Chantilly Follow-up Colloquium: Meeting the Security Challenges Ahead

Proceedings

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Editor:
Caroline Baylon
Center for Strategic Decision Research
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Overview

Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon
Director, Center for Strategic Decision Research

This booklet contains the proceedings of the Chantilly Follow-up Colloquium which was held on 9 January 2006 in Paris, France at the Defense Ministry. It was presented by the Center for Strategic Decision Research and the Délégation aux Affaires Stratégiques, Ministère de Défense, with the aim of further developing the discussion topics of the 22nd International Workshop in Chantilly in June 2005 and preparing for the upcoming 23rd International Workshop in Berlin in May 2006. The first three papers in this booklet deal with NATO-EU relations while the subsequent three discuss Afghanistan, network-centric operations, and proliferation in Iran respectively.

The 22nd International Workshop in Chantilly in June 2005. The 22nd International Workshop on Global Security took place in Chantilly, France on 10-12 June 2005. It was presented by the Center for Strategic Decision Research with the patronage of the French Minister of Defense Michèle Alliot-Marie, who gave the opening address. Other speakers included British Defence Secretary Dr. John Reid, Canadian Defense Minister Bill Graham, Bulgarian Defense Minister Nikolay Svinarov, Slovakian Defense Minister Juraj Liška, and Slovenian Defense Minister Karl Erjavec. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk gave a keynote speech during a dinner at the Château de Chantilly, the former residence of the Princes de Condé. From NATO, General Harald Kujat gave his valedictory address as Chairman of the Military Committee, while the United States was represented by Dr. Linton Wells, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration (acting), and Mr. Dale Klein, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs. The Workshop also included high-level industry participation with CEOs, presidents, or vice presidents from such companies as EADS, Northrop Grumman, Alenia, Boeing, Lockheed Martin, MBDA, MITRE, Raytheon, SAFRAN, Thales, General Dynamics, and BDLI. The conference brought together some 120 political, military, academic, and industry leaders from North America and Eastern and Western Europe to discuss a host of security issues ranging from the EU and NATO to the Middle East to information security.

Chantilly Follow-up Colloquium. The Chantilly Follow-up Colloquium on 9 January 2006 was conceived as an informal meeting to further discuss some of the Chantilly workshop topics in a relaxed, small group environment. Mr. Jean de Ponton d'Amécourt, Director for Strategic Affairs in the French Defense Ministry gave opening remarks on the NATO-EU relationship. Lieutenant General Jean-Paul Perruche, Director General of the European Union Military Staff, and Ambassador Jean-Pierre Juneau, Canadian Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council, further developed the NATO-EU cooperation discussion in their roundtable. Lieutenant General Patrick Porchier, French Military Representative to the NATO Military Committee, then gave an address
on NATO’s role in Afghanistan, while Mr. Robert Lentz, Director of Information Assurance, Office of the United States Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration, gave a presentation on network-centric operations. The discussions in the Defense Ministry were followed by a dinner at “La Maison des Polytechniciens” in the 17th century Hôtel de Poulpry, where Mr. Jean-Louis Gergorin, Vice President of EADS France, gave a talk on the proliferation issues surrounding Iran.

We would like to warmly thank Mr. Jean de Ponton d'Amécourt for his hospitality in hosting the colloquium in his Ministry and for delivering the colloquium’s opening remarks. Ingénieur Général de l’Armement Robert Ranquet, his Deputy Director, put forth tremendous effort in preparing both the colloquium and the 22nd International Workshop in Chantilly. We also appreciate Ingénieur Général Ranquet’s role as moderator of the colloquium’s first roundtable. Admiral Jean Betermier, Special Advisor to the Chairman of EADS, deserves thanks for moderating the second panel—and for his assistance, too, with the Chantilly workshop organization.

Last but not least, we would like to thank all 24 participants—some of whom traveled from Belgium, Germany, Spain, and the United States in order to be with us—for their important contributions to the colloquium discussions:

Ms. Claude-France Arnould, Director - Defense Aspects, Council of the European Union
Ms. Anne D. Baylon, Deputy Director, Center for Strategic Decision Research
Admiral Jean Betermier, Special Advisor to the Chairman, EADS
Mr. Edgar Buckley, Senior Vice President for EU, NATO, and European Cooperation, Thales
Mr. Colin Cameron, Secretary General of the Interparliamentary European Security and Defense Assembly, Western European Union
Ms. Marie-Jeanne Capuano, Head Publisher, EuroFuture
Mr. Wolf-Peter Denker, Senior Vice President, Governmental and Political Affairs, EADS
Mr. Jean-Louis Gergorin, Vice President, EADS France
Mr. Guillaume Giscard d’Estaing, Deputy Vice President, International Business Development, SAFRAN
Mr. Camille Grand, Counselor to the Minister, Ministry of Defense of France
Ambassador Jean-Pierre Juneau, Canadian Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council
Colonel Patrick Lefebvre, Assistant Cabinet Director, Chief of Staff of the French Air Force
Mr. Robert Lentz, Director of Information Assurance, Office of the United States Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration
Mr. Jean-Pierre Maulny, Deputy Director, Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques
Lieutenant General Jean-Paul Perruche, Director General, European Union Military Staff
Mr. Jean de Ponton d’Amécourt, Director for Strategic Affairs, Ministry of Defense of France
Lieutenant General Patrick Porchier, French Military Representative to the NATO Military Committee
Mr. Jacques Pous, Regional Vice President, Northrop Grumman International
Ingénieur Général de l’Armement Robert Ranquet, Deputy Director for Strategic Affairs, Ministry of Defense of France
Vice Admiral Norman Ray (ret.), President, Europe, Raytheon International
Mr. Jesus Redondo, Vice President, General Dynamics Land Systems
Ms. Hélène de Rochefort, Parliamentary Attaché, Office of the French Minister of Defense
Mr. Guillaume Schlumberger, Director, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique
Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon, Director, Center for Strategic Decision Research

The 23rd International Workshop in Berlin in May 2006. The 23rd International Workshop on Global Security will take place in Berlin on 18-20 May and is being presented by the Center for Strategic Decision Research in association with the ILA Air Show. Invited

We look forward to seeing you in Berlin!
Allocution d’Ouverture:
La Relation OTAN-UE

Mr. Jean de Ponton d’Amécourt
Directeur Chargé des Affaires Stratégiques, Ministère de Défense

Aborder la relation OTAN-UE est toujours un exercice délicat. C’est tout d’abord difficile avec l’ensemble de nos alliés et je le constate chaque jour lors de mes rencontres. En pensant à nos alliés, le premier bien sur à me venir à l’esprit est les Etats-Unis. Je me souviens de ma stupéfaction lors de ma première visite à Washington il y a quelques mois devant un haut responsable de la Maison Blanche qui, alors que je venais de lui exposer la façon dont nous voyions le développement de la PESD, me répondit en me demandant pourquoi diable voulez-vous une PESD alors que vous avez l’OTAN?

Les nouveaux membres. Par contraste l’attitude des nouveaux membres, particulièrement les pays Baltes et la Pologne est tout entière marquée par leur volonté d’assurer leur sécurité contre le tout puissant voisin russe. Pour eux l’essentiel est l’article 5 de la Charte qu’ils assimilent à la protection américaine.

Le Royaume Uni. Les Britanniques, marqués par l’expérience de deux guerres mondiales, ont placé toute leur politique de sécurité dans l’assurance d’un engagement continu des Etats-Unis en Europe. Pour eux donc il s’agit essentiellement de jouer avec habileté et dans l’ambiguïté pour rester ancrés dans cette alliance américaine tout en maintenant un rôle actif dans l’UE.

L’Allemagne. Les Allemands, tout en réaffirmant leur attachement à l’Europe et à la PESD, veulent restaurer l’harmonie de leur relation transatlantique et choisissent, tout naturellement, comme beaucoup d’autres pays européens (Italie, Espagne, Hollande par exemple) l’OTAN comme le forum essentiel pour les consultations transatlantiques.

La France. Cette difficulté, ce caractère délicat de la relation OTAN-UE, se retrouve aussi entre Français avec des lignes mal définies entre les gardiens du temple, toujours sourcilleux lorsque l’on semble toucher au dogme et ceux qui s’abritent derrière le pragmatisme pour pratiquer dans les faits une politique soi-disant réaliste les amenant à flirter dangereusement avec l’alignement sur les positions américaines.

UN PAYSAGE EN TRAIN DE CHANGER

Dans ce cadre cependant, j’ai la conviction que les débats que nous aurons en 2006 sur la problématique OTAN-UE seront plus difficiles encore, car le paysage est en train de changer de façon accélérée. L’Europe comme l’OTAN changent…
L’Union Européenne. Nous avions pris l’habitude ces trois dernières années de considérer que la PESD avançait suffisamment: le cadre institutionnel nous satisfaisait (Berlin Plus, OHQ nationaux ou centre opérationnel de Bruxelles; comité militaire de l’UE, Etat-major européen, cellule civilo-militaire; Agence européenne de défense). Quatorze opérations ou missions lancées créaient par ailleurs une dynamique favorable pour la PESD. Nous avions pris l’habitude de valoriser l’aptitude de l’Europe à agir avec des instruments variés du civilo-militaire. Son intervention se révélait particulièrement adaptée à la gestion des crises.

Voici néanmoins venu le temps des difficultés. Tout commence bien avec le rejet du traité portant constitution qui jette des doutes sur la solidité du soutien des opinions publiques à la construction de l’Europe.

La démarche capacitaire se révèle un chemin semé d’embûches (par exemple débat entre la vision allemande et la vision britannique de l’exercice d’inventaire capacitaire des forces), tandis que l’Agence Européenne de Défense rencontre des difficultés à adopter un budget de recherche et de technologie d’un niveau raisonnable.

L’Europe enfin s’est montrée incapable à trois reprises d’apporter une contribution militaire en soutien à l’intervention d’assistance dans les grandes catastrophes humanitaires, laissant en pratique le champs libre à l’OTAN comme on l’a vu récemment au Pakistan.

C’est du reste dans cet esprit que la présidence britannique a ouvert à Hampton Court la discussion sur des points importants touchant l’adaptation des structures et le financement.

L’OTAN. Parallèlement l’OTAN a fait preuve d’un activisme exceptionnel au cours des derniers mois, de par la volonté de l’administration de Bush II qui voit désormais dans l’alliance un forum de discussion stratégique ouvrant la voie à un partage du fardeau avec les nations en ayant les capacités militaires.

L’alliance est en pleine transformation…ce sera le thème du sommet de 2006. Il ne s’agit plus d’une transformation limitée aux seules forces. C’est tout à la fois une transformation politique, une transformation des structures, un élargissement des missions (s’appuyant notamment sur l’engagement en Afghanistan). L’OTAN évolue clairement vers cette alliance « expéditionnaire » voulue par les Etats-Unis.


COMMENT VOIR L’ÉVOLUTION DE LA RELATION OTAN-UE EN 2006?

Alors comment voir, dans ce contexte, l’évolution de la relation OTAN-UE en 2006? Pour répondre à cette question, il vous faudra répondre à d’autres questions:
• La première est sans doute de se demander ce qu’est l’OTAN pour nous aujourd’hui. Cette question ne peut être dissociée de celle de l’ensemble de nos relations avec les États-Unis, c’est-à-dire avec celle de la relation transatlantique.
• Je note au passage que la plupart de nos partenaires européens, même les plus attachés à la PESD, réclament toujours plus de liens entre l’OTAN et l’UE. Je note aussi que derrière le mot complémentaire, nous ne mettons pas toujours la même chose. S’agit-il de complémentarité politique, géographique, ou de répartition des rôles selon l’intensité des interventions et des conflits?
• J’ai aussi le sentiment que la vision d’un « pilier européen de l’OTAN » est maintenant dépassée avec une alliance qui ne se résume plus aux deux rives de l’Atlantique et dont les missions prétendent embrasser le monde…

**LA VISION POLITIQUE DE LA FRANCE**

De toute évidence, une clarification de ces différents points ne peut aller sans une réaffirmation de notre vision politique. Tel est bien l’objet de vos travaux. Mais laissez moi vous donner un cadre. Pour nous, pour la France, les choses sont claires. Notre politique suit une triple voie:

*La PESD.* Je ne reviendrai pas sur les positions bien connues de la France à ce sujet.


*La position de la France au sein de l’OTAN.* Depuis plus de dix ans maintenant la France a pleinement repris sa place au sein de l’OTAN. Certes, elle ne participe pas aux décisions intégrées de l’organisation, mais quelle importance cela a-t-il aujourd’hui face aux évolutions de l’alliance? Elle est en revanche le deuxième ou troisième contributeur militaire et l’un des piliers de la NRF. Nous avons désormais près de cent officiers français déployés dans l’organisation. Enfin nous sommes le quatrième contributeur financier de l’alliance.

Mais je vous laisse à votre réflexion en formulant les vœux qu’elle contribue à éclairer notre voie. Merci d’avance.
Opening Remarks: 
The NATO-EU Relationship

Mr. Jean de Ponton d’Amécourt  
Director for Strategic Affairs, Ministry of Defense of France

Discussing the NATO-EU relationship is always a difficult exercise. To start with, it is difficult with most of our allies and I am aware of this whenever we meet. When thinking of our allies, the first one to come to mind of course is the United States. I recall how surprised I was during my first visit to Washington a few months ago when, after explaining how we thought ESDP should develop to a top-level official in the White House, he replied, “Why would you need an ESDP when you have NATO?”

The New Members. In contrast, the attitude of the new members, especially the Baltic States and Poland, reflects their desire to be protected from their almighty Russian neighbor. For them, Article 5, which they identify with the American umbrella, is the most important part of the NATO Charter.

The United Kingdom. After going through two world wars, the UK’s security policy rests on the US assurance that it will stay engaged in Europe. Britain’s desire to stay anchored in its alliance with America and at the same time to maintain an active role in the EU requires it to play a skillful and ambiguous role.

Germany. The Germans, who wish to reaffirm their commitment to Europe and ESDP but also restore a more harmonious transatlantic relationship, have simply opted, like many other European countries including Italy, Spain, and The Netherlands, for NATO as the main forum for transatlantic consultations.

France. The sensitive nature of the NATO-EU relationship is also difficult for the French, with poorly defined lines between the “guardians of the temple” who adamantly protect dogma and those who hide behind pragmatism in order to actually conduct a so-called realist policy that is flirting dangerously with an alignment on US positions.

THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE

Within this framework, however, I believe that the NATO-EU debates of 2006 will be even more difficult due to the accelerating pace at which the landscape is changing. Europe and NATO are both changing…

The European Union. For the past three years, we had got used to thinking that ESDP was moving forward fast enough: the institutional framework was satisfactory (Berlin Plus, national operational headquarters or operational center in Brussels; EU military
committee, European staff, civ-mil cell, European Defense Agency). In addition, the launching of fourteen operations or missions had created favorable dynamics for ESDP. We had also started to value Europe’s ability to act with various civ-mil instruments. Europe’s intervention proved to be particularly appropriate for crisis management.

However, difficult times have come. It all started with the rejection of the Constitutional treaty, which cast doubt on whether public opinion actually supported the construction of Europe.

The capability effort is becoming a path ridden with obstacles (such as the debate between German and British views concerning the exercise of force capability inventory) while the European Defense Agency has difficulties adopting an appropriate level for its research and technology budget.

Finally, on three different occasions, Europe has been unable to provide a military contribution in support of aid operations for large humanitarian disasters, in effect letting NATO operate as we saw recently in Pakistan.

It is in this context that the British EU presidency opened the discussion at Hampton Court on the important issues of structural adaptation and financing.

**NATO.** In parallel, NATO has been exceptionally active during the past few months given the second Bush administration’s will to use the Alliance as a strategic discussion forum that would open the way to sharing the burden with militarily-able nations.

The transformation of the Alliance will be the theme of the 2006 NATO Summit. This transformation is no longer limited to forces only. It is also political, structural, and it involves an enlargement of the missions (relying notably on the commitment to Afghanistan). NATO is clearly moving toward the US concept of an “expeditionary” alliance.

The Alliance is also growing with the prospect of a future enlargement to Ukraine, Georgia and the Balkans…and through an ever closer participation by the partners and contact countries, from Australia to Middle Eastern nations.

**HOW WILL THE NATO-EU RELATIONSHIP EVOLVE IN 2006?**

In this context, how can we predict the evolution of the NATO-EU relationship in 2006? A response requires answers to the points below:

- First, we need to ask what NATO represents for us today. This relationship is inseparable from our whole relationship with the United States, i.e., the transatlantic relationship.
- Let me mention in passing that most of our European partners, including those who are pushing for ESDP, always insist on securing stronger ties between NATO and the EU. I also notice that we do not always attach the same
significance to the word “complementary.” Is this complementarity political, geographical, or a matter of role assignments depending on the intensity of the interventions and conflicts?

- I also feel that the vision of a “European pillar of NATO” is obsolete now that the Alliance encompasses more than the two sides of the Atlantic and that the world is the limit for its missions…

**FRANCE’S POLITICAL VISION**

Obviously, it is not possible to clarify these different points without reaffirming our political vision. This is what your work is about. But let me give you a framework. For us and France, things are clear. Our policies follow a triple direction:

*ESDP*. We are committed to ESDP and I will not go over French positions on the subject. They are well known.

*The France-US Relationship.* It is now back to where it always should have been: a relationship based on military cooperation and serene policies. We work together on multiple tasks. Together, we seek to resolve crises: for example in Syria and in Lebanon, in the Horn of Africa, in Afghanistan with our other NATO Allies. This relationship goes back a long way and it is excellent, sometimes exemplary.

*France’s Position in NATO.* For over ten years now, France has recovered its position within NATO. It still does not participate in the integrated decisions of the organization but does this matter in the face of the evolution of the Alliance today? On the other hand, it is the second or third military contributor and one of the pillars of the NATO Response Force. Almost one hundred French officers are currently deployed in the organization. Finally, our financial contributions to the Alliance are the fourth highest.

I will leave you now with the hope that your discussions will help us as we move forward.
L’OTAN et l’UE

Lieutenant General Jean-Paul Perruche
Directeur, Etat-major de l’Union Européenne

QUELQUES CARACTERISTIQUES DU NOUVEAU CONTEXTE SECURITAIRE

La Globalisation/Mondialisation
• Accroît les déséquilibres entre riches et pauvres en l’absence d’une gouvernance mondiale et rend ces déséquilibres plus visibles.
• S’accompagne d’un affaiblissement du pouvoir de contrôle des Etats sur les citoyens (liberté de mouvement, de communiquer, des liens de solidarité extraétatiques, web).
• Exacerbe l’affrontement identitaire, voire idéologique chez ceux qui refusent les valeurs occidentales. Stimule sans doute la prolifération nucléaire et le terrorisme.

Conséquences sur le domaine sécurité
• Il faut des réponses globales aux crises.
• Les limite géographiques des zones d’intérêt sécuritaire se trouvent élargies (pollution, devoir d’ingérence, terrorisme).
• Multiplication du nombre des crises lointaines et simultanées à traiter sur tous les continents.

Besoin de capacité de réaction rapide adaptée aux cas spécifiques de chaque crise.

GENERALITES SUR L’OTAN ET L’UE

Bien que regroupant de nombreux pays communs (19),
• Les organisations sont de nature et format différents.
• Elles ont toutes les deux une légitimité a traiter des questions de défense et sécurité (décision commune des Etats-membres).
L’UE ne peut avoir une politique étrangère et de sécurité commune et être dépendante de pays tiers ou extérieurs pour la mettre en œuvre. La CFSP--PESC--/PESD est fondée sur les intérêts spécifiques de l’UE.

Chaque organisation a des atouts et des limites qui lui sont propres.

OTAN
Atouts:
- Force militaire crédible.
- A su s’adapter aux nouvelles crises armées.
- A su créer une culture commune de travail en Etat-major (de doctrine) entre européens et avec USA et Canada.
- Facteur de stabilité en Europe. Défense collective.

**Limites:**
- Alliance politique et militaire.
- Leadership US.
- Difficulté à accepter une identité Européenne de sécurité et de défense (IESD) concrète en son sein (l’OTAN est une des rares organisations où l’UE ne peut parler d’une seule voix).

**Union Européenne**

*Atouts:*
- Union politique globale fondée sur de forts intérêts économiques communs.
- Forte légitimité de la PESD (défense d’intérêts créées en commun) qui a permis à la PESD de devenir une réalité en 4 ans (14 opérations PESD lancées).
- Forte dynamique d’intégration (Commission, Euro, AED).
- Capacité de gestion de crises « à la carte » en s’adaptant au contexte (Darfour, Palestine, ACEH : opérations de nature très différentes).

*Limites:*
- Unité d’action politique parfois difficile à trouver.
- Architecture complexe (communauté: 1er pilier -- intergouvernemental: pour 2ème et 3ème piliers).
- Capacités militaires limitées (Headline Goal limité à la gestion de crises).
- Manque de chaîne de commandement permanente qui entraîne une difficulté de réponse aux situations de désastres.

**RELATIONS OTAN-EU**

- Il y a un intérêt évident a utiliser toutes les ressources de ces deux organisations en utilisant leurs atouts et en tenant compte de leurs limites, en évitant les rivalités et en travaillant leur complémentarité.
- Cette complémentarité doit reposer sur un partenariat équilibré.
- Pas de dépendance d’une organisation par rapport a l’autre—autonomie de décision.
- La complémentarité doit tenir compte entre autres paramètres de la différence d’image Etats-Unis—Union Européenne sur les théâtres d’opérations considérés.
- Pas de répartition des rôles a priori mais au cas par cas.

**Coordination pour travailler côte à côte quand c’est nécessaire**
- Echange d’informations en respectant les intérêts mutuels.
- Développer l’interopérabilité par des doctrines, concepts communs ou proches.
- Recherche d’accord sur la répartition des rôles pour gérer les crises.

La présence des deux organisations sur un même théâtre ne devrait pas être une obligation.
Coopération pour travailler ensemble dans le respect de l’autonomie de chaque organisme en tenant compte de leurs différences de nature.
- Entraînement.
- Développement de capacités.

CONCLUSIONS

• Un partenaire européen fort renforce le lien transatlantique en rendant l’UE capable de prendre sa part du fardeau sécurité.
• L’émergence de l’Union Européenne n’est pas une duplication car elle correspond au besoin d’une union politique.
• Les moyens militaires des États appartenant à l’OTAN et l’UE doivent être disponibles à priori pour les 2 organisations.
NATO and the EU

Lieutenant General Jean-Paul Perruche
Director General, European Union Military Staff

SEVERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Globalization
• Accentuates the discrepancies between rich and poor in the absence of a global governing body and renders these discrepancies more visible.
• Is accompanied by the weakening of countries’ ability to monitor their citizens (freedom of circulation, of communication, of forming extra-state solidarity bonds, internet).
• Exacerbates the cultural and ideological clash with those who do not accept western values. Is likely to stimulate nuclear proliferation and terrorism.

Consequences for the security arena
• Crises must be met with global responses.
• Broadening of the geographical confines of zones of security interest (pollution, duty to intervene, terrorism).
• Multiplication of the number of distant and simultaneous crises that must be dealt with on all continents.

Need for a rapid reaction capability adapted to the requirements of each crisis.

OVERVIEW OF NATO AND THE EU

Although they have a number of member countries in common (19),
• The organizations differ in their nature and format.
• Both have legitimacy in dealing with defense and security matters (joint decision of member countries).

The EU cannot have a common foreign and security policy while being dependent on third parties in order to implement it. The CFSP/ESDP is based on the specific interests of the EU.

Each organization has its own strengths and limitations.

NATO
Strengths:
- Credible military force.
- Has demonstrated its ability to adapt to the new military crises.
- Has been able to create a common work ethic among the staff (of doctrine) between Europeans and with the USA and Canada.


**Limitations:**
- Political and military alliance.
- US leadership.
- Difficulty in accepting a European security and defense identity (ESDI) within the organization (NATO is one of the rare organizations in which the EU cannot speak with one voice).

**European Union**

**Strengths:**
- Comprehensive political union founded on strong common economic interests.
- Strong legitimacy of the ESDP (defense of common interests) that has permitted ESDP to become a reality in 4 years (14 ESDP operations launched).
- Strong dynamic of integration (Commission, Euro, EDA).
- Ability to manage crises in an « a la carte » manner by adapting to the context (Darfur, Palestine, ACEH: operations of very different natures).

**Limitations:**
- Unity of political action is sometimes hard to achieve.
- Complex architecture (community: 1st pillar -- intergovernmental: for 2nd and 3rd pillars).
- Limited military capabilities (Headline Goal limited to crisis management).
- Lack of a permanent chain of command which causes difficulties in responding to disaster situations.

**THE NATO-EU RELATIONSHIP**

- There is an obvious benefit to using the resources of both of these organizations--in utilizing their strengths while taking account of their limitations, in avoiding rivalries, and in ensuring their complementarity.
- This complementarity must rest upon a balanced partnership.
- Importance of the US-EU dialogue so that the interests of both parties are considered.
- No dependence of one organization with respect to the other—autonomy in decision-making.
- The complementarity must take into account among other factors the US—EU image difference in the theaters of operation that are being considered.
- No prearranged division of roles but rather on a case-by-case basis.

**Coordination in order to work side-by-side when necessary.**
- Exchange of information while respecting mutual interests.
- Developing interoperability through doctrines and common or similar precepts.
- Seeking an accord on the division of roles in crisis management.

The presence of the two organizations on the same theater of operations should not be required.
Cooperation in order to work together while respecting the autonomy of each organization and taking into account their differences in nature.
- Training.
- Development of capabilities.

CONCLUSIONS

- A strong European partner strengthens the transatlantic link by giving the EU the ability to assume its share of the security burden.
- The emergence of the European Union is not a duplication since it corresponds to the need for a political union.
- The military means of NATO and EU member countries must de facto be available to both organizations.
NATO-European Union: Collaboration and Complementarity

Ambassador Jean-Pierre Juneau
Permanent Representative of Canada to the North Atlantic Council

NATO TODAY

Since its creation in 1949, NATO has been a guarantor of stability in the Euro-Atlantic region. Throughout the Cold War, the Alliance maintained the security of its members, and the region more broadly, through its role as a key deterrent. NATO’s longevity as an Alliance alone bears witness to its success, the confidence the Allies continue to place in the organization, and above all, NATO’s ability to adapt to change.

Much has been accomplished by NATO since it was created. In large part this has been the result of its ability to adapt to changing international circumstances, even during the Cold War. It has had to do so again more recently, first following the collapse of the Berlin Wall, and second in the months after the September 11 attacks. Today, NATO is much more than a defense military alliance. It is the only transatlantic forum for consultation and cooperation between the Allies on shared defense and military challenges, and on security more broadly defined. Let me add that it has also become a political forum in which partner countries from Eastern Europe, Central Asia, the Mediterranean basin and the Middle East meet with Allies and other countries in their region to exchange points of view and deepen their relations of trust.

These partnerships also play an important role in advancing democracy and human rights on a global level. Though military cooperation and the implementation of defense reforms, NATO promotes the adoption and respect of legal frameworks that protect those ideals. A commitment to democracy and human rights is an important criterion by which NATO gauges the type and depth of relations it wishes to maintain with its partners. In contrast, a purely military alliance would concentrate on geostrategic considerations.

In short, I would describe NATO as a multilateral and primarily political organization whose decisions are implemented through its military component. This military component has a history of over 50 years of operations, training, partnership, and shared experiences.

On the operational level, though the protection of its members is still its leitmotiv, the Alliance is currently conducting operations and missions outside its traditional geographic area. Consider, for example, NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan, Iraq, Darfur, and for another few weeks yet, Pakistan.
In my view, it is this type of involvement that will preserve the organization’s relevance in the years to come. Missions and operations abroad clearly demonstrate that NATO’s support and assistance is increasingly sought after, and further, that NATO possesses the means and political will necessary to provide an effective response to events that threaten international security, even in the midst of the regions where these events occur.

To accomplish this new task, the Alliance is involved in a transformation process to increase its effectiveness and flexibility. This notion of transformation is so important that it will be the main theme at the upcoming NATO Summit in Riga, Latvia, in November 2006.

One key aspect of this transformation is the creation of the NATO Response Force (NRF). The NRF is designed to be deployed rapidly in response to crises around the globe. Although the NRF will not be fully operational until October, the elements of this force were central to NATO’s humanitarian relief operation in Pakistan in response to the October 8th earthquake. While it is true that in its deployment the mission had to deal with coordination issues that were quite understandable under the circumstances, it is recognized that it rose to the challenge. An assessment of the mission is currently being conducted at NATO that will review a range of issues including funding and transportation logistics.

Thus, the question is no longer, “Should we preserve NATO?,” which is what we have asked ourselves as the Cold War drew to a close, but rather, “How can we derive maximum benefit from the Alliance in order to address future issues?”

I believe that NATO is indispensable as a multilateral organization. It contributes to international security and stability and serves the interests of both North American and European countries. Even from a strictly European viewpoint, support for NATO is a logical choice. In addition to providing protection for its members and projecting stability beyond its borders, NATO is the only transatlantic multilateral forum in which the allies are free to debate and exchange points of view and expertise. This opens up enormous possibilities, particularly in terms of reducing tensions and the lack of mutual understanding that can sometimes disrupt Euro-Atlantic cohesiveness.

**NATO AND THE EUROPEAN UNION**

I would be remiss in praising the virtues of NATO if I did not highlight its ties with the European Union. The Alliance does not operate in a vacuum. In a global context with complex challenges—whether they involve failed or fragile states, international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, or ongoing regional tensions—it is crucial for NATO, the UN, the OSCE, and the EU to pool their resources and expertise. Canada is a strong supporter of the NATO-EU partnership because it is a partnership based on common values through which we can achieve shared strategic objectives and avoid duplicating our efforts.
Developing an EU security and defense structure within the framework of the European Security and Defense Policy is essential for Europe. Canada recognizes this fact and recently signed a framework agreement with the EU on the issue of Canadian participation in European operations that involve civilian and military management of crises.

NATO and the EU are already working together in the areas of civilian protection and information sharing. They consult together on other issues of common interest such as the situations in Moldavia and Afghanistan. Through the “Berlin Plus” provisions, the EU benefits from the Alliance’s assets and capabilities. This arrangement allows for a high level of cooperation and consultation between the two organizations. Canada supports this cooperation and would like to see it deepened and expanded into other areas.

In concrete terms, Canada would like to see the European Security and Defense Policy continue to complement NATO’s capabilities. The ESDP should recognize the Alliance’s role as the main forum in terms of joint consultations and actions involving transatlantic defense and security. The example of Bosnia Herzegovina, where the EU took over from NATO with Operation Althea, is a prime example of the potential of such cooperation and should serve as an example for the future.

One question the participants in this symposium should consider is, “Is it desirable for limits to be placed on NATO-EU cooperation? If so, what should these limits be?” Another question is, “How can NATO branch out into new avenues of activity while still supporting the European Security and Defense Policy?”

EXAMPLES OF CURRENT SECURITY ISSUES

We live in an era marked by a resurgence in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The accessibility of knowledge generated by the development of communication technologies, particularly via the internet, is facilitating access to weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, there are ongoing concerns that stockpiles and technology from the Soviet era could fall into the hands of criminals or terrorists.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by states is not a thing of the past. Although for a long time, only UN Security Council members had nuclear weaponry, India, Pakistan, and probably Israel have added nuclear weapons to their arsenals. We have good reason to fear that North Korea and Iran may go ahead with programs to develop nuclear weapons. Proliferation is a new destabilizing factor at the regional level and increases the risk of a state using such weapons or of the weapons falling into the hands of criminals. These elements pose a considerable threat to members of the Alliance.

The consequences of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the risk of them falling into irresponsible hands, either at the government or non-government level, are potentially so serious that we cannot allow institutional issues to hinder our capacity
to detect, dissuade, and prevent proliferation. As for terrorism, non-proliferation should be the main thrust of a new agenda in NATO-EU relations.

In conclusion, I would like to draw your attention to recent developments involving Africa. At the 2004 Summit, the G8 countries committed to developing peacekeeping capacities for African states. In the wake of the Summit, Washington is currently exploring the idea of setting up cooperation and training centers in the area of security—one in Africa and another in the Middle East. These centers would develop regional peacekeeping expertise and promote reform, defense, and broader security efforts in the countries concerned. As I have already indicated, NATO has over 50 years of experience in training and peacekeeping operations. Should it draw upon this expertise and become involved in such projects in Africa?

**CONCLUSION**

In summary, I believe that NATO is adjusting well to the new international reality and is serving the interests of the transatlantic community in an effective manner. Current operations, which demonstrate a certain degree of flexibility and ability to turn political will into concrete action, suggest that NATO will remain a central player internationally. That said, sound NATO development is only possible in close cooperation and together with other multilateral organizations, particularly the EU.

I have raised two questions that I feel are essential, and some points for discussion. On that note, I will hand the discussion over to you. I would appreciate hearing your views on the topics discussed.

Thank you.
The Situation in Afghanistan

Lieutenant General Patrick Porchier
French Military Representative to the NATO Military Committee

ISAF, NATO’s force in Afghanistan, is considered by most of the 26 nations as the main NATO operation. Only a few nations among the 26 give the priority to KFOR. The importance given by NATO to Afghanistan comes in my view from at least 3 factors:

1. Military operations in Afghanistan are considered by the US and others as a significant response to 9-11. So this operation must stay a major operation.
2. Then the US leads Operation Enduring Freedom with 18,000 soldiers…so NATO is pressed to share the burden.
3. Some of these nations which are not engaged in Iraq insist on participating in the so-called “fight against terrorism” in Afghanistan.

Yet, Afghanistan, as a military theater, combines a lot of challenges:

1. a great distance from Europe
2. a chaotic geography
3. a degree of security which is not so good, particularly in the east, south, and in the cities, and
4. a very active narco-traffic.

As a consequence, NATO has to face several difficulties, among them the issue of force generation and funding:

- Given the distance and logistic requirements, nations are reluctant to contribute with high value assets such as helicopters, transport aircraft, drones, or airport command and control.
- Because of that, NATO must call on civilian companies, multiplying as a result the cost of ISAF by 5 within 3 years (from 40 million euros in 2002 to 100 or 180 million in 2006).
- NATO in Afghanistan is probably about to reach the limit of its capabilities, particularly if the contributions of nations stay at the present level which is very low compared to the political ambitions.

We are now at a turning point for ISAF. The revised operation plan (OPLAN) was approved by the ministers of foreign affairs in December. This OPLAN validates both the expansion of ISAF to the south and the east of Afghanistan and the extension of the mission of ISAF to a more civilian-military mission.
The chain of command takes into account the necessity of synergy between ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom:

- Commander ISAF has two deputy commanders: one of them, the Deputy Commander for Security is double-hatted under Com ISAF as COMCFC.A (a US command).
- As a result of the expansion, NATO’s area of responsibility will encompass the entire Afghanistan. Every region will be under the coordination of one nation: Germany in the north, Italy in the west, Canada in the south, the US in the east, and France and Turkey will coordinate Kabul.

The concept of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) remains the core of the action in Afghanistan. The objective is to have about 20 PRTs running in the 5 regions.

Concerning the mission, the extension has been the subject of intense discussions. As a result, the OPLAN defines ISAF’s mission related to Afghan police as a key support task and not as a key military task.

Guidelines for counter narco-traffic remain unchanged but courses of action can be extended.

Concerning border control, ISAF will be allowed to support Afghan authorities….and last but not least….ISAF could be involved in combat operations, not only for protection but to secure the environment of the PRTs. That means robust rules of engagement.

**CONCLUDING REMARKS**

While ISAF is expanding to the entire Afghanistan and extending its mission, NATO has to maintain its capabilities and ability to meet any possible security challenges that may arise. It will be difficult for several reasons:

1. Force generation does not meet the objective, particularly concerning rotary wing and fixed wing tactical air transport.
2. Need for funding increases dramatically.
3. Security in Afghanistan has not been improved and the spreading of improvised explosive devices could complicate the situation.
4. The C2 (Command and Control) post ARRC (Allied Rapid Reaction Corps) in 2007 is not absolutely clear. During the year 2006, the situation will be under control thanks to ARRC, and also because every region will be coordinated by one nation already deployed and finally because Operation Enduring Freedom represents a significant number of soldiers. But what about the future beyond 2007? What about US intent concerning Operation Enduring Freedom?

The last point that I would like to make is related to the role that ISAF plays in the transformation of NATO.
The revised operation plan for Afghanistan is the first concrete step taken by NATO to experiment on the ground with an overarching process on both military and civilian actions—civilian actions like police, border control, counter narco-traffic, and reconstruction. This is a very significant step that needs to be deeply analyzed.
Challenges of Information Security

Mr. Robert Lentz
Director of Information Assurance, Office of the United States Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration

Over the years we have engaged in many discussions regarding the new challenges facing global security for the coming decades. Last year, Admiral Di Paola, Chief of Defense of Italy, talked of the new challenges in a world of transformation; General Naumann, Chief of Defense of Germany, emphasized organizations in need of a fresh look; and my boss, Dr. Wells, CIO for the US Department of Defense, emphasized the transition to Net-Centric Operations. All these presentations and many others in past summits have a common thread that is, Are we positioning ourselves effectively for the future security environment? I would argue that we are confronting an information revolution in which we all are unprepared!

While the US Department of Defense and many other military defense establishments are making significant progress towards leveraging emerging information-age technologies and grasping the vision of Network Centric Information operations, a transformation of this scope offers innumerable challenges and opportunities. The reality is that inducing change in military and governmental establishments is slow, painful work. This probably explains why most “information age” experts feel we in the government are only now beginning to emerge from industrial age thinking.

Why is this important? Everyone appreciates the power of the Internet—how it makes the world smaller, more connected, more efficient. Experts agree that networked computers are our most powerful assets! As you know, within DoD, we call this the Global Information Grid (GRID). Other expert views:

- For Vint Cerf, father of the Internet, “the GIG will change the military the way the internet is changing business and culture.”
- For Lockheed Martin’s CEO, “the GIG will shape the 21st century operations in the way nuclear technology concluded WWII and controlled the Cold War.”
- According to former DSD, Dr. Hamre, “our unending appetite for information can only be realized by leveraging the power of the internet and fully implementing the GIG.”
- And for Secretary Rumsfeld, “the single most transforming event is not the weapons system but the GIG/Net-Centric Operations.”

On the most basic level, we all are witnessing radio, TV, movies, telephones, all converging to leverage the Internet. We are all going to operate in communities of interest that are wider and more powerful than we ever imagined. And we all are going to have to quickly adopt new technologies in “information age” speeds in months, not years,
if we are going to be competitive and meet the demands of 21st century operations. Some examples are deploying a powerful Internet Sensing Grid for early warning and response to environmental disasters like this past year’s earthquake in Pakistan or the 2004 tsunami. Other examples are sophisticated collaboration networks being deployed to detect the movement of potential terrorists; micro-sensors embedded in structures for real-time reconfigurations in the face of hurricanes, tornadoes or other catastrophes; and of course, the multitude of transformations underway in monitoring the power grid, roadways, and telecommunications networks in most cases belonging not just to governments but to global enterprises with no national boundaries.

On the negative side, the information age gives our adversaries a fertile footprint to operate to further their interests. Recreational hacking has become hacking for money. The FBI in the US is getting more than one cyber extortion case every day. More than 100 organizations report cyber extortion. This epidemic originally started as a way for rival cyber gangs to take down chat rooms of their competitors. Now, for money, gangs will threaten to take down sites in time increments—15 minutes etc.—and will escalate as you bring in law enforcement. The Bali Bomber wrote in his autobiography that, “if hacking is successful, get ready to gain windfall income for just 3 to 6 hours of work, greater than the income that a policeman earns in 6 months of work. But, please do not do that for money alone. I want America and its cronies to be crushed in all aspects.” Here are some interesting trends by 2010:

- 1 cyber bug will hit the internet every 5 minutes.
- The number of security incidents will swell to 400,000 a year or 8,000 a week.
- An average PC will cost $99 and will contain 200 million LOC.
- Within those LOC there will be an estimated 2 million software bugs.
- The average software vulnerability that used to take months/weeks to be exploited by hackers is now taking days and very soon these groups will have Zero Day and sub-Zero Day capability to attack systems/networks before a vulnerability is known or published.

So as an Information Security leader, I am excited but deeply worried that we are not taking these future challenges as seriously as we need to in light of the asymmetric and unconventional threats facing us today and especially those on the horizon. From my vantage point, it is not just about technology. In fact, I would argue it is more about governance and leadership.

Traditionally, military organizations have focused primarily on delivering military mass and power into the battle space. This approach to military operations has been platform-based, but that is now changing in military organizations around the world as they move toward network-centric operations.

While the details of new network-centric operational concepts are being applied differently by nations, the new concepts are all underpinned by the common understanding of the changing and growing role that one critical factor will play in increasing military effectiveness: INFORMATION. The Chief Information Officer (CIO)
has really become the center of gravity. The primary concern of the CIO in the future enterprise is not only as the visionary; the core competency is in reality to ensure the integrity of the information and availability of the infrastructure. Looking over the entire enterprise, they have to be certain there are no errors or losses of any of the data and of the information being served up to the users. Today this job is important; tomorrow it is a huge responsibility. The CIO is not only the technologist but also the knowledge leader and the information strategist.

The intelligent use of information across an organization and its partners affects and influences all aspects of that organization—from the front line to the back office, from equipment purchase to financial controls, including the organizations’ relationships with its partners, whether they are commercial suppliers or other government organizations.

A growing body of evidence shows that successful net-centric operations are about human and organizational behavior. The purchase and deployment of net-ready capabilities will deliver little benefit if the processes and procedures that govern how they are used are left unchanged. Another key challenge in achieving success will come from prioritizing and coordinating the myriad pieces that make up new initiatives. Success will be realized only if the approach and the changes it requires are embedded across the whole organization—in the way its people think, train, and act and in everything it does.

So as an example, one of the CIO’s core responsibilities is also the chief security officer! There is a completely new paradigm for running a business or government enterprise. In the face of asymmetric warfare and the reality that a successful information attack can paralyze an organization or bankrupt a business, this responsibility has become a core role.

Most, if not all, successful businesses today rely on the CIO. He sits at the right hand of the CEO. Within the US, good examples are Wal-Mart, Fed-X, AT&T and Southwest Airlines. For Wal-Mart, their CIO was an early pioneer in pushing radio frequency identification (RFID) technology, embracing it as a tool for reducing inefficiency and increasing productivity. Officials at the European Central Bank, for example, are working on a project to embed RFID tags into higher-denomination euro bills. And going hand in hand with these new technologies is security. The key attributes of all these successful enterprises are agility, adaptability, scalability, and interoperability.

Within DoD we have a three-prong CIO strategy: build, populate and protect. For the protect mission area, we have five strategic imperatives: Empower the People, Transform the Processes, Trust the Info, Secure the Network, and Effectively Operate! What is important is not necessarily the specifics as much as having a strategic framework. The question is, Are all the institutions we rely upon for our safety and security, such as NATO, aggressively moving in this direction?

Importantly, we are all in this together. We need to develop a simple, open, flexible, and on-demand infrastructure to share security information and policies. We need a common, interoperable architecture. The wider we view the global network traffic the more
proactive we become in responding to threats. The experience gained by the commercial industry during large-scale transformations can benefit the armed forces in their practical realization of network-centric operations.
Summary of Dinner Remarks: 
The Challenges Arising from Proliferation

Mr. Jean-Louis Gergorin 
Vice President, EADS France

As a former student of the prestigious Ecole Polytechnique, Mr. Jean-Louis Gergorin gave dinner remarks at “La Maison des Polytechniciens,” housed in the 17th century Hôtel de Poulpry. Below is a brief summary of his remarks.

By restarting nuclear research that may enable it to acquire a nuclear weapon, Iran is playing “double blackmail” with the US (with its “stick”) and the European Troika (with its “carrot”). According to Iran’s view of the strategic situation, Iran can exert influence (a) by applying economic pressure through control of the oil supply from its fields and (b) by its ability to withstand attempts to bomb its centrifuges—for it is not clear whether the US (or Israel) knows where the centrifuges actually are, whether the US (or Israel) actually has the ability to destroy centrifuges that may be deep below ground or otherwise protected, and whether the US or Israel can deal with collateral damage in case the Iranians may have built their facilities in populated areas. A preemptive strike on Iran, moreover, could be destabilizing since it could excite Hezbollah. Iran’s recent policy of negotiating as it prepares to restart nuclear research resembles Chairman Mao’s precept: talk while fighting. In this context, the US and the European Troika are seeking to bring Iran before the UN Security Council, although the cooperation of permanent member China is problematic.