that is based on a clear understanding of national responsibilities and the rights and duties of all involved parties
B) Rely on a governance body for networks and information systems whose main goal is to coordinate the responsibilities of public and private actors and to ensure the complete security of those connected to the network, be it for their belongings, images, identities, or commercial relationships

Short-term recommendations:
A) Put in place a governance authority for the digital world
• Allow public authorities to ensure, through dialogue with all public and private actors, the controlled and responsible development of the digital world
• Oversee the security of people, their identities, their properties and use, and also provide service continuity
B) Modify the laws necessary to manage personal data and electronic identities, including the “right to be forgotten,” and respect the requirements of individual and national security
• Define a legal status of the digital identity at the European level (or even worldwide) in order to guarantee every citizen the right to be forgotten and to control his digital personal capital
• Regulate the practice of online profiling at the European or worldwide level
• Implement technical measures that guarantee protection of private data and continuous monitoring of the evolution of the state of the art in the area of technique and societal practices

PROMOTING A SECURE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

The security and reliability of communication and information systems is crucial in crisis situations. The network failures which occurred during Hurricane Klaus in southwestern France in early 2009 and in conjunction with the propagation of the Conficker virus highlight the importance of network security.

Defense against cyber attacks is also a key priority. According to a French white paper on defense and national security, “the current daily level of cyber attacks, whether from state or other sources, points to a very high potential for the destabilization of everyday life, paralysis of critical networks for the life of the nation, or denial of access to certain military capabilities. Society and government are still ill-prepared for the risks of massive attacks, and these should therefore be the subject of fresh attention, both in terms of strengthening defenses and enhancing our capacity to hit back.”

Long-term recommendations:
A) Guarantee the security of the main communication and information systems used by governments in crisis situations
B) Identify critical digital infrastructures for 2025 and list areas considered strategic in the scope of the European defense and security technological and industrial base

Short-term recommendations:
A) Put in place quickly and with all necessary means an information security agency as envisaged in the white paper on defense. This agency’s responsibilities should include:
• Identifying critical infrastructures and their Internet dependence
• Updating the list of areas regarded as strategic in the scope of the European defense and security technological and industrial base, ensuring that information systems are included
• Identifying and preventing potential cyber attacks and coordinating joint responses with our European partners
B) Implement a highly secured infrastructure dedicated to critical sensitive needs, including deploying a specific network (with a very high data rate and highly secured) for critical fix and mobile communications
CONCLUSIONS

Policies aimed at fostering the digital economy should follow a systemic approach: A combination of measures must be used within the areas of education and training, European cooperation and the creation of a European market, innovation, the reinforcement of confidence amongst users of digital tools, and the securing of critical infrastructures. If successful, the resulting increase in industrial competitiveness will combine with the human, financial, and industrial capacities in France and Europe and allow us to meet major societal goals with regard to transportation, the environment, healthcare, and culture.

Information and communication networks have become the nerve center of our society, without which it would cease to function. The economy; operations of public authorities; major energy, transport and food producers; and the organization of our defense all rely upon information systems. This has thus rendered our society vulnerable to accidental breakdowns or intentional attacks on computer networks.

The current daily level of cyber attacks, whether from state or other sources, points to a very high potential for the destabilization of everyday life, paralysis of networks that are critical for the life of the nation, and denial of access to certain capabilities. Society and government are still ill-prepared for the risks of massive attacks, and these should therefore be the subject of fresh attention, both in terms of strengthening defenses and enhancing our capacity to hit back.

Guarding Against the Unique Challenges of Cyberspace

Yet cyberspace, which consists of the networking of all networks, is radically different from physical space in that it has no frontiers, is constantly changing, and is anonymous, making it hard to identify an aggressor with certainty. The threat takes many forms, ranging from malevolent blocking and physical destruction (e.g., of satellites or infrastructures for crucial networks) to neutralization of computer systems, data theft and distortion, and even taking control of a system for hostile purposes.

Over the next 15 years, the proliferation of attempted attacks by non-state actors, computer pirates, activists, or criminal organizations is a certainty. Some of these could take place on a massive scale; covert attempted attacks are also highly probable. To deal with such attacks from state actors, several countries have already mapped out offensive cyber warfare strategies and are effectively putting in place technical capabilities with the aid of hackers.

Technological developments and the interconnection of networks are rendering simple passive and perimeter defense strategies less and less effective, even though they remain necessary.

The transition from a passive defensive strategy to an active defensive strategy, combining intrinsic systems protection with permanent surveillance, rapid response, and offensive action, calls for a strong governmental impetus and a change in mentalities. The state must develop, maintain, and disseminate its information systems security expertise among economic actors, and particularly among network operators. The instantaneous, nearly unpredictable nature of attacks also calls for a crisis management and post-crisis management capability able to maintain the continuity of activities, and to prosecute and punish attackers.

The Way Forward

Cyberspace has become a new area of action in which military operations are already taking place. But Internet regulation appears to be a particularly difficult topic due to:

- The wide variety of actors
- Lack of borders, as opposed to mainly national legislation
- The extremely rapid evolution of technology

Systemic questions arise:

- What role is there for governments, and for international organizations? This is a major question for the European Parliament.
- What rules will be actually enforced by powerful non-governmental players and user groups?

Regardless, all experts agree that security is the foremost issue in Internet regulation:

- Governments are afraid of cyber terrorism
• Companies rely more heavily on their networks and on e-commerce than ever before
• Users are concerned about privacy issues, in addition to network reliability
  Answers cannot be technical only:
• Governments have failed to find a fully satisfactory solution, even if an agreement has been achieved within the
  Council of Europe on cyber criminality
• Companies, in a global economy, need to reduce vulnerabilities on their transactions
• Individuals are also direct actors in these security issues: they need to ensure that they correctly protect their own PCs,
  otherwise they may unwittingly allow their PCs to become part of a botnet and to attack other users
  Trust is the master word of an efficient economic development in a digital economy and it must be addressed globally.
  This International Workshop on Global Security is certainly the right place to address these issues.
Chapter 23

Cyber Security

Mr. Robert Lentz
U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Networks and Information Integration)

W
e have been on a very interesting ride since the Moscow workshop regarding the world of cyber security, because that subject has gotten so much attention. Many of us in the field consider that meeting as the tipping point, because, since that time, we have had several incidents and events, from those in Estonia to those in Georgia to the cable cuts in the Mediterranean to other cyber-related incidents that we keep reading about in the paper—malware incidents, Cisco routers that have been counterfeited, networks that have been taken down, viruses that have hit. Cyber security clearly has gotten the attention of everyone and is now a very high priority for most nations.

CYBER SECURITY AS A HIGH PRIORITY

Recently, President Obama made a statement about the major focus his administration has on cyber security. Just before this workshop, the Secretary of Defense announced the creation of a cyber command to focus on this very important subject. A recent press article said that the U.K. is about to announce the creation of a national strategy for cyber security, something we know the British have been working on but that is now ready to hit the streets. We also just heard from Henri Serres that the French are about to announce a similar national initiative, and NATO also has been focusing with increased vigor on cyber security.

Cyber security has become a major priority, both at the military and the international level. People have moved on from a geeky IT kind of discussion of cyber security to a discussion that has national importance, and includes everyone from the Prime Minister and President on down. That is great, because each of us realizes that, in the Information Age, we will not be successful if we do not know how to deal with the threats facing us in a world so dependent on information technologies.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE INTERNET

Just a few years ago, in the Department of Defense we tested the F-35 in the far western part of the United States. The commander tried to run the exercise but could not load the necessary operational data on the F-35 because the network was down. He became increasingly frustrated and said, “What is going on? I have a program to run and I am spending a lot of contractor money.” After about six hours, the commander and his group determined that the network is pretty important. Operationally, it would not have looked too good if that very expensive airplane had been sitting on the tarmac in a wartime scenario. A similar incident took place when both the British and the French had their weapons platforms disabled while they waited for the network to respond.

Early in 2009, I was on a U.S. aircraft carrier and asked the captain, “What is the most important thing on this aircraft carrier?” I expected him to talk about the airplanes or the nuclear engine room, but he said, “The Internet is the most important thing. I have 5,000 sailors on this aircraft carrier under the age of 20 and everything we depend upon for morale and for the welfare of these sailors requires the Internet to be constantly up.” And that is not just for morale and welfare. A lot of the other things that a carrier requires depends on the Internet or, as the DoD calls it, a NIPRnet, to be up and running.
CONCLUDING REMARKS

In Russia in 2003, I talked to a senior member of the Russian Defense Ministry who said to me, “We really do believe strongly in this concept of net-centric operations, but what happens if the Internet goes down and is not available? What is your strategy for that?”

That is where we are today. Most nations are talking about cyber security, most nations are trying to deal with this interconnected world, because everybody realizes that, with today’s very fragile economic situation, we depend more and more on the Internet. NATO, as I said, has a major focus on this subject, and we can all see that it revolves around leveraging the technologies of the Internet, for use in places like Africa as well as for sustaining operations in Afghanistan.
The first time I participated in this workshop, which was in 2004 in Berlin, I was still with the U.S. Department of Defense and I remember that the group participating in the cyber defense panel was much smaller. There was interest but not major interest. It is quite telling to the importance placed on cyber security that, five years later, almost everyone attending this year’s event is here for this discussion. The cyber security problem has continued to grow; the circumstances we have seen over the past couple of years, particularly the cyber-attacks against Estonia and Georgia, show this is an issue area almost everybody cares about today. What is also telling, from a U.S. perspective, is the creation of a four star level command this year to manage cyber defense.

I tend to look at the cyber security problem from several different angles: as a military officer, as a former cyber defender, and now from an industry perspective. From an industry perspective, at Microsoft where I come from, we are not a defense company so we don’t reside within the traditional defense system integrator community. We have to work with everybody around the world—many countries, many industries—and yet security for us has become an extremely important part of what we do as we develop software for customers. Our main focus when we build software is not the military or defense; it is the consumer market. As a result, we are very focused on finding new and exciting ways to use technology so that people can connect with other people in better ways and so that technology becomes an enabler for all kinds of possible activities in life. Despite a down economy, we will spend even more money on Research and Development, over $9 billion, and some of this funding supports advances in security. How one can use Information Technology in a military and intelligence environment, and also how Information Technology can improve or change military and public safety operations, is what I would like to talk about.

I would like to focus first on where we are and where are we going. There is a lot of forward movement into the areas of Cloud Computing and Virtualization which, to some extent, is very important for the defense community to consider. It is a way in which we can save money; it is a way in which we can reduce hardware costs and—if we can ever figure out a multi-level security solution which allows us to move information back and forth seamlessly between top secret, secret, and unclassified levels—we will have a significant impact on reducing budget requirements for our networks. Additionally, there is a focus on mobile data centers which we are developing today. There are new data handling capabilities which you can plop into the middle of a crisis zone, quickly stand up a system to support military operations and, when the crisis is over, throw the data center away.

**COMPELLING NEW TECHNOLOGIES FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS**

There are other very compelling technologies that we are deploying which have implications for military operations:

**Geographic Information Systems.** I am amazed at some of the mapping and imagery systems in use today and there are even more coming out on the market in the near term. These technologies include capabilities to merge commercial and military-grade imagery into single, low cost servers which provide exciting ways to manipulate and see the data. In some cases, one can produce virtual 3-D worlds of the target area to enhance planning, war gaming, pre-combat exercises, and post-combat after action reporting. These geographic systems greatly improve command and control operations, enhance our ability to provide a common operating picture, and make it easier for us to share imagery across units, across organizations, and across different types of operations.

**Presence Information.** Using a new type of software on the cell phone I am holding, or when using my laptop or desktop computer, I can see if the people I care about are online or not, whether they are available or in a meeting or call, and I have multiple ways to get hold of them, either through an instant message, a web call, or by using my phone or computer...
to call one of their listed numbers. Furthermore, this same software allows me to talk to a number of people through these means simultaneously, all through the click of a button using the power of the Internet. The presence capability we can deliver today in the commercial and consumer world can provide much improved communications for military or public safety operations.

We are also seeing an explosive growth in social networking software, such as Facebook, LinkedIn, or Twitter. The people serving in our military units, or in our businesses, are using this technology at home for many different reasons. Given this capability and the apparent usage of it to some degree of success or advantage, what are the implications for our operations? Is this a technology we should use to improve collaboration and interoperability? I do not know the answer to this question but the younger people in our organizations are going to push us to use this technology and we should experiment with it to see what can be done to yet again improve operational capabilities.

I want to mention a couple collaboration examples using this new technology because these cases directly impact NATO at this point in time. One is the Civil-Military Cooperation Portal which was established at NATO Headquarters and is being used today round-the-clock to support the movement of information between non-governmental organizations, local, regional, and national-level political leaders, as well as the military, in Afghanistan. This portal uses the power of the Internet and our collaboration software called SharePoint. There are some who consider SharePoint to be the military C2 system of today as it is used in so many ways by today’s military organizations which deploy this technology.

Another current system example is called KNIFE (Knowledge Information Fusion Exchange). This is a joint Microsoft-U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) project, which allows for the sharing of counter Improvised Explosive Device (IED) related information in the Iraqi and Afghanistan theaters of operation. Using KNIFE, again a SharePoint application backed by several other Microsoft products, U.S., NATO and Coalition forces share information across a number of classified networks. KNIFE is designed to support current operations and military planning, fusing together all known information on IEDs. Using KNIFE, friendly units call into the KNIFE command center, or contact the organization via a variety of networks and check the latest information on IED locations, types of munitions used, or other related information to consider before going out on patrol. We believe this capability is saving lives on the battlefield.

In summary, whether it is social networking, geographic, presence, data centers, cloud computing, virtualization, SharePoint, or other Information Technology advances, our ability to integrate these technologies into military operations provides exciting choices for military leaders. At the same time, our ability to acquire and deploy these technologies and the potential risks involved must be considered as we consider these new techniques and capabilities.

Are we agile enough to take this technology and employ it in our organizations? When one considers the procurement processes and the bureaucracies we have to deal with to add technology into our military organizations, one has to question our ability to adopt change. It is a real problem. These kinds of capabilities do not take ten or fifteen years to develop. They are developed almost overnight and they suddenly are used around the world within a matter of weeks or months. Yet, there are some potential good uses for this technology in our operations. How do we change the system to allow for the use of the technology?

Then we have to consider the risk. What do we have to do in our Information Assurance programs, and in our certification processes and procedures, to check these new kinds of capabilities to insure they are safe to use and can then be placed on our military networks to support our operations? This is a very challenging area. We are trying to integrate off-the-shelf commercial technology into legacy systems which have been around a long time. The impact of government procurement and budget cycles, plus the need for agile Information Assurance, certainly makes for a complicated employment environment. Some of the methods used by NATO, including spiral development and the Coalition Warfighter Interoperability Demonstration (CWID) program may be part of the answer. The ability to test new technology against current operational considerations, including assessing security risks, is the initial key action required to get these capabilities to our military organizations. How we assess the risk is perhaps the long pole in the tent.

**VULNERABILITIES OF THE NEW TECHNOLOGIES**

The other concern I have is the ability of threat forces to use the same technology. While we often lack flexibility to acquire and deploy these new technologies—Al-Qaeda does not have this problem. They can use new technology overnight if they want to. I wonder what the risk is to us if the threat is able to use such technology quicker and have the agility to take advantage of these new capabilities before we do in our operations. This really concerns me.

Let us turn now to our current view of cyberspace, the network centric warfare concept, and some of the new operational means and ways we are using on the battlefield, in particular the networks themselves upon which we operate. I
wonder if these networks are not our Achilles heel. The greatest threat to these networks is not for a competing nation-state to develop a computer network attack capability, I consider this a given and we must plan for it. The greatest threat is an attack capability in the hands of a terrorist organization not bound by the laws of land warfare. Furthermore, these groups will not limit themselves to our military networks. They will want to do the greatest possible damage to our societies, which indicate to me that they will attack critical infrastructure to maximize the damage to our civilian populations and the psychological impacts of their attack.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Now that we have reviewed the opportunities and risks that new Information Technology pose for us, what are some of the roles for industry and government as we move forward? From an industry perspective, we have to do several things. First, we have to continue to put money into research and development to improve our security posture and reduce our risk. R&D efforts should focus on improving the software development process, thus making it more secure for both civilian and military use. Additionally, industry needs to put programs in place to improve our capability to deliver usable software on our military networks. Methods that we should replicate across the software industry include rigorous software security development life cycles, source code sharing with government, and security cooperation programs where we share information on cyber threats and newly identified vulnerabilities.

Partnerships are also extremely important. Microsoft has a long-standing partnership with NATO. It has been very successful, focused on cyber defense, technology exchange, and R&D futures, enabling both NATO and Microsoft to anticipate the impact and value of change across an evolving, vibrant network. At the same time, we are developing a new partnership with INTERPOL to focus more on cyber crime and other types of Internet-based criminal activities and how our technology can improve police operations. I mention this effort as it has implications for military and intelligence operations as well.

Jointly, there are some things we can do together. We need to develop mechanisms to anticipate and reduce risk. We generally understand the present problem facing our current networks, but we also have to build capabilities to anticipate risks in advance and build improved processes for sharing information between government and industry. Perhaps we need an international military-industrial body which helps guide us in this regard. When I was supporting U.S. DOD international cyber security efforts, we tried bilateral and multilateral approaches and found this did not scale very well. We may need a body which sits above any particular national military interest, perhaps at the international government level, with an initial focus on information-sharing and policy development. As we continue to develop our partnership with INTERPOL and work to help this organization improve its information-sharing mechanisms, this may help us in the military-industrial space as well.

Finally, there are two key areas for government engagement required today. One is to review software certification processes. For example, Common Criteria, which is archaic, too expensive, and largely ineffective in detecting software system risk, needs significant improvement, if not a complete overhaul, to ensure the software we put on our networks is really ready for prime time. The second key area lies in international law. Today there are no international legal standards which reduce the risk from the implied illegal uses of the Internet and software that we have been discussing in this panel. Until the international community takes action to put effective laws in place to enable safe use of the Internet, we will face an uphill battle to effectively defend our networks from the variety of threats we face today, let alone attacks from terrorists or nation-states.
Chapter 25

Cyberspace—A New Area of Knowledge

Mr. Terry Morgan
Chairman, Executive Council, Network Centric Operations Industry Consortium; Director, Net-Centric Strategies, Global Government Solutions Group at Cisco

Earlier today, the Minister of Defense of Slovenia said that ministers need to get and to hear new knowledge. The issue of cyberspace is probably a “new” area of knowledge. It is an interesting one. It might become a separate instrument of power and it is at least an element impacting all of the classic instruments of power.

A study that was done about ten years ago by KPMG found that a number of IT projects—Information Technology projects and command and control projects—were failing. The leaders did not understand why they were failing. As they dug into the problem, KPMG discovered that the technical speak between the technical community and the leadership community was a hurdle. The technical community would come up with all this techno babble and those who signed the checks and approved the projects were not able to make the best decisions because there was a lack of understanding; and going forward, there was a lack of communication. Leadership abrogated responsibility to the technologist. This is critical in cyber security, not just in the defense community and not just across government but across industry and society as well. For example, at Cisco—and I am sure it is very similar at Microsoft—we run a coalition network. There are more people on our network at Cisco who are not employees than we have employees of Cisco. These individuals are our supply chain and outsourced capabilities supporting corporate functions. These are the people that need the information to work with us; these are the people who deliver their information to Cisco with the idea that as company number one provides information, company number two will not be able to see the information. Why is this important? Company one is competing with company two for the same business.

Let us take that into the coalition environment: It is much the same. We have common information, and we have information that is segregated. There are a lot of interesting “parts and pieces” of coalition operations that are being approximated in the commercial world. We can take these commercial capabilities and apply the necessary and additional bits of security, environmental protection, etc. to rapidly and more cost effectively develop government solutions. Cisco’s Global Government Solutions does this with our partners and customers. Understanding the possibilities comes from getting out to industry and spending time understanding what is the realm of the possible—the terms I like to use from my military background is to conduct strategic technical, technology trend, and business process reconnaissance. This is not looking at what is here today but understanding where corporations are investing in research and development and with mergers and acquisitions; how the successful corporations operate in business coalitions; and understanding their business process so that we are aware of what is being done and are better able to make decisions.

DEALING WITH THE REALITY OF CYBERSPACE

Now to address cyberspace and its reality: Cyberspace will always be a work in progress. In his work, technology visionary Ray Kurzweil talks about the “accelerating rate of technology change.” If you read Kurzweil’s publications, an eight year program now will be three to four generations behind in its technology when fielded. If you are unable to change your procurement specifications, as technology moves forward and as that acceleration occurs, then in just a few years you will find that the eight years to buy the system will give you a system that is fifteen generations behind in technology when fielded. The critical aspect of cyber security is that it will probably change even more rapidly than other aspects of technology. The processes by which we acquire and certify capability needs to keep pace with the accelerating rate of technology change. We know that if the government’s processes do not keep pace, the young soldier, sailor, airman, and marine will do his best to keep pace outside of the official process. We have to bring our processes forward, to have quicker acquisitions, and to be faster at technology delivery.
The biggest hurdle can be explained by a ten-year-old study prepared by a European government that asked, Why are we not making the progress that we should be making to become an e-government? The answer was: 49 percent of the reason we are not changing is cultural, 40 percent is due to procurement, 36 percent is due to government coordination to make projects work, and 9 percent has to deal with technology. The technology is not an unchallenging engineering problem but a fairly graspable one. It deals with physics and with physical things and we can more easily address that part. The others are more difficult.

As we get into the operational world, the capability to move information and to move it securely, the need to know where the information is, that it is valid, and that it has not been tampered with, and similar concerns must be considered. Of course, these all apply to any of the elements of power, (not just defense, but political, economic, informational issues). These are questions that are part of every decision when you are using information that has been moved by a network.

We are in a battle of measure—counter measure. If you go back to the Cold War, it was a battle of measure—counter measure but one fought in industrial time. From the technical perspective, the current battle is going to be fought at “run time”—as fast as our computer and our adversaries’ computers run. We talk about the physical devices that protect our networks, the firewalls and all sorts of equipment. The equipment is needed; defense is needed. But the true essence in the way we protect our networks—certainly at Cisco Systems—is more the sense of the network, similar to a “coup d’oeil”: as Clausewitz calls it, the commander’s intuition. The security of our network is about maneuver, not static defense. It is having that sense of our network, of what is right and what is wrong, and in being able to react to what is wrong instantaneously in a machine-to-machine battle. Sensing and responding cannot be done when the technical community must come to the leadership community and explain what is happening. By the time that conversation happens, we are four or five waypoints down the road in the run time—machine versus machine—technical battle.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The point is that, as we move forward in this business of cyber security, network resiliency, or whatever descriptive term we want to use, we need to address the issues of cyberspace and we must remember that it is a work in progress. We must define it much better than it is currently defined. What is cyberspace? Some talk of the links—the wires, the cable cuts; others about the network—the denial of service attacks; we talk about the data and its reliability; we talk about applications and their vulnerabilities; however, there are other parts of cyber security. One question in our discussion concerns the security of the supply chain. Cisco and the entire IT industry have had problems because there is big money in counterfeiting. In our experience, the counterfeiting we have encountered has all been for criminal financial reasons. There are also the questions of the supply chain’s provenance—the companies, who owns them, and who the investors are. The globalization of the IT industry and its many components all impact the supplier base.

The commercial IT industry is not part of the classic defense industrial base. The commercial electronic industry is an entirely new set of players to deal with in the defense industrial base. The commercial IT industry is cooperating to defeat the problems that we all have in securing our nations and businesses. There are two additional major problems to address from the government’s perspective: the first has been alluded to—procurement; the second is certification. With the rate of change that we are dealing with in the IT industry, it is nearly impossible to get through a certification cycle with the current certification regime.

Now that we have merged voice, video, and data, governments require sequencing of these certifications. As we go through the required sequence—number one to number two and so on, frequently what was certified in number one has already changed when we start certification number two. Industry and government cooperate in working through the current process. But that day-to-day collaboration is working through the old processes. The world continues to march, things continue to happen, and the battle of the networks continues to be fought. Government and industry need to come together in a forum that will allow us to learn government’s pain points, but just as importantly, for government to learn industry’s pain points; then to work to an AGREED arrangement addressing the concerns of the supply chain, the procurement process and the certification issue.
Chapter 26

Dealing with Crises in Afghanistan and Pakistan

Ambassador Dr. Zahir Tanin
Afghanistan’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations

OPENING REMARKS

It is an honor to have the opportunity to speak to you today. This is a key time for the world in both Afghanistan and the surrounding region. In the last few months, international attention has refocused. New U.S. leadership has promised more troops and a civilian surge. In a short time, Afghans will go to the polls and choose our next leaders. Despite the continuing security and political challenges, this new focus has already generated several steps in the right direction: A civilian surge, attention on sub-national governance, and a new international alignment with Afghan priorities.

The stakes for success in Afghanistan are high. This is NATO’s first peacekeeping mission outside Europe in its 60-year history. Some have suggested that Afghanistan represents a definitive measure of NATO’s ongoing transformation and resolve as well as a true test of NATO’s future. In addition, a failure of international engagement would be a serious triumph for terrorism. As the world saw eight years ago, an unstable Afghan state can foster terrorists. Conversely, a successful Afghan state offers security for its neighbors and allies and can act as an economic hub and land bridge.

The time is right. The stakes are high. So today our discussion about how to achieve success in Afghanistan is crucial.

I have been asked to speak about the political and diplomatic perspectives on a strategy for success. Speaking to an audience of mostly defense specialists and representatives, my goal today is to lay out the correct civilian and political strategy to complement our military understanding.

THE NEED FOR A COMPLEMENTARY CIVILIAN-MILITARY STRATEGY

At a time of economic uncertainty, a civilian strategy and a military strategy need to be complementary. The United States has recognized this. As President Obama stated, “It is far cheaper to train a policeman to secure their village or to help a farmer seed a crop than it is to send [U.S.] troops to fight tour after tour of duty.” We also understand that no victory in Afghanistan can be purely military. Only a comprehensive political-military solution is sustainable and lasting.

My recommendations for a comprehensive political-military strategy would improve the understanding of the situation in Afghanistan in order to improve our actions in Afghanistan. We need to cultivate two understandings: 1) an understanding that rejects defeatist assumptions about the politics of Afghanistan and, 2) an understanding that better identifies the enemy so that we can defeat it. Far too often, I am asked about the “likelihood” or the “possibility” of building a successful state and political culture in Afghanistan. To understand my country’s history is to recognize that there is no question about possibility—there is only the actuality of a stable, democratic state in our country’s history.

The modernization of our country did not begin in 2001—it began in the early 1900s. In 1923, our first constitution enforced such laws as compulsory elementary education. In the 1960s, women voted and served in political offices alongside men. There was freedom of movement and security of property. The state enforced a legitimate control that extended throughout the country before external powers interfered and violence unsettled our progress. In short, there has been a central state in Afghanistan; there can be one again.

The Taliban seeks to persuade the world, and Afghans themselves, that their movement is only “returning” Afghanistan to its traditional morality. But their barbarity does not represent any Afghan tradition. In fact, the Taliban is exactly the opposite—they are an anti-tradition and an anti-culture. They are a product of war and destruction, capable of producing only further destruction.

So we must ensure that our comprehensive political-military strategy is not stymied by wrong assumptions. A better po-
litical understanding of Afghan culture and history opens up new beliefs in our opportunity for success. Similarly, a better political understanding of the enemy opens up new possibilities for their defeat. This enemy is comprised of Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and their international terrorist allies, as well as the destabilizing internal networks of corruption and warlordism.

TURNING BETTER UNDERSTANDING INTO BETTER ACTION

In the last eight years, Al-Qaeda and the Taliban have been able to strengthen and regroup. In 2001, they were not included in the Bonn political process, nor did the international community send enough troops to eliminate them. After their initial defeat, flagging international attention ignored the sanctuaries and sources of their external support. The combination of all of these factors was a deadly recipe for terrorism’s strengthening and re-emergence. Recent developments in the region indicate that terrorism continues to find leadership and guidance from outside Afghanistan.

Beyond the Taliban, a network of corruption threatens our Afghan state from within. Since 2001, old warlords have been able to gain new power by linking themselves to the aims of the international community. Yesterday’s warlords with guns have become today’s warlords with position and money. The international community has continued to ignore the illegal operations of these power-holders, contributing to a deepening nexus between warlordism, drugs, and the criminalization of politics. This internal weakness denies the Afghan people’s desire for justice and destabilizes the democratic process in Afghanistan. International efforts in Afghanistan should instead focus on supporting the moderate forces for progress. Moderate elements are a more stable foundation for our state. Today we must also translate this better understanding into better action. Better action prioritizes security, strengthens governance, and emphasizes regional cooperation.

First, the right strategy stems insecurity to create space for governance. Where there is no minimum security, governance is impossible. Thus, international forces can help our government create a human security corridor where we can move beyond only fighting the Taliban to delivering an effective system of justice, healthcare, education, and safety of movement for Afghans. We must establish this minimum-security environment immediately. But for long-term success, troops should move toward establishing a more permanent security by eliminating the sanctuaries that provide long-term support to the insurgency. In addition, politically we should work to weaken the Taliban and their extremist allies by separating out those elements that are willing to support a strong, stable, democratic Afghanistan and by including them in the political process.

Second, the right strategy strengthens governance. Interlinked with fighting the Taliban is establishing Afghan government institutions, including effective Afghan national security forces. At this time of economic constraints, quality of strategy is more important than quantity of resources. International support should be accomplished through a strategy that maximizes the impact of every international effort. This best-quality strategy is coordinated, continuous, and accountable.

Recently there has been improvement in the coordination of international efforts, but we must continue to be focused. Military efforts are still visualized through a province-by-province, instead of a national, perspective. Civilian and development work is often conducted by piecemeal non-state organizations outside of the Afghan government. Many foreign experts also do not stay long enough to complete their projects. But this does not have to be the case. The Paris Donor Conference of 2008 recognized that international engagement should be coordinated around the pillars of the Afghan National Development Strategy.

In addition, how we spend money must be clear and accountable. The Ministry of Finance recently revived our donor database. International aid should be channeled through this database so that we can measure how well funds have been used. Private contractors must also be accountable.

Today the most visible test for strengthened governance is in the upcoming elections—a crucial moment for democratic progress in Afghanistan. We are happy to see full international and Afghan commitment to fair, free, and transparent elections with a level playing field for all candidates. It is important to keep the right expectations: A successful election does not deliver a quick-fix solution to all challenges. Instead, our goal is to strengthen a continuing democratic process that is fully and completely Afghan-owned.

Third, the right strategy requires sustained regional cooperation. The region has the most to lose—and the most to win—from Afghanistan. Increased bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral processes can reduce negative perceptions and increase positive, productive action. Together with Pakistan, Afghanistan has recognized that we face a joint threat of terrorism. We are coordinating our efforts to defeat this threat. We also look toward NATO and the United States to support us in eliminating sanctuaries for terrorism in the region.

Beyond Pakistan, Afghanistan looks to bilaterally work with Iran, India, Central Asia, Russia, and China on issues of security, border control, trade, and drugs. For the first time in a long time, many countries in our region understand the
possibility of honest cooperation. Uzbekistan's energy supply and the Russian Federation's facilitating of the NATO supply line are two important examples. In addition, trilateral processes with the U.S., Pakistan, Turkey, and Iran are becoming important ways to forward talks for cooperation. Multilaterally, Afghanistan is committed to participation in the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and the contact group of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

The focus on Afghanistan and the renewed work through bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral processes ultimately strengthen the frameworks in which they are conducted. And with stronger regional frameworks and organizations, we are better equipped to face the future. Afghanistan's present challenges may very well be the catalyst to a stronger, more peaceful region for decades to come.

**TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE RENEWED FOCUS ON AFGHANISTAN**

Today there is refocused international attention on Afghanistan and a genuine momentum heading in the right direction. We must seize the moment to cement our progress in an improved political-military strategy. This strategy increases the understanding of Afghan culture and of the enemy in order to prioritize security, strengthen governance, and emphasize the region. Success in Afghanistan will mean opportunities realized: It is a state rich in minerals, energy, and agricultural potential and is a state located strategically to serve as a land bridge between Europe, Central Asia, South Asia, and China. Afghans hope to become active and productive players in global progress.
Chapter 27

The Afghan Conflict: A Perspective from Pakistan

Ambassador Abdullah Hussain Haroon
Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations

A COMPLEX BACKGROUND

I want to emphasize that the war in Afghanistan is not a little matter of turf in the backyard of Europe or Asia. The conflict started off as a collateral Arabian problem in Africa and travelled to the wilds of Afghanistan based on a power vacuum left by the retreating superpowers of the era, touching off the brutal 30-year war that is currently underway. This is a conflict similar to the Thirty Years’ War in Europe in the 17th Century that crippled the continent for decades. It can also be seen as a corollary to the 10-year war in Iraq which brought the mighty economy of the United States, including Wall Street, to its feet. Most devastatingly, however, it has resulted in 30 years of leaving the burden on just two countries to deal with a situation that is neither national nor regional in outlook.

Afghanistan has come to its present state after long wars, deep turmoil, and the crippling of its natural economy: Forty years ago, it was a bright, prosperous country that had great potential. Pakistanis used to holiday there often. In fact, we along with other investors, built the Intercontinental Kabul as an investment in Afghanistan because it was such a great place to go. Today of course, not only Afghanistan but also Pakistan—which was self-sufficient in all of its needs prior to the Afghan War—are in deep economic deficit.

THE INSURGENCY

I have been able to have in-depth conversations with people who have now become pillars of the system that created the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and other such organizations. Their quest is to find the right staging post to take on the world. In fact, they have already done so and they brag about it. They brag about how they can hurt you in Madrid. They brag about how they can hurt you in Africa. They brag about how they can hurt you in Lebanon. They even brag that they can hurt you more than the Japanese were able to during the Second World War in the Pacific. They have taken on the Atlantic and, by virtue, NATO. So I warn you: Do not view this as a limited or a regional move. This is a move for world supremacy, no matter how absurd it might appear to all of you living in western society.

You are dealing with an implacable foe. These people try to hide themselves like a cancer. They can remain undetected for long periods of time because they take over the muscle or bone that they are in fact destroying and try to confuse anyone who tries to counter them. This is exactly what has happened. The insurgents have adopted a guise under which they attempt to convince people to buy into their vision of how the world should be, claiming certain moral reasons for the things they do. If you try to enter into any type of dialogue with them, they promptly say, “Ah, but the books you read are Anglo-Saxon or European. They are not the books that we were brought up on and are incorrect records of history.” They are a Trotsky-like nihilist force who aim to destruct everything that does not fit their idea of how the world should work. Unfortunately, history has shown that when a civilization is threatened, it is often by forces which are considered to be diminished or that do not have the wherewithal and the finances to sustain such an attack. If you read the annals of Rome, Greece, or other civilizations, this is what happens every time.

In Afghanistan there has been a more than 40% increase in incidents over the past year and in Pakistan some major districts of the northwest and frontier have fallen to the Taliban one by one. In addition, the sense of alienation and the grievances experienced by a major section of the Afghan population have led to hostility and insurgency.

Due to the lack of essentials and the absence of credible security in Afghanistan, the situation is severe. One obvious reminder of this is that there are still approximately 3 million Afghans living in Pakistan that are afraid of going back. In
the city of Karachi alone, we have roughly tabulated 2 million of them.

**POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS**

*Military Successes.* However, with the troop surge in Afghanistan and the strong offensive which has taken place in Pakistan recently, the international and regional powers are holding off the enemy. This year is considered to be crucial for the Taliban from a strategic standpoint, so these successes are particularly significant.

*Strong U.S. Involvement.* The Obama Administration’s new strategy, which is under constant review, has also brought hope and promise. This is the first time we are taking this on a more dynamic basis and it is a good idea. Of course, it is founded on the belief that we can negotiate with the insurgency. Let me assure you that these are not people who will see reason; they will take the opportunity to keep you engaged but it will not in fact produce results. However, the U.S. expression of a long-term interest in the region is very important. In addition, the acknowledgement that abandoning these regions in the past was a mistake is also important.

*Increased Cooperation, Including Improved Pakistani-Afghan Relations.* The Pakistani government has worked to cultivate a closer relationship with the Karzai government in Afghanistan over the past year. I am very glad to see that both sides agree that it is important for us to cooperate and that the Kabul government has reciprocated our efforts towards this end; it is not tangible for Pakistan and Afghanistan to carry on the way we have been. This has now led to better thinking, more appropriate functioning, and of course clarity of command between Islamabad and Kabul.

There have also been improvements in relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan and neighboring countries due to the Regional Economic Cooperation on Construction of Afghanistan (RECCA). We have met many times under this aegis and are creating joint strategies to fulfill our common destiny. We have also been engaged in trilateral summits, including with Turkey, Iran, and Russia, at various times. These summits are producing consensus and results.

As a result of all these efforts, the Taliban are being routed for the first time in years. In order to be successful in Afghanistan, the world must work in tandem. We must apply the motto of the musketeers: “All for one and one for all.” Otherwise, the conflict will likely culminate with one side or the other wiping itself out. While this might not be imminent, this is what each side would like to see happen.

**WHAT IS NEEDED**

*A Better Understanding of the Insurgency.* The legal implications and aspects have not been fully considered. For example, in the United Nations today, we are just starting to realize that the insurgents in Afghanistan are not people who operate within the ambit of any law. When you speak to the insurgents of the Geneva Convention, they are not aware that it even exists. We must understand this. They do what they wish with impunity and have no commitment to civilization.

*The Importance of Ownership.* Another necessity is to promote a sense of ownership in Afghanistan with regards to the conflict. It is the Afghan community that truly needs to win in Afghanistan. In fact, this is the most important aspect. The Afghan people need to become convinced of the need to take action and that it is their rights which are being violated.

In Pakistan we had a similar situation. At first, Pakistanis thought, “Oh, the war with the Taliban is an American war.” Then the Taliban started slitting Pakistani throats, killing innocents by the thousands, and bombing the country, and we realized that it was no longer an outside war. However, we had to feel that sense of ownership in order to be catalyzed into stepping up and countering the Taliban. One advantage that we had in Pakistan was a viable army of over one million strong. This is considerable, especially with some amount of international support. If we see ourselves as immune to the situation and do not address it earnestly and urgently, no country in the region or in the world, not even America or any of the European nations, will be able to contain the impact and consequences of a prolonged conflict in Afghanistan. I say this because, in our part of the world, we feel that, within NATO, there is an aspect of fatigue.

**BUILDING TRUST IN A REGIONAL APPROACH, INCLUDING IMPROVING PAKISTANI-INDIAN RELATIONS**

The need for a regional approach is a nice catchphrase. It has worked in many ways thus far. It should bring solid stakes to all sides and lasting peace. However, its specifics need to be clear. For this, the divergence of strategic perceptions has to be addressed and gaps in trust between the countries involved need to filled. Any strategy for the region should have an objective understanding of the countries’ perspectives and sensitivities and must take their legitimate security interests into
account. Removing the trust deficit is essential for smooth and continued cooperation. If we cannot do so, the countries
involved are more likely to say ‘no’ to matters which need to be clarified rather than put aside.

In addition, the dialogue process between Pakistan and India is very important; we must keep talking and never break
off talks. The region is not going to see peace if India and Pakistan do not work together.

LIMITATIONS OF THE MILITARY AND IMPORTANCE OF RE-ESTABLISHING
NORMALCY IN A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

A comprehensive approach as recommended by Ambassador Tanin is absolutely the right strategy. A military solution
by itself is not going to be the answer. The notion that reliance on military means cannot deliver peace has predominantly
been accepted internationally. However, one aspect that is still being debated is what is a good Taliban and what is a bad
Taliban. There is no such thing; there are only Taliban. In addition, the shifting of blame for failure, which we have been
practicing for a long time, must be avoided. This is counter-productive.

Lastly, benchmarks for progress must be people-centric rather than power-centric. Improvement can best be measured
by seeing the people of Afghanistan living normal lives again in the country. Normalcy will only reappear when people
once again inhabit the regions they used to inhabit. The recent U.N. Secretary General’s report to the Security Council treats
this topic in detail and is available on the internet.

INVESTMENTS IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, REPATRIATION OF PEOPLES,
AND A LONG-TERM COMMITMENT

Of course, there has been a policy shift in Afghanistan; the new appointment of the U.S. Command in Afghanistan is
indicative of this. However, a much bigger surge is needed in civilian development. The investment which European and
other countries have promised time and again has not really materialized and it needs to. This is crucial in Pakistan and
Afghanistan in order to bring back some sort of normalcy and to mitigate the level of poverty by providing a way for the
people to go back to their traditional ways of working, obstructed after 30 years of war. This is not going to be done by
donations, by the way, but rather by “teaching them how to fish,” which is the best way. What is needed is the ability to
refinance in order to bring back traditional society.

The Taliban have managed very brilliantly to kill the heads of the regions they wanted to overtake so that refugees do
not have a fulcrum to return to. The repatriation of people to Afghanistan should be a priority and the global economic
and financial crisis should not be an excuse to cut the development efforts and financing.

It is also very important for us to make a long-term commitment to Afghanistan. Talk of an exit strategy implies that we
have failed and must run, and hence creates further insecurity and pushes more people to become refugees. There must be
a permanence. The people must have confidence that we are in Afghanistan to help rebuild and stabilize and that we will
do what needs to be done when it is necessary.

PAKISTAN’S FINANCIAL SITUATION

We have to realize that there are huge sums of money involved. I believe that Iraq was never the global threat that it was
portrayed as. After $3 trillion has been poured into the country, the world is weary. But there was a line that built up in
Afghanistan—September 11 is proof of that—and that line has now moved into Pakistan. I was talking to the American
Ambassador Anne Patterson in Karachi recently and said to her, “You know, we have not seen anything forthcoming for
a very long time. In fact, you might be surprised to know that regarding the contract you signed with us to supply fuel to
the American forces in Afghanistan, the payment which is now overdue by one year and is growing every day now amounts
to close to $1 billion dollars. This means that we are actually paying for your war. You have not been able to repay us what
you asked us to invest in it financially.” She was shocked because she did not know this. This is what it is all about—empty
pledges, broken promises, and many things which never really arrive. This is the story of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

None of us are asking for handouts. As I have said to the U.S. Administration, “we do not need money; we need help
and support in order to build capacity.” The U.N. Secretary General is doing a brilliant job with this. We are currently in
an untenable situation. If we could get interest write-offs, this would introduce $7 billion into our economy. In this case,
we would not need money from the international community. A lot of our debt has come in after the Afghan War. In fact,
the build-up of the Pakistan debt pre-Afghan War and post-Afghan War is practically 100%. We had to bring in the money
to carry the brunt and we carried it.

I also said to the U.S., “on cotton alone you have a favored nation status treaty with Dubai and Bangladesh. They are buying our cotton, adding value, and giving it to you. If you let us do it ourselves and send it to you directly, i.e. allow us to put all of the work in it, you would have another $7 billion coming in from there. That would be $14 billion in all.” Similarly, if you allow for the refinancing of 1% of the pension funds of the U.S. for one year, which you have done in many countries of the world, in that one year we would be able to get the kickoff that would bounce this economy back and the world would not have to pay for anything, as it is not paying now.

**WAZIRISTAN AND CONCLUSIONS**

Many of your governments are asking, “What is happening in Waziristan? Why has Pakistan gone in? This is a quagmire. It is too early.” As I have said, “we have gone in on our own resources. We have asked you for three years to give us communication equipment, helicopters, modern weaponry, and basic things like night goggles for vision. None of this has materialized. But we have taken on Swat. And we are trying to get Waziristan.” This is a much more difficult situation, but the task needs to be done. We cannot wait for the world to come up with the answers now that we have assumed ownership. We are going into it ourselves. There is an urgent need to bring an end to a vicious cycle of conflict. If nothing is done, the situation in Afghanistan and in its neighboring regions is going to affect the world sooner or later.
Chapter 28

Dealing with the Crises in Afghanistan and Pakistan

General Vincenzo Camporini
Chief of General Staff of the Italian Armed Forces

OPENING REMARKS

I am going to provide a brief overview of the Italian perspective and of our guiding principles regarding national participation in the peace support operation in Afghanistan, starting with the Italian Constitutional Charter and ending with specific terms of reference for our troops. I will also look at activities related to peace support, which Italy is particularly well-equipped for because of several important tools, such as the Carabinieri, who are a unique mix of military and police capabilities.

THE ITALIAN APPROACH TO NATIONAL SECURITY

In order to understand fully the Italian stance regarding the Afghan crisis, it is essential to sketch the general guidelines of our national security policy. After realizing that in the post-Cold War environment security is no longer automatically granted by membership in the Alliance, Italy revised its traditional role as a security-consuming country and embarked on an effort to become a security-producing country. Thus, since the early 1990s, Italian governments have pursued a number of policies aimed at reinforcing and linking the different multilateral organizations of which the country is a member, primarily the U.N., EU, and NATO.

Regarding NATO, Italy recognizes that, in the post-Cold War environment, NATO must take responsibility for out-of-area missions, whether for humanitarian reasons or, more concretely, to project stability around our borders. One of the consequences of this changed attitude has been that Italian governments have begun to play a much more active role within each of these organizations, thus becoming more visible and audible on the international scene. Today, Italy's national interests are no longer vaguely defined by passive membership in these multilateral organizations (as was the case during the Cold War), but are instead identified by the active pursuit of policies aimed at shaping the future of these organizations in an effectively coordinated manner.

NATO is the central pillar of national security, and there is significant interest in preserving its credibility and confidence. The preferred Italian approach is to promote true burden-sharing among all participating nations, coupled with a requirement for equal dignity and capability for shaping Alliance policies.

In the last few years, Italy has demonstrated that it can provide a significant value addition in its approach to international crises and peace support operations. Traditional and cultural elements blend to focus special attention on niche capabilities such as military forces with police capabilities (our Carabinieri), CIMIC (Civil-Military Cooperation), the training of local security personnel, and security sector reform activities. This approach has been tested and refined through commitments in the Balkans, the Middle East, Iraq, Africa, and several other hot spots around the world.

MANDATORY LEGAL FRAMEWORK CONSTRAINTS ON MILITARY OPERATIONS

To clarify Italy's attitude, I need to provide some details about our Constitutional Charter. Article 11 of our Constitution clearly states that Italy rejects the use of force to solve international disputes; on the other hand, it defines the need to support the efforts of international organizations. This helps to understand the importance given to a U.N. Resolution as a required legal framework for any issue in foreign policy. This is also the reason why Italy has always acted as a very responsible contributor to world stability while sometimes interpreting armed conflicts in a fairly complicated way.
It is worth noting in this respect that the national stance regarding the management of apprehended and suspected people, mandated by the national penal code, refuses the death penalty and demands mandatory respect for human rights, limiting the ability of Italian peacekeepers to hand over prisoners to local authorities unless these standards are fully met.

ITALY AND AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan is a test for NATO as an organization contributing to global security and concerned with stabilizing crisis areas outside the traditional Euro-Atlantic space. Since the very beginning, the government of Italy has strongly supported the idea that peace in Afghanistan depends not only on military means but primarily on a massive and coordinated effort of the political and civil realms.

We have therefore welcomed the development of the comprehensive approach. Security, in fact, must be considered a supporting function—a needed framework to enable institution-building and consolidation activities rather than merely being an end unto itself—and an area where the military can also significantly contribute to civil-military cooperation and reconstruction efforts.

This makes it necessary for the international community to have a multidimensional approach. From that standpoint, the Italian Armed Forces are committed to increasing their support of initiatives aimed at reinforcing the police sector and public order in general as well as civil reconstruction activities. Italy has been involved since shortly after 2000 in promoting political progress in Afghanistan after decades of civil war. And since the fall of the Taliban regime, Italy has always actively supported Afghanistan’s stabilization and reconstruction through military and civil assistance. Our country has led international community efforts, within the G8 framework, to strengthen Afghanistan’s government and justice system.

MILITARY ENGAGEMENTS

In terms of military engagements, Italy plays a major role in ensuring the security conditions necessary for reconstruction. We have been contributing significantly to EF and ISAF since 2002, and commanded ISAF between 2005 and 2006. Presently there are approximately 2,800 Italian troops deployed in Afghanistan, mainly in the western region, where an Italian general is in charge of RC-W. Reinforcements are also to be sent for the presidential elections. Our troops are fully equipped and supported by general purpose helicopters, A129 Mangusta attack helicopters, which have shown great effectiveness and operational flexibility, as well as RPV Predator A, tactical fixed-wing aircraft, and most recently Tornado aircraft in the reconnaissance role.

NATIONAL CAVEATS

I would now like to clarify our position regarding the vexing question of national caveats. In any coalition, operational national caveats are inevitable, at least unless intelligence-sharing is limited and sometimes not fully reliable. This has been a central concern for the ISAF chain of command, and it is often called a major limiting factor in the daily planning of military activities. Italy used to put a geographic caveat on the employment of our troops, with a 72-hour warning to authorize out-of-area operations. A recent decision has reduced the warning time to six hours, transforming the caveat into a remark. We are ready to delete this remark as soon as we are allowed into the “four eyes” community.

TRAINING AFGHAN FORCES

Regarding our commitment to training the Afghan army and Afghan police forces, presently we have more than 200 army personnel involved in seven OMLTs, and we will increase the number of Carabinieri engaged in police force training up to 200 units. The Afghan National Army continues to make steady progress, increasing its capabilities while simultaneously conducting security and stabilization operations.

However, although there are a number of initiatives to improve police development, the Afghan National Police lags behind the Afghan National Army. In order to address this shortfall, NATO authorities have approved the establishment of the NATO Training Mission Afghanistan, which will encompass and coordinate the bulk of activities related to Afghan national security forces training, with specific attention to police training. Italy fully supports this new activity, which will result in a tremendous increase in capabilities of both the Afghan army and the police. Our experience in this field is significant, since it was acquired and honed in the challenging environment of Iraq, where Italy leads the NATO Training
Mission-Iraq (NTM-I); in Kosovo, in favor of the Kosovo security forces; as well as in Congo and other theaters.

With specific reference to our engagement in region west, keeping in mind that the mission is to assist the Afghan Government in developing its own capabilities and providing security throughout the country, humanitarian and reconstruction efforts are a primary part of the engagement. ISAF contributes to the reconstruction of Afghanistan through Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), which combine both a military and a civil component. A distinct division of tasks has been established between the two, although they blend to achieve the final objective of supporting and advising the reconstruction of civilian society, establishing a normal living environment, and facilitating the activities of the Afghan Government and non-governmental organizations.

Additional activities undertaken by Italy’s armed forces are also unfolding outside the ISAF mandate. I specifically refer to the training of the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), a program activated in cooperation with the U.S. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and executed with success in Adraskan by the Carabinieri. I would also like to mention the significant contribution made to the European Union police mission (EUPOL), with its Carabinieri and Guardia di Finanza, outstanding examples of the unbeatable contribution these police forces with military status can make in stability operations.

**COUNTER-NARCOTICS ACTIVITIES**

Regarding counter-narcotics initiatives, Italy well knows that growing opium is a primary financing source for the insurgency and that countering the narcotics trade is an essential part of a comprehensive strategy. In this arena Italian forces will be providing the maximum level of support to the Afghan authorities in their counter-narcotics activities. However, it is not compatible with our national policy to consider any element of the opium trade chain a legitimate military target.

**CONCLUDING REMARKS**

In this brief overview I have tried to outline the Italian defense perspective regarding the delicate Afghan situation and to provide the general guiding principles of our commitment to this troubled Asian country. In summary, we perceive Afghanistan as a critical point for our collective security and we will therefore provide our best efforts as we continue to contribute our capabilities to help the international community stabilize the country and create the basis for a democratic and self-sufficient Afghanistan.

In doing so, our guiding principle will be the original objective of the ISAF mission, intended to support the Afghan authorities in achieving ownership of the governance process. It is quite clear that the path will be long and difficult, but I think we are on the right path to the continuing growth both of the nation and Afghan society.
Dealing with Crises in Afghanistan and Pakistan: Strategic Issues

General Karl-Heinz Lather
Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)

With regard to the overall strategy, the NATO Alliance has an approach for achieving enduring progress in Afghanistan, which all the heads of state and government agreed to at the Bucharest Summit in April 2008 and recently re-affirmed and updated at the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit. Not surprisingly, the key elements of the new U.S. strategic approach are consistent with this NATO approach. There are no major disagreements—only differences of emphasis. I will illustrate this by framing my comments with the four guiding principles of the NATO approach.

LONG-TERM ENGAGEMENT

First is long-term commitment: NATO has recognized that the international community will need to be engaged in the region on an enduring basis if we are to achieve our goals. Such a commitment is necessary for a number of reasons. To begin with, there is still much to do to reconstruct Afghanistan’s infrastructure, economy, society, and government. This will take time. Next, we need to reassure Afghans that we, the international community, will stay as long as it takes and that we will not abandon the region as we did after the Soviet withdrawal, or ever allow the possibility of a return to a Taliban regime. Lastly, from a military perspective, we require the long-term commitment in order to enable us to plan and resource the longer-term infrastructure projects required, including the Afghan National Army and National Police.

AFGHAN ENGAGEMENT

The next guiding principle in the NATO approach is Afghan leadership. UN Security Council Resolution 1386 (2001), which authorized the establishment of ISAF, recognized that the responsibility for providing security and law and order resides with the Afghans themselves. ISAF’s role was, and is, to assist with security until the Afghans can do the job unaided. Indeed SACEUR’s end state, and our exit strategy, is the establishment of Afghan security forces which can provide security without NATO support. There are a number of areas where we can help develop Afghan capacity to assume a leadership role. These include mentoring Afghan National Army units, providing advice and capacity-building programs to the Afghan MoD, as well as wider support to the development of governance, the rule of law, and democratic processes. At the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit, NATO announced a range of further initiatives in this area. These include the establishment of a NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan, the provision of more trainers and mentors in support of the Afghan National Police, and the provision of more mentor teams for the Afghan National Army.

On the security side one of the best ways to develop capability is actually to put Afghans in the driver’s seat. We have seen from the process of transferring the lead for security in Kabul province, that the Afghans are more than capable of stepping up to the mark, and have rapidly become effective. As conditions permit and in conjunction with the Afghan Government, we will look to expand this process beyond Kabul. Again, the focus on developing Afghan abilities was reflected in the new U.S. strategy.

THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

The third guiding principle is enhanced coordination of all the lines of effort—most commonly known as the “Comprehensive Approach.” Now that we can see that after 7 years success remains elusive, there is a growing consensus that to
achieve stabilization in Afghanistan (and it will be the same in Pakistan) there needs to be genuine progress along the three main lines of effort at the same time— that is to say security, governance, and reconstruction and development—the three pillars of the Afghan National Development Strategy. In straightforward terms, we cannot provide security by military means alone, when frustration at the lack of good governance and the lack of tangible signs of economic development drive people into the arms of the insurgency. It is worth commenting that the conditions fomenting the insurgency in Afghanistan are almost exactly replicated in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, and so it is evident that the same comprehensive approach is required there. To achieve this comprehensive approach requires the integration of the efforts of multiple actors including different ministries of the contributing governments, U.N. international and non-governmental organizations, as well as the ministries of the Afghan government. At its Strasbourg / Kehl Summit, NATO committed to provide more support to the Afghan government and U.N. to achieve just such an integrated approach.

REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT

The last of NATO’s guiding principles is regional engagement. We have recognized that extremists in Pakistan, especially in western areas, and the insurgency in Afghanistan undermine security and stability in both countries and that the problems are deeply intertwined. NATO supports enhanced military-to-military cooperation through the Tripartite Commission structures and Border Coordination Centres and through exchanges of liaison officers and high-level political contacts. Indeed, NATO supports any initiative aimed at improving relations and cooperation between Afghanistan and its neighbors. This theme is of course a major element running through the whole of the new U.S. approach, with the appointment of Ambassador Holbrooke as special envoy to both countries, and with parallel initiatives to boost counter-insurgency capabilities and civilian development on both sides of the border simultaneously.

This developing consensus is not only between the U.S. and NATO. The International Conference on Afghanistan held in The Hague on 31 March, which was attended by 71 countries and 11 major international organizations, picked up on exactly the same themes. Similarly, the Donors’ Conference in Tokyo on 17 April, which consolidated the support of the international community for Pakistan’s stable development, was designed to be coherent with the U.S. strategy, The Hague conference, and the NATO Summit. Again, on the operational level the Joint Force Command Brunssum-led PRT conference in Maastricht in early June tried to foster relations between the Afghan Government, the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and NATO.

CONCLUSIONS

In recognizing that there is broad consensus about what needs to be done, there is genuine difficulty in agreeing how to do it—the devil is in the detail! The national governments of the 28 NATO and 14 non-NATO countries contributing to ISAF are each responsible to their own electorates with differing collective views on the importance of the mission. In this difficult current economic climate, it is inevitable that there will be conflicting views on resource priorities. To implement the comprehensive approach itself presents problems—for example, UNAMA is both under-resourced and too weak in its mandate for its overall coordinating role. And many international actors do not necessarily want to be coordinated, as they pursue what their nation or organization perceives as the priorities. In implementing the strategy we also have to acknowledge the realities of dealing with sovereign governments in Afghanistan and Pakistan. We must work with and through the indigenous institutions, keeping their legitimate interests in mind.

To sum up, there is broad international consensus on the key elements of the approach to dealing with the crises in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Although differences remain over resourcing and prioritization of implementation, NATO is already pursuing several key initiatives that in conjunction with the renewed impetus provided by the new U.S. commitment to the region should move us in the right direction.
Chapter 30

Afghanistan and Pakistan—Looking Ahead

Admiral Luciano Zappata
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Transformation

OPENING REMARKS

My perspective on the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan is based on my experience as Deputy Commander of Allied Command Transformation, the NATO HQ that is responsible for leading military transformation, enhancing interoperability, and supporting NATO missions and operations. We just completed the Multiple Futures Project (MFP), which explores the question of future threats and challenges. While it is impossible to make predictions, we must try and anticipate future strategic and operational contexts.

Many elements of the reality we face today in operations will remain in the future. The MFP has confirmed the importance of working in strategic anticipation to avoid having regional crises and failed states spill over and become sources of threats to the values and populations of the Alliance. The situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan highlights the importance of working in strategic anticipation. At the same time, however, we must also be reactive and adaptive in order to flexibly and quickly respond to challenges that emerge on the field. That is why we are committed to making use of a lessons-learned process that provides operational feedback across the full spectrum of activities, and we do it at the NATO Joint Analysis Lessons Learned Center in Portugal.

GOING FORWARD IN AN INTERCONNECTED WORLD

We live in an increasingly global and interconnected world. Nowadays, emerging challenges do not affect only individual countries or regions, but all of us in the international community. Global challenges demand global responses; NATO will have to clarify further its roles and responsibilities in the security environment. But one thing is certain: The relationship with other international actors will increase dramatically in importance and NATO will rely even more on the successful implementation of a comprehensive, cooperative, and interagency approach to security, making military strength only one component of a much larger capability set. The lack of an established comprehensive approach cannot be an excuse to justify the problems we have. We must also do our homework. The issue is that we must learn to network with others and implement an interagency model that takes into account different interests and cultures.

Being Flexible

At Allied Command Transformation we have conducted successfully an experiment to build a civil-military fusion center and a civil-military overview to share information among various actors. One of the lessons learned from this experience is that, as NATO, we must be flexible and ready to integrate in non-military contexts as well as to lead interagency initiatives, depending on the situation and the requirements. At the military transformational level, our work in Afghanistan has underlined the need to focus our action on interoperability issues, training and education, strategic communication, and the fielding of capabilities.

There is one strategic constant in this type of security environment. Because we dominate in the conventional areas of warfare, our adversaries, who are very adaptable and difficult to identify, focus on our perceived weaknesses and confront us using irregular warfare tactics. In order to succeed we need a changed mindset, and new approaches, doctrines, strategies, and concepts. Conventional, irregular, and policing capabilities need to be integrated operationally and tactically at the lowest possible level. Forces must be expeditionary, sustainable, flexible, and adaptable—they need robust command and
control structures and the modus operandi needs to become increasingly decentralized.

Maintaining the Human Element

The human element in this type of environment is also key to success. The mindset and judgment of soldiers in the field are as important as their knowledge of procedures and tactics. This includes ethical and moral dimensions: Deployed forces are expected to perform non-combat missions aimed at winning the loyalty and support of local populations while facing an ample spectrum of combat situations at various degrees of intensity and tempo. This is a challenge in strategic communication. In fact, it is important to win the “battle of the narrative,” but we must also be mindful of our conduct as we go about winning “the hearts and minds” of the population. Being the “good guys” means more than just saying the right words. We must strive to match our words with our behavior, for what we do as much as for what we say.

The human element also has fundamental implications in the training and education of our forces as well as in the training of indigenous security forces. In this regard, NATO has decided to establish the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan in order to help Afghans grow, but not in order for us to do their job. The many initiatives at the national and NATO levels are often fragmented and not well coordinated. We need to improve the way we make use of existing resources and available technologies, a key area. In NATO, we are reviewing our organization and processes to be more efficient and to respond to the needs of a changing environment.

Maintaining Ambition and Capabilities

As the Alliance explores new territories in a strategic context in which the distinction between defense and security is not clear-cut, we have to be coherent and compelling regarding our level of ambition and the capabilities required. This is true today and will be even more so in the future. We need to match ambition with capability. It is a problem of budget, but the military also has to adapt in order to improve the way it defines requirements and ensures that forces and systems are interoperable.

In Afghanistan, we are working to fix interoperability problems as coalitions that are different in quality and standards work together at a very low tactical level. But the real issue is that we must plan for interoperability from the beginning of the capability development process. Another problem is that fielding capabilities takes too long. Because of this, we are not in a position to provide timely responses to operational needs. Moreover, changes in requirements and views during long programs create management, cost, and risk issues that eventually end up delivering solutions that do not meet users’ needs.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The next panel will discuss industry involvement; I am convinced that we must partner with industry as early and as often as possible in order to field capabilities faster, develop solutions closer to users’ requirements, explore potentially disruptive technologies, and improve interoperability. This can be done in various ways; in fact we are building a framework in which we exchange information, experiment with ideas, and explore technologies. It can really help. In this regard, on 8–9 October, we will hold Industry Day in Washington, D.C.

Adapting to answer all of the challenges requires adjusting doctrine, operational guidance, training and education, equipment, and organizational structures. It is a monumental job, and most organizations’ first impulse is to resist change. But for NATO to be successful, the transformational agenda needs to have a high priority.
Chapter 31

Dealing with the Challenges in Afghanistan and Pakistan: How Can the International Defense Industry contribute?

Mr. Al Volkman
Director for International Cooperation,
Office of the United States Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics)

This panel is about providing technology and defense equipment to the war fighter. This is not a new problem. History is replete with examples of men fighting wars without the equipment and technologies that would have saved lives—even though they were readily available.

The panel will address this question: How can the defense industrial establishment (both industry and government) help the war fighter in the wars being fought in Afghanistan and Pakistan? Much of the discussion thus far has addressed this issue.

SPEED OF TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION

The Dutch Minister of Defense remarked on Thursday about their success in buying 48 Bushmaster armored vehicles in three years and deploying them for use in ongoing operations in Afghanistan. He contrasted that success with the ten years it normally takes to field a combat vehicle. However, my guess is that for the Dutch war fighter, three years is still a very long time.

Tim Bloechl of Microsoft raised the problem of getting the latest Information Technology into the hands of the war fighter before it becomes obsolete. We do not do that now!

Secretary of Defense Gates has said that the troops are at war, but the Pentagon is not. The Pentagon bureaucracy and the defense industry continue to do business as usual.

Like the Dutch, the U.S. has had some success in providing badly needed equipment to the war fighter—equipment like Mine Resistant, Ambush Protected (MRAP) armored vehicles and technologies that defeat Improvised Explosive Devices (Counter IEDs), but we must do an even better job. We need to provide the right equipment in a timely manner at an affordable cost. The question is how?

We are fortunate today to have a most distinguished panel to address that question.
Chapter 32

NATO’s New Strategic Concept, the Economic Crises, And Implications for Industry

Mr. Thomas Homberg
Corporate Vice President, Head of Strategic Coordination, EADS

I am going to focus on two points: First, how we envisage the new NATO Strategic Concept and its consequences for interaction between governments, non-governmental organizations, and industry; and second, the economic crisis that is impacting industries and governments and their ability to prepare for the future.

THE NEW NATO CONCEPT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR INDUSTRY

The new concept will be based on the pillar of cooperation between civil actors, military actors, and security actors following the principles of networked security. Thus, three levels of cooperation need to be addressed now.

1. Cooperation within the industrial sector. Our defense industry today is too fragmented and our focus is still very nationalistic. One figure taken from a European Defense Agency analysis illustrates our inefficiency: approximately 80% of Europe’s total defense research and technology budget is spent to meet purely national aims. We must systematically favor cooperative programs over exclusively nationalistic industrial approaches which cause unsustainable redundancies and duplications without sufficiently supporting interoperability between defense, security, and civil actors in line with what I believe are the prerequisites and requirements of the new NATO concept.

As a consequence, my first request is this: Let us spend more cleverly. Let us:
- Harmonize and prioritize government demands and investments in defense and security to support industrial rationalization;
- Better coordinate and fund research investments; and
- Launch cooperative European and transatlantic programs rather than national ones.

2. Cooperation between defense, security, and civil players in operations. All military operations abroad will someday include a police and civil infrastructure development component with interoperability requirements. All parties engaged in a theatre, from defense or security forces to civil agencies, undoubtedly have their particular specialties. However, due to the convergence of needs when operating in the same environment and in line with the new NATO concept, together we must increase these players’ interoperability whilst considering their ConOps, employment in theatre, equipment, and training.

As a consequence, my second request is to further strengthen cooperation between defense, security, and civil forces, supported by industry. This includes:
- Ensuring cross-fertilization between security and defense forces and, to a lesser extent and if applicable, with civil players in both training and operations;
- Systematically sharing lessons learned, and including industry in this exchange;
- Developing dual-use equipment to make the best use of common standards, procedures, and logistics in operations;
- Fostering dual-use equipment to maximize economic benefits in research, development, and procurement.

3. Cooperation between defense and security forces, governmental and non-governmental actors, and industry. We need a straightforward, honest, and constructive dialogue between industry and the customer base through a multidisciplinary approach involving all actors. With such an approach, certain requirements will gain importance in light of the economic
crisis and its effects:
• Refrain from over-customization and over-specification which result in overly complex programs and high risks, including cost overruns and delays;
• Ensure, consequently, faster and more cost-efficient development and production cycles;
• Support these shorter cycles by providing industrial partners with privileged access to defense and security planners, concepts, and lessons learned; and
• Increase the exchange of personnel to facilitate this access and ensure joint training for all actors, including industry.

THE ECONOMIC CRISIS AND ITS IMPACT

The world faces increasingly complex global security challenges and threats which include international terrorism, pandemics, climate change, energy security, cyber security, and a severe global economic crisis at the same time. Thus the new NATO Strategic Concept is introduced in a very challenging environment. Because of the crisis, it will be difficult for some countries to maintain their level of spending for defense and security.

Governments can take two possible actions in times of economic crisis, but only one is attractive to us.
• This crisis could be an accelerating factor that could strongly encourage nations to increase cooperation in order to efficiently manage limited resources.
• On the other side, the crisis could cause a protectionist reflex where governments move to protect national interests first, not favoring European and transatlantic cooperation.

To me the choice is obvious: separate national approaches will fall short of the target because they a) contradict our interoperability requirements, and b) ignore the need for industrial and financial rationalization in times of limited resources. Instead, new European and transatlantic collaboration approaches are needed.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

To summarize:
• The new NATO concept is launched at a time when new security threats are materializing alongside serious economic challenges.
• We therefore must overcome national protectionist reflexes and instead strengthen cooperation to share capabilities at both the European and transatlantic levels.
• The new NATO can act as a true accelerator for strengthened cooperation. However, vice-versa, it will take cooperation to make the new concept a success and to ultimately serve all those in the field and in theatre.
Dealing with the Challenges in Afghanistan and Pakistan—How Can the International Defense Industry Contribute?

Mr. Peter Flory
NATO Assistant Secretary-General for Defense Investment

FINANCIAL AND STRATEGIC CONTEXT

I would like to define our topic as follows: how do we—NATO and industry—develop and deliver capabilities for the missions that we, at NATO, have taken on, in particular the ISAF mission in Afghanistan?

The first point that we need to hit is the financial and strategic context, which I define as two “not enoughs” and one “too much.” The first “not enough” is not enough money. Even before the financial crisis, only five out of the then-26 NATO Allies met the 2% target of GDP, and a number of Allies were way below that. And within that money there is not enough investment; specifically, too much money relatively speaking is spent on personnel and not enough on procurement and R&D. In European defense budgets, 21% goes to investment versus 52% to personnel. Obviously, when you talk about a large number of defense budgets, some of them have a better balance, some have a worse one. But four NATO Allies, for example, spend over 70% on personnel. This is not a good balance when it comes to procurement and capability.

Also, this “not enough” money is not necessarily spent in the right way. Or, it is spent on too many programs. General de Gaulle once asked, “How can you govern a country that has 246 different kinds of cheese?” More relevantly for our purpose, President Sarkozy asked, how can Europe afford five surface-to-air missiles, three combat aircrafts, six attack subs, and around 20 tank programs? This is the context.

What are some of the solutions to this situation? One is that, even in these challenging economic times, it is important to hold the line on defense spending. We owe it to our soldiers, we owe it to the missions we take on, and we owe it to the people of Afghanistan and the Balkans and all those on behalf of whom we take on these missions.

How do we match our resources to the things we said we need to do? One way is via what we call multinational approaches. This is not new at NATO. It is a way to share costs, create economies of scale, and, very importantly, improve interoperability. This approach also gives smaller nations access to costly capabilities that they might not be able to get on their own. Of course, multinational approaches are not a panacea. They face even more of the same challenges that other defense programs face. For example, they typically lack the national constituencies that many other national programs have. And, in my recent experience, it is often the NATO program that gets the axe when something has to be cut to meet a budget crunch, or to pay for operations. This risk is exacerbated by the fact that, due to the political processes involved and the complex industrial structures, these programs tend to be slow and, of course, the longer something takes, the more time it is exposed to the risks I just talked about—budget cuts, competing needs, and so on. Finally, there is the difficulty of balancing industrial equities and the desire of participating nations for an industrial share, with the necessity of quickly delivering a capability.

CREATING NATO-INDUSTRY SOLUTIONS

Speakers have already mentioned examples of what we are doing. The Full Operational Capability Plus (FOC+) is a lesser-known program: It provides deployable Communication and Information Services (CIS) in Afghanistan and has been contracted out to Thales. Having a contractor doing CIS in a war zone is a new experience for both of us. Both NATO and Thales have learned from this experience, and we have made a lot of progress. It has been a very challenging program.

Allied Ground Surveillance (AGS) is a critically important program. We are now very close to having a Program Memo-
randum of Understanding (PMOU) signed by all of the participants. This is good news. The bad news is that it has taken us much too long to get here.

The Strategic Airlift Capability is a better news story—it will take us just three years to go from a piece of paper to aircraft flying missions. Our first aircraft is ready and we will have two more very soon. They will be flying missions in Afghanistan by the fall of 2009. This story took a different approach, and has had a different result, because it involved purchasing an off-the-shelf capability. In many situations, especially facing urgent shortfalls, this might be the right way to go ahead, the right way to deliver a capability in the shortest possible time, but for some nations, the lack of industrial participation is a disincentive.

A very complex program that has not been mentioned is ALTBMD, the Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defence Program. The Alliance is working with an industry team led by SAIC to put together this command-and-control backbone for a Theater Ballistic Missile Defense system. It could be the core of NATO's contribution to a European missile defense system if the nations decide to have one. We are also working through industry, the NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG), and through ACT initiatives to put together a conference on transatlantic defense industrial cooperation in the fall of 2009 to try to answer some of the difficult questions about how to make this work better.

WHAT WE NEED FROM EACH OTHER

In this context, what is it that NATO owes industry? I think we owe you a number of things, some of which we have been doing better on than on others. First of all, we owe guidance to all our nations, and we owe commitment from our own nations, to resourcing capability development and making decisions that prioritize the development of capability. This is something I think is appropriate to see mentioned in the Strategic Concept. I have the feeling that the trend right now is toward a shorter, less detailed Strategic Concept than the last one, but we certainly need to see in there a commitment to resourcing, to decision superiority, to deployability, interoperability, and all the key elements that NATO needs to carry out its missions.

Obviously, as the AGS example indicates, decision making and implementation can be improved. These are things that we simply do not do well enough. We are a large organization, now with 28 nations, and our organization is inherently complicated. If we talk about putting together complicated industrial structures, that is not going to be easy, but we need to be better at it than we are.

An important part of implementation, and I am focusing here on common funded programs that NATO buys as NATO kit for NATO use, is to improve and reform our acquisition process. I am working on proposals for how to do this that I hope I will have a chance to discuss with the new Secretary General when he takes office. Something we need to look at obviously is a faster process that includes more parallel processing than we currently have. Right now, we tend to wait till each runner has gone all the way around the track before passing the baton. We can do that better. We need to take a more structured and more transparent approach to risk management in programs, analyzing trade-offs, for example, the cost and capability required. We do a pretty good job with that, but I am not sure we do a good job analyzing the impact of time, the impact of delay. Getting things done 80% sooner would be a better solution to the war fighter's needs, certainly in Afghanistan.

What do we need from industry to help us do this? One is patience in working with us while we continue to try to solve some of these problems. Another is flexibility in helping us solve these problems, because they are not all just NATO problems. We need flexibility in particular when we are trying to close a deal and when we are trying to finalize industrial procedure, because there is the temptation, by both industry and governments, to keep pushing the envelope and to try to get the best deal for your side. Getting the best deal for your side is completely reasonable. On the other hand, there is a point at which the risk of delay outweighs any argument for seeking additional advantage. As I told many national and industry representatives in the last year or so as we tried to bring AGS to closure, an extra 1% of zero is still zero, and we have been very close to zero a few times, in part because of delays that I think could have been avoided.

We also need your technical ingenuity, because this is something that, for the most part, we do not have, although we do have some very specialized and expert agencies. And we need you to help us structure programs in a way that increases the chances that they will work. If we create programs that look like a bumblebee—something that seems that it cannot fly based on the normal laws of physics—they will sometimes transcend the laws of physics and actually get in the air but, a lot of times, they won't. So we particularly look at ways in which, instead of insisting that each program include an exact, decimal point industrial share for matching financial contributions, we can stretch and spread industrial share over a greater range of programs. That is something that would facilitate the structuring of programs, facilitate deciding on programs,
and facilitate delivering them.

My last point concerns interoperability. Admiral Zappata and General Lather already mentioned it, but one of the things we concluded in the recent review on our interoperability shortfall, is the importance of engineering in interoperability from the beginning, not just adding it on at the end. A group at NATO, the NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG), is looking now at how industry can contribute more to interoperability. The group recognizes that, from an industrial perspective, there may be times when there is an advantage to having less rather than more interoperability. But they are trying to find a way in which we can structure incentives so that interoperability becomes a good thing from industry’s perspective, and therefore industry has the incentive to create it.

In closing, we are working in many fora—the NIAG, with ACT Industry Day, and in a conference this fall on Transatlantic Defence Industrial Cooperation—to improve our cooperation with industry in order to come up with win-win solutions.
Chapter 34

The NATO–Industry Partnership

Dr. Edgar Buckley
Senior Vice President, Thales

The defense industry and defense technologies are capabilities in the same sense that military forces are. Although we are not normally recognized as such in doctrine and strategic concepts, it is important to change that. Our contributions in Afghanistan best illustrate our critical contribution: We have provided all of the equipment for the forces in Afghanistan and also the means of deploying these forces.

We have upgraded and adjusted the equipment to meet the special needs of the theater and have developed and produced new equipment under urgent operational requirements in a very effective manner. On top of this, we have deployed our own personnel in direct support of the military effort.

To cite some examples, my company has been deploying drones and surveillance equipment, which we own and operate, to the United Kingdom forces engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan. The drone takes off and is placed into an airbox, from where it is taken over by the United Kingdom forces, used, and brought back to the airbox. We then retake control, land it, turn it around, service it, and it is ready to go again. This capability was put in place within six months of the British Ministry of Defence requesting it.

We have also developed enormously complicated and sophisticated force protection devices—which have saved countless lives—to guard the forces against IEDs. New systems have been put in place to track the forces in Afghanistan, and Blue Force Tracker has been developed for that theater. In addition, we have recently deployed satellite communication networks in Afghanistan which we own, operate, and keep in place every day.

None of this would be possible if the defense industry were not there, ready to respond, to the requests and needs of the military. In having these technologies available—I will not say under our sovereign control, but in running and operating them—we provide the military with important capacities.

NATO should therefore help boost the efficiency of the defense industry. This means not just providing financial support but also facilitating operations across borders and ensuring that, where programs do not exist to sustain these technologies, other means are brought to bear.

MAJOR CHALLENGES IN AFGHANISTAN

What are the main challenges for the defense industry in Afghanistan? The challenges are two-fold: First, we must respond very quickly to the demands of crisis operations. We have to allocate our best people to these tasks. This means redeploying resources which are not always automatically available, both when it comes to developing new equipment and updating legacy systems. We have to give these demands absolute priority internally. This is what we do in my own company and I am certain that the other major defense companies do the same. The defense industry is not just in business to make money—of course, we have to make money otherwise we cannot exist—but we are also part of a team effort. We have citizen values. I do want to emphasize this.

Second, there is an increasing need for outsourced services to support the front line, particularly in long-running peace support and crisis operations. Whether it be logistics—providing everything that the troops need on the ground and getting it there—satellite communications, or surveillance, more and more areas are seeing civilian contractors operating alongside the military in their direct support. It is important to choose the right targets for this approach, but when it is done right it means that the services which the military receives are of much better quality than they would otherwise be.

Outsourced services do a great deal to reduce overstretch on military forces. This is a very positive trend and I do not think there is any way around it. There was a time in NATO when some people thought it was too expensive compared with putting military forces on the ground to do these things. But the question is, how much do military forces really cost?
Nobody actually knows their true cost. In contrast, it is straightforward to calculate the exact cost of outsourced services. In fact, outsourced services cost less in the short-term because they avoid the capital cost, and if managed correctly they are less expensive in the long-term as well.

**BOOSTING EFFICIENCY AT NATO**

As I mentioned earlier, I would like to see the importance of the defense industry and defense technology recognized in the Strategic Concept. NATO and the defense industry must find better ways to collaborate. We cannot keep this arm's length approach. In many cases, we need to operate in integrated teams and also need to address the operational challenges together. It would be extremely beneficial to see a much wider acceptance in NATO of the idea of partnership with industry.

Let me give you some examples. In the defense planning area, which is now under the oversight of ACT, why not have an industry consultation and transparency panel inside the defense planning system? It is not a matter of security; we are all security-cleared. It is just a matter of getting a system put in place. It would help industry to be involved in this process, particularly as it becomes increasingly important.

In terms of managing and developing projects in NATO, why not have a consolidated NATO customer approach? I can tell you—and I am sure that other companies have had similar experiences—it is extremely frustrating to be dealing with overlapping NATO agencies. We have to first spend time trying to understand what the customer wants. After that, another agency comes along and says, “I am here to negotiate the contract with you,” and then, right at the end, SHAPE arrives and says, “Oh no, that is not what we wanted, you have not understood at all, let's go back to the beginning again.” It is not possible to carry on like this. General Lather knows that when my company put the FOC+ sitcom system into the field, a major reason the project was so successful was that he chaired a regular meeting with all of the interests present and made sure that we were “one team, one mission” and it worked. I would like to see this approach used much more regularly in NATO.

In operations support, why isn't there a mechanism for engaging industry directly in support of operational needs? Why can't the commander come to some sort of industry forum and say, “Look, this is what we need. Who has got this? And if you don't have it, step back and do not compete.” This is what happens in the UK. For example, the government sometimes calls certain companies to say, “Off the record, this one is not for you, it is for somebody else,” and those companies stay out of the competition. The need for rapid action often means that unconventional approaches must be allowed to go forward.

I would like to see a permanent network of industry battle labs, linked to ACT and NATO, to work on concept development and experimentation. There is no reason why we cannot do this. It would only require a small investment.

Finally, I imagine there is going to be a review of NATO’s acquisition process. It would be valuable to have this as a joint review with industry, i.e., industry representatives present inside a joint review. There are big questions to answer: Why don't we have an acquisition agency in NATO? Every country has one. Why do we have to take every decision, no matter how small, to the infrastructure committee where 28 nations have got to agree, and where the politics come in and some of them say, “I am not saying 'yes' until I get more industrial return for my country”? While an acquisition agency in NATO may not be the right solution, the idea is certainly worth considering. These types of radical new approaches need to be looked at and I think industry is ready to support them.
Chapter 35

Defense Industry Perspectives: Technological Development, Human Resources, and Consolidation

Dr. Scott Harris
President, Continental Europe, Lockheed Martin Global, Inc.

Let me elaborate on a few of the themes that have been discussed by other panelists. These themes include the need, in the face of limited resources and urgent demands, to make our spending more efficient, to increase cooperation, and to place an emphasis on the sufficiency of the total resources—including management resources—to bring fielded capabilities to bear more rapidly.

RAPID DEVELOPMENT OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES

About six years ago, I was called into the office of the NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defence Investment—the predecessor of Peter Flory—who asked me what industry was planning to do about the IEDs (improvised explosive devices) out there that were killing a large number of our troops. I am sure that similar meetings took place in many capitals, including in Washington D.C., and with many other industry representatives. It is rather remarkable to think about how rapidly industry was able to turn out responses to the IED problem. Protected vehicles were produced and delivered into the field, detection capabilities—including very modern technologies for identifying where an IED may be placed or hidden—were developed, as were sophisticated jammers that can accompany convoys and neutralize an IED if it is operated by a radio signal. Some innovative operational concepts were also implemented; in particular, the use of UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) as escorts for convoys in order to be able to determine whether there is anybody up ahead hiding behind a bush. Many very creative developments made it into the field in a very rapid time frame and are supporting the deployed forces. Now that is the good news.

However, there is also a bad news story here. Many of these newly developed technologies which could be deployed with one or more of the national forces in the theater have not yet been disseminated to all of these forces. For example, a very sophisticated and useful IED jammer is not able to get out of the U.S. export control process fast enough.

But from the industry point of view, it is fair to say that given the challenge and given the resources, we will provide many effective responses. Another case in point is the use of UAVs for both persistent surveillance and armed combat. There has been a very rapid evolution of the technology. It has gone from the time just eight years ago when the fact that a weapon might be on a UAV was classified information to today’s attitude of, “Can we please use more of these to save our forces having to go into harm’s way? And by the way they are pretty effective against the enemy.” As Edgar Buckley stated earlier, all of that evolution and all of that capability is brought to you by industry—by a number of different companies of course.

INDUSTRY-PROVIDED HUMAN RESOURCES

Soft power, or the people side of the industry contribution, was also mentioned and is worth discussing further. Not only do we provide direct assistance in the theater for the weapons, programs, and systems that we have produced and continue to support operationally, but we also aid with the logistics and sustainment in order to be able to keep the equipment going over time in very severe environments. These services are all increasingly being supplied by the private sector.

In addition, we also deal with the human consequences of war. Although we say in shorthand that the military operation is on one side and the NGOs, international agencies, and civil issues are on the other side, in actuality most of the work being done for the international agencies is going to be outsourced or done by contractor support. The expertise to do this
therefore relies on the private sector in many cases. This means that the ability to handle displaced persons and refugee camps is fast becoming a capability that industry actually brings to the theater. We contribute not just by providing people; i.e., “here is the guard in the camp”-type of services, but also by providing high technology. This includes environmentally efficient, rapidly assembled buildings and tents as well as the supplying of logistics. It is a very important part of the total industry support package.

**THE NEED FOR INDUSTRY CONSOLIDATION**

I will conclude with a few key issues. Unfortunately, the financial crisis makes all of this harder. Yet it does not need to. Thomas Homberg made a very interesting point: If governments respond to the crisis with creativity and some cleverness, they can actually take advantage of the opportunity to get more capability for the same resources. There is a need for efficiency and consolidation in our industry, both in the United States and in Europe, and there is nothing like a crisis to push people to make some decisions that need to be made.

Unfortunately, I do partially share the pessimism. The reaction to a crisis initially leads people to go into “protect what I have” mode. So instead of closing a base or consolidating infrastructure or letting the natural evolution occur which might see some companies converge, governments too often try to keep things alive and to keep things going. The government thinks, “I cannot close the base because there is high unemployment.” We understand the political pressures of course; we all deal with them. But it is unfortunate if the crisis is used as an excuse to not do what needs to be done.

The positive side is the need for cooperative programs. European programs have been mentioned, but I would also emphasize that transatlantic programs, where the industrial investment of the United States can be used to help bring capability to Allied industry and forces, are absolutely essential in a time of crisis. The crisis makes cooperation more imperative, not less. It is the key to overcoming all of the challenges that we face.
First, I would like to thank Roger Weissinger-Baylon and his team, Al Volkman, and our host, the government of Turkey, a significant customer and one that has been a partner with my company for more than 40 years. Quoting Leon Trotsky about war has suddenly become fashionable. Recently I enjoyed listening to Lord Roberson in Paris weaving into his discussion about the public's flagging interest in further debates on national security a Trotsky observation that people, even those who consider themselves outside the debate, are keenly interested in war. Over the past few days, I have also been reminded of Trotsky's rather more pointed remark on the manner of the Bolsheviks' path to success over the more consensus-prone Mensheviks. He said, “If there had been more time for discussion, they would probably have made a great many more mistakes.”

One cannot help feeling the prescience of those words when one considers the dilemma facing liberal democracies, which require broad consensus, the true strength of our response to many possible threat scenarios, to act in an alliance. If you are a fan of the author Robert Kagan's latest book, *The Return of History*, you will immediately recognize the dilemma.

Within the defense industry, I believe we sense a turning point in the discussion about the amount of money spent on defense and the case of “topical fatigue” within the general population. The economic crisis has put pressure on all of us for obvious financial reasons, but many citizens wonder about all forms of their armed forces' active engagements in out-of-area operations and the role of defense in our societies.

**CONNECTING WITH THE PUBLIC**

The broader debate has spread from people demanding to understand better the threats they are familiar with to, in quick succession, asymmetrical threats, cyber wars, and militarized space. The public is now required to consider all facets of this three-dimensional chess game as governments and industry seek to deal with the demands of operational sovereignty within the matrix of a coalition approach to warfare.

From a U.S. technologist’s point of view, consistent policies, thoughtfully developed and harmoniously applied, are immediate means to connect with the general population. They also enable the U.S. defense industry to specifically address critical and immediate requirements for theatre engagements in Afghanistan, Iraq, or wherever the new crises emerge, demanding defense material resources and agile application of legal constructs upon which political viability for sustaining coalition action in combat and support functions is based. Spending on defense research in liberal democracies is underfunded because the economic crisis exacerbates the existing trend of fragmented and parallel investments to support domestic defense industries.

As the debate surrounding the anticipated Strategic Defense Review in the U.K. underscores, it is a formidable challenge for most nations to maintain investment levels and capability expertise across the board, because demands for investment in hypersonics, stealth technology, UAVs, cyber warfare, militarized space systems, nuclear deterrents, and nuclear surface and subsurface capabilities, to name just a few obvious examples, demand hard coin to keep abreast of new technology trends and demands.

**THE NEED FOR CLARITY**

Peter Flory summarized my theme rather well when he said, “We must balance the need to share in equal measure with
the need to protect.” In frank terms, clarity is required between governments and industry so that we may bring timely solutions to the men and women on the front line. America has a responsibility to address its intentions and rules for technology sharing with partners, and non-U.S. coalition partners need to honestly address their inherent limitations on mission and total capability investment ambitions. As Ian Godden, CEO of British Aerospace Companies (BAC), concisely described to Defense News, “If you do not have growth in defense, at least have consistency. That is what industrialists need. If you have no growth and no consistency, the markets do not encourage investment, and, eventually, your industrial base will collapse.”

If industry is to support the military in meeting the defense and security requirements of our predominantly liberal democratic societies, wrestling with non-state actors, failing states, and authoritarian regimes in all spectra, all governments will have to address the need to honestly engage their polity in a rational discussion on realistic investment levels, implications for operational sovereignty and, ultimately, the impact on national pride over the effectiveness of sustained common interests and security. I keep using the term operational sovereignty, which is something of a catchall, but our experience is that this term means something different for every nation, or, perhaps, every political party within each nation. For the United States, it is a consistent focus on its technological superiority over all potential peer competitors, while for the nations of Europe and liberal democracies as a whole, the issue is closely associated with the determination to obtain access to the latest technology with as little ITAR-connected liabilities as possible, based upon concern over operational self-determination.

American defense companies adapt and respond by developing off-shore subsidiaries and promulgating partnerships that produce non-ITAR technology, though it is best to consider this intellectual property as “ITAR-light,” because all technology emanating from our house, as it were, is ultimately attachable as a “price to pay” within the U.S. DoD budget. This is a complicating factor, often of our own creation in the U.S., frustrating coalition-enabling solutions as an unintended consequence.

**SEEING THE CHALLENGES AND SEEING “AROUND THE CORNER”**

European governments are now forced to attempt to protect companies from falling into disrepair, either by becoming too small to sustain themselves or by becoming overly dependent upon external sources of defense intellectual property, creating unique and parallel solutions of their own. The A400M program is an example of the risks associated with this situation. Historically, the United States has clearly preferred to spearhead high-intensity offensive operations, and our European partners have preferred to engage in long-term peacekeeping and support operations. This is evolving, with NATO ISAF forces in Afghanistan undertaking difficult, dangerous, and costly “tip-of-the-spear” roles. President Obama, while campaigning for president, postulated that the true test of the role of the American commander-in-chief at this juncture in history is judgment. He framed this concept as an ability to see what America’s challenges are, to be able to see around the corner and anticipate where threats may come from in the future, and to exercise judgment effectively in deploying not just America’s military but its larger arsenal, American power—its diplomatic power, economic power, intellectual, cultural, and scientific power—all of which find focus on the security stage as this administration assesses its posture toward carrying out a consistent defense technology export policy that favors support of the words used to forge alliances with the actions required to ensure success.

**CONCLUDING REMARKS**

In recent visits to Europe and the Middle East, President Obama eloquently framed his own international experience and demonstrated an appreciation for the complexity of transnational threats as well as the simple need for America to foster reassurance among its network of available coalition partners. American security, at any rate, is more than ever dependent upon the manner in which we build strong coalitions and forge resilient alliances. A consistent strategy of defense technology export, decoupled as much as realistically possible from a persistent election cycle, would benefit by empowering the experienced, stable, and existing OSD executive staff to define the opportunities to share and co-develop critical technologies that would immediately begin to answer the many questions of operational sovereignty currently being debated by Alliance partners, partners who have provided proof of their conviction by way of mortal sacrifice, affirming our mutual bridge to a secure and prosperous global commons.
Chapter 37

Afghanistan: The Organizational Challenges

General George A. Joulwan
former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

INTRODUCTION

In the past we were concerned about deterring a multi-echelon Soviet attack in the famous Fulda Gap of Germany. We arrayed ships, tanks, and planes to make it difficult for the Soviets to succeed in an offensive move against NATO. Our primary objective was deterrence but we were prepared to fight and win if deterrence failed. And deterrence worked. Fourteen million American GI’s deployed to Europe and joined millions of NATO troops during the 40 years of the Cold War to demonstrate U.S. and NATO resolve. Twenty years ago the Berlin Wall and Iron Curtain were torn down, Germany was reunited, and the Soviet Communist Empire was no more. Victory without firing a shot.

However, the post-Cold War period has been anything but peaceful. Long simmering ethnic and religious strife came into full bloom. Atrocities, tribal warfare, and ethnic cleansing placed millions of innocent men, women, and children at risk. The international community was slow to respond to these new threats and when it did, it lacked the doctrine, force structure, and political will to do so effectively.

A new concept was needed. One that recognized that the goal was not to defeat a large standing army but rather to achieve an end state where a host nation government had the capacity to govern itself, protect its sovereignty, and provide a better life for its citizens.

THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

To provide a framework for the challenges of the 21st Century requires a different strategy. One focused not just on the initial entry or war fight but primarily on the end state. And the end state may require engagement for 5, 10, or 20 years. It will require stabilization or a secure environment within the country to allow interagency and international organizations and non-governmental organizations to build capacity in the government, train security forces, and establish the rule of law. The goal is to go from stabilization to normalization where the country can provide for the security and well-being of its people, protect its sovereignty, and demonstrate and practice the rule of law for all of its people. I have on this panel three highly qualified members of non-governmental organizations and civil agencies. Before they address you, allow me to lay the foundation for further discussion.

Clearly military means alone will not provide the desired end state. The diagram below provides a framework for conducting operations in the post-Cold War period. It requires not just U.S. and multinational military forces, but also interagency and non-governmental organizations. The key is that all three must work together in a common strategy. All three must be involved in the planning for the operations, not piecemeal, committed after the initial war fight. Notice that all three circles intersect one another. We have paid little attention to the third circle—the interagency. Yet for a successful outcome in today’s environment the contributions made by the interagency, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations are essential for success.

We have not managed to successfully factor the third circle (see chart on the following page) into our operational planning. It is not just pulling down a statue in Baghdad to say “victory,” the challenge is much more complicated that that. We have failed to understand what I call the “battle space.” And it requires more than troops!

By the way, I first showed this chart when I was the U.S. commander in Latin America and brought peace to El Salvador in 1992! I used it in Bosnia in 1995, but it was difficult to get nations’ militaries to plan for more than what we did in the Cold War. Nations then said, “We do not do nation building.” I contend it is not nation building but security building.
THE CHALLENGE

The second chart (see below) tries to put this environment into focus. In the early stages of an operation, there is a very strong military presence (the first bar from the left) and a very small civilian presence (the second bar from the left). Over time, the military presence should build down (the second bar from the right) while the civilian presence should increase (the first bar from the right). This is what we should plan for.

The key to all of this is understanding that our military needs to create a stable, secure environment for civilian agencies to work in. Someone mentioned earlier today that we do not need the military in there for 15 years. I could not agree more. Look at how much all of the normalization phase involves non-military actors. Given this, why not include all of the organizations involved in the normalization process (the aid agencies, etc.) in the planning? This is especially important if our goal is to reach an end state—as the military officers on the previous panel concurred—and not simply an end date. Why don’t we bring together civil and military planners before we intervene in a region? Why can’t we have simulation exercises before the train wreck occurs? This is how we can create conditions for success.
CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS

Once we understand the operational environment and the challenge to go from the war fight to stabilization to normalization, we need to now consider what I call conditions for success. These are:

• Clarity of mission
• Unity of command
• Robust rules of engagement
• Timely political decisions

Clarity of Mission

Nothing is more important than a clear understanding by both military and civilian actors on the mission. As I said, the mission is more than the war fight or initial entry. In Afghanistan, it is creating a stable government capable of protecting its sovereignty and under the rule of law. Therefore, it is more than just the use of military force. It includes numerous civil agencies to provide the basic necessities that make peace possible—energy, shelter, jobs, police, and capacity building in the host nation’s government. We did not get it right initially in Iraq and Afghanistan. We need to do so now! Remember the military can bring about an absence of war but not true peace. To do so requires the infusion of interagency organizations and NGOs to build legitimacy in the host nation government. And that includes verified elections.

Unity of Command

There needs to be both unity of command and unity of effort by all involved—military, civilian, and political participants. There has been an absence of unity of command in Afghanistan for over 8 years and we are paying the price. Afghanistan is under the authority of NATO but NATO has been fragmented in its approach to Afghanistan, both militarily and politically. We are better than that as a military and as an alliance. We need to plan for not only the military “surge” but also for civilian implementation. One suggestion is to form a Civilian Military Integrated Staff (CMIS). Information and intelligence would be shared. Trust and confidence would be established.

Robust Rules of Engagement

Rules of engagement—the predetermined and approved conditions under which force may be employed—are essential to the success of civilian-military implementation. They provide commanders with flexibility and credibility. Most important, rules of engagement change from the initial war fight to stabilization to normalization. In Bosnia, I insisted on changing the name from IFOR (Implementation Force) to SFOR (Stabilization Force) because the mission had changed. And therefore so did the rules of engagement. Understanding the rules of engagement in the different phases is crucial to a successful outcome. It is not just kicking in doors. By our conduct in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is my view that we still do not understand the different phases of the rules of engagement.

Timely Political Decisions

The most difficult of the conditions for success is timely political decisions. Nations are reluctant to make decisions early, but early guidance allows for proper force generation, training, and planning. During the Bosnian conflict a meeting of the heads of state of countries involved in the conflict was held in Paris on December 14, 1995. It was at this meeting that NATO agreed to send an implementation force into Bosnia to enforce a peace settlement dictated by the Dayton Peace Accords. Afterwards, the Secretary General turned to me and said, “SACEUR, you have your mission.” They wanted, in one week, to deploy 60,000 troops in a winter campaign into the most difficult terrain in Europe—with only one airport and one seaport! Fortunately, I had anticipated a possible deployment to Bosnia and began planning two years earlier. Because of this early planning the NATO force—to include a Russian airborne brigade—was able to deploy and be “set” within 45 days. Therefore timely political decisions are essential for success. By doing so, it is possible to develop the political clarity of the mission and unity of command and unity of effort.
CONCLUSION

As the world grapples with the current asymmetrical threats to international security, it is imperative that the international community and an alliance such as NATO be proactive in confronting the challenges to civilization as we know it. A realistic, proactive approach to these threats we now face in Iraq and Afghanistan buttressed by structures and procedures that facilitate achieving the desired end state are essential for success. To do so will require inclusion of all elements—joint, multinational and interagency, and civil organizations—in the planning and execution of the strategy.

To elaborate further on the role and importance of civil organizations—particularly non-governmental organizations—I will be followed by Renée Acosta, CEO of Global Impact; Julius Coles, President of Africare; and Rabih Torbay, Vice President for International Operations, International Medical Corps.
The past three days of the conference have been inspiring and encouraging. Every time a panel concluded, I would rewrite my remarks to ensure I captured the essence of a different perspective. Certainly, much has been said about a comprehensive approach. The underpinning of a comprehensive approach is common sense. Often the most difficult aspect of a situation is to be able to step back and ask, what makes sense? It is important to distil a situation to the lowest common denominator and then build it up again. Going down to simplicity and then back to complexity usually makes it easier to develop a plan of action.

We need to think about Afghanistan from the perspective of what its people want, not necessarily from the viewpoint of what others want to impose. Certainly, the people of Afghanistan want peace and prosperity. One of the lessons I have learned in my 15 or 20 years of dealing with the poorest people on earth is that mothers want the same thing for their children everywhere. The opportunity to provide services and the efforts made to undertake programs vary by circumstances. The resources available vary. We must therefore keep in mind, what do the people of Afghanistan desire and how can we help in that regard? We all know that the problems are legendary and numerous and that we could spend hours listing them. But let’s move forward with developing a plan. Let’s figure out what can be accomplished and how to implement the plan to make sure that there is a future for the people of Afghanistan.
THE CHALLENGES OF PROVIDING DEVELOPMENT AID

Let me refer you to the above diagram, which is an attempt to graph what really happens when we are trying to offer humanitarian relief and development aid. The quadrants are labelled Q1, Q2, Q3, and Q4. The most efficient way to deliver aid would be to begin in the top left corner of the diagram (development aid) and move linearly from prevention to sustainability, passing through phases of development. The ultimate goals are increased life expectancy, improved education, increased per capita income, and a civil society. Very straightforward.

Regrettably, what happens in the course of history is that we start out in prevention where we have productive discussions, look at different research studies, and begin to draft what actions might be taken in response to a humanitarian crisis. The next phase is when there is an early warning of a humanitarian event, either natural or manmade. Suddenly, there is political will, there is tremendous interest, and there is money. This causes response to move quickly to Q2. We are then into the preparedness and the relief effort, including the emergency provision of food, water, and shelter. But it is all crisis-oriented. Very quickly, as the crisis begins to abate from the humanitarian point of view, we short circuit right back to the top of prevention. The money and the political will have run out.

A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY IN AFGHANISTAN

There is an opportunity in Afghanistan and that is to avoid the short circuit; everything I have heard over the last three days says that there is political will, there is funding available, and there is desire to help create a very different outcome. It can be done.

This is a halcyon moment. It is right now; it is right here. We have the support of the people who can influence the decisions and in many cases, who can even make the decisions. These are the people who can make that long-term commitment of at least 15 years that General George Joulwan spoke about. We do not have to view ourselves as being in the middle and having to start over; we can view ourselves as being a little bit further along.

BUILDING TRUST AND CONFIDENCE

How do we make sure we avoid the short circuit? How do we move forward? It does take a long-term commitment and it does take money. With a nod to all of the comments that have been made about the challenges and to the many ideas heard in individual conversations during the last three days, another important element is trust and confidence. How do we build that? We know it takes time. But most importantly, we have to understand that there are different points of view and that sometimes we have to agree to disagree; we need to allow people to hold ideas and beliefs that are different from our own, without letting that deter us from addressing the needs that exist.

To give a classic example, in the humanitarian aid world, relief is given with a blind eye to political affiliation. Assistance is provided to any person who is hungry or who needs shelter. The right or wrong of that is not debated or evaluated. There are different ways of thinking. In some cases, from a different perspective, this could be considered aiding and abetting the enemy. So if we are going to make a full-blown effort in Afghanistan, is there a willingness to deliver the necessary aid, regardless of the beliefs of the people who need help? This does not mean supporting criminality. But it is a concern that complicates the process of working together. We need to be willing to bridge these differences in viewpoints. This is only one example; there are many.

WORKING TOGETHER

Is the desired outcome for NATO to be able to withdraw from Afghanistan? Or, is the desired outcome to reduce mortality, increase life expectancy, and increase the average years of education? Are we aiming for an end date or an end state? This is a big question. Likewise, do we divide up the responsibilities? Is it best to allocate tasks in a “you do this, I will do that” manner and just proceed in our own linear fashion? Or, do we work together in tandem with frequent, honest, and meaningful communication that may dictate a change of action and a redirection? Can we be nimble; can we be responsive? These are very simple but very important questions.

The problems encountered in the delivery of humanitarian assistance are well-documented and we could spend the rest of the day giving examples of what is called the “ain’t it awful.” There is a tendency to dwell on the problems and say, “That was terrible, that problem happened, we had better not try again.” Again, I suggest the leapfrog approach. Each of us can
readily cite problems, but future outcomes are what capture my attention—and from what has been said in the last three days, they also are what captures the attention of everyone else present at this conference. Let’s look to the future. Our panel suggested the focus on Afghanistan because it is perched on the precipice of success or failure and there has been a change in policy that can tip the balance in the direction of success.

Nobody challenges the value of pre-planning. The biggest challenge is the will to spend the time in advance so that when events unfold, we have had the discussions, we know what the choices are, and again, we can be nimble enough to move in an appropriate and meaningful direction. What often does not occur is the coordinated planning between the government, private sector, and NGOs. General George Joulwan mentioned that our organization has a long history of partnerships. While this is certainly positive, these tend to be either partnerships with the government or with the private sector, but not partnerships with all of the entities concerned. One exception is the Partnership for Lebanon that engaged the Department of State, private sector, and NGOs.

In other sessions, we have touched upon what the defense industry can do to help address some of the problems of rapidly changing environments. What can the private sector do to support humanitarian aid, which will in turn result in growing markets and increased prosperity for everyone worldwide, not just for the country being helped? Afghanistan is the opportunity to change the dynamic and there are some efforts currently underway. Some of them have been very successful and some of them not so successful. Let’s decide to change our independent approaches. We know we have political will, adequate funding, adequate interest, and adequate capacity. If we can agree upon and execute a comprehensive plan, we can overlook our differences and work together to achieve success. We can overlook who wins and who loses, and instead look at the country of Afghanistan as a whole as winning.
Chapter 39

Planning for Long-Term Benefits

Mr. Julius E. Coles  
CEO, Africare

My first real contact with civil-military cooperation occurred some 40 years ago, during the Vietnam War. I was assigned, as a junior officer, to be a special assistant to one of the senior people in the United States Agency for International Development in Vietnam, and spent a total of two years in the country, from 1967 to 1969. This experience gave me my first real exposure to the whole issue of planning and to the failure of planning within the context of civil-military cooperation. It was in Vietnam that this issue really began, when it became evident that there was a need to integrate civilian agencies into the military and integrate military units into civilian agencies.

LOOKING BACK TO LESSONS LEARNED

We talk a lot about Afghanistan regarding this issue, but we do not go back to that earlier period in history, we do not remember. I think it is very important to remember that history because a lot of lessons emerged from the Vietnam period. One of my own views is, and General Joulwan has stated it over and over, that we did not plan. We did not know what the long-term objectives were or what the “end state” should be in Vietnam. We must ask those questions now regarding Afghanistan. We must say, “It is eight years into the war: Do we really know where we are and where we plan to go?” We must use the lessons learned from our Vietnam experience to change the way we go about doing our business now in Afghanistan.

In Vietnam, military people were assigned to AID. In fact, the director of our health programs for all of Vietnam was a career U.S. military officer. We also had civilian people assigned to the military and integrated into a CORDS organization, which was a development support program targeted at improving the quality of life in the rural areas and led by provincial representatives; some of these representatives were military people, civilians, foreign service officers, and AID people. This was a great experiment in integrating civilians and military people in terms of trying to win the hearts and minds of the people. When I heard that phrase used today at this conference regarding Afghanistan, it took me back to some 40 years ago, because that is the expression we used: “trying to win the hearts and minds of the people.” But we did not have a clear idea then of how to go about to achieve this outcome.

Another important point concerns the Provincial Reconstruction Teams that we have been talking about at this conference, how they operate, and some of their problems. In Vietnam, we had a similar program called the Strategic Hamlet Program, yet we do not talk about that program’s experiences and failures and how it could have been managed better. When I look at the organizational structure of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan, I am concerned, because even though I do not have complete knowledge about them and have not seen these teams in operation, just looking at the diagram of how these teams are organized concerns me, because the organization is very military-oriented and not very civilian-oriented. The organizational diagram points out logistical support and engineering, but most of the boxes on the diagram are very military-oriented. I do not see anything about agriculture, I do not see anything about water and I do not see anything about health.

THE NEED TO RE-ENVISION OUR PROGRAMS

We need to take another look at how we perceive such things and how we envision programs. During the 1990s, discussion of the integration of political and military activities in multinational efforts toward conflict management and resolution leaned toward multinational military forces taking on humanitarian roles. In Bosnia-Herzegovina and Somalia, it was thought that such a trend would weaken impartial and neutral humanitarian efforts in the minds of both the warring parties and those who would benefit from such actions. Armed forces became somewhat unwilling and unable to meet the
humanitarian challenge in those two countries, and it was not until the late 1990s that we talked about the question of civilian action and of involving NATO forces in this kind of action.

I would like to look now at what some institutions have said about civil-military cooperation and how it could have solved some problems. An article appeared in a brochure published by the Institute of Land Warfare in which the institute evaluated what had been done so far in this type of cooperation. It pointed out two shortfalls: insufficient response capacity by civilian agencies and inadequate planning and coordination by governmental agencies. In Afghanistan, reconstruction activities have been based on reconstruction teams, including both military and civilian personnel. But when the teams were first formed, civilian agencies did not have either the personnel to staff them nor enough funds for reconstruction projects. Military personnel often had to work with limited expertise and with little funding authority. In Iraq, relationships have been difficult between civilians in the Coalition Provisional Authority and their military counterparts in Combined Joint Task Force-Seven. Problems have included unclear lines of authority; cultural issues brought about by planning and decisionmaking; and disagreement regarding the division of labor between civilian and military units.

In both Afghanistan and Iraq, improvements have occurred, but they were slowed down by no advanced planning, poor coordination, and poor execution. When the military turned to civilian agencies that had the expertise they needed, these agencies did not always provide leadership or advice. Funding was in such short supply that the Secretary of Defense asked for and was given authorization to transfer funds to the State Department for stabilization and reconstruction activities. With so few civilians available, armed soldiers and marines were often the only Americans local people saw, which alienated some of them as well as international aid organizations. A larger civilian response capacity and better interagency cooperation were clearly needed.

And these problems have continued. From what I have heard in the discussion here, a lot needs to be resolved regarding how civilians, military organizations, and civilian agencies operate together in the various conflict areas of the world.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

What does this mean for the future? It is never too soon to plan in an integrated manner, not just with the military, not just with NATO, but with multilateral organizations, civilian agencies, and civilian organizations. We need to plan a process that will get us to the end state we want. We need to seek common ground, learn where our interests coincide, and learn about the things we have a mutual desire to do. We must ask, Can we develop a common vision, a shared goal? Can we decide what our objectives are and, when we disagree, decide that it may be good to have disagreements? We also need to define roles in regard to the people we are trying to assist: What is the military’s responsibility? What is the government’s responsibility? What part should civilian organizations play in the process? If we consider all of these things, even after eight years in Afghanistan, there is hope. But if we do not, we are headed for failure.
Bridging the Gap: The Role of NGOs in Promoting Development and Security

Mr. Rabih Torbay  
Senior Vice President for Programs, International Medical Corps

You may be wondering what an NGO like ours is doing at a workshop on global security. Some people refer to us as "tree huggers," but the reality is that we are finally being recognized as an integral and essential part of the security arena. We have all heard of the "three D" approach—deterrence, defense, and development. There has been quite a bit of focus on the first two—deterrence and defense—but not much on the development side, which is a crucial aspect of stability. This is where we come in.

The need to put greater effort into development has already been integrated into the policy level. Now it has to be taken into action. We need to make sure that the development part actually makes it to the field and does not just remain at the policy stage. Our organization has been working in Afghanistan since 1984. This is where we started actually—in Afghanistan and Pakistan during the Soviet invasion—and we are still there. We have seen many events unfold and we have seen how our work has transpired. Frankly, we cannot continue to work in the way we have been working for the past eight years in Afghanistan. We have not succeeded collectively. We can do much better than this.

WORKING TOGETHER

What we need is a common vision between the civil societies, the military, the policy makers, and the governments. This has been lacking. What is the end state? We do not have an end state. We have never focused on an end state. Even if we had done so, we probably would have had 10 different end states in mind. We need to have a unified goal.

It is also important to have clearly defined tasks and objectives. We do not need to be doing each other's work. The NGOs should specialize in one domain, the military in another, and the private sector in yet another. As long as our actions are complementary and not duplicative, we can get the work done.

The "three D" approach has to be integrated, not only into our policies but also into practices. We have to recognize—the NGOs, the military, and the private sector—that we need each other and we have to learn how to work with each other in environments like Afghanistan. This is something that we have talked about over the past five or six years, most recently in Iraq. But we have not really taken it to the next level which is, let's sit down and plan together. The blame does not fall only on the military or the Department of Defense side. The NGOs as well, the civil societies, have not been as outgoing as they should have been. They have not really reached out to the other party to say, let's get to know each other, let's talk.

NEW APPROACHES

We need to find new ways of doing things. Let's be realistic: Not all NGOs are interested in working with the military. But not all NGOs are against working with the military either. Some NGOs are willing. This is something that we need to understand very well. Of course, association sometimes creates security risks for NGOs. So we need to be creative in our approach. We cannot keep on doing the same thing. What worked in Kosovo does not necessarily work in Afghanistan, it did not work in Iraq, and chances are it is not going to work in other areas, should we end up going there.

Sometimes we need to create a buffer between the NGOs and the military. Creating that buffer creates a level of comfort within the NGO community that could help us work more effectively and achieve the end state.
FINDING COMMON GROUND

In order to be successful, we also have to build trust and confidence between civilian agencies, the military, and the government. Most importantly, however, we have to build that trust and confidence with the people of Afghanistan. We have to earn their trust and confidence. As long as we are not coordinated, as long as we are not working together, we will not be able to earn that trust. The insurgency will always find wedges to put between us and succeed in destroying everything we have built over the past eight years.

We need to bridge our cultural divide. We—by this I mean the civilian agencies and the military—have more in common than we believe we do. A few years ago we did an exercise at the marine university in Quantico, Virginia. The director asked us to list 20 things that we wanted from the military, and we asked the military to list 20 things that they wanted from the NGOs. Believe it or not, once we sorted out the acronyms and the differences in language and in the way of expressing our ideas, we had 16 things that we wanted in common. So let's focus on these 16 things rather than focusing on the four things that we will probably never agree on. This is the way we need to move forward in order to promote civilian and military interaction.

We need to have frequent and meaningful exchanges. There are a lot of coordination meetings where in essence we sit down for two hours and we do not communicate. We do a lot of talking but we do not necessarily share essential and useful information. We need to change that. We need to trust each other and share knowledge that could be critical for our success.

MAKING A LONG-TERM COMMITMENT AND PROMOTING SOCIAL SERVICES

We need an exit strategy for all actors and the exit strategy does not happen overnight. It takes a long-term commitment of probably 10 to 20 years of work between the civilians, the military, the host government, the donor government, and everybody else involved. It takes planning beforehand and frequent interaction throughout the process. The exit strategy has to have the capacity-building of the host government integrated.

We need to help the government provide services for its people. If you look around the world at some of the failures in countries in the Middle East and elsewhere, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine come to mind. The reason these groups have been so successful is because the government failed to provide some of the essential services. There was a gap and they took advantage of it. They have actually become a social network as well as a military arm. The same thing happened in Iraq with the Al Mahdi army. We need to learn from these experiences and do everything possible to help the host government achieve its goals and reach out to its people. In this way the people will appreciate that their government cares about them and that it is not just those military groups in their area who can supply assistance.

We have a renewed opportunity to do better in Afghanistan. There have been some successes but we can be much more successful. We have to seize that opportunity. We owe it to ourselves, we owe it to our governments, we owe it to our donors, but most importantly we owe it to the people of Afghanistan who have been through a lot over the past 30 years.
I would like to take a few minutes to talk about the three operations that we at Joint Force Command Naples are involved in. Then I will specifically focus on the Balkans, Kosovo in particular. The three major operations we are responsible for at Joint Force Command Naples are:

- Operation Active Endeavor, which involves maritime domain awareness for the Mediterranean Sea as well as monitoring activity in the Black Sea;
- the NATO Training Mission in Iraq, which includes just under 200 individuals who are responsible for training the security force for Iraq, the largest force of which is made up of Carabinieri from Italy;
- last, the Kosovo force, our largest operation. NATO has been in Kosovo for 10 years now, and we have just under 16,000 troops. In Kosovo most of the day is occupied supporting the tactical commander on the ground as well as answering to our strategic commanders above. Naples is at the operational level of command.

We are encouraged by several recent developments. Croatia and Albania were accepted into NATO in 2009; the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is involved in a Membership Action Plan; and we have Montenegro close on the heels of that. So there are good-news stories in and around the Balkans as far as security goes.

Our original charter was to maintain a safe and secure environment and ensure freedom of movement. Depending on how you measure success or failure over the last 10 years, we could say that we have been extremely successful because, although the tactical commander characterizes the Balkans on a daily basis as calm and tense, nonetheless, they are for the most part a safe and secure environment and there is freedom of movement.

On the other hand, if you look at the fact that we have been in that area for 10 years and are still there, then you can answer for yourself whether that is a true measure of success or somewhat of a failure. The North Atlantic Council just approved our move from our current operations to a simple deterrence presence, which means essentially that over the next two years, we will go from just under 16,000 troops on the ground to approximately 2,500, which will take us to a minimum-presence role.

**THREATS TO SECURITY IN THE BALKANS**

As we look at threat disability and/or security in the Balkans and again focus primarily on Kosovo, it can be said that economic stability and corruption are probably the two largest threats throughout the area. We do not find ourselves in a traditional military-on-military role there. In fact, NATO was the third responder to civil unrest and things of a similar nature. The Kosovo police were the first responder, and the EULEX mission is now second. The year 2009 saw a change over from U.N. forces, UNMIK, to European Union forces. There are approximately 2,500 European Union forces in Kosovo and they are actually the second responders. What we are primarily engaged in now is training the Kosovo Security Force (KSF), which stood up as the Kosovo Protection Corps stood down. We are now training them in traditional roles as a security force, including for civil unrest, humanitarian assistance, search and rescue operations, hazardous materials, firefighting, and certain areas of emergency medical care, but we are not training them as an army.

If we want to identify the main threats to stability and/or security, we could list them in three areas: (1) political—the political parties, in Kosovo in particular, form along clan lines, each one striving for primacy through rhetoric and not through physical means; (2) religious culture, which forms along ethnic lines; and (3) economics, which is the most likely cause of instability in not only Kosovo but the entire Balkans region.

Kosovo is the poorest country in Europe, with a 58% unemployment rate. Thirty percent of its Gross Domestic Product is generated by remittances from the diaspora. The country has an inflation rate of 13% and lacks investment in infrastruc-
ture—the people of Kosovo, especially in terms of energy, live with 1950s and 1960s technology. The high unemployment rate and instability in the economy pose a large threat and generate organized crime, smuggling, and corruption. So economic factors have a direct impact on other things as well.

**CONCLUDING REMARKS**

I would like to close with three basic takeaways. The first is that in order to have economic stability, you have to have security, and we need to work on that both within Kosovo as well as in the entire Balkans region. The second is that western values and western ways of operating in the militaries will be stabilizing forces in these countries. And the third is that nations want collective security—they need and want it beyond their own national interest.
Chapter 42

Dealing with Illicit Human Trafficking and Smuggling of Arms, Drugs, and WMD Materials in Afghanistan And Other Areas at Risk

Ms. Elaine Dezenski
Managing Director, INTERPOL’s Global Security Initiative for the 21st Century

Policing and the Military

The crucial military component of law enforcement and the civilian component, while complementary in nature, operate on different timelines, involve separate groups of stakeholders, and address unique aspects of the underlying problem. But they both share the same overarching goal, which is to enhance the capacity of local law enforcement and effectively transfer the expertise of global partners that is necessary to achieve long-term independence and be self-sustaining.

INTERPOL and the Global Security Initiative

The International Criminal Police Organization, or INTERPOL, is the world’s largest international police organization, with 187 member countries. Created in 1923, it facilitates cross-border police cooperation and supports and assists all organizations, authorities, and services whose mission is to prevent or combat international crime. Afghanistan has been an INTERPOL member country since 2002.

With a view to supporting its member countries, INTERPOL has core functions that focus on three main areas: namely, capacity-building, policing training, and regional projects and operations. Capacity-building aims to develop and enhance close cooperation with the National Central Bureaus (NCBs) of the member countries in order to enhance their operational capacities and responsiveness. Police training aims to strengthen NCB staff’s abilities in INTERPOL’s core functions and their knowledge of INTERPOL’s tools and services. It also works to increase awareness of INTERPOL within national law enforcement departments. The aim of regional projects and operations is to assist in specialized crime areas through coordinating joint or simultaneous operations.

The Global Security Initiative (GSI) aims to strengthen global policing and complement and support the work of the INTERPOL community by acting as an “incubator” for innovation and to establish partnerships with governments, the private sector, and other international organizations. GSI embodies a broad, cross-sector approach to tackling the challenges of 21st Century crime based on five pillars that are vital in INTERPOL’s role of enhancing the safety and security of citizens worldwide. These pillars are global security, secure global infrastructure, global law enforcement capacity, strategic global partnerships, and innovation. In particular, global law enforcement capacity ties in closely with INTERPOL’s focus on capacity building, policing training, and regional projects and operations.

Human Trafficking

In the “Trafficking in Persons” (TIP) report published by the U.S. Department of State, Afghanistan is identified as a Tier II country, meaning that significant trafficking takes place and that the government has not undertaken appropriate initiatives to combat the problem. Under normal circumstances, this categorization would make Afghanistan liable for a range of sanctions, but, because of its special designation as a transitional state, it remains immune from such repercussions.
However, without sustained progress (specific to prosecuting known traffickers and providing protection for victims), the eventual exit from this transitional period will prove doubly traumatic.

In particular, failed and/or transitional states risk becoming a magnet for this type of trafficking. Furthermore, this type of illicit activity eventually supports the Taliban and other forces opposed to stability and the rule of law. Thus, increasing civilian law enforcement capacity and close coordination with the military are important enabling factors that help defeat this established dynamic.

In 2001, INTERPOL established a specialist group to address the issue of trafficking in women for sexual exploitation. Approximately 50 countries participate in the group, whose current focus is on practical operational investigations, sharing of new techniques, best practices, and use of the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Message via I-24/7. The group also looks at other forms of trafficking such as trafficking in labor and organs.

In 2000, the General Assembly mandated the INTERPOL Working Group on Trafficking in Women for Sexual Exploitation to develop the “Trafficking in Human Beings—Best Practice Guidance Manual for Investigators.” Paul Holmes, a British police officer (now retired) and former chair of the working group, undertook the task and in 2002 the manual for investigators was issued with great success.

In 2005, the working group decided that the manual should be revised in order to take into account additional regions and other forms of human trafficking such as trafficking of women, men, girls, and boys as sources of labor and organs. Again, Paul Holmes was invited to author the updated version, and Claire McKeon, an intelligence officer at INTERPOL, undertook coordination.

The resulting manual is a tool, a best practice guide for law enforcement working with trafficking cases. It is structured to assist the investigator in identifying and locating advice on any specific issue during the investigation. Its contents bring together collective international investigative experience to date.

**ILLEGAL NARCOTICS/DRUGS**

Because of the expected closure of the U.S. airbase in Kyrgyzstan, announced in February 2009, and a worsening of the security situation on the main land route from Pakistan that resulted from Taliban attacks on cargo vehicles, the U.S. has stepped up its efforts to secure alternative supply routes for the NATO troops serving in Afghanistan. Considering that Uzbekistan is the only central Asian country with a rail connection across the Afghan border, at Hayraton-Termez, this will probably serve as the main entry point for goods. According to Ria Novosti (the Russian newsire service), once the transit route becomes operational, 700 wagons will be sent weekly via this line, carrying commercial supplies such as construction materials, water, fuel, and medicines. This development raises the issue of the capacity of the transit countries to inspect 700 wagons every week. Due to the commercial nature of the cargo, the U.S. and NATO forces will not be responsible for controlling the wagons’ contents. Therefore, it appears there will be a high risk of increased smuggling of the precursor chemicals needed to extract heroin from opium from Europe into Afghanistan and illicit drugs from Afghanistan into Europe in the returning freight cars.

These developments emphasize the urgent need for an increased civilian capacity focused on border control in Afghanistan. The trade in illicit narcotics, primarily heroin, is a major funding stream for the Taliban. The narcotics trade is characterized by a complicated web of tribal alliances, politics, underdevelopment, and poverty—the major growing regions are likely to be stressed by increased coalition military action during the summer of 2009. What is absolutely clear is that Afghanistan has no viable future unless it can limit the influence of the illicit narcotics trade within its borders. Accomplishing this will require a multipronged approach, including military action, political will at a national level, better development programs, and, very critical, an enhanced law enforcement capability to control the nation’s borders through better training, superior equipment, and coordination with domestic, coalition, and international partners.

INTERPOL’s Drug Intelligence Unit collects and analyzes data obtained from member countries for strategic and tactical intelligence reports. It disseminates these reports to the concerned countries, responds to and supports international drug investigations, helps to coordinate drug investigations involving at least two member countries, and organizes operational working meetings between two or more member countries in which INTERPOL has identified common links in cases being investigated in these countries. It also organizes regional or global conferences on specific drug topics, the aims of which are to assess the extent of the particular drug problem, exchange information on the latest investigative techniques, and strengthen cooperation within law enforcement communities.

INTERPOL has embarked on a number of projects to deal with drug problems. For example, project NOMAK was launched to increase effectiveness and efficiency in the exchange of information regarding Southwest Asian heroin traffick-
ing along main routes. Another example is project WHITEFLOW, which concerns the smuggling of cocaine from South America to Europe via west, central, and southern Africa. The goal is to facilitate communication, intelligence sharing, and collaboration between the concerned countries by collecting all data on traffickers (fingerprints, DNA, photos, etc.). This project also aims to promote joint investigations and operations against cocaine trafficking rings linked to Africa.

Last but not least, the Drug@net initiative enables the General Secretariat to address an emerging crime area not currently handled by any other international organization. This project aims to form a global network on Internet-related drug offenses and provide training in close cooperation with all Sub-Regional Bureaus.

SMUGGLING OF ARMS AND WEAPONS

Most if not all of us are aware of the interdependencies of separate trafficking operations. Stable revenue from the opium trade goes to purchase arms that equip Taliban and insurgent forces utilizing the same protected supply channels and trusted distribution mechanisms. The Afghan police, military, and coalition forces cannot solve any of these challenges in the near, mid, or long term without continuing to enhance the capacity and coordination of Afghan law enforcement and civilian agencies.

INTERPOL’s bioterrorism project, funded by grants from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, aims to raise awareness of the bioterrorist threat, counter bioweapons proliferation, develop police training programs, and strengthen the enforcement of existing legislation as a complement to international treaties.

INTERPOL’s Firearms Program is a three-pronged approach to assisting countries in the mining of available intelligence from firearms used in crime: namely, identification—using the Interpol Firearms Reference Table (IFRT); tracing—using INTERPOL’s Firearms Tracing Instrument; and ballistics—using INTERPOL’s Ballistic Information Network (IBIN).

In 2008, INTERPOL launched the INTERPOL Firearms Reference Table. We know that well over one third of all firearms trace requests fail because of the inaccurate or incomplete description of the firearm. The IFRT can help solve this problem because it is an easy-to-use web-based application available on the I-24/7 network that enables investigators to correctly identify a firearm before submitting a trace request to the proper country. The IFRT has over 250,000 firearms references, giving investigators detailed descriptions and 57,000 high-quality images. It is currently available in French and English. The web-based application was developed by INTERPOL using the data supplied by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. This force is our valued partner in this endeavor, supplying us with updates each year to keep the system current.

At the end of 2008, we created the INTERPOL Firearms Trace Request. This is a structured form on I-24/7 that requires the requester to identify five pieces of information about the firearm: the make, model, calibre, serial number, and country of origin or import. It provides a check against INTERPOL’s databases and a link to the IFRT. INTERPOL created this tracing form in recognition of the need to give law enforcement agencies the tools to combat firearms violence, as outlined in the United Nations 2005 protocol that calls for an international instrument to enable states to identify and trace, in a timely and reliable manner, illicit small arms and light weapons.

The third prong of INTERPOL’s Firearms Program is the INTERPOL Ballistics Information Network. Every firearm leaves unique microscopic markings on the surface areas of fired bullets and cartridge cases; in other words, a ballistic fingerprint. Current ballistics technology, similar to Automated Fingerprint Identification System technology, can enable us to share and compare thousands of ballistic exhibits in a matter of hours. However, no vehicle exists for the transnational sharing or comparing of ballistics data. IBIN will change that by connecting, with a central server at INTERPOL, the current 47 member countries/territories that use the Integrated Ballistic Identification System and choose to participate. It will also connect countries or regional alliances that may acquire the system in the future.

Just as fingerprint data has linked crimes and criminals across international borders, so too will the transnational sharing of ballistic data. IBIN will link separate crimes across international borders that we would otherwise not know were linked. Over time, we anticipate that the analysis of the shared ballistic data will reveal illicit firearms trafficking routes and point to illicit firearms traffickers. In the coming months, we will receive and install the network and develop the programmatic performance measures for IBIN, and IBIN will be operational in 2009. Turkey has the ballistic system to be used in the IBIN program.

HOW CAN INTERPOL HELP?

Afghan Border Police number just over 3,000 officers (200 officers graduate every six weeks). To put that in perspective, there are about 65,000 international troops operating in the region, and this gap between existing capacity and desired
capacity in terms of manpower is a linear problem that will be slow to resolve without access to additional trainers with
the proper qualifications.

That is where INTERPOL comes in. By providing a crucial connection to law enforcement databases now, fewer
personnel can accomplish more by leveraging existing technology. The primary objective is to connect police around the
country with the Interior Ministry headquartered in Kabul (the location of Afghanistan’s INTERPOL office and/or NCB).
Right now, no Afghan police offices in the country’s 34 provinces can take fingerprints and send them to Kabul to be en-
tered into the international database (five to seven provinces were identified as pilot candidates for this program). Fixing
this capacity gap solves a dual set of problems and satisfies both internal and external stakeholders (GSI stresses that mutu-
ally reinforcing benefits arise from global partnership).

Most arrest subjects do not carry documentation—access to the database can quickly identify repeat offenders who
are typically released, turned around, and subsequently re-enter via an alternate route. Subjects linked to terrorist efforts
abroad will be quickly identified and neutralized before perpetuating similar crimes in-country (previously established links
to terrorism serve as a compelling basis for extradition and effective prosecution). This is the same basic approach that has
been employed in Iraq—motivating principles are based on demonstrable success observed in the past (a Morocco case
involving Abdesslam Bakkali, from August 2004).

WHAT DOES INTERPOL PLAN TO DO GOING FORWARD?

In June 2008, the RAND Corporation released a report suggesting that NATO’s success in Afghanistan hinges in great
part on the ability of the international community to build up the police force. Specifically, it referenced the Afghan police
as “corrupt, incompetent, under-resourced, and often loyal to local commanders rather than to the central government.”

This presents a critical opportunity for INTERPOL to build upon its initial database project with additional GSI re-
sources (currently under development) that align with the intermediate to long-term needs of the Afghan National Police
as it matures as an organization and gradually becomes less reliant on direct military support. INTERPOL can bring
significant added value to international efforts to combat the types of crimes discussed today. INTERPOL, as the largest
international law enforcement organization, is best placed to coordinate the international law enforcement response, rather
than merely respond to incidents through military actions.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Our panel has spent a lot of time focused exclusively on the situation in Afghanistan. It is important to note that traf-
ficking in all forms constitutes a threat to global security—the impact of these crimes does not conveniently end at the
border of a given nation. Furthermore, the interconnectedness and cross-jurisdictional nature of these criminal networks
demand enhanced international cooperation. INTERPOL represents a prime example of the type of partnership that can
be focused on a clearly defined set of transnational issues.

INTERPOL is uniquely positioned to bring the assets and strengths of global policing to the 21st Century problems
these issues present. The experiences of the last decade demonstrate the futility of combating these problems unilaterally
and, more importantly, of using an exclusively military response to them (with all deference to my co-panelists). As the
Secretary General is fond of saying, “There is a need for nations to shift from a predominantly military-led approach to
fighting terrorism to one that includes greatly enhanced global police cooperation.”
Chapter 43

Dealing with Illicit Human Trafficking and Smuggling of Arms, Drugs, and WMD Materials

Vice Admiral Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte
Former Italian Military Representative to the NATO Military Committee

Among the situations most difficult to detect ahead of time, thus making them impossible to prevent, is the existence of a strategic vacuum, something that grows slowly and is mostly the product of omissions by governments that inadvertently create these gaps in their nations’ strategic security and defense postures by diverting resources to strengthen other sectors. This capital sin is seldom the product of bad will, because financial resources for security and defense are, like blankets, never enough to cover all requirements, so difficult choices must always be made, often leaving some parts of the military out in the cold.

The problem is, when these parts are neglected and unattended for a long period of time, those who nurture unfriendly feelings toward our nations inevitably spot and exploit them, because they are weak points for their adversary—us.

THE RESULTS OF GAPS IN SECURITY

There are numerous times in history when such situations occurred, both in peacetime and in wartime. One particular instance was the neglect of the U.S. Navy during a great part of the 19th Century, when Congress did not want to divert funding from the requirement to provide military support to the penetration and colonization of the “Wild West.” By doing so, however, Congress forgot that such expansion sooner or later would cause international disputes.

In 1835, panic spread in Washington, when “following a rupture of diplomatic relations, it was reported that the French Government was sending a formidable fleet across the Atlantic on an observation cruise, manifestly designed to intimidate the United States Government, and to be in a position to strike in case of war.” This was, in fact, the main consequence of the weakness of the U.S. Navy, which had left a strategic vacuum in the seas around America, thus allowing France to enforce her claims on Mexico through her fleet and openly challenge the famous U.S. claims expressed through the Monroe Doctrine. In the Oregon crisis with the U.K. some years later, the U.S. naval weakness was the driving factor that led to an appeasement, very much against U.S. interests.

A similar situation exists today, because Western sea power, on the whole, is very much unbalanced, with very reduced numbers and almost exclusive focus on power projection from the sea. This works against those tasks that are less glamorous yet indispensable for sea control.

THE NEED FOR BETTER CONTROL OF THE SEA

The end of the Cold War led to the delusion that such activities were no longer essential. However, we must acknowledge that we cannot afford to neglect sea control, an essential enabler of sea trade, especially in times of possible exploitation of a power vacuum both by state and non-governmental entities, who might reap profits as well as damage the economic and military predominance of the Western nations. It would be naïve of us to consider that illicit trafficking is connected only with what is improperly dubbed organized crime. This is particularly evident in the case of human trafficking, a cynical trade of human flesh that has become a powerful instrument of international relations.

Mass migrations, as Professor Halford J. Mackinder noted in 1904, are those “more elemental movements whose pressure is commonly the exciting cause of the efforts in which great ideas are nourished,” or, more clearly, they are the driving engine of history. They are not, though, simple spontaneous fluxes, but often are the product of a policy either aimed at solving internal problems or one that is a sort of invasion without weapons.
During the last decades, in fact, it was noted that several mass migrations through the sea have been real acts of policy: one nation, for instance, emptied her prisons by stuffing her convicts and their relatives on a single ship and sending 10,000 people across the sea on a single trip. Also, just before the tragedy of September 11th took place, a number of ships carried thousands of people across the Mediterranean to a country in which diplomatic officials from a third nation were ready to provide these persons with immigration visas and allow them to settle, thus increasing the latter country’s dwindling work force.

In addition, in very recent times, migration through the sea has been an effective tool to exert pressure on other countries to help solve longstanding differences. What is more worrying, though, is that it has become apparent, through judiciary enquiries, that most often the organizers of this kind of cynical shuttle, which causes many destitute people to suffer and die, are members of terrorist organizations that reap huge profits through this cynical trade and ensure the connivance of the sending nation by threatening to unleash fundamentalist cells there.

The smuggling of arms, drugs, explosives, and WMD is seldom the product of initiatives by criminal groups: They need the backing of more powerful structures, thus becoming instruments of policy, whether they like it or not, and supporters of the political aims of those willing to spread destruction and disruption on our soil.

It should be clear, though, that all of these actions are made possible by the weakness of the maritime instruments in the countries of destination, which are unable to exert strict control in the depths of the sea and to thwart attempts against them. Often, maritime power does not need to be called to violent action, because its influence is so evident that nobody dares to challenge it.

INITIATIVES TO STRENGTHEN MARITIME POWER

Slowly but steadily, the Western nations have become aware of the need to improve their ability to control against these initiatives, even if they are forced to shift the scarce assets of one crisis area to another in order to reopen a door that was closed, thereby shutting another. Operation Active Endeavour, the Proliferation Security Initiative, as well as the maritime component of Operation Enduring Freedom and the two NATO and EU efforts against piracy, are the most notable instances of this kind of action. The impossibility of providing these operations with enough assets to carry them on successfully must eventually be considered in the force planning cycle. We must be aware that we face a number of years of vulnerability before such assets will be available.

It has also been acknowledged that it is not enough to build new assets. We must also put in place new forms of control of the sea, and both NATO and the EU are launching initiatives to that effect. This is an indispensable component of the overall effort to thwart the undermining of Western wealth and power, which cannot be seen in isolation from the requirement to establish again a controlling presence that will protect international trade.

THE DANGERS OF DISREGARDING THE UNWRITTEN LAWS OF THE SEA

Before concluding, I would like to mention another dangerous byproduct of this action-reaction chain: namely, an increasing disregard of some of the unwritten laws of behavior at sea, which are sacred to mariners. Some countries have refused to rescue at sea migrants who are piled up in unseaworthy and foundering boats, and some prosecutors have even accused the masters of merchant vessels who save such desperate people of favoring illegal migration.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Having to face increasing danger resulting from the use of the sea against the West, governments are losing their capability to respect fundamental laws. This attitude dangerously contradicts the West’s key values, thus placing us at the same level as those cynical sea exploiters. We have placed the human being at the center of our ethic, and we must not disregard this principle lest we lose the prestige we enjoy worldwide. Therefore, our nations must act swiftly to emerge from this treacherous state, and avoid experiencing dangerous situations or losing our moral standing in world affairs.
Chapter 44

Concluding Remarks

Dr. Linton Wells II
Distinguished Research Fellow, National Defense University
Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense

Our focus has the rather august title of “The Way Ahead.” I think we are not going to try to distill the extraordinary discussions we have had over the last couple of days but we will focus instead on some forward-leaning ideas. Before turning it over to the panelists, I would like to make two short remarks on two short points. The first is on unity of command; the second is on strategic communication.

UNITY OF COMMAND

In complex operations, under the comprehensive approach, you will include the military of many countries, civilian governments of many countries, business, civil society, NGOs, and others. Recognizing the importance of unity of command, I submit that you will never get unity of command among all these different players. What we need to get to is unity of action, so we need to rethink the concept of command and control in these environments since many of these entities will never subordinate themselves to traditional military command and control. In this area, I command the work of the DOD command and control research program in looking at alternative approaches. If any of you are interested, their website is dodccrp.org. One of the keys to this is sharing unclassified information beyond the boundaries of the joint military force with civil military mission participants. Unless you can communicate, collaborate, translate, and engage, with relevant populations in terms they can understand, you cannot achieve the social, political, and economic goals for which the military has committed blood and treasure. This cannot be considered a “nice to have” adjunct to the kinetic base of warfare, it has to be a core part of the planning from the beginning. In this vein, I would like to express appreciation to John Grimes for issuing a new DOD instruction in April that leans very far forward in the use of DOD information and communications to support NGOs, private volunteer organizations, international organizations, host populations, and others, in complex operations. It allows for example DOD bandwidth to be used by internet access to NGOs.

I would also like to offer in support of Global Impact, AFRICARE, International Medical Corps, NATO, anyone else interested, an international research project called Tides that is focused on sustainable support to stressed populations post-war post-disaster impoverished. It expressly addresses planning by public, private, civil, and military government and transnational entities including NGOs in the private sector, the sort of action General Joulwan called for. For those interested, Tides is helping to plan an approach to deliver essential services in Afghanistan, things that are important to the Afghans in their world.

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS

The second and last point is strategic communication. There has been an extensive discussion today on the battle of the narratives. To win this, we have got to engage with people in terms they can relate to and understand that actions speak far louder than words. The problem is that if you look at the media over the past 36 hours, one would have to conclude that the most important thing that has happened in the world is the death of Michael Jackson, some grainy cell phone footage from some place undefined in Iran, and a couple of sporting events. So panel after panel have spoken of the importance of long-term Alliance commitments, and of the clarity of political pronouncements but in this environment, how do you effectively communicate complex messages to your and other people to get that kind of support? The way you deliver the message needs to get as much attention as the content of the message itself. Probably it is going to have to use some non-traditional means which could include social networking and even radical tools like Facebook and You Tube, and software
which we may not feel comfortable with but which the rest of the world is increasingly using.

**LEVERAGING INFORMATION, COMMUNICATIONS AND DISTRIBUTED ENERGY TO BUILD PARTNER CAPACITY—SUMMARY**

In a stable Afghanistan, internal economic activity and outside assistance should provide capabilities and services that are valuable to and sustainable by Afghans. Time is important since international interests will expect demonstrable success by the summer of 2012. This leaves less than three years to manage expectations, influence perceptions, and show recognizable progress.

Information and communication (I&C) are powerful forces that can contribute much to Afghanistan. Together with distributed, renewable energy, they can support essential services through a bottom-up approach that could be executed quickly, while being consistent with top-down national development strategies. Such services could include (but are not limited to):

- **Agriculture/Food**—information about market prices, forecasts and transportation; cool storage and on-site processing; integrated solar and combustion cooking; irrigation.
- **Clean water**—purification systems tailored to local conditions.
- **Public health**—cell phone-based services for pre-natal and maternal care, internet and cell service to remote areas.
- **Lighting**—Basic lighting for streets, stores and households (a light in every kitchen).
- **Information Technology**—education-internet expansion to universities, provision of low-cost laptops.
- **Business development**—extension of micro-credit, information on market conditions, coordination of buyer/seller relationships, encouragement of entrepreneurs.

Critical enablers of these services include: 1) distributed, renewable energy (microhydro, solar, wind, and perhaps local geothermal), 2) communications ranging from cell phone voice to text messaging to wide-band, high-speed internet, 3) information sharing to help non-traditional players, and 4) reach back support from experts outside the country to supplement those on the ground.

Nangarhar province would be an excellent location for a pilot project since it is relatively prosperous and stable, and has significant private sector capacity. Within Nangarhar the initial focus would be on Jalalabad, four district capitals, and 25 remote villages. Preparations so far suggest that useful services could begin this fall and scale quickly, if the effort is given priority. If judged successful, the approach could be extended to other provinces, combining Afghan and international efforts, and adapted to local conditions.

Four official actions are essential: 1) high-level Afghan, U.S., coalition and international support for the initiative, 2) encouragement of private sector engagement, 3) leveraging ongoing institutions like UNAMA, the National Security Program, and the Nangarhar PRT, and 4) the assignment of people from all stakeholders to begin planning. Rough resource estimates are being developed as a basis for further discussion. Planning teams should be identified by early July, with planning completed by the Afghan elections and adjusted for implementation in the fall. A more detailed proposal is available for review separately.
Chapter 45

Which Way Ahead for NATO’s Partnerships?

Dr. Jean-Jacques de Dardel
Ambassador of Switzerland to the North Atlantic Alliance

Is NATO capable of predicting the future better than other organizations? If the answer is no, why bother with a new Strategic Concept knowing that its relevance might last at the most a few years? Wouldn’t it be more useful to try to fix problems that have already been identified instead of starting a process that could reveal itself more complex and time consuming than ever? In other words, how can we avoid a situation where, despite its best efforts to adjust to the perceptible future, NATO yet again prepares itself for yesterday’s war?

As a representative of a country not intending to join the Alliance, I would like to contribute some thoughts to the debate. Furthermore, considering that Switzerland is an active member of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), I believe it is important to explore the utility of such a structure in the future and, in particular, in the process leading to the new Strategic Concept in late 2010. I will focus on three points: First, how I see the development of NATO in the near future. Second, how can the EAPC and Partnership for Peace (PfP) be most useful in the coming years and how can they optimize their contributions to NATO’s objectives? Third and more concretely, how should NATO’s partners be involved in the Strategic Concept exercise?

THE FUTURE OF NATO

A somewhat disrespectful description of the North Atlantic Alliance would underscore that NATO has almost never done anything it has prepared to do, but instead has frequently had to do what it had not expected. It long prepared for a Third World War, but never fired a shot at the enemy it kept in check; when it did fire shots, it did so in a state of legal unpreparedness, against a foe it had until then not considered an enemy. Every time it has acted, it has done so outside of the territorial scope it had assigned itself. When it has grown, it has mostly been by ingesting former enemies it had never dreamed of welcoming into its midst. And whereas it has prepared for battle against a mighty enemy, it is now toiling against elusive Taliban and sending warships against rag shag pirates assailing tankers with ladders.

On the other hand, NATO emerged stronger than ever after its 60th Anniversary Summit. It now has a re-energized transatlantic link, better perspectives of complementarities between NATO and the European Union, and there is a common analysis of the situation and the strategy to be applied in Afghanistan. Also, as NATO’s departing Secretary General is keen to remark, many aspects of the 1999 Strategic Concept still seem to remain viable and useful today. So, what are the prospects for a renewed NATO making the best use of the new Strategic Concept exercise? Let us first identify the challenges ahead.

THE CHALLENGES

Geographically, we can point to well-known trouble spots and volatile situations—Afghanistan, Pakistan, Georgia, the Caucasus in general, Iran most definitely, Somalia, Sudan, other parts of Africa, and of course the Middle East as always. More causally, we can point to tugs of war over energy and dwindling resources, the pernicious effects of climate change, fundamentalism, terrorism and possible new forms of terror attacks, pandemic scourges, not to mention the effects of the economic crisis. Functionally, we can point to cyber attacks, piracy, international crime, and the turmoil of failed states. But whereas the crises and causes for concern may be known, their unravelling and full-scale effects are not known. Moreover, new trouble spots are sure to emerge in the coming years.

What is certain is that while geographical rivalries still play an important role, security challenges are amplified and in some cases accelerated by globalization. In other words, the only thing that is predictable is that NATO—like other organizations and governments—will have to face rapidly changing contradictory forces and events for which it will not
be fully prepared.

Therefore, I believe that NATO's best interests lie in a pragmatic approach. What is called for above all is a new flexibility of structures. NATO should make sure that it is flexible enough to deploy appropriate capacities to the theater of the next crisis. In doing so, NATO should develop instruments to cooperate with its partners in the best conditions possible, so as to ensure that the right mix of capacities can be drawn on and that these come from as wide a pool of military and civil resources as possible.

**THE BENEFITS OF THE EAPC AND PfP**

This implies finding the best ways to work with partner countries. The structures developed around the EAPC and PfP since the 1990's are a very valuable asset in this context. It is therefore quite astonishing that the EAPC and PfP are no longer used to their full potential, especially given that several proposals were made at the Riga and Bucharest Summits to strengthen the Euro-Atlantic Partnership.

The EAPC and PfP are instruments to promote shared values and principles and to build confidence between all of the countries in this community. The EAPC validates at the political and diplomatic level the activities and work done under PfP. It is the forum best suited to conducting political dialogue on hard security issues. Furthermore, it involves the political leaders of our countries, and thus has an important impact on the national decision making processes.

But the Euro-Atlantic Partnership is more than that. It was the cradle of the enlargement process and of the contributions of partners to NATO-led operations. It serves as a home for many initiatives like the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Reduction Centre, trust funds, the Political-Military Framework, and policy discussions like the implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1325. It provides a clearing house mechanism for Southeastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. Best of all from a Swiss perspective, it allows for institutionalized relations with NATO but also for the self-differentiation of each and every country.

With all of these qualities, the EAPC and PfP are clearly models for other partnerships like the Mediterranean Dialogue, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, and even for NATO links with so-called partners around the globe like Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. However, the needs of these different categories of partners are not necessarily the same and creative solutions are required.

**THE ROLE OF PARTNERS IN THE NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT**

One area where the new Strategic Concept can bring concrete answers concerns the role that NATO should attribute to its non-member partners, to the first circle belonging to the EAPC and PfP structures, and then to the outer circle of non-institutional partner countries, which may expand further still. A change in the mental structure of NATO might be required to progress on this issue.

This change is important given the fact that NATO will increasingly need consultations with partners in all regions of the world and might eventually even want to partly rely on partner involvement in flexible structures such as the NATO Reaction Force. Given NATO's increasing difficulty in reaching consensus at 28 countries, some Allies might also want to resort to coalitions of the willing involving partners.

**THE CHALLENGES OF PARTNERSHIP**

Here is where NATO is confronted with a dilemma. Being open and transparent with all of its partners boosts NATO's acceptance in the international community but also raises the risk of slower decision making or even blockage. When it comes to operations, partners' contributing troops are increasingly being associated in the decision-shaping of the Alliance thanks to the Political-Military Framework process. However, partners are often consulted late and without any real possibility of influencing the outcome.

Let me give you one example regarding the recent decision to downsize the KFOR. When it became clear that the question of the transition to deterrent presence would be a main topic of the Defense Ministers' Meeting on June 11-12, why didn't NATO organize a Ministerial meeting in KFOR format? A group of Western European partners shared their concerns about this and NATO finally decided to organize an information-sharing NAC meeting with KFOR partners, one week after the decision had already been made at the Ministerial. Furthermore, even though the relevant documents were circulated just before the Ministerial to involved partners, very little time was given to them to react.
Oftentimes partners are confronted with the situation of a “fait accompli,” even in matters of direct concern to them, and this is certainly not the best way to engage them and to give them a sense of ownership. Apparently, there are two main points blocking more information-sharing with partners. The first one is that when Allies do not agree on an issue, they are reluctant to debate it publicly out of fear that their differences might be taken advantage of by non-Allies. The second one is that Allies are willing to share information with some partners but not with all of them due to political and security concerns. While both of these explanations are legitimate, there is scope for improvement to the end benefit of NATO.

VISION FOR THE NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT

So what should NATO propose in its new Strategic Concept? The simple answer would be the ability to share information with partners even if there is no agreement among Allies. It could involve starting discussions on specific topics in an EAPC or perhaps in an even wider context so that all viewpoints can be expressed at the onset. This, by the way, is what will happen during the launching of the new Strategic Concept process at the Brussels conference on July 7.

A second possibility mentioned on several occasions by Allies is the “compartmentalization” of the EAPC into different groups (partners from Western Europe, the Caucasus, Central Asia, etc...) according to the needs of each. This approach is already in force for Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia in the format NAC+1, as well as for the Mediterranean Dialogue and other partners like Australia and New Zealand. On one occasion, NATO also had a separate meeting with countries from Central Asia and the Caucasus. The NATO+N model has the advantage of efficiency and coherence. However, there is a big disadvantage to choosing to intensify these types of links at the expense of the idea of holding meetings in EAPC format, which is the loss of the sentiment of belonging to a security community sharing the same values and principles. There is also a loss of the confidence-building effect that such a setting has.
Chapter 46

The Business of Global Security in a Stressed Global Economy

Mr. David Patterson
College of Business Administration, University of Tennessee
Former U.S. Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)

There is a myth that developed nations’ aerospace and defense industries are somehow immunized from the global economic downturn. That idea is just that, a myth. The distressed global economy has had an impact on both those industries’ financial capability to sustain a robust, responsive industrial base and nations’ willingness to make greater investments in national security at the expense of domestic priorities.

THE EFFECT OF ECONOMIC PRESSURE ON GLOBAL SECURITY

I would like to connect the dots and pull some points together about this link between a distressed global economy and investments in national security. First, I think it is helpful to provide a brief perspective on the magnitude of the economic pressure that we all are experiencing. Second, I want to show what this economic pressure is doing to the aerospace and defense industrial base generally. Third, I am going to talk about what we can and should do to address global security during the economic downturn.

Let me begin by setting the economic versus global security stage. The opening sentence of the annual threat assessment by the new United States Director of National Intelligence, Dennis Blair, may have caught some U.S. legislators by surprise, but it should not have. Director Blair explained that the crisis facing the global economy is a security threat that influences all other security threats faced by the U.S. The aerospace and defense communities do, in fact, exist in the economic arena of which Admiral Blair speaks.

To put global economic conditions in some context, the Asian Development Bank places the magnitude of the total global loss of capital valuation of financial assets worldwide at over $50 trillion. This loss of capital stock is very significant and amounts to the equivalent of one full year of world GDP. The consequence of this loss some see is that countries most open to international trade, including products and systems for national security, may be subject, as the Asian Development Bank puts it, “to the greatest shock on account of reduced world demand.”

Looking at individual Gross Domestic Products (GDPs) close to home, we find that the financial crisis we are experiencing did not start in September 2008. It was well underway for some European countries for some months before that time. The decline in GDP, particularly for a number of European countries as well as for the United States, has been ongoing since the first quarter of 2008. Data released on May 15 of this year by the European Commission’s statistical office Eurostat indicates a 2.5% quarterly decline in both the 16-member eurozone and the European Union for the first quarter of 2009. Again, Eurostat data released on June 12 indicates that the April 2009 industrial production in the European Union’s 27 member states fell by 19.4% compared with April of 2008. The prediction is that this downward trend will continue through 2009 into 2010.

WHY IT IS A MYTH THAT AEROSPACE AND DEFENSE ARE IMMUNE TO ECONOMIC PRESSURES

At the beginning of my comments I mentioned that it is a myth that the aerospace and defense industries are immune to the consequences of these economic pressures. Let me explain why it is a myth. First, the large defense companies in the U.S. and Europe depend on their major suppliers to provide the necessary sub-assemblies and systems that go into major weapon systems. The first- and second-tier suppliers depend on their own suppliers for raw materials and parts that have a
wider market than just the defense industry. It is this wider market that is experiencing the declining demand for manufactured goods. When production declines in these lower-tier suppliers, the primes feel the pressure to buy greater inventory or provide financial support to their supply chain. This economic condition adds even greater risk to the acquisition process that drives defense progress to be behind schedule and over cost. Second, domestic economic pressure adds to the problem, and all of our countries are bowing to that pressure by reducing spending on national security. This reduction only makes the financial problem for major defense companies worse.

THREE STEPS TO TAKE

So what is to be done? Initially, we need to begin by recognizing that our individual and collective defense industries are not immune to the economic downturn. Second, each of our nations needs to make the efficient and effective acquisition of defense systems and equipment a national priority. Stable defense budgets and time-certain development and production would also be helpful. Programs that take longer than five years stand the highest probability of being no longer relevant to meeting the war fighter’s needs. Last, our collective security organizations need to take on the task of understanding and fortifying the defense industrial base for all our nations. We need to make economic security a linchpin of our collective global security endeavors.

As developed nations, we need to understand the economics of global security. We also need to realize that we may face an adversary whose disregard for the economic well-being of its own citizens and willingness to develop devastating weapons at the expense of keeping its people fed makes him a very formidable foe.
Chapter 47

Wrap-Up Remarks

General Karl-Heinz Lather
Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)

OVERVIEW

I will share some observations concerning the discussions over the past two days and also talk about what we could do next year. The main focus, unsurprisingly, was on Afghanistan and Pakistan. Success there is essential for domestic as well as for global security: What happens in that region impacts the security situation around the world. Whether we like it or not, this is a fact. We understood that there are inherent links between the Afghanistan conflict, the Middle East, and even Africa. We touched on the NATO Strategic Concept. And we discussed topics like energy security, climate change, piracy, use of space, and nuclear proliferation, just to name a few. These are all crucial issues in the global security arena.

We also had a great deal of exchange on relations between nations, Georgia-Russia for example, and between organizations as well: the EU, NATO, the U.N., and even the African Union. How do they interact with each other? Finally, we heard a view from India, which is extremely important as well.

THE COMING YEAR

So, how should we further develop these topics given what the global situation is likely to be next year? There could be a panel on the NATO Strategic Concept, as it should be coming to a close by that time. It would be an opportunity to assess the state of the Alliance, including NATO-Russia relations, since outreach is very important to NATO not only on the political front but with regard to promoting true military cooperation as well.

Afghanistan will most certainly still be a major topic. It will be interesting to see, talk about, and build upon the outcome and results—if there are results by then—of the current military and civilian surge in Afghanistan. It is too early to predict now, but in a year's time, we will have a better understanding of what has happened there. Moreover, there will be a new president in Afghanistan, or the old president will be the new president. And let's not forget the region. If we talk about the crisis in Afghanistan, we obviously need to consider Pakistan, we need to consider India, and we need to consider Iran. We may even need to consider the Central Asian states, while Russia certainly has a role to play too.

The Middle East… We had an excellent panel on the Israel-Palestine issue. It would be very interesting if we repeated this with an Israeli official participating so that we are not just talking about Israel-Palestine but are talking with them and engaging them as well.

A related topic that Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte has described so eloquently is counter piracy, certainly a matter which will not have faded by this time next year.

Cyber communications and new technologies are also crucial elements and we always learn a great deal from the industry representatives. Are they really, what I heard here, a capacity-building element in support of the military or in support of strategies? This vision is worth further developing.

And then there is the need to plan together with NGOs, when they are involved, and maybe with other organizations such as INTERPOL. The topic is promising because we have not addressed it in detail in the past. So deterrence, defense, development… I do not know whether this framework is still entirely valid, but it will certainly be important to build on it.

The Balkans… We will see if the deterrent presence and nation-building efforts are fruitful and if the situation remains calm. If so, it could be the first year in which we will not have to address that part of the world. But I am afraid that I am probably too optimistic.

There may also be interest in discussing the effects and the outcome of the engagement, hopefully a positive engagement,
between Russia and the United States on the nuclear arms control side. One question I heard was: What is the value of tactical nuclear arms in the future? That is an interesting side point. But I think it is more important for these two great nations to move forward on the fundamental issue. It could be worthwhile to include Korea, both North Korea and South Korea (because we are talking about global security and not only Afghanistan, the Middle East, NATO, and Russia) in the dialogue. A panel to talk about strategic communications is also warranted. This is something that we are trying to do in NATO. But of course we need our nations, and it is a very complicated and challenging field.

I am very grateful that you invited me again to be here. If you do so again next year, I promise to try to be here. I found it extremely helpful.

**AN ANECDOTE ON AFGHANISTAN**

As to the comprehensive approach, I would like to add just one anecdote from Afghanistan: Very recently, I was in Kambu and had a chance to talk to two elders; one Pashtun and one Uzbek. And I put this question to them: “Our intelligence has told us that it is mostly local people who fight themselves and fight us. Well, these are your children, these are your sons. What can you do to talk to them, and to stop them?” They each gave their own arguments as to why this is not feasible and were very adamant about it. One response was, “there is too much corruption in our country.” The other was, “there is no real governance in our country. We do not see any effects trickling down from the center of government to our province, to our district, to our village, or to our city. We do not see investment, so the international money does not come here.” And the result of that is, there is no work for the youngsters. There only need to be a few extremist Taliban coming from either Pakistan or the south of the country, and then these youths become inflamed. They want to have something meaningful to do, or at least something that they think is meaningful. This is a vicious cycle. And on top of all that, in that particular province the governor does not use the instrument of the Sharia, which is part of the Afghan culture, to resolve problems on a local level. So they are disappointed about that as well.

To break this vicious cycle, we need to proceed just as we discussed here: comprehensively, collaboratively, and cooperatively addressing all of the surrounding issues. If we are successful, then Afghanistan will be better off in the end. But Afghanistan has to do its part as well.
international workshop series on global security

S P O N S O R E D B Y

Center for Strategic Decision Research | Turkish Ministry of National Defense
U.S. Department of Defense | Northrop Grumman | Microsoft
Lockheed Martin | EADS | URS | Cisco | Thales | MITRE | General Dynamics

The University of Tennessee National Defense Business Institute